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Evidence from Resource 5 pieces of evidence from this resource.

National Transportation Safety Board (1980). Aeromexico DC-10-30 over Luxembourg, November 11, 1979. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-80-10. Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board.

  1.  
  2. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "3. CONCLUSIONS 3.1 Findings ... 2. Thrust from all three engines was at an autothrottle limiting value for several minutes during which pitch and attitude increased and airspeed decreased. ... 6. The autopilot commanded an increasing angle of attack while attempting to maintain a preselected vertical speed which exceeded the limit thrust performance capability of the aircraft at higher altitudes." (page 22)
    Issue: automation may not work well under unusual conditions (Issue #150) See Issue details
    Strength: +5
    Aircraft: DC10
    Equipment: autoflight

  3.  
  4. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "The Safety Board thus concludes that the crew erred in both their actions and recollections regarding the AP mode selection. It is probable that the flightcrew did begin, or intended to begin, the climb with the ATS N1 mode/AP IAS mode selections. However, when the captain selected 320 kn into the ATS speed window he may have either intentionally or unintentionally pulled the ATS speed selector knob. This action would have changed the ATS selection from the N1 mode to the airspeed mode. This in turn would have caused the AP IAS Hold mode to disengage and revert automatically to the vertical speed mode of operation. In any case, the DFDR indicates that the AP was in the vertical speed mode from about 16,000 ft upward. ... 3. Conclusions ... 3.1 Findings ... 6. The autopilot commanded an increasing angle of attack while attempting to maintain a preselected vertical speed which exceeded the limit thrust performance capability of the aircraft at higher altitudes." (page 21-22)
    Issue: mode selection may be incorrect (Issue #145) See Issue details
    Strength: +5
    Aircraft: DC10-30
    Equipment: autoflight

  5.  
  6. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "3. CONCLUSIONS ... The flightcrew was not thoroughly knowledgeable of the aircraft's flight guidance and control system." (page 23)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: DC-10-30
    Equipment: autoflight

  7.  
  8. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "The Safety Board thus concludes that the crew erred in both their actions and recollections regarding the AP mode selection. It is probable that the flightcrew did begin, or intended to begin, the climb with the ATS N1 mode/AP IAS mode selections. However, when the captain selected 320 kn into the ATS speed window he may have either intentionally or unintentionally pulled the ATS speed selector knob. This action would have changed the ATS selection from the N1 mode to the airspeed mode. This in turn would have caused the AP IAS Hold mode to disengage and revert automatically to the vertical speed mode of operation. In any case, the DFDR indicates that the AP was in the vertical speed mode from about 16,000 ft upward. The Safety Board cannot explain why corresponding indications on the mode selection panels failed to alert the flightcrew to these selections. ... 3. Conclusions ... 3.1 Findings ... 6. The autopilot commanded an increasing angle of attack while attempting to maintain a preselected vertical speed which exceeded the limit thrust performance capability of the aircraft at higher altitudes." (page 21-22)
    Issue: mode awareness may be lacking (Issue #95) See Issue details
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: DC10-30
    Equipment: autoflight

  9.  
  10. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "Consequently, the Safety Board can only conclude that the crew's attention must have been diverted from the control of the airplane and from instrument scan soon after engaging the autopilot. Believing that the autopilot was effectively maintaining a satisfactory climb attitude and speed, they probably were surprised at the control column vibration or the onset of stall buffet or a combination of both and consequently misinterpreted these cues as an engine problem." (page 21)
    Issue: pilots may be overconfident in automation (Issue #131) See Issue details
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: DC-10-30
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot
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