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Evidence from Resource 24 pieces of evidence from this resource.

Sarter, N.B. & Woods, D.D. (1994). Pilot interaction with cockpit automation II: An experimental study of pilot's model and awareness of the Flight Management System. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 4(1), 1-28. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

  1.  
  2. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "When asked to disengage the APPR mode after localizer and glideslope had been captured, only 3 pilots (15%) could recall the three ways of accomplishing this ... Seven pilots (35%) did not know of any procedure for disengaging the APPR mode." (page 16)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot

  3.  
  4. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: Immediately before receiving their takeoff clearance, pilots were asked what procedure they would use to abort the takeoff at 40 kts. Although it was emphasized that the takeoff had to be aborted at 40 kts -- before Throttle Hold (THR HLD) is reached at 64 kts, when the pilot can manually position the throttles -- 16 pilots (80%) described the procedure as "Throttles back, reversers, and manual brakes," They did not mention that the autothrottles would have to be disconnected to prevent the throttles from coming back up again after manual intervention. (page 15)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: autoflight: autothrust

  5.  
  6. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "5 of the 6 [83%] pilots without line experience could not describe how to program an intermediate descent on the VNAV Cruise page for avoiding traffic, whereas none of the 14 experienced pilots had any problem with this task." (page 17)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS

  7.  
  8. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "After G/S capture, a G/S signal loss was simulated at approximately 3,000 ft ... pilots were asked about the consequences of this event, and 54% of the pilots provided the correct answer. When asked whether a G/S failure at a lower altitude (<1,500 ft) would have different effects, only 15% of the pilots knew the answer. [85% did not know the answer.] Twenty-three percent of the participants did not know the answer to either question." (page 17)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: autoflight

  9.  
  10. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: Pilots were asked for their expectations concerning ADI mode indications throughout the takeoff roll ... N1 ... and THR HOLD ... Five of the pilots (25%) expected to see both these indications. Twelve subjects (60%) only mentioned either THR HOLD (15% of the pilots) or N1 (45% of the pilots) as an indications during takeoff. Another 3 pilots (15%) could not predict any of the mode indications. (page 15)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: autoflight: autothrust

  11.  
  12. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "The GA mode becomes available when descending below 2,000 ft radio altitude with autothrottles armed. Out of 20 pilots, only 5 [25%] recalled the altitude at which this occurs. Eight pilots (40%) knew that the availability of the mode depends on reaching a certain altitude, but they did not remember the actual height." (page 16)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: autoflight

  13.  
  14. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "... when asked about the consequences of using an excessive vertical rate of climb in the V/S mode, none of the transitioning pilots could provide the correct answer, as compared to only 5 (35%) of the experienced participants [i.e., (6 + 9)/20 = 75% didn't know]." (page 17)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: autoflight

  15.  
  16. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "... when asked to intercept the LAX 248 [degree] radial, all 6 of the transition pilots had difficulties carrying out the task using LNAV, as compared to only 7 of the 14 experienced pilots." (page 17)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS

  17.  
  18. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "Nine out of 20 pilots knew how the FMS maintains target speed during a VNAV Path descent. Eight pilots (40%) were aware of the speed control mode during a VNAV Speed descent. With respect to the end-of-descent point of a path descent versus a speed descent, the results were similar: Twelve pilots (60%) were aware of the end of descent during a VNAV Path descent, and 9 pilots (45%) knew at what point the VNAV Speed descent would end." (page 16-17)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS

  19.  
  20. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "[a] problem related to mode engagement was the attempt to activate a mode without the prerequistes for this activation being met: Three (50%) of the transitioning and one of the 14 experienced pilots tried to engage VORLOC without being in the manual radio mode as required. Three (50%) of the transitioning and 5 of the 14 experienced pilots engaged the APPR mode without lowering the MCP altitude first, and they were surprised to find that the aircraft did not start the descent." [Total number of pilots to make mistakes = 8 to 12 (66% to 88%)] (page 20)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: autoflight

  21.  
  22. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "Another interesting result refers to failures to engage or re-engage a mode after entering (new) target values into either the MCP or the CDU. This omission occurred at least once during the scenario for 5 of the 6 transitioning pilots (the total number of omissions for this group was 9). Only two of the 14 [14 %] experienced pilots forgot to engage an appropriate mode, and this occurred only once for each of them. The problem occurred four times in regard to the LNAV mode, six times with respect to the VNAV mode and once concerning the LVL CHG mode." [7 of 20 pilots = 35% made an omission] (page 18-20)
    Issue: mode selection may be incorrect (Issue #145) See Issue details
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS & autoflight

