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All Accidents 21 resources found.


  1.  
  2. Source: Aeronautica Civil of the Republic of Colombia (1996). Controlled Flight Into Terrain, American Airlines Flight 965, Boeing 757-223, N651AA, Near Cali, Colombia, December 20, 1995. Santafe de Bogota, DC, Colombia: Aeronautica Civil of the Republic of Colombia.
    Source Type:   Accident
    Synopsis: "At 2142 eastern standard time (est) , on December 20, 1995, American Airlines Flight 965 (AA965), a Boeing 757-223, N651AA, on a regularly scheduled passenger flight from Miami International Airport (MIA), Florida, U.S.A., to Alfonso Bonilla Aragon International Airport (SKCL), in Cali, Colombia, operating under instrument flight rules (IFR), crashed into mountainous terrain during a descent from cruise altitude in visual meteorological conditions (VMC). The accident site was near the town of Buga, 33 miles northeast of the Cali VOR (CLO). The airplane impacted at about 8,900 feet mean sea level (msl), near the summit of El Deluvio and approximately 10 miles east of Airway W3. Of the 155 passengers, 2 flightcrew members, and 6 cabincrew members on board, 4 passengers survived the accident."
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  3.  
  4. Source: Air Accident Investigation Branch, Department of Transport - England (1990). Report on the accident to Boeing 737-400 G-OBME near Kegworth, Leicestershire on 8 January 1989; British Midlands Ltd; AAIB Report 4/90. AAIB Report 4/90. London: Department of Transport.
    Source Type:   Accident
    Synopsis: January 8, 1989 -- British Midland B737-400 -- Leicestershire, England "G-OBME left Heathrow Airport for Belfast at 1952 hrs with 8 crew and 118 passengers (including 1 infant) on board. As the aircraft was climbing through 28,300 feet the outer panel of one blade in the fan of the No 1 (left) engine detached. This gave rise to a series of compressor stalls in the No 1 engine, which resulted in airframe shuddering, ingress of smoke and fumes to the flight deck and fluctuations of the No 1 engine parameters. Believing that the No 2 engine had suffered damage, the crew throttled that engine back and subsequently shut it down. The shuddering caused by the surging of the No 1 engine ceased as soon as the No 2 engine was throttled back, which persuaded the crew that they had dealt correctly with the emergency. They then shut down the No 2 engine. The No 1 engine operated apparently normally after the initial period of severe vibration and during the subsequent descent. The crew initiated a diversion to East Midlands Airport and received radar direction from air traffic control to position the aircraft for an instrument approach to land on runway 27. The approach continued normally, although with a level of vibration from the No 1 engine, until an abrupt reduction of power, followed by a fire warning, occurred on this engine at a point 2.4 nm from the runway. Efforts to restart the No 2 engine were not successful. The aircraft initially struck a field adjacent to the eastern embankment of the M1 motorway and then suffered a second severe impact on the sloping western embankment of the motorway. 39 passengers died in the accident and a further 8 passengers died later from their injuries. Of the other 79 occupants, 74 suffered serious injury. The cause of the accident was that the operating crew shut down the No 2 engine after a fan blade had fractured in the No 1 engine. This engine subsequently suffered a major thrust loss due to secondary fan damage after power had been increased during the final approach to land."
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  5.  
  6. Source: Council of State appointed investigation commission - Finland (1996). Aircraft accident at Kajaani Airport, Finland, 3. November 1994. DC-9-83 registered as F-GHED operated by Air Liberte Tunisie. Translation of the Finnish original report. Helsinki: Multiprint.
