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Evidence from Resource 21 pieces of evidence from this resource.

Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (2004). Should Computers Function as Collaborators?. In Proceedings of HCI-Aero 2004 held in Toulouse, France September 29, 2004 to 1 October 2004.

  1.  
  2. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Moreover, the functionality of being able to pre-program the FMS to carry out complex automated tasks requires pilots to convey these plans and instructions to the system. Since more complex instructions can be communicated, the communication becomes more complex, too. Rudisill [10] reports that pilots often express problems with entering instructions through the keypad into the FMS, particularly when under time pressure. Likewise, pilots have mentioned this issue to us as a particular problem: P1: “...during the high workload phases, operating the FMS, especially the tasks that you don’t do very often ... you might forget to put a slash or a stroke, whatever the format should be that you are typing into the scratchpad ... that is very distracting, getting the format correct. (page 4)
    Issue: automation may adversely affect pilot workload (Issue #79) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: FMS keyboard

  3.  
  4. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: However, their responses also reflect the significance of change. P2: “People say to me ‘what do you do?’... I say I am a systems operator. (page 2)
    Issue: pilot's role may be changed (Issue #144) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation

  5.  
  6. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Whilst the pilots we have talked to did not report mode reversions, they reported many situations in which to make decisions as to what parts of the automated systems to use when, as a prominent aspect in pilots’ tasks. For example, situational factors often require the use of less sophisticated equipment (e.g. adverse weather conditions, landings, Air Traffic Control (ATC) giving headings), or pilots may need to decide when the automated systems cannot cope: P1: “But invariably on every flight the route is changed to some degree by ATC ... even to a point where you disconnect it from the FMS and fly in another mode.” P2: “On our descent they changed the runway three times ... for some reason we didn’t change the frequencies [the third time]. We came in ... looked from a distance... thought ‘this is wrong’... so we knocked off the autopilot.” P2: “Sometimes you have situations where you know the plane is supposed to turn at 4 miles and if it doesn’t then, because it’s so much easier to use the automated system to fly this departure, you’ll find the pilot will sit there and go like, ‘OK, I’ll give it a little more time’.” P2: “[in bad weather]... what you do is you take off the height control... A lot of up- and downdrafts ... can confuse the sensors... If it bobs up and down, you don’t have the autopilot fighting it. But that’s not a company procedure.” P2: “...due to traffic etc. they can’t descend you ... you now find that the system is telling you ‘top of descent’ but you have to ignore it ...suddenly the controller announces to you that you are cleared to descend... Now ... you have to close the throttles and pull out the spoilers, the speed breaks, which gives you the right maximum rate of descent, and in most of the times the autopilot cannot comprehend what is going on ... you have to knock off the descent mode and descent it yourself at the very high rates, and when you’re closer to your level you put it back on ... for the 727 you definitely have to remove the descent mode, in the Learjet you go to speed. ” (page 3)
    Issue: pilots may be reluctant to assume control (Issue #26) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation

  7.  
  8. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Whilst the pilots we have talked to did not report mode reversions, they reported many situations in which to make decisions as to what parts of the automated systems to use when, as a prominent aspect in pilots’ tasks. For example, situational factors often require the use of less sophisticated equipment (e.g. adverse weather conditions, landings, Air Traffic Control (ATC) giving headings), or pilots may need to decide when the automated systems cannot cope: P1: “But invariably on every flight the route is changed to some degree by ATC ... even to a point where you disconnect it from the FMS and fly in another mode.” P2: “On our descent they changed the runway three times ... for some reason we didn’t change the frequencies [the third time]. We came in ... looked from a distance... thought ‘this is wrong’... so we knocked off the autopilot.” P2: “Sometimes you have situations where you know the plane is supposed to turn at 4 miles and if it doesn’t then, because it’s so much easier to use the automated system to fly this departure, you’ll find the pilot will sit there and go like, ‘OK, I’ll give it a little more time’.” P2: “[in bad weather]... what you do is you take off the height control... A lot of up- and downdrafts ... can confuse the sensors... If it bobs up and down, you don’t have the autopilot fighting it. But that’s not a company procedure.” P2: “...due to traffic etc. they can’t descend you ... you now find that the system is telling you ‘top of descent’ but you have to ignore it ...suddenly the controller announces to you that you are cleared to descend... Now ... you have to close the throttles and pull out the spoilers, the speed breaks, which gives you the right maximum rate of descent, and in most of the times the autopilot cannot comprehend what is going on ... you have to knock off the descent mode and descent it yourself at the very high rates, and when you’re closer to your level you put it back on ... for the 727 you definitely have to remove the descent mode, in the Learjet you go to speed. ” (page 3)
    Issue: pilots may over-rely on automation (Issue #106) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation

  9.  
  10. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Whilst the pilots we have talked to did not report mode reversions, they reported many situations in which to make decisions as to what parts of the automated systems to use when, as a prominent aspect in pilots’ tasks. For example, situational factors often require the use of less sophisticated equipment (e.g. adverse weather conditions, landings, Air Traffic Control (ATC) giving headings), or pilots may need to decide when the automated systems cannot cope: P1: “But invariably on every flight the route is changed to some degree by ATC ... even to a point where you disconnect it from the FMS and fly in another mode.” P2: “On our descent they changed the runway three times ... for some reason we didn’t change the frequencies [the third time]. We came in ... looked from a distance... thought ‘this is wrong’... so we knocked off the autopilot.” P2: “Sometimes you have situations where you know the plane is supposed to turn at 4 miles and if it doesn’t then, because it’s so much easier to use the automated system to fly this departure, you’ll find the pilot will sit there and go like, ‘OK, I’ll give it a little more time’.” P2: “[in bad weather]... what you do is you take off the height control... A lot of up- and downdrafts ... can confuse the sensors... If it bobs up and down, you don’t have the autopilot fighting it. But that’s not a company procedure.” P2: “...due to traffic etc. they can’t descend you ... you now find that the system is telling you ‘top of descent’ but you have to ignore it ...suddenly the controller announces to you that you are cleared to descend... Now ... you have to close the throttles and pull out the spoilers, the speed breaks, which gives you the right maximum rate of descent, and in most of the times the autopilot cannot comprehend what is going on ... you have to knock off the descent mode and descent it yourself at the very high rates, and when you’re closer to your level you put it back on ... for the 727 you definitely have to remove the descent mode, in the Learjet you go to speed. ” (page 3)
    Issue: workarounds may be necessary (Issue #107) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation

  11.  
  12. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Whilst the pilots we have talked to did not report mode reversions, they reported many situations in which to make decisions as to what parts of the automated systems to use when, as a prominent aspect in pilots’ tasks. For example, situational factors often require the use of less sophisticated equipment (e.g. adverse weather conditions, landings, Air Traffic Control (ATC) giving headings), or pilots may need to decide when the automated systems cannot cope: P1: “But invariably on every flight the route is changed to some degree by ATC ... even to a point where you disconnect it from the FMS and fly in another mode.” P2: “On our descent they changed the runway three times ... for some reason we didn’t change the frequencies [the third time]. We came in ... looked from a distance... thought ‘this is wrong’... so we knocked off the autopilot.” P2: “Sometimes you have situations where you know the plane is supposed to turn at 4 miles and if it doesn’t then, because it’s so much easier to use the automated system to fly this departure, you’ll find the pilot will sit there and go like, ‘OK, I’ll give it a little more time’.” P2: “[in bad weather]... what you do is you take off the height control... A lot of up- and downdrafts ... can confuse the sensors... If it bobs up and down, you don’t have the autopilot fighting it. But that’s not a company procedure.” P2: “...due to traffic etc. they can’t descend you ... you now find that the system is telling you ‘top of descent’ but you have to ignore it ...suddenly the controller announces to you that you are cleared to descend... Now ... you have to close the throttles and pull out the spoilers, the speed breaks, which gives you the right maximum rate of descent, and in most of the times the autopilot cannot comprehend what is going on ... you have to knock off the descent mode and descent it yourself at the very high rates, and when you’re closer to your level you put it back on ... for the 727 you definitely have to remove the descent mode, in the Learjet you go to speed. (page 3)
    Issue: workarounds may be necessary (Issue #107) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation

