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Source: Council of State appointed investigation commission - Finland (1996). Aircraft accident at Kajaani Airport, Finland, 3. November 1994. DC-9-83 registered as F-GHED operated by Air Liberte Tunisie. Translation of the Finnish original report. Helsinki: Multiprint.
Source Type:   Accident
Synopsis: "On Thursday November 3, 1994 at 06.57 local time an aircraft accident took place at Kajaani airport in which a Douglas DC-9-83 (MD-83) aircraft, registered F-GHED, owned by Gie Libellule 1 and operated by Tunisian Air Liberte Tunisie was severely damaged." The cruise phase of the flight proceeded normally. "When the crew had got the clearance from Tampere Area Control Centre (ACC) to descend from FL 330 (Flight Level) to FL 110, the descent was commenced at 124 nm (nautical miles) from Kajaani airport. ... The crew selected Runway (RWY) 07 for landing and decided to fly the initial approach and to intercept ILS localizer according to the official approach procedure via VOR/DME Kainuu 10 nm arc. ... Autopilot captured RWY 07 ILS localizer below the glide slope while the speed was 170 kt. When the aircraft approached the glide slope the first officer [pilot flying] called for extension of the landing gear. Shortly after this he called for 28 degrees of flaps. Speed of 150 kt was selected for autothrottle. In this configuration the autopilot captured ILS RWY 07 glide slope. ... A speed of 141 kt was selected for autothrottle. According to the Air Liberte Tunisie FOM [Flight crew Operating Manual] the final approach speed would have been threshold speed + 5 kt which would have given 136 kt. According to the aircraft landing speed booklet the threshold speed would have been 131 kt with the actual weight. ... The runway was sighted slightly before the outer marker. The aircraft passed the outer marker in normal landing configuration with autopilot engaged and with a speed of 141 kt [5 kt overspeed]. ... Approximately 50 s after passing the outer marker the captain said: 'descend slightly below glide slope.' Autopilot was disconnected 52 s after passing the outer marker at an altitude of approximately 490 ft Above Ground Level (AGL). The speed was 143 kt [7 kt overspeed] and the aircraft was on localizer and glide slope. The autothrottle was engaged and a speed of 141 kt was still selected. The first officer continued the approach manually. ... The captain [pilot not flying] told he had stated to the first officer that the aircraft was still slightly above glide slope and that the first officer should increase the rate of descent. However, according the DFDR [Digital Flight Data Recorder] the aircraft was on localizer and glide slope. The captain decided to land the aircraft himself and stated this to the first officer. ... The change of duties obviously took place at a height of approximately 150 ft. The captain [now, pilot flying] decided to move the aiming point slightly further on the runway because the aircraft was, according to his observation, slightly above the glide slope. The aircraft was so close to the runway threshold that the captain could not in his opinion increase the rate of descent much in order to reduce height. According to the DFDR the autothrottle thrust mode changed to go-around mode at a height of approximately 120 ft [and] the distance to the threshold [of RWY 07] was 520 m." The mode change caused the thrust of both engines to increase. "The speed increased to 149 kt and the aircraft climbed slightly above the glide slope. When the captain was retarding the throttles against the autothrottle movement to idle thrust the aircraft passed the RWY 07 threshold at a height of 50 ft and with a speed of 155 kt [24 kt overspeed]. ... Immediately after the engines obtained idle thrust, the thrust started to increase again ... The autothrottle was disengaged three seconds before touchdown. ... The aircraft touched down at a distance of 600 nm [beyond] the normal touch-down point ... with a speed of 153 kt (26 kt of overspeed). ... The nose gear touched down first. The touchdown force was normal. ... The captain applied the brakes immediately after touchdown and did not release them [until] the aircraft had stopped. The aircraft started to shudder and vibrate severely approximately three seconds after touchdown. The wings had lift because of the considerable overspeed and because the spoilers were not deployed. The captain retarted [in sic] the thrust to idle which was reached six seconds after touchdown. ... Reverse thrust was applied 10 s after touchdown ... The captain realised that the remaining runway length was not sufficient for stopping and decided to steer the aircraft with the rudder out of the runway to the right in order to avoid crashing into the electrical equipment on the runway extension. Actually the aircraft turned mostly because only the right brakes were operating. The nose of the aircraft turned right whichafter [in sic] the aircraft sideslipped from the asphalt to the grass area left side first." The accident report was translated into English from the Finnish original report.
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