    Source Type:   Accident
    Synopsis: "On Thursday November 3, 1994 at 06.57 local time an aircraft accident took place at Kajaani airport in which a Douglas DC-9-83 (MD-83) aircraft, registered F-GHED, owned by Gie Libellule 1 and operated by Tunisian Air Liberte Tunisie was severely damaged." The cruise phase of the flight proceeded normally. "When the crew had got the clearance from Tampere Area Control Centre (ACC) to descend from FL 330 (Flight Level) to FL 110, the descent was commenced at 124 nm (nautical miles) from Kajaani airport. ... The crew selected Runway (RWY) 07 for landing and decided to fly the initial approach and to intercept ILS localizer according to the official approach procedure via VOR/DME Kainuu 10 nm arc. ... Autopilot captured RWY 07 ILS localizer below the glide slope while the speed was 170 kt. When the aircraft approached the glide slope the first officer [pilot flying] called for extension of the landing gear. Shortly after this he called for 28 degrees of flaps. Speed of 150 kt was selected for autothrottle. In this configuration the autopilot captured ILS RWY 07 glide slope. ... A speed of 141 kt was selected for autothrottle. According to the Air Liberte Tunisie FOM [Flight crew Operating Manual] the final approach speed would have been threshold speed + 5 kt which would have given 136 kt. According to the aircraft landing speed booklet the threshold speed would have been 131 kt with the actual weight. ... The runway was sighted slightly before the outer marker. The aircraft passed the outer marker in normal landing configuration with autopilot engaged and with a speed of 141 kt [5 kt overspeed]. ... Approximately 50 s after passing the outer marker the captain said: 'descend slightly below glide slope.' Autopilot was disconnected 52 s after passing the outer marker at an altitude of approximately 490 ft Above Ground Level (AGL). The speed was 143 kt [7 kt overspeed] and the aircraft was on localizer and glide slope. The autothrottle was engaged and a speed of 141 kt was still selected. The first officer continued the approach manually. ... The captain [pilot not flying] told he had stated to the first officer that the aircraft was still slightly above glide slope and that the first officer should increase the rate of descent. However, according the DFDR [Digital Flight Data Recorder] the aircraft was on localizer and glide slope. The captain decided to land the aircraft himself and stated this to the first officer. ... The change of duties obviously took place at a height of approximately 150 ft. The captain [now, pilot flying] decided to move the aiming point slightly further on the runway because the aircraft was, according to his observation, slightly above the glide slope. The aircraft was so close to the runway threshold that the captain could not in his opinion increase the rate of descent much in order to reduce height. According to the DFDR the autothrottle thrust mode changed to go-around mode at a height of approximately 120 ft [and] the distance to the threshold [of RWY 07] was 520 m." The mode change caused the thrust of both engines to increase. "The speed increased to 149 kt and the aircraft climbed slightly above the glide slope. When the captain was retarding the throttles against the autothrottle movement to idle thrust the aircraft passed the RWY 07 threshold at a height of 50 ft and with a speed of 155 kt [24 kt overspeed]. ... Immediately after the engines obtained idle thrust, the thrust started to increase again ... The autothrottle was disengaged three seconds before touchdown. ... The aircraft touched down at a distance of 600 nm [beyond] the normal touch-down point ... with a speed of 153 kt (26 kt of overspeed). ... The nose gear touched down first. The touchdown force was normal. ... The captain applied the brakes immediately after touchdown and did not release them [until] the aircraft had stopped. The aircraft started to shudder and vibrate severely approximately three seconds after touchdown. The wings had lift because of the considerable overspeed and because the spoilers were not deployed. The captain retarted [in sic] the thrust to idle which was reached six seconds after touchdown. ... Reverse thrust was applied 10 s after touchdown ... The captain realised that the remaining runway length was not sufficient for stopping and decided to steer the aircraft with the rudder out of the runway to the right in order to avoid crashing into the electrical equipment on the runway extension. Actually the aircraft turned mostly because only the right brakes were operating. The nose of the aircraft turned right whichafter [in sic] the aircraft sideslipped from the asphalt to the grass area left side first." The accident report was translated into English from the Finnish original report.
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  7.  
  8. Source: Endsley, M.R. & Strauch, B. (1997). Automation and situation awareness: The accident at Cali, Columbia. In R.S. Jensen & L. Rakovan (Eds.), Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 877-881. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University.