  13.  
  14. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Whilst the pilots we have talked to did not report mode reversions, they reported many situations in which to make decisions as to what parts of the automated systems to use when, as a prominent aspect in pilots’ tasks. For example, situational factors often require the use of less sophisticated equipment (e.g. adverse weather conditions, landings, Air Traffic Control (ATC) giving headings), or pilots may need to decide when the automated systems cannot cope: P1: “But invariably on every flight the route is changed to some degree by ATC ... even to a point where you disconnect it from the FMS and fly in another mode.” P2: “On our descent they changed the runway three times ... for some reason we didn’t change the frequencies [the third time]. We came in ... looked from a distance... thought ‘this is wrong’... so we knocked off the autopilot.” P2: “Sometimes you have situations where you know the plane is supposed to turn at 4 miles and if it doesn’t then, because it’s so much easier to use the automated system to fly this departure, you’ll find the pilot will sit there and go like, ‘OK, I’ll give it a little more time’.” P2: “[in bad weather]... what you do is you take off the height control... A lot of up- and downdrafts ... can confuse the sensors... If it bobs up and down, you don’t have the autopilot fighting it. But that’s not a company procedure.” P2: “...due to traffic etc. they can’t descend you ... you now find that the system is telling you ‘top of descent’ but you have to ignore it ...suddenly the controller announces to you that you are cleared to descend... Now ... you have to close the throttles and pull out the spoilers, the speed breaks, which gives you the right maximum rate of descent, and in most of the times the autopilot cannot comprehend what is going on ... you have to knock off the descent mode and descent it yourself at the very high rates, and when you’re closer to your level you put it back on ... for the 727 you definitely have to remove the descent mode, in the Learjet you go to speed. (page 3)
    Issue: automation may lack reasonable functionality (Issue #109) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation

  15.  
  16. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Whilst the pilots we have talked to did not report mode reversions, they reported many situations in which to make decisions as to what parts of the automated systems to use when, as a prominent aspect in pilots’ tasks. For example, situational factors often require the use of less sophisticated equipment (e.g. adverse weather conditions, landings, Air Traffic Control (ATC) giving headings), or pilots may need to decide when the automated systems cannot cope: P1: “But invariably on every flight the route is changed to some degree by ATC ... even to a point where you disconnect it from the FMS and fly in another mode.” P2: “On our descent they changed the runway three times ... for some reason we didn’t change the frequencies [the third time]. We came in ... looked from a distance... thought ‘this is wrong’... so we knocked off the autopilot.” P2: “Sometimes you have situations where you know the plane is supposed to turn at 4 miles and if it doesn’t then, because it’s so much easier to use the automated system to fly this departure, you’ll find the pilot will sit there and go like, ‘OK, I’ll give it a little more time’.” P2: “[in bad weather]... what you do is you take off the height control... A lot of up- and downdrafts ... can confuse the sensors... If it bobs up and down, you don’t have the autopilot fighting it. But that’s not a company procedure.” P2: “...due to traffic etc. they can’t descend you ... you now find that the system is telling you ‘top of descent’ but you have to ignore it ...suddenly the controller announces to you that you are cleared to descend... Now ... you have to close the throttles and pull out the spoilers, the speed breaks, which gives you the right maximum rate of descent, and in most of the times the autopilot cannot comprehend what is going on ... you have to knock off the descent mode and descent it yourself at the very high rates, and when you’re closer to your level you put it back on ... for the 727 you definitely have to remove the descent mode, in the Learjet you go to speed. ” (page 3)
    Issue: company automation policies and procedures may be inappropriate or inadequate (Issue #166) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation

  17.  
  18. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Moreover, the functionality of being able to pre-program the FMS to carry out complex automated tasks requires pilots to convey these plans and instructions to the system. Since more complex instructions can be communicated, the communication becomes more complex, too. Rudisill [10] reports that pilots often express problems with entering instructions through the keypad into the FMS, particularly when under time pressure. Likewise, pilots have mentioned this issue to us as a particular problem: P1: “...during the high workload phases, operating the FMS, especially the tasks that you don’t do very often ... you might forget to put a slash or a stroke, whatever the format should be that you are typing into the scratchpad ... that is very distracting, getting the format correct. (page 4)
    Issue: data entry and programming may be difficult and time consuming (Issue #112) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: FMS keyboard

