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Evidence from Resource 74 pieces of evidence from this resource.

Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center.

  1.  
  2. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 9: "I prefer to hand-fly part of every trip to keep my skills up." From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, 89% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, 87% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement while 4% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and 7% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 7% in Phase 1 and 6% in Phase 2. (page 81)
    Issue: manual skills may be lost (Issue #65) See Issue details
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  3.  
  4. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "... many, perhaps most, of the crews reported that in times of heavy workload, they tended to 'click it off', that is, revert to manual modes of flight guidance because they did not have time to do the programming necessary to exploit the automation." (page 170)
    Issue: data entry and programming may be difficult and time consuming (Issue #112) See Issue details
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: FMS

  5.  
  6. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 11: "In the B-757 automation, there are still things that happen that surprise me." From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, 68% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, 56% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement while 18% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and 27% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 14% in Phase 1 and 17% in Phase 2. (page 28)
    Issue: automation behavior may be unexpected and unexplained (Issue #108) See Issue details
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  7.  
  8. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 18: "Automation does not reduce total workload, since there is more to monitor now." From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, 49% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, 53% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement while 42% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and 41% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 9% in Phase 1 and 6% in Phase 2. (page 132) "With respect to workload there was strong disagreement, but at least half of the respondents reported concern that automation actually increase workload, that workload was increased during phases of flight already characterized by high workload, and decreased during periods of low workload." (page 170) (page 132, 170)
    Issue: automation may adversely affect pilot workload (Issue #79) See Issue details
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  9.  
  10. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 35: "In the B-757 there is too much programming going on below 10,000 feet and in the terminal areas." From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, 54% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, 50% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement while 30% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and 33% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 16% in Phase 1 and 17% in Phase 2. (page 43)
    Issue: automation may demand attention (Issue #102) See Issue details
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: FMS

  11.  
  12. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 2: "I am concerned about a possible loss of my flying skills with too much automation." From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, 49% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, 50% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement while 32% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and 33% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 19% in Phase 1 and 17% in Phase 2. (page 81)
    Issue: manual skills may be lost (Issue #65) See Issue details
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  13.  
  14. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "With respect to workload, there was strong disagreement, but at least half of the respondents reported concern that automation actually increased workload, that workload was increased during phases of the flight already characterized by high workload, and decreased during periods of low workload." (page 170)
    Issue: automation may adversely affect pilot workload (Issue #79) See Issue details
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  15.  
  16. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 34: "There are still modes and features of the B-757 FMS that I don't understand." From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, only 34% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, only 21% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement while 53% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and 64% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 13% in Phase 1 and 15% in Phase 2. (page 58)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: FMS

