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Evidence from Resource 4 pieces of evidence from this resource.

National Transportation Safety Board (1973). Eastern Airlines, Incorporated, L-1011, N31OEA, Miami, Florida, December 29, 1972. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-73-14. Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board.

  1.  
  2. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "2.2 Conclusions (a) Findings ... 7. The autopilot was utilized in basic CWS. 8. The flightcrew was unaware of the low force gradient input required to effect a change in aircraft attitude while in CWS. ..." (page 22-23)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: +5
    Aircraft: L1011
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot

  3.  
  4. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "2. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 2.1 Analysis ... Pilots' testimony indicated that dependence on the reliability and capability of the autopilot is actually greater than anticipated in its early design and certification. This is particularly true in the cruise phase of flight. However, in this phase of flight, the autopilpot is not designed to remain correctly and safely operational without performance degradation, after a significant failure occurs. ... the following took place in this accident: ... 2. The aircraft was flown to a safe altitude, and the autopilot was engaged to reduce workload, but positive delegation of aircraft control was not accomplished." (page 21)
    Issue: pilots may over-rely on automation (Issue #106) See Issue details
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: L1011
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot

  5.  
  6. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "2. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS ... 2.1 Analysis ... Pilots' testimony indicated that dependence on the reliability and capability of the autopilot is actually greater than anticipated in its early design and certification. This is particularly true in the cruise phase of flight. However, in this phase of flight, the autopilpot is not designed to remain correctly and safely operational without performance degradation, after a significant failure occurs. ... the following took place in this accident: ... 2. The aircraft was flown to a safe altitude, and the autopilot was engaged to reduce workload, but positive delegation of aircraft control was not accomplished." (page 21)
    Issue: pilots may be overconfident in automation (Issue #131) See Issue details
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: L1011
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot

  7.  
  8. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "2. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 2.1 Analysis ... Although formal training provided adequate opportunity to become familiar with this new concept of aircraft control [control wheel steering], operational experience was limited by company policy. Company operational procedures did not permit operation of the aircraft in CWS; they required all operations to be conducted in the command modes. This restriction might have compromised the ability of pilots to use and understand the unique CWS features of the new autopilot." (page 14-21)
    Issue: company automation policies and procedures may be inappropriate or inadequate (Issue #166) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: L1011
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot
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