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Evidence from Resource 4 pieces of evidence from this resource.

Main Commission Aircraft Accident Investigation - Poland (1994). Report on the accident to Airbus A320-211 Aircraft in Warsaw on 14 September 1993.

  1.  
  2. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "3. Conclusions ... 3.1 Findings ... B. Aircraft ... 4. In emergency, the crew is unable to override the lock-out and to operate ground spoilers and engine thrust reversers" ... also on page 44: "3.2 Causes of Accident ... Actions of the flight crew were also affected by design features of the aircraft which limited the feasibility of applying available braking systems as well as by insufficient information in the aircraft operations manual (AOM) relating to the increase of the landing distance." (page 40 (44))
    Issue: pilots have responsibility but may lack authority (Issue #12) See Issue details
    Strength: +5
    Aircraft: A320-211
    Equipment: flight controls: brakes & spoilers

  3.  
  4. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "3. Conclusions ... 3.1 Findings ... B. Aircraft ... 4. In emergency, the crew is unable to override the lock-out and to operate ground spoilers and engine thrust reversers" (page 40)
    Issue: pilots have responsibility but may lack authority (Issue #12) See Issue details
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: A320-211
    Equipment: automation

  5.  
  6. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "3. Conclusions ... 3.1 Findings ... B. Aircraft ... 3. The aircraft automatics comprises, for basic landing configuration if the aircraft [sic] ..., the programme which subjects actuation of all braking devices to some specific conditions. Ground spoilers, when selected, will extend provided that either shock absorbers are compressed at both main landing gears ..., or wheel speed [sic] are above 72 kts at both main landing gears. Engine reversers, when selected, will deploy provided that shock absorbers are compressed at both main landing gears. ... D. Crew ... 6. The steering technique applied in the course of aircraft landing in the touchdown phase utilized the lateral bank as a countermeasure to balance lateral wind component. It resulted in touchdown on one main undercarriage leg only and in false impression on the part of the crew that touchdown was efficient. In reality the immediate start of operation of braking devices was not possible." (page 42)
    Issue: automation may not work well under unusual conditions (Issue #150) See Issue details
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: A320-211
    Equipment: automation

  7.  
  8. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "3. Conclusions ... 3.1 Findings ... D. Crew ... 6. The steering technique applied in the course of aircraft landing in the touchdown phase utilized the lateral bank as a countermeasure to balance lateral wind component. It resulted in touchdown on one main undercarriage leg only and in false impression on the part of the crew that touchdown was efficient. In reality the immediate start of operation of braking devices was not possible." (page 42)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: A320-211
    Equipment: automation
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