  17.  
  18. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 25: "I am concerned about the reliability of some of the modern equipment." From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, only 33% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, only 28% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement while 56% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and 56% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 11% in Phase 1 and 16% in Phase 2. (page 42)
    Issue: pilots may lack confidence in automation (Issue #46) See Issue details
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  19.  
  20. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "VIII. Workload ... The most frequent comments in both the questionnaires and the interviews dealt with the demand for programming the CDU, especially in the terminal areas, and the effect on 'heads up' time." ... Statement 28: "We have more time to look out for other aircraft in the terminal areas in the B-757 than other aircraft I've flown." From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, only 21% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, only 30% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement while 58% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and 48% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 21% in Phase 1 and 22% in Phase 2. (page 134)
    Issue: automation may demand attention (Issue #102) See Issue details
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  21.  
  22. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 27: "Overall, automation reduces pilot fatigue." From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, 52% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, 58% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement while only 24% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and 30% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 24% in Phase 1 and 12% in Phase 2. (page 134)
    Issue: fatigue may be induced (Issue #156) See Issue details
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  23.  
  24. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 3: "The B-757 automation works great in today's ATC environment." From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, 51% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, 55% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement while only 28% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and 25% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 21% in Phase 1 and 20% in Phase 2. (page 147)
    Issue: flightdeck automation may be incompatible with ATC system (Issue #82) See Issue details
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  25.  
  26. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 20: "Crew coordination is more difficult in the B-757." From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, 25% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, 26% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement while 56% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and 62% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 19% in Phase 1 and 12% in Phase 2. (page 120)
    Issue: crew coordination problems may occur (Issue #84) See Issue details
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  27.  
  28. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 8: "I use the automation mainly because my company wants me to." From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, only 9% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, only 11% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statemen while 66% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and 68% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 25% in Phase 1 and 21% in Phase 2. (page 162)
    Issue: company automation policies and procedures may be inappropriate or inadequate (Issue #166) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  29.  
  30. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "LIKES AND DISLIKES On the first questionnaire, crews were asked ... List the features or modes of the 757 automation, instrumentation, or avionics that you like or dislike. Explain why if you wish." ... 11 pilots of 166 responded as a 'dislike' : "Non-availability of FMC maintenance pages in flight". [11/166 = 6.6% of pilots surveyed] (page 25)
    Issue: insufficient information may be displayed (Issue #99) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  31.  
  32. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "PROGRAMMING DUTIES ... The Phase-2 questionnaire contained [the following] open-ended question about programming the FMC ... What changes in the method of programming of the CDU or additional features, pages, prompts, etc. would you like to see? Do you feel that the programming tasks could or should be simplified? In what way?" In response to this question, 3 pilots of 133 mentioned "Maintenance information should be available to crew". [3/133=2.3% of the pilots] (page 34)
    Issue: insufficient information may be displayed (Issue #99) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  33.  
  34. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "INITIAL OPERATING EXPERIENCE (IOE) [On the first questionnaire, crews were asked]... Describe any problems that you had during your IOE (initial operating experience) and early months of flying the 757. Are there still areas you have trouble with, or don't understand?" 7 pilots of 166 responded that "Too much time had been spent in training on computer, and not enough on basic flying of airplane." [7/166 = 4.2% of the pilots] (page 72)
    Issue: deficiencies in basic aircraft training may exist (Issue #63) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  35.  
  36. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: In response to question "1-6. Do you like the way the 757 automation interfaces to the ATC environment? Please mention things you have trouble with, and things that work well, in working with ATC." One pilot responded: " 'No! No! No! ATC can't seem to understand that this airplane does not want to come down! They treat us like older A/C with a 3:1 glide <3 miles longitudinally for 1000 feet vertically>, and this thing with its 4:1 [glide] is very difficult to get down without "cheating" all the automation. This just negates the fuel efficiency advantages of the aircraft and its automation. The 757 is also much slower on approach, which causes all kinds of problems with automation.' 2064" (page 154)
    Issue: workarounds may be necessary (Issue #107) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: FMS

  37.  
  38. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "LIKES AND DISLIKES On the first questionnaire, crews were asked ... List the features or modes of the 757 automation, instrumentation, or avionics that you like or dislike. Explain why if you wish." ... 21 pilots of 166 responded as a 'dislike' : "Slowness of FMC to respond to input". [21/166 = 12.7% of pilots surveyed] (page 25)
    Issue: automation performance may be limited (Issue #126) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: FMS

  39.  
  40. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: In response to question "1-5. What did you think of your training for the 757? What topics should you receive more/less emphasis? Any comments on training aids and devices that were used , or needed?" One pilot responded: "The training was good in the 757. I liked the crew concept, and the CPT training to learn the FMC before getting to the simulator. The point that should be stressed is that if automation isn't doing what you want it to do, turn the magic off and flying it like like any other plane. Too many checkrides are almost total automation checks. 2095" (page 68)
    Issue: automation may be over-emphasized in pilot evaluation (Issue #116) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  41.  
  42. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Based on the information in this study, we can summarize the areas of concern in cockpit resource management of high technology aircraft: ... 5. There is a tendency of the crew to 'help' each other with programming duties when workload increases." (page 178)
    Issue: both pilots' attention simultaneously diverted by programming (Issue #75) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: FMS

