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Evidence from Resource 6 pieces of evidence from this resource.

Sarter, N.B. & Woods, D.D. (1992). Pilot interaction with cockpit automation: Operational experiences with the Flight Management System. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 2(4), 303-321. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

  1.  
  2. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "During these first 3 sessions, it was, in some cases, difficult for pilots to keep track of who is in charge and what are the currently active target values ... difficulties in tracking active target values and FMS behavior in some modes can contribute to losing track of 'what the automation is doing'." (page 314-317)
    Issue: behavior of automation may not be apparent (Issue #83) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS

  3.  
  4. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "The FMS training that we observed emphasized a bottom-up approach oriented towards proficiency in specific tasks by providing 'recipes' for system operation. The result that most of the difficulties in the corpus [which includes both this study and the study referenced by s0069] involved non-standard situations and complex interactions of FMS subsystems seems to suggest that a top-down approach would be desirable as an addition or complement. If pilots were provided with an overall mental representation of the functional structure of the FMS, they would be better able to manage and utilize the automated systems in unusual or novel situations. Given that their role has shifted towards the detection of deviations from the expected and towards troubleshooting and managing such situations, this capability seems to be very important for pilots in highly automated aircraft." (page 320)
    Issue: training may be inadequate (Issue #133) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS

  5.  
  6. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "Many examples of inadequate feedback occurred in the corpus [which includes both this study and the study referenced by s0069] including difficulties integrating data on FMS status distributed over different cockpit displays or CDU pages, difficulties anticipating uncommanded mode changes, difficulties assessing the implications of changes to the instructions given to the FMS (e.g., enroute changes in cruise speed may interact with pre-programmed values for the descent phase on a different CDU page), difficulties visualizing the descent profile programmed in VNAV." (page 317)
    Issue: behavior of automation may not be apparent (Issue #83) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS

  7.  
  8. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "Another common factor implicated in many of the problems noted in the corpus is incomplete or buggy mental models of how various modes of the FMS work and especially how they interact with each other in different flight contexts." (page 317)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS

  9.  
  10. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "During these first 3 sessions, it was, in some cases, difficult for pilots to keep track of who is in charge and what are the currently active target values ... difficulties in tracking active target values and FMS behavior in some modes can contribute to losing track of 'what the automation is doing'." (page 314-317)
    Issue: behavior of automation may not be apparent (Issue #83) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS

  11.  
  12. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "Frequently, pilots were able to describe FMS behavior during standard operations. ... But the same pilot would have difficulties applying this knowledge to a specific and more complicated operational situation, e.g. an aborted takeoff." (page 315)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS
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