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Evidence from Resource 20 pieces of evidence from this resource.

Sarter, N.B. & Woods, D.D. (1992). Pilot interaction with cockpit automation: Operational experiences with the Flight Management System. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 2(4), 303-321. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

  1.  
  2. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "The pilots' rating of the two statements on cockpit automation basically replicate Wiener's (1989) results." The following are the "percentages of pilots' responses to the first statement 'In the B-737-300 automation, there are still things that happen that surprise me.' " Out of 135 pilots, 18% "strongly agreed", 49% "agreed", 7% were "neutral", 22% "disagreed", and 4% "strongly disagreed" with the statement. That is, 67% agreed or strongly agreed and 26% disagreed or strongly disagreed. (page 307-309)
    Issue: automation behavior may be unexpected and unexplained (Issue #108) See Issue details
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: B-737-300
    Equipment: automation

  3.  
  4. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "The pilots' rating of the two statements on cockpit automation basically replicate Wiener's (1989) results." The following are the "percentages of pilots' responses to the second statement 'There are still modes and features of the B-737-300 FMS that I don't understand.' "Out of 135 pilots, 12% "strongly agreed", 33% "agreed", 16% were "neutral", 25% "disagreed", and 14% "strongly disagreed" with the statement. That is, 45% agreed or strongly agreed and 39% disagreed or strongly disagreed. (page 307-309)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: B-737-300
    Equipment: FMS

  5.  
  6. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Pilots were asked to describe instances where FMS behavior surprised them and to indicate modes/features of FMS operation that they did not understand. There were no sharp boundaries between the incidents elicited by the two questions. Pilot reports are categorized according to their underlying theme." ... There were 38 reports [38 / 135 = 28.1%] in the category: "VNAV logic and calculations ... Pilots indicate that the algorithms underlying the calculation of a VNAV path are not transparent to them. They cannot visualize the intended path, and therefore they are sometimes unable to anticipate or understand VNAV activities initiated to maintain target parameters (25 reports [19%]). VNAV control actions are often described as being surprisingly abrupt (4 reports [3%]). Several pilots report that they have been surprised by VNAV when it failed to start the descent upon reaching the top-of-descent point (TOD) (9 reports [7%])." That is, at least 38 reports (28%) indicated misunderstanding or surprise. (page 307, 310)
    Issue: automation behavior may be unexpected and unexplained (Issue #108) See Issue details
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: automation

  7.  
  8. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Pilots were asked to describe instances where FMS behavior surprised them and to indicate modes/features of FMS operation that they did not understand. There were no sharp boundaries between the incidents elicited by the two questions. Pilot reports are categorized according to their underlying theme." ... There were 14 reports [14 / 135 = 10.4%] in the category: "Infrequently used features/modes ... Pilots report that they do not understand modes and features of the FMS that they rarely use (e.g. the Required Time of Arrival (RTA) feature). However, they also comment that they do not think of these as critically importuned features." (page 307, 311)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS

  9.  
  10. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Pilots were asked to describe instances where FMS behavior surprised them and to indicate modes/features of FMS operation that they did not understand. There were no sharp boundaries between the incidents elicited by the two questions. Pilot reports are categorized according to their underlying theme." ... There were 11 reports [11 / 135 = 8.1%] in the category: "Switching between VNAV and MCP descent modes ... These examples refer to situations where pilots had a descent properly programmed and both VNAV (Vertical Navigation mode) and LNAV (Lateral Navigation mode) engaged when ATC asked then for an unanticipated level-off or change in heading. They report uncertainty as to whether or not the reengagement of VNAV after compliance with the clearance by means of MCP interventions would bring them 'back on track'. They have problems with keeping track of active target values related to different FMS subsystems under such circumstances." (page 307, 310)
    Issue: automation behavior may be unexpected and unexplained (Issue #108) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS VNAV

  11.  
  12. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Pilots were asked to describe instances where FMS behavior surprised them and to indicate modes/features of FMS operation that they did not understand. There were no sharp boundaries between the incidents elicited by the two questions. Pilot reports are categorized according to their underlying theme." ... There were 8 reports [8 / 135 = 5.9%] in the category: "VNAV Speed Descent Mode in general ... Pilots indicate that they do not understand how the VNAV Speed Descent works in terms of its targets, protections, and its operational logic." (page 307, 310)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS VNAV