  19.  
  20. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Moreover, it is essential to be able to develop a good understanding of the characteristics and functions of other collaborators (e.g. what they can do, how they do it; how they are structured; what they cannot do). Whilst the behaviour of the computer-based systems may make perfect sense to the automation logic, it does not necessarily to the pilots: … P2: “You have situations where ... you get close to the airport and the controller now vectors you ... the guy says when you’re established give me a call... [when going] from heading back to NAV ... all that happens is that the plane swings round and it is going back to where is was going before ... you run the chance of being disorientated ... before you do that you have to have moved the plane in the system onwards to the next point so you come into position. (page 4)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: FMS & ATC

  21.  
  22. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Likewise, input procedures and dialogue structures have to follow the logic of the pilot’s task. Again, pilots reported problems with programming instructions to the FMS: P2: “You have to make sure that the departure clearance is linked up, it would just be flashing and say ‘no link’, so you may have to delete it and then it becomes a link. (page 4)
    Issue: data entry and programming may be difficult and time consuming (Issue #112) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation & FMS

  23.  
  24. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Collaboration requires the maintenance of (mutual) awareness (e.g. what others are doing, intending, have done, found out). Whilst the above-mentioned implications of role switches between pilot and automation (e.g. ironies of automation, automation surprises) may sometimes be unavoidable, their effects may be mitigated by enabling better awareness of computer collaborator’s activities. Human collaborators would consider mode reversions very bad practice without announcing them clearly, ensuring that they have been noticed, and coordinating their effects in relation to collaborators’ activities and plans. Likewise, the supervisory role of pilots needs to be supported by providing suitable indications of automation progress, status, and predictions [13]. Pilots need to constantly double-check what the automation is doing since responsibility remains with them: P1: “you tend to double-check, although the longer you are on the airplane, the more confident you become. I certainly do that with the descent and the approach, double-check using my little method, a lot of guys I guess do the same sort of thing.” P2: “Generally no matter what system you are using you have to monitor it all the time ... you know in three minutes you are going to be here and the plane is going to turn right.” (page 4)
    Issue: pilots may lack confidence in automation (Issue #46) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation

  25.  
  26. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Collaboration requires the maintenance of (mutual) awareness (e.g. what others are doing, intending, have done, found out). Whilst the above-mentioned implications of role switches between pilot and automation (e.g. ironies of automation, automation surprises) may sometimes be unavoidable, their effects may be mitigated by enabling better awareness of computer collaborator’s activities. Human collaborators would consider mode reversions very bad practice without announcing them clearly, ensuring that they have been noticed, and coordinating their effects in relation to collaborators’ activities and plans. Likewise, the supervisory role of pilots needs to be supported by providing suitable indications of automation progress, status, and predictions [13]. Pilots need to constantly double-check what the automation is doing since responsibility remains with them: P1: “you tend to double-check, although the longer you are on the airplane, the more confident you become. I certainly do that with the descent and the approach, double-check using my little method, a lot of guys I guess do the same sort of thing.” P2: “Generally no matter what system you are using you have to monitor it all the time ... you know in three minutes you are going to be here and the plane is going to turn right. (page 4)
    Issue: pilots may lack confidence in automation (Issue #46) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation

  27.  
  28. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Moreover, it is essential to be able to develop a good understanding of the characteristics and functions of other collaborators (e.g. what they can do, how they do it; how they are structured; what they cannot do). Whilst the behaviour of the computer-based systems may make perfect sense to the automation logic, it does not necessarily to the pilots: P1: “It’s understanding the technology, and if you are not doing a particular function often enough you forget ... If you can understand it, you would be able to remember it a lot longer. (page 4)
    Issue: automation skills may be lost (Issue #137) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation

  29.  
  30. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Moreover, it is essential to be able to develop a good understanding of the characteristics and functions of other collaborators (e.g. what they can do, how they do it; how they are structured; what they cannot do). Whilst the behaviour of the computer-based systems may make perfect sense to the automation logic, it does not necessarily to the pilots: P1: “It’s understanding the technology, and if you are not doing a particular function often enough you forget ... If you can understand it, you would be able to remember it a lot longer. (page 4)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation

  31.  
  32. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Moreover, it is essential to be able to develop a good understanding of the characteristics and functions of other collaborators (e.g. what they can do, how they do it; how they are structured; what they cannot do). Whilst the behaviour of the computer-based systems may make perfect sense to the automation logic, it does not necessarily to the pilots: … P1: “There is one area on the 777 ... to do the VNAV approach they want you to open the speed window again. So it’s in VNAV and you open the speed window to manually set the speed, as soon as you put VNAV, the thing blanks, the speed bug jumps, it usually goes back to a lower speed ... and then you have to open it again and as soon as you open it, it’s back to whatever speed, and you watch the throttles come back. It’s messy. (page 4)
    Issue: automation may be too complex (Issue #40) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B777
    Equipment: FMS VNAV