  43.  
  44. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "LIKES AND DISLIKES On the first questionnaire, crews were asked ... List the features or modes of the 757 automation, instrumentation, or avionics that you like or dislike. Explain why if you wish." ... 30 pilots of 166 responded as a 'dislike' : "Displays.. Weather radar -- various complaints: low intensity on HSI map, too much red; underestimates intensity". [30/166 = 18.1% of pilots surveyed] (page 25)
    Issue: displays (visual and aural) may be poorly designed (Issue #92) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  45.  
  46. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Based on the information in this study, we can summarize the areas of concern in cockpit resource management of high technology aircraft: ... 3. Automation tends to induce a breakdown of the traditional (and stated) role of the pilot flying (PF) versus pilot not flying (PNF), and a less clear demarcation of 'who does what' than in traditional cockpits." (page 178)
    Issue: pilot control authority may be diffused (Issue #104) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  47.  
  48. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "The most commonly heard criticism of ground school was that there was an over-emphasis on 'magic' (automation) to the exclusion of basic airplane knowledge and skills. The conduct of the first day of instruction both in ground school and simulator was particularly criticized on these grounds. In ground school it was felt that the first day should have been devoted to 'basic airplane' introduction in the classroom, and likewise basic handling characteristics in the first day CSS instruction. Obviously pilots feel the need to understand the basic characteristics of a new airplane before becoming immersed in the details of its advanced equipment. As many reported, 'it's still just an airplane.' Some improvement in this situation has already occurred in the 757 training at host airlines, where more emphasis on the 'basic airplane' has been added to the first day of ground school. Over-emphasis on automation on the first day of ground school appears to be a valid criticism, and other training departments, faced with introducing crews to the advanced technology for the first time, might consider revising their syllabi to respond to this need. If nothing else, such a revision might give the crews more self-confidence before moving into the unfamiliar land of the details of programming the FMS. It might also be helpful in overcoming the computer resistance seen in some of the older captains." (page 172)
    Issue: deficiencies in basic aircraft training may exist (Issue #63) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  49.  
  50. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Many pilots expressed the desire for additional features, and many had learned ways to 'trick the computer' to obtain desired results when no direct method was available." (page 171)
    Issue: workarounds may be necessary (Issue #107) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation & FMS

  51.  
  52. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "As for safety, many of the crews [surveyed in this study] expressed the view that automation may have gone too far, that they felt they were often 'out of the loop', probably meaning that they tended to lose situational awareness, and that they feared that automation led to complacency, a term used repeatedly in interviews and questionnaires in this study." (page 170)
    Issue: pilots may be overconfident in automation (Issue #131) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  53.  
  54. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "As for safety, many of the crews [surveyed in this study] expressed the view that automation may have gone too far, that they felt they were often 'out of the loop', probably meaning that they tended to lose situational awareness, and that they feared that automation led to complacency , a term used repeatedly in interviews and questionnaires in this study." (page 170)
    Issue: pilots may be out of the loop (Issue #2) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  55.  
  56. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "VII. Cockpit Resource Management, Crew Coordination And Communication ... B. Cockpit Resource Management, Supervision, and Coordination ... Some [of the pilots interviewed] mentioned that it was difficult for the captain to see what the F/O was doing, and that it took time to digest what had been entered in the CDU, whereas in the DC-9 or 727 one quick scan of the panel revealed what modes had been selected, and hence what one could expect." (page 121)
    Issue: cross checking may be difficult (Issue #72) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: FMS: CDU

  57.  
  58. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 7: "I always know what mode the autopilot/flight director is in." From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, 68% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, 72% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement while only 20% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and 13% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 12% in Phase 1 and 15% in Phase 2. (page 28)
    Issue: mode awareness may be lacking (Issue #95) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot

  59.  
  60. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "VIII. Cockpit Errors And Error Reduction ... B. Reports Of Cockpit Errors [Pilots were asked to respond to the following question:] 3. Describe in detail an error which you made, or observed, in operating the automatic features of the 757 that could have led to an incident or violation. How could it have been avoided? (equipment design? Training? Crew? Coordination?) Please describe specifically what was done." ... One pilot responded, "Trying to copy takeoff load advice via company radio because ACARS was inop. As a result one pilot was talking to and receiveing instructions from ground control while the other pilot was off the air. Consequently there was a mix-up and we missed a taxi clearance and taxied onto the wrong runway. Solution: the automated stuff has to work or you are worse [emphasized] off than the two pilot planes. 4054" (page 100, 107)
    Issue: crew coordination problems may occur (Issue #84) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  61.  
  62. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: In response to the open-ended question, "2-4 What can you say about overall workload of the 757 compared to the other aircraft you have flown? Include mental workload, monitoring etc. What about outside scan?": 21 pilots out of a total of 133 [16%] responded that there was either "More" or " Much more workload" in the 757, 17 pilots out of a total of 133 [13%] responded that there was "Same or more", "About the same", or "Same or less" workload in the 757, and 32 pilots out of a total of 133 [24%] responded that there was either "Less" or " Much less" workload in the 757. (page 138)
    Issue: automation may adversely affect pilot workload (Issue #79) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  63.  
  64. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: In response to the open-ended question, "2-2 If you were to leave the 757 for an older model aircraft, what features would you miss the most? What would you be happy to leave behind?": 8 pilots out of a total of 133 [6%] responded that "Features that Would not be missed" were "Excessive workload in terminal areas" or "High workload during malfunctions, short legs, or entry in complex TCAs" (page 44-46)
    Issue: automation may adversely affect pilot workload (Issue #79) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  65.  
  66. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "PROGRAMMING DUTIES ... The Phase-2 questionnaire contained [the following] open-ended question about programming the FMC ... What changes in the method of programming of the CDU or additional features, pages, prompts, etc. would you like to see? Do you feel that the programming tasks could or should be simplified? In what way?" In response to this question, 3 pilots of 133 mentioned "FMC should calculate and display V-speeds". [3/133=2.3% of the pilots] (page 34)
    Issue: insufficient information may be displayed (Issue #99) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: FMS