  13.  
  14. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Pilots were asked to describe instances where FMS behavior surprised them and to indicate modes/features of FMS operation that they did not understand. There were no sharp boundaries between the incidents elicited by the two questions. Pilot reports are categorized according to their underlying theme." ... There were 6 reports [6 / 135 = 4.4%] in the category: "Disengagement of the Approach (APPR) mode ... Some pilots report that they were not able to disengage the APPR mode when required to do so." (page 307-311)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS

  15.  
  16. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Pilots were asked to describe instances where FMS behavior surprised them and to indicate modes/features of FMS operation that they did not understand. There were no sharp boundaries between the incidents elicited by the two questions. Pilot reports are categorized according to their underlying theme." ... There were 28 reports [28 / 135 = 20.7%] in the category: "Uncommanded Mode Transitions ... Pilots report that they are surprised by 'uncommanded' mode transitions which occur upon reaching a target state or for protection purposes. Most often, the reports refer to the automatic reversion from Vertical Speed Mode (V/S) to Level Change mode (LVL CHG) which occurs if the airspeed deviates from the target range due to an excessive rate of climb or descent." (page 307, 311)
    Issue: mode transitions may be uncommanded (Issue #44) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: autoflight

  17.  
  18. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Pilots were asked to describe instances where FMS behavior surprised them and to indicate modes/features of FMS operation that they did not understand. There were no sharp boundaries between the incidents elicited by the two questions. Pilot reports are categorized according to their underlying theme." ... There were 6 reports [6 / 135 = 4%] in the category of "Disengagement of the Approach (APPR) mode ... Some pilots report that they were not able to disengage the APPR mode when required to do so." (page 307-311)
    Issue: pilots have responsibility but may lack authority (Issue #12) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS

  19.  
  20. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Pilots were asked to describe instances where FMS behavior surprised them and to indicate modes/features of FMS operation that they did not understand. There were no sharp boundaries between the incidents elicited by the two questions. Pilot reports are categorized according to their underlying theme." ... There were 11 reports [11 / 135 = 8.1%] in the category: "Flight Director (FD) Bars ... Pilots describe cases where the FD bars commanded pitch attitudes which seemed to be inadequate or unnecessarily abrupt. Some pilots report that, as a result, they loose [in sic] confidence in the FD bars." (page 307,311)
    Issue: pilots may lack confidence in automation (Issue #46) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS FD Bars

  21.  
  22. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Pilots were asked to describe instances where FMS behavior surprised them and to indicate modes/features of FMS operation that they did not understand. There were no sharp boundaries between the incidents elicited by the two questions. Pilot reports are categorized according to their underlying theme." ... There were 10 reports [10 / 135 = 7.4%] in the category: "Active Target Values ... In some situations, it seems to be difficult for pilots to keep track of what are the currently active target values. The pilot reports indicate that one of the major sources of this problem is the interaction between the values selected on the MCP and those selected within the CDU. Pilots also commented that, while the MCP targets can immediately be seen on the MCP, the FMS targets are sometimes 'hidden' in the CDU page architecture." (page 307,312)
    Issue: behavior of automation may not be apparent (Issue #83) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS

  23.  
  24. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Pilots were asked to describe instances where FMS behavior surprised them and to indicate modes/features of FMS operation that they did not understand. There were no sharp boundaries between the incidents elicited by the two questions. Pilot reports are categorized according to their underlying theme." ... There were 10 reports [10 / 135 = 7.4%] in the category: "Multiple Methods ... Some pilots mention that, for certain tasks, there seems to be an overwhelming number of possible methods to do the job. Their reports indicate that there is a cognitive load associated with learning and deciding on which method to use for a particular task in a particular flight context." (page 307, 312)
    Issue: automation may be too complex (Issue #40) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS

  25.  
  26. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Pilots were asked to describe instances where FMS behavior surprised them and to indicate modes/features of FMS operation that they did not understand. There were no sharp boundaries between the incidents elicited by the two questions. Pilot reports are categorized according to their underlying theme." ... There were 9 reports [9 / 135 = 6.7%] in the category: "Lack of data propagation ... Pilots report that they are sometimes surprised by the effects of interactions between target values entered on different but interrelated CDU pages. They suggest that certain data should propagate automatically to functionally interrelated CDU pages." (page 307, 312)
    Issue: automation behavior may be unexpected and unexplained (Issue #108) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS

  27.  
  28. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Pilots were asked to describe instances where FMS behavior surprised them and to indicate modes/features of FMS operation that they did not understand. There were no sharp boundaries between the incidents elicited by the two questions. Pilot reports are categorized according to their underlying theme." ... There were 3 reports [3 / 135 = 2.2%] in the category: "The effects of partial system failures ... These pilots report that they are unsure of the consequences of partial FMS failures. After such failures, they can not tell which subsystems are still active, which systems are available, or how the failure may interact with the active flight control mode. These reports implicate potential problems with both pilots' mental model of the FMS structure and with the indications of FMS status and behavior." (page 307-313)
    Issue: failure assessment may be difficult (Issue #25) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS

  29.  
  30. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Pilots were asked to describe instances where FMS behavior surprised them and to indicate modes/features of FMS operation that they did not understand. There were no sharp boundaries between the incidents elicited by the two questions. Pilot reports are categorized according to their underlying theme." ... There were 3 reports [3 / 135 = 2.2%] in the category: "The effects of partial system failures ... These pilots report that they are unsure of the consequences of partial FMS failures. After such failures, they can not tell which subsystems are still active, which systems are available, or how the failure may interact with the active flight control mode. These reports implicate potential problems with both pilots' mental model of the FMS structure and with the indications of FMS status and behavior." (page 307-313)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS

  31.  
  32. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Pilots were asked to describe instances where FMS behavior surprised them and to indicate modes/features of FMS operation that they did not understand. There were no sharp boundaries between the incidents elicited by the two questions. Pilot reports are categorized according to their underlying theme." ... "VNAV logic and calculations ( 38 Reports) Pilots indicate that the algorithms underlying the calculation of a VNAV path are not transparent to them. They cannot visualize the intended path, and therefore they are sometimes unable to anticipate or understand VNAV activities initiated to maintain target parameters (25 [of 135] reports [19%])". (page 307,310)
    Issue: vertical profile visualization may be difficult (Issue #53) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: automation

  33.  
  34. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Pilots were asked to describe instances where FMS behavior surprised them and to indicate modes/features of FMS operation that they did not understand. There were no sharp boundaries between the incidents elicited by the two questions. Pilot reports are categorized according to their underlying theme." ... "VNAV logic and calculations (38 Reports) Pilots indicate that the algorithms underlying the calculation of a VNAV path are not transparent to them. They cannot visualize the intended path, and therefore they are sometimes unable to anticipate or understand VNAV activities initiated to maintain target parameters (25 [of 135] reports [19%])". (page 307,310)
    Issue: behavior of automation may not be apparent (Issue #83) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: automation

  35.  
  36. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Pilots were asked to describe instances where FMS behavior surprised them and to indicate modes/features of FMS operation that they did not understand. There were no sharp boundaries between the incidents elicited by the two questions. Pilot reports are categorized according to their underlying theme." ... There were 54 reports [54 / 135 = 40%] in the category: "Data Entry ... There was a large number of reports related to the rejection of attempted input into the CDU due to different software versions running on the FMS. While the survey was underway, three slightly different FMS software versions were in use. According to the reports, this resulted most frequently in unsuccessful attempts to enter a new crossing restriction during the approach because the required data entry format and procedure is not the same for the three software versions." (page 307,311)
    Issue: software versions may proliferate (Issue #134) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS

  37.  
  38. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "The pilots' rating of the two statements on cockpit automation basically replicate Wiener's (1989) results." The following are the "percentages of pilots' responses to the second statement 'There are still modes and features of the B-737-300 FMS that I don't understand.' "Out of 135 pilots, 12% "strongly agreed", 33% "agreed", 16% were "neutral", 25% "disagreed", and 14% "strongly disagreed" with the statement. That is, 45% agreed or strongly agreed and 39% disagreed or strongly disagreed. (page 307-309)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS

  39.  
  40. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "The pilots' rating of the two statements on cockpit automation basically replicate Wiener's (1989) results." The following are the "percentages of pilots' responses to the first statement 'In the B-737-300 automation, there are still things that happen that surprise me.' " Out of 135 pilots, 18% "strongly agreed", 49% "agreed", 7% were "neutral", 22% "disagreed", and 4% "strongly disagreed" with the statement. That is, 67% agreed or strongly agreed and 26% disagreed or strongly disagreed. (page 307-309)
    Issue: automation behavior may be unexpected and unexplained (Issue #108) See Issue details
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: B-737-300
    Equipment: automation
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