    Source Type:   Accident
    Synopsis: "The circumstances of the accident involving an American Airlines (AA) Boeing 757 that struck a mountain while in descent for a landing at Cali, Colombia, on December 20, 1995, and the manner in which the pilots lost situation awareness (SA), reveal much about the nature of situation awareness and the factors that can affect it in a dynamic environment such as an aircraft cockpit. In this paper, we will closely examine the circumstances that contributed to the loss of situation awareness by the pilots and describe how this led ultimately to the accident."
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  9.  
  10. Source: Investigation Commission of Ministry of Transport - France (1989). Final report concerning the accident which occurred on June 26th 1988 at Mulhouse-Habsheim (68) to the Airbus A 320, registered F-GFKC. Ministry of Planning, Housing, Transport and Maritime Affairs.
    Source Type:   Accident
    Synopsis: "On the 26th of June 1988, the Air France Airbus A320 aircraft registered F-GFKC was to perform for Air Charter a series of flights with passengers on behalf of the Mulhouse flying club. For the first roundtrip flight from Basle-Mulhouse, the pilot in the left seat was the designated captain, and he had the controls. During taxiing, the captain explained in detail the program of the flyby to be made at Habsheim (first overflight at low speed, with landing gear and flaps extended, at a height of 100 ft., the overflight at high speed in clean configuration). The intention to make two overflights was transmitted to air traffic control by radio. The motorway was used as the first visual navigation landmark, then a track, parallel to the motorway, leading to the Habsheim aerodome. At 12:44, the aircraft left this level flight altitude and descended toward the aerodome, which was identified visually. The engines were throttled back. Flap and landing gear were extended at start of descent. The vertical speed during descent was 600 ft./min. The first officer informed the captain that the aircraft was reaching 100 ft. at 12:45.14 and simultaneously the radio altimeter emitted a "100 ft." message, the vertical speed still being 600 ft./min. The descent continued at a slightly lower rate down to 50 ft. above ground level (agl.), which was reached 8 sec. after passing through 100 ft. agl., then at a very low rate down to 30-35 ft. above the ground, the aircraft then remaining more or less in level flight. Throughout the whole descent and at the start of level flight made with engines set to flight idle, the aircraft decelerated and its pitch-up increased during the last 25 sec. of flight. The end of the descent and the level flight were made above Runway 34R. Between 12:45.34 and 12:45.35, the engine controls were set to initiate go-around (the acceleration of the engines can be seen on the flight data recorder at 12:45.35). The aircraft touched the trees shortly after the end of the runway at 12:45.40; at this time, engine speed was around 83% N1, the pitch altitude of the aircraft was 14°. The aircraft was totally destroyed by the successive impacts and the very violent fire which followed."
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  11.  
  12. Source: Investigation Commission of Ministry of Transport - France (1993). Rapport de la Commission d'Enquete sur l'Accident survenu le 20 Janvier 1992 pres du Mont Saite Odile (Bas Rhin) a l/Airbus A.320 Immatricule F-GGED Exploite par lay Compagnie Air Inter. Official English translation from the Ministere de l'Equipement, des Transports et du Tourisme, France. Ministere de l'Equipement, des Transports et du Tourisme.