  67.  
  68. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "PROGRAMMING DUTIES ... The Phase-2 questionnaire contained [the following] open-ended question about programming the FMC ... What changes in the method of programming of the CDU or additional features, pages, prompts, etc. would you like to see? Do you feel that the programming tasks could or should be simplified? In what way?" In response to this question, 2 pilots of 133 mentioned "Latitude and longitude should be displayed on map display". [2/133=1.5% of the pilots] (page 34)
    Issue: insufficient information may be displayed (Issue #99) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  69.  
  70. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "PROGRAMMING DUTIES ... The Phase-2 questionnaire contained [the following] open-ended question about programming the FMC ... What changes in the method of programming of the CDU or additional features, pages, prompts, etc. would you like to see? Do you feel that the programming tasks could or should be simplified? In what way?" In response to this question, 3 pilots of 133 mentioned "FMC computer should display approach speeds". [3/133=2.3% of the pilots] (page 34)
    Issue: insufficient information may be displayed (Issue #99) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: FMS

  71.  
  72. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "VIII. Cockpit Errors And Error Reduction ... B. Reports Of Cockpit Errors [Pilots were asked to respond to the following question:] 3. Describe in detail an error which you made, or observed, in operating the automatic features of the 757 that could have led to an incident or violation. How could it have been avoided? (equipment design? Training? Crew? Coordination?) Please describe specifically what was done." ... One pilot responded, "While flying at 12,000 in the MSP terminal area, using weather radar to vector around thunderstorm cells, which were particularly active, we entered an area of moderate precip, some 15 miles north of MSP. Almost immediately Mode 2A of the ground prox sounded 'Whoop, whoop, pull up, pull up', and the weather radar went to solid red on all range scales. Coincidentally, the ACARS selcal aural sounded (indicating a message was waiting) and a flight attendant signaled from the aft section requesting the MSP arrival time. The cacophony of aural signals caused substantial distraction and confusion, and resulted in difficult communication with MSP APC. Our request for vectors was not heard by APC, and a MSP altitude and heading change was missed by us. After several minutes we were able to sort out the aural warnings and calls, and disable the Mode 2 Warning while re-establishing clear contact with MSP. When we emerged from the precip, the weather radar regained its usefulness and we resumed a more normal terminal arrival, using the radar to vector around cumulus build-ups. It is obvious that a third crew member [emphasized] would have been of substantial assistance here, however, a weather radar which is not useful in precip is useless 25% of the time. 2044" (page 100, 107)
    Issue: displays (visual and aural) may be poorly designed (Issue #92) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  73.  
  74. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "VIII. Cockpit Errors And Error Reduction ... B. Reports Of Cockpit Errors [Pilots were asked to respond to the following question:] 3. Describe in detail an error which you made, or observed, in operating the automatic features of the 757 that could have led to an incident or violation. How could it have been avoided? (equipment design? Training? Crew? Coordination?) Please describe specifically what was done." ... One pilot responded, "A mechanic was removing the No. 2 altimeter and I was standing out of the way watching. The F/O reached across the pedestal to assist the mechanic as he was having difficulty installing the altimeter. His arm touched a select button on the climb page, in this case we believe it was the S/E climb speeds etc. After completion of the mechanical work I got into the seat and the F/O said that the route was in and needed to be executed. By this time (I think I was on the RTE page) I executed what I thought was a route activation. I looked at the HSI to verify this, but the route did not activate so I went through the steps again. This time it took. I said, 'That's strange' but forgot about it. Everything was normal until climb power was called for and VNAV was selected. The power went to max cont. and VNAV disengaged. This confused us both. So I told the F/O to see if he could fix the problem and that I would fly the aircraft. We pulled breakers etc. but finally went to the DATA page, then the CLB page and found out we had selected S/E climb performance inadvertently and then executed it. Not sure how to prevent this error. Maybe the EXE light should not light unless the corresponding page is in view. 1006" (page 100, 104)
    Issue: displays (visual and aural) may be poorly designed (Issue #92) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  75.  
  76. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "INITIAL OPERATING EXPERIENCE (IOE) [On the first questionnaire, crews were asked]... Describe any problems that you had during your IOE (initial operating experience) and early months of flying the 757. Are there still areas you have trouble with, or don't understand?" In response to this question, the following comment was made by one of the pilots: " Yes! What [emphasized] information is available from what [emphasized] page of the CDU and when [emphasized]? Example: VOR/ILS frequencies? Field elevation? 2033" (page 72, 76)
    Issue: displays (visual and aural) may be poorly designed (Issue #92) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: FMS: CDU