  33.  
  34. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Moreover, it is essential to be able to develop a good understanding of the characteristics and functions of other collaborators (e.g. what they can do, how they do it; how they are structured; what they cannot do). Whilst the behaviour of the computer-based systems may make perfect sense to the automation logic, it does not necessarily to the pilots: … P1: “There is one area on the 777 ... to do the VNAV approach they want you to open the speed window again. So it’s in VNAV and you open the speed window to manually set the speed, as soon as you put VNAV, the thing blanks, the speed bug jumps, it usually goes back to a lower speed ... and then you have to open it again and as soon as you open it, it’s back to whatever speed, and you watch the throttles come back. It’s messy. (page 4)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B777
    Equipment: FMS VNAV

  35.  
  36. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Moreover, it is essential to be able to develop a good understanding of the characteristics and functions of other collaborators (e.g. what they can do, how they do it; how they are structured; what they cannot do). Whilst the behaviour of the computer-based systems may make perfect sense to the automation logic, it does not necessarily to the pilots: … P2: “You have situations where ... you get close to the airport and the controller now vectors you ... the guy says when you’re established give me a call... [when going] from heading back to NAV ... all that happens is that the plane swings round and it is going back to where is was going before ... you run the chance of being disorientated ... before you do that you have to have moved the plane in the system onwards to the next point so you come into position. (page 4)
    Issue: automation may be too complex (Issue #40) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: FMS & ATC

  37.  
  38. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Whilst the pilots we have talked to did not report mode reversions, they reported many situations in which to make decisions as to what parts of the automated systems to use when, as a prominent aspect in pilots’ tasks. For example, situational factors often require the use of less sophisticated equipment (e.g. adverse weather conditions, landings, Air Traffic Control (ATC) giving headings), or pilots may need to decide when the automated systems cannot cope: P1: “But invariably on every flight the route is changed to some degree by ATC ... even to a point where you disconnect it from the FMS and fly in another mode.” P2: “On our descent they changed the runway three times ... for some reason we didn’t change the frequencies [the third time]. We came in ... looked from a distance... thought ‘this is wrong’... so we knocked off the autopilot.” P2: “Sometimes you have situations where you know the plane is supposed to turn at 4 miles and if it doesn’t then, because it’s so much easier to use the automated system to fly this departure, you’ll find the pilot will sit there and go like, ‘OK, I’ll give it a little more time’.” P2: “[in bad weather]... what you do is you take off the height control... A lot of up- and downdrafts ... can confuse the sensors... If it bobs up and down, you don’t have the autopilot fighting it. But that’s not a company procedure.” P2: “...due to traffic etc. they can’t descend you ... you now find that the system is telling you ‘top of descent’ but you have to ignore it ...suddenly the controller announces to you that you are cleared to descend... Now ... you have to close the throttles and pull out the spoilers, the speed breaks, which gives you the right maximum rate of descent, and in most of the times the autopilot cannot comprehend what is going on ... you have to knock off the descent mode and descent it yourself at the very high rates, and when you’re closer to your level you put it back on ... for the 727 you definitely have to remove the descent mode, in the Learjet you go to speed. ” (page 3)
    Issue: flightdeck automation may be incompatible with ATC system (Issue #82) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: FMS & ATC

  39.  
  40. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Automation was perceived as beneficial by the pilots we spoke to, thus reflecting a widely observed opinion: P2: “The autopilot takes a lot of the workload off the pilot... it also helps you in being more accurate.” (page 2)
    Issue: automation may adversely affect pilot workload (Issue #79) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot

  41.  
  42. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Automation was perceived as beneficial by the pilots we spoke to, thus reflecting a widely observed opinion: … P1: “In all the planes I have flown, the 777 has been the most user-friendly ... if you think about how the system would function, it’s generally how it does function, they obviously thought about it in the design. (page 2)
    Issue: human-centered design philosophy may be lacking (Issue #100) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B777
    Equipment: automation
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