    Source Type:   Accident
    Synopsis: "On the 20th of January 1992, the Airbus A320 aircraft registered F-GGED operated by Air Inter was operating a scheduled night flight between Lyon-Satolas and Strasbourg-Entzheim under the radio call sign ITF 148 DA. The departure from Lyons was at 17h20 with 90 passengers, 2 flight crew members and 4 cabin crew members. During the flight no problems were reported by the crew. The active runway was 05. The crew had planned to carry out an ILS approach procedure for runway 23 but after having heard the information from the ATIS, the crew planned to make an ILS approach on 23 followed by a visual onto 05. Before transferring the aircraft to the Strasbourg approach control, the Centre Régional de la Navigation Aérienne (CRNA) east of Reims cleared them down to flight level 70 toward the ANDLO beacon. At 18h09, contact was established with the Strasbourg approach control. The aircraft had crossed to flight level 150 during descent and its distance to VOR STR was 22 nautical miles. The Strasbourg controller asks them to turn towards the ANDLO beacon and gave them clearance to descend to 5000 feet on the QNH. After they announced they had passed over ANDLO, the controller authorized a VOR-DME approach for runway 05. However, taking into account the altitude and the speed of the plane, the direct approach procedure was not possible and the crew signaled to the controller their intention to carry out an ILS 23 procedure followed by a visual onto 05. The controller advised them that in view of the approach they requested, they may have to wait to allow three aircraft to take off of runway 05. The crew decided to change their approach strategy and advised the controller that they would carry out a complete VOR-DME procedure for runway 05. The controller then suggested radar guidance to bring the crew over the ANDLO beacon to shorten the approach procedure. The aircraft was several seconds from VOR STR. The crew accepted and carried out the changes that the controller indicated: turn left to heading 230° for a parallel alignment and then turn to return to the ANDLO beacon. At 18h19 the controller authorized them for final approach and advised the crew that the plane was passing to the right of ANDLO beacon. The plane began its descent, noticeably at the distance planned for the approach procedure, it was 11 nautical miles from VOR STR. Thirty seconds later the controller asks the crew to report when over STR. The crew acknowledges this message. This is the last contact with the plane. The wreckage was found at approximately 22h35, on a slope of the mountain "La Bloss" at a topographical altitude of 800 meters (2620 feet), at about 0.8 nautical miles to the left of the axis of approach and at 10.5 nautical miles from the end of the runway. "
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  13.  
  14. Source: Main Commission Aircraft Accident Investigation - Poland (1994). Report on the accident to Airbus A320-211 Aircraft in Warsaw on 14 September 1993.
    Source Type:   Accident
    Synopsis: "On the 14th of September 1993, the Lufthansa Airlines, Inc. Airbus A320-211 aircraft registered D-AIPN was flying a regularly scheduled flight. Flight DLH 2904 was scheduled to fly from Frankfurt to Barcelona to Frankfurt to Warsaw and back to Frankfurt. The legs from Frankfurt to Barcelona to Frankfurt were performed uneventfully. The accident occurred during the flight from Frankfurt to Warsaw and carried two flight crew, four cabin crew and 64 passengers. DLH 2904 flight from Frankfurt to Warsaw progressed normally until Warsaw Okecie Control Tower warned the crew that windshear existed on the approach to Runway 11. This had been reported to Warsaw Okecie Control Tower by DLH 5764 who had just landed. According to Flight Manual instructions PF used an increased approach speed and with this speed touched down on Runway 11 in Okecie aerodome. A very light touch of the runway surface with the landing gear and it consequential lack of compression of the left landing gear resulted in delayed deployment of spoilers and thrust reversers. Delay was about 9 seconds. Because the braking commenced with delay and there was the condition of heavy rain and a strong tailwind, the aircraft did not stop on the runway. The aircraft rolled over the end of the runway and after traveling another 90 meters its left wing collided with an embankment. When the aircraft collided with the embankment, its fuel tanks were damaged and fuel began to spill on the left side of the fuselage. The fuel was ignited most probably because of contact with hot parts on the damaged left engine. Evacuation of passengers, organized by the four cabin crew, contributed to the rescue of 63 of the 64 passengers on board. The left seat pilot survived but the right seat pilot was killed during the collision with the embankment. Aerodome fire service extinguished the fire on the aircraft."
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  15.  
  16. Source: Ministry of Civil Aviation - India (1990). Report on Accident to Indian Airlines Airbus A-320 Aircraft VT-EPN at Bangalore, February 14, 1990. Ministry of Civil Aviation, Government of India.