  77.  
  78. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "LIKES AND DISLIKES On the first questionnaire, crews were asked ... List the features or modes of the 757 automation, instrumentation, or avionics that you like or dislike. Explain why if you wish." ... 8 pilots of 166 responded as a 'dislike' : "Lack of aural tone on altimeter alerter". [8/166 = 5% of pilots surveyed] (page 26)
    Issue: displays (visual and aural) may be poorly designed (Issue #92) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  79.  
  80. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "LIKES AND DISLIKES On the first questionnaire, crews were asked ... List the features or modes of the 757 automation, instrumentation, or avionics that you like or dislike. Explain why if you wish." ... 9 pilots of 166 responded as a 'dislike' : "F/D V-bars should be filled in (not outlined) - Airline-2". [9/166 = 5% of pilots surveyed] (page 26)
    Issue: displays (visual and aural) may be poorly designed (Issue #92) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  81.  
  82. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "VII. Cockpit Resource Management, Crew Coordination And Communication ... B. Cockpit Resource Management, Supervision, and Coordination ... [Pilots were asked to respond to the following question:] 1-4. What would you say about crew coordination on the 757 (compared to other aircraft?" The responses were analyzed to determine the pilot's overall evaluation of crew coordination on the 757. Out of a total of 105 responses, 71 pilots' [68%] responses were classified as either "Excellent, much better" or "Good, better, easier", while only 17 pilots' [16%] responses were classified as either " Fair, more difficult" or "Poor, much more difficult". 17 pilots' [16%] responses were classified as "Same, adequate, OK" (page 123-124)
    Issue: crew coordination problems may occur (Issue #84) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  83.  
  84. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "One captain who was interviewed made an interesting comment about proficiency checks. He said that throughout his career the FAA examiners had 'turned things off.' Now they insist that everything be turned on. The interviewee expressed the opinion that (even on proficiency checks) a pilot should be allowed the use or not use features and modes as he sees fit, a view consistent with the Weiner-Curry guidelines..." (page 174)
    Issue: automation may be over-emphasized in pilot evaluation (Issue #116) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  85.  
  86. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: C. ALTITUDE DEVIATIONS ("BUSTS") ... Incidents Reported ... [One pilot in the study reported the following:] Observed a few altitude busts while being hand flown due to distraction with company paperwork and radio calls, ATC radio calls and routing, and A/C abnormalities. This aircraft needs an altitude alerting system that signals the approach of an altitude, not after you bust it. I realize that is contrary to the 'quiet cockpit' philosophy touted by Boeing, but the standard altitude alerting system in other aircraft is distinct enough and recognized by all pilots to be immediately identified and not confus4ed as an EICAS alert message. The one [emphasized] extra cockpit sound is well worth the compromise of that philophy. No extra training or crew coordination would be the cure. 2067" (page 113-116)
    Issue: state prediction may be lacking (Issue #152) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  87.  
  88. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "VIII. Workload ... B. Coping Strategies... Workload Management and Advanced Planning Numerous pilots stressed the importance of management of workload, and of planning ahead. They recognized the importance of management by doing as much planning and data entry as possible during phases of lower demand. Many stressed pre-flight programming at the gate whenever possible, and likewise for planning and programming during cruise in preparation for descent." (page 135) ... In response to Question "2-4. What can you say about overall workload of the 757 compared to the other aircraft you have flown? Include mental workload, monitoring etc. What about outside scan?" 4 pilots mentioned the "Importance of pre-planning in workload reduction" (page 138-139) ... 1 pilot made the following response: "It is easy to get pushed and make minor errors on the ground before takeoff if you try to move at the pace that external pressure required (making schedule, radio communication, FMC programming etc.). Planning ahead is definitely required for approaches. All the A/C I have flown have peaks and valleys of workload. However, the peaks and valleys are more accentuated on the 757. 4007" (page 141) (page 135-141)
    Issue: planning requirements may be increased (Issue #158) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  89.  
  90. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "INITIAL OPERATING EXPERIENCE (IOE) [On the first questionnaire, crews were asked]... Describe any problems that you had during your IOE (initial operating experience) and early months of flying the 757. Are there still areas you have trouble with, or don't understand?" In response to this question, the following comment was made by one of the pilots: " The FMS is so [emphasized] complex, it takes a while to feel comfortable in its use. However, for me, this becomes a positive thing because it reduces the tendency for complacency. 1053 " (page 72, 75)
    Issue: automation may be too complex (Issue #40) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: FMS