  23.  
  24. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "Another interesting result refers to failures to engage or reengage a mode after entering new target values into the MCP or the CDU. This omission occurred at least once during the scenario for 5 of the 6 transitioning pilots (total number of omissions = 9). Only 2 of the 14 experienced pilots forgot to engage an appropriate mode, and this occurred only once for each of them." (page 18-20)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS & autoflight

  25.  
  26. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "After G/S capture, a G/S signal loss was simulated at approximately 3,000 ft. ... Although detection time was not measured for this failure, it was observed that it took some pilots a rather long time (in some cases, several minutes) to even realize the problem although they were looking directly at the ADI (with the G/S indications and FD bars disappearing) during this phase of flight." (page 17)
    Issue: failure assessment may be difficult (Issue #25) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: autoflight

  27.  
  28. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "This study ... confirms that most of the difficulties in pilot-automation interaction are related to a lack of mode awareness and to gaps in pilots' mental models of the functional structure of the automation." (page 21)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: automation

  29.  
  30. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "Another problem related to mode engagement was the attempt to activate a mode without the prerequisites for this activation being met. Fifty percent [3] of the transitioning pilots and 1 of the 14 experienced pilots tried to engage VORLOC without being in the manual radio mode as required. [(3+1)/20 = 4/20 = 20% failed]" (page 20)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: autoflight

  31.  
  32. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "The GA mode becomes available when descending below 2,000 ft radio altitude with autothrottles armed. Out of 20 pilots, only 5 [25%] recalled the altitude at which this occurs. Eight pilots (40%) knew that the availability of the mode depends on reaching a certain altitude, but they did not remember the actual height." (page 16)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: autoflight: autothrust

  33.  
  34. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "After G/S capture, a G/S signal loss was simulated at approximately 3,000 ft ... pilots were asked about the consequences of this event, and 54% of the pilots provided the correct answer. When asked whether a G/S failure at a lower altitude (<1,500 ft) would have different effects, only 15% of the pilots knew the answer. Twenty-three percent of the participants did not know the answer to either question." (page 17)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: autoflight

  35.  
  36. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: Pilots were asked for their expectations concerning ADI mode indications throughout the takeoff roll ... N1 ... and THR HOLD ... Five of the pilots (25%) expected to see both theses indications. Twelve subjects (60%) only mentioned either THR HOLD (15% of the pilots) or N1 (45% of the pilots) as an indications during takeoff. Another 3 pilots (15%) could not predict any of the mode indications. (page 15)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: autopilot: autothrust

  37.  
  38. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "Nine [45%] out of 20 pilots knew how the FMS maintains target speed during a VNAV Path descent. Eight pilots (40%) were aware of the speed control mode during a VNAV Speed descent. With respect to the end-of-descent point of a path descent versus a speed descent, the results were similar: Twelve pilots (60%) were aware of the end of descent during a VNAV Path descent, and 9 pilots (45%) knew at what point the VNAV Speed descent would end." (page 16-17)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS

  39.  
  40. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "... when asked to intercept the LAX 248 [degree] radial, all 6 of the transition pilots had difficulties carrying out the task using LNAV, as compared to only 7 of the 14 experienced pilots." That is, 7 out of 20 (35%) did not have difficulties. (page 17)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS

  41.  
  42. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "Another interesting result refers to failures to engage or reengage a mode after entering new target values into the MCP or the CDU. This omission occurred at least once during the scenario for 5 of the 6 transitioning pilots (total number of omissions = 9). Only 2 of the 14 experienced pilots forgot to engage an appropriate mode, and this occurred only once for each of them." That is, 13 of 20 (65%) did not forget. (page 18-20)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS & autoflight

  43.  
  44. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "When asked to disengage the APPR mode after localizer and glideslope had been captured, only 3 pilots (15%) could recall the three ways of accomplishing this ... Seven pilots (35%) did not know of any procedure for disengaging the APPR mode." This means that 50% of the pilots were able to recall at least one way to disengage the glideslope. (page 16)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot

  45.  
  46. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "... when asked about the consequences of using an excessive vertical rate of climb in the V/S mode, none of the transitioning pilots could provide the correct answer, as compared to only 5 (35%) of the experienced participants [i.e., (6 + 9)/20 = 75% didn't know]." (page 17)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: -4
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: autoflight

  47.  
  48. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "Another problem related to mode engagement was the attempt to activate a mode without the prerequisites for this activation being met. Fifty percent of the transitioning pilots and 1 of the 14 experienced pilots tried to engage VORLOC without being in the manual radio mode as required." That is, 16 of 20 (80%) did it correctly. (page 20)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: -4
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: autoflight
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