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Evidence from Resource 5 pieces of evidence from this resource.

Mumaw, R.J., Sarter, N.B., & Wickens, C.D. (2001). Analysis of Pilots' Monitoring and Performance on an Automated Flight Deck. In Proceedings of the 11th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University..

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  2. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: We collected detailed performance data on automation use during the scenario and found several areas in which pilots were not proficient. One notable finding is that there was considerable confusion about the altitude intervention button (which provides very poor feedback). No pilot used this button correctly in all cases. (page 5)
    Issue: behavior of automation may not be apparent (Issue #83) See Issue details
    Strength: +5
    Aircraft: B747-400
    Equipment: automation: controls

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  4. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: At the conclusion of the simulator session we interviewed each pilot to assess his understanding of various automation concepts. Through these interviews, we found that pilots typically could state correct expectations about common mode behavior. For example, 16 of 20 pilots indicated that they expected to see VNAV PTH as the pitch mode during cruise. However, few pilots applied this knowledge effectively during the simulator session, where they flew cruise in VNAV ALT. Also, although pilots were generally correct in the information they offered, they provided little information on subtler automation features. Detailed knowledge of VNAV SPD and VNAV ALT, in particular, was not offered. Note, however, that we recorded only what pilots volunteered, and it is possible that pilots knew these details but chose not to offer them in this setting. (page 5)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: B747-400
    Equipment: FMS VNAV

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  6. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: The data showed that pilots often “failed” to fixate the FMA within the first 10 seconds (during which time a green box appears to highlight it). The percentages of cases in which pilots failed to fixate in that first 10 seconds were as follows: M = 53%, AE = 45%, AU = 62%. In other cases, pilots fixated near the time or near the FMA. However, if we examine (more liberally) failures to fixate any FMAs in the first 20 seconds after the green box appears, the failure rates are still high: M = 32%, AE = 29%, AU = 40%. Thus, for a considerable percent of cases pilots do not verify the FMA change, and further, Unexpected mode changes are verified less frequently than the Manual or Automatic-Expected mode changes. This failure suggests that the attention-attracting properties of the green box that accompanies every mode change may be an insufficient cue (Nikolic, Orr, & Sarter, 2001). (page 5)
    Issue: displays (visual and aural) may be poorly designed (Issue #92) See Issue details
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: B747-400
    Equipment: automation & FMS

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  8. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: In three separate Events (3, 7, 8), we changed the FMA artificially (and unknown to the pilot; in fact, for these cases the standard green box did not accompany the mode change). Table 3 shows the three cases where a change occurred. The second column indicates how many pilots fixated the relevant FMA while that change was in effect (note that data were not available for all pilots at this level of precision). The last column shows that in only 1 of the 32 total cases did a pilot notice that the FMA was inappropriate. Thus, even when scanning included the FMA, pilots failed to understand the implications of the FMA. (page 5)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B747-400
    Equipment: automation & FMS

  9.  
  10. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: The data showed that pilots often “failed” to fixate the FMA within the first 10 seconds (during which time a green box appears to highlight it). The percentages of cases in which pilots failed to fixate in that first 10 seconds were as follows: M = 53%, AE = 45%, AU = 62%. In other cases, pilots fixated near the time or near the FMA. However, if we examine (more liberally) failures to fixate any FMAs in the first 20 seconds after the green box appears, the failure rates are still high: M = 32%, AE = 29%, AU = 40%. Thus, for a considerable percent of cases pilots do not verify the FMA change, and further, Unexpected mode changes are verified less frequently than the Manual or Automatic-Expected mode changes. This failure suggests that the attention-attracting properties of the green box that accompanies every mode change may be an insufficient cue (Nikolic, Orr, & Sarter, 2001). (page 5)
    Issue: displays (visual and aural) may be poorly designed (Issue #92) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B747-400
    Equipment: automation & FMS
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