  91.  
  92. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "VII. Cockpit Resource Management, Crew Coordination And Communication ... B. Cockpit Resource Management, Supervision, and Coordination ... Numerous captains stated that it is somewhat more difficult to supervise the work of the first officer in the automated cockpit. This may be due to the fact that the CDU gives the first officer more opportunities to make decisions than he had on traditional aircraft." (page 121)
    Issue: cross checking may be difficult (Issue #72) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  93.  
  94. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: In response to the open-ended question, "2-2 If you were to leave the 757 for an older model aircraft, what features would you miss the most? What would you be happy to leave behind?": 1 pilot out of a total of 133 responded that a feature that "Would not be missed" is "Erroneous status messages" (page 44-46)
    Issue: false alarms may be frequent (Issue #70) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  95.  
  96. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "... [a] problem leading to confusion and hence increased workload is that fact that the computer-produced flight plan provided to the crew may contain waypoints whose names are inconsistent with those in the FMC. This is particularly true of waypoints located at non-directional beacons (NDBs). An example is Carolina Beach. The computer-produced flight plan (KMIA to northeast airports) reads '...AR3 CLB...' and the crew quite naturally attempts to load 'CLB' into the FMC, only to receive 'not in database' error messages. The FMC stores this waypoint as 'CLBNB', which is on neither the flight plan nor the chart. ... The author has several times seen crews puzzling over their inability to load such a waypoint before discovering from their charts that the waypoint is an NDB, and recalling that the 'NB' must be added. It would seem a small matter to program the computers that furnish the flight plans to be consistent with the FMC designators, and it would also probably aid crews of conventional aircraft. Such inconsistencies generate increased workload and frustration, often leading to abandonment of the automation, and what is worse, they harbor the potential for serious error." (page 180)
    Issue: data entry and programming may be difficult and time consuming (Issue #112) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: FMS

  97.  
  98. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: One pilot made the following response to the open-ended question, "2-2 If you were to leave the 757 for an older model aircraft, what features would you miss the most? What would you be happy to leave behind?": "...But I dislike surrendering most of my experience and judgment to a computer, especially when it's judge, jury, and executioner. 3033" (page 49)
    Issue: pilots have responsibility but may lack authority (Issue #12) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  99.  
  100. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: One pilot made the following response to the open-ended question, "2-2 If you were to leave the 757 for an older model aircraft, what features would you miss the most? What would you be happy to leave behind?": "...Out of SEA one day I lost the right engine at 140 feet above the field at near max gross weight. I wished I had had the capability of overriding the EEC inorder to obtain more than 'limit EPR' power. 2024" (page 50)
    Issue: pilots have responsibility but may lack authority (Issue #12) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  101.  
  102. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 31: "Some times I feel more like a 'button pusher' than a pilot." From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, only 18% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, only 19% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement while 65% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and 58% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 17% in Phase 1 and 23% in Phase 2. (page 165)
    Issue: job satisfaction may be reduced (Issue #13) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  103.  
  104. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "INITIAL OPERATING EXPERIENCE (IOE) [On the first questionnaire, crews were asked]... Describe any problems that you had during your IOE (initial operating experience) and early months of flying the 757. Are there still areas you have trouble with, or don't understand?" In response to this question, the following comment was made by one of the pilots: " I had a tough time believing that the automation was going to do what I had programmed it to do (e.g. capturing altitudes, proceeding direct to fixes, etc.). I found myself turning off the A/P, placing the aircraft where I wanted it, and turning the A/P back on. 2022" (page 72, 76)
    Issue: pilots may lack confidence in automation (Issue #46) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot

  105.  
  106. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "In spite of the conclusions regarding the problems of the difficult interface, the crews reported satisfaction with the general layout of the cockpit, and few problems in the area of traditional human factors." (page 171)
    Issue: interface may be poorly designed (Issue #39) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  107.  
  108. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Training for the 757 at both airlines in this study was generally considered to be well planned and well conducted. A large number of pilots reported on their questionnaires that 757 school was the best training program they had ever been through." (page 172)
    Issue: training may be inadequate (Issue #133) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  109.  
  110. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "With respect to workload, there was strong disagreement, but at least half of the respondents reported concern that automation actually increased workload, that workload was increased during phases of the flight already characterized by high workload, and decreased during periods of low workload." (page 170)
    Issue: automation may adversely affect pilot workload (Issue #79) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  111.  
  112. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "With respect to workload, there was strong disagreement, but at least half of the respondents reported concern that automation actually increased workload, that workload was increased during phases of the flight already characterized by high workload, and decreased during periods of low workload." (page 170)
    Issue: automation may adversely affect pilot workload (Issue #79) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  113.  
  114. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "The data reported here concur with that of the author's previous field of study on the MD-80 (Wiener, 1988b), in finding little evidence that crews of advanced technology aircraft have suffered significant skill loss. Crews report little problem on the manually flown portion of their proficiency checks." (page 174)
    Issue: manual skills may be lost (Issue #65) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B757/MD80
    Equipment: automation

  115.  
  116. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 11: "In the B-757 automation, there are still things that happen that surprise me." From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, 68% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, 56% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement while only 18% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and 27% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 14% in Phase 1 and 17% in Phase 2. (page 28)
    Issue: automation behavior may be unexpected and unexplained (Issue #108) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  117.  
  118. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: In response to the open-ended question, "2-4 What can you say about overall workload of the 757 compared to the other aircraft you have flown? Include mental workload, monitoring etc. What about outside scan?": 21 pilots out of a total of 133 [16%] responded that there was either "More" or " Much more workload" in the 757, 17 pilots out of a total of 133 [13%] responded that there was "Same or more", "About the same", or "Same or less" workload in the 757, and 32 pilots out of a total of 133 [24%] responded that there was either "Less" or " Much less" workload in the 757. (page 138)
    Issue: automation may adversely affect pilot workload (Issue #79) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  119.  
  120. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 2: "I am concerned about a possible loss of my flying skills with too much automation." From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, 49% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, 50% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement while only 32% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and 33% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 19% in Phase 1 and 17% in Phase 2. (page 81)
    Issue: manual skills may be lost (Issue #65) See Issue details
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  121.  
  122. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 18: "Automation does not reduce total workload, since there is more to monitor now." From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, 49% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, 53% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement while 42% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and 41% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 9% in Phase 1 and 6% in Phase 2. (page 132)
    Issue: automation may adversely affect pilot workload (Issue #79) See Issue details
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  123.  
  124. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 35: "In the B-757 there is too much programming going on below 10,000 feet and in the terminal areas." From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, 54% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, 50% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement while only 30% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and 33% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 16% in Phase 1 and 17% in Phase 2. (page 43)
    Issue: automation may demand attention (Issue #102) See Issue details
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: FMS

  125.  
  126. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "P8 ['I use the automation mainly because my company wants me to.' From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, only 9% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, only 11% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement while 66% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and 68% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 25% in Phase 1 and 21% in Phase 2.] and P29 ['I use automation mainly because it helps me get the job done.' From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, 62% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, 70% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement while only 15% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and only 14% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 23% in Phase 1 and 16% in Phase 2.] were designed to look into the motivation to use automation, and should be examined jointly. Clearly these probes indicate that the crews turn to automation not because it is expected of them, but because they view it as positively as a means of getting their job done." (page 165)
    Issue: company automation policies and procedures may be inappropriate or inadequate (Issue #166) See Issue details
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  127.  
  128. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 25: "I am concerned about the reliability of some of the modern equipment." From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, 33% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, 28% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement while 56% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and 56% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 11% in Phase 1 and 16% in Phase 2. (page 42)
    Issue: pilots may lack confidence in automation (Issue #46) See Issue details
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  129.  
  130. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 34: "There are still modes and features of the B-757 FMS that I don't understand." From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, 34% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, 21% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement while 53% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and 64% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 13% in Phase 1 and 15% in Phase 2. (page 58)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: FMS

  131.  
  132. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 31: "Some times I feel more like a 'button pusher' than a pilot." From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, only 18% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, only 19% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement while 65% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and 58% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 17% in Phase 1 and 23% in Phase 2. (page 165)
    Issue: job satisfaction may be reduced (Issue #13) See Issue details
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  133.  
  134. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 3: "The B-757 automation works great in today's ATC environment." From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, 51% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, 55% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement while only 28% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and 25% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 21% in Phase 1 and 20% in Phase 2. (page 147)
    Issue: flightdeck automation may be incompatible with ATC system (Issue #82) See Issue details
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  135.  
  136. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Many who have written in the field of automation, in aviation and elsewhere, have predicted that as systems became more automatic, the workers in those systems would suffer a sense of detachment and lack of self-worth. These authors forsee the day when workers in these highly automated industries will perceive themselves alienated from the goals of the system, playing a minor or peripheral role, or becoming the servants of the machines, rather than the other way around (Wiener and Curry, 1980). So far we have seen no evidence in this study, or previous field studies that such a thing has taken place in cockpit automation." (page 167)
    Issue: job satisfaction may be reduced (Issue #13) See Issue details
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  137.  
  138. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "LIKES AND DISLIKES On the first questionnaire, crews were asked ... List the features or modes of the 757 automation, instrumentation, or avionics that you like or dislike. Explain why if you wish." ... Pilots mentioned items as a 'like' 122 times regarding the HSI in general such as: "HSI map mode", "HSI radar plot with map", "Ability to scale map, "Wind vector", "Map display of airports and navaids, "Green arc", "Ability to see point where will intercept ILS", "Map plan mode", "Track predictor display" . [122/166 = 73.5% of pilots surveyed] (page 22)
    Issue: displays (visual and aural) may be poorly designed (Issue #92) See Issue details
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  139.  
  140. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "VII. Cockpit Resource Management, Crew Coordination And Communication ... B. Cockpit Resource Management, Supervision, and Coordination ... [Pilots were asked to respond to the following question:] 1-4. What would you say about crew coordination on the 757 (compared to other aircraft?" The responses were analyzed to determine the pilot's overall evaluation of crew coordination on the 757. Out of a total of 105 responses, 71 pilots' [68%] responses were classified as either "Excellent, much better" or "Good, better, easier", while only 17 pilots' [16%] responses were classified as either " Fair, more difficult" or "Poor, much more difficult". 17 pilots' [16%] responses were classified as "Same, adequate, OK" (page 123-124)
    Issue: crew coordination problems may occur (Issue #84) See Issue details
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  141.  
  142. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 20: "Crew coordination is more difficult in the B-757." From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, only 25% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, only 26% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement while 56% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and 62% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 19% in Phase 1 and 12% in Phase 2. (page 120)
    Issue: crew coordination problems may occur (Issue #84) See Issue details
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  143.  
  144. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "VIII. Workload ... The most frequent comments in both the questionnaires and the interviews dealt with the demand for programming the CDU, especially in the terminal areas, and the effect on 'heads up' time." ... Statement 28: "We have more time to look out for other aircraft in the terminal areas in the B-757 than other aircraft I've flown." From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, only 21% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, only 30% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement while 58% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and 48% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 21% in Phase 1 and 22% in Phase 2. (page 131-134)
    Issue: automation may demand attention (Issue #102) See Issue details
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation

  145.  
  146. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 7: "I always know what mode the autopilot/flight director is in." From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, 68% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, 72% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement while 20% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and 13% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 12% in Phase 1 and 15% in Phase 2. (page 28)
    Issue: mode awareness may be lacking (Issue #95) See Issue details
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot

  147.  
  148. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "The subject of fatigue has not been explored in this study, and was seldom mentioned by the crews in interviews, questionnaires, or during the jumbseat observations. Where it was mentioned, most commented favorably on what they perceieved as a reduction in fatigue attributable to automation. See Item No. 27" Statement 27: "Overall, automation reduces pilot fatigue." From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, 52% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, 58% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement while 24% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and 30% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 24% in Phase 1 and 12% in Phase 2. (page 134-135)
    Issue: fatigue may be induced (Issue #156) See Issue details
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation
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