    Source Type:   Accident
    Synopsis: "On the 14th of February 1990, the India Airlines Airbus A320 aircraft registered VT-EPN was operating a scheduled passenger flight IC-605 from Bombay to Bangalore. Capt. S.S. Gopujkar was in command of the flight. Capt. C.A. Fernandez was the second pilot operating under supervision. There were five cabin crew and a total of 135 passengers and four infants on board the flight. The aircraft took off from Bombay at 1158 hours (Indian Standard Time) and after it had reported the runway was in sight, landing clearance on runway 09 was given by Bangalore Control Tower at 1302 hours. During the final approach, the aircraft descended below the normal approach path and its wheels contacted ground in the golf course area at about 2300 feet from the beginning of the runway and impacted the embankment at the boundary of the golf course. The aircraft thereafter hopped over a nullah and a road adjacent to the golf course and landed on the area outside the boundary wall of the airport. The aircraft was destroyed due to the impact and fire. In all, 90 persons on board including both flight crew members and two cabin crew died in the accident. The accident occurred in broad daylight. The Probable Cause of the Accident was the failure of the pilots to realize the gravity of the situation and respond immediately with the proper action of moving the throttles. The pilots spent the final seconds of the flight before the accident trying to understand why the plane was in idle/open descent mode."
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  17.  
  18. Source: Ministry of Transport Japan, Aircraft Accident Investigation Commission (1996). China Airlines Airbus Industrie A300B4-622R, B1816, Nagoya Airport, April 26, 1994. Report 96-5. Ministry of Transport.
    Source Type:   Accident
    Synopsis: "China Airlines Airbus Industrie A300B4-622R B1816 took off from Taipei International Airport at 0853 UTC (1753 JST) on April 26, 1994 and continued flying according to its flight plan. About 1116 UTC (2016 JST), while approaching Nagoya airport for landing, the aircraft crashed into the landing zone close to E1 taxiway of the airport. ... While the aircraft was making an ILS approach to Runway 34 of Nagoya Airport, under manual control by the F/O, the F/O inadvertently activated the GO lever, which changed the FD (Flight Director) to GO AROUND mode and caused a thrust increase. This made the aircraft deviate above its normal glide path. The APs were subsequently engaged, with GO AROUND mode still engaged. Under these conditions the F/O continued pushing the control wheel in accordance with the CAP's instructions. As a result of this, the THS (Horizontal Stabilizer) moved to its full nose-up position and caused an abnormal out-of-trim situation. The crew continued approach, unaware of the abnormal situation. The AOA increased, the Alpha floor function was activated and the pitch angle increased. It is considered that, at this time, the CAP (who had now taken the controls), judged that landing would be difficult and opted for go-around. The aircraft began to climb steeply with a high pitch angle attitude. The CAP and the F/O did not carry out an effective recovery operation, and the aircraft stalled and crashed. ... On board the aircraft were 271 persons: 256 passengers (including 2 infants) and 15 crew members, of whom 264 persons (249 passengers including 2 infants and 15 crew members) were killed and 7 passengers were seriously injured. The aircraft ignited, and was destroyed." The accident report written in Japanese was translated into English.
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  19.  
  20. Source: National Transportation Safety Board (1973). Eastern Airlines, Incorporated, L-1011, N31OEA, Miami, Florida, December 29, 1972. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-73-14. Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board.
    Source Type:   Accident
    Synopsis: "On December 29, 1972, an Eastern Air Lines Lockheed L-1011 crashed at 2342 eastern standard time, approximately 18 miles west-northwest of Miami International Airport, Miami, Florida. The aircraft was destroyed. There were 163 passengers and a crew of 13 aboard the aircraft; 94 passengers and 5 crewmembers received fatal injuries. All other occupants received injuries which ranged in severity from minor to critical. The flight diverted from its approach to Miami International Airport because the nose landing gear position indicating system of the aircraft did not indicate that the nose gear was locked in the down position. The aircraft climbed to 2,000 feet mean sea level and followed a clearance to proceed west from the airport at that altitude. During this time, the crew attempted to correct the malfunction and to determine whether of not the nose landing gear was extended. The aircraft crashed into the Everglades shortly after being cleared by Miami Approach Control for a left turn back to Miami International Airport. Surviving passengers and crewmembers stated that the flight was routine and operated normally before impact with the ground. The National Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the flight crew to monitor the flight instruments during the final 4 minutes of flight, and to detect an unexpected descent soon enough to prevent impact with the ground. Preoccupation with a malfunction of the nose landing gear position indicating system distracted the crew's attention from the instruments and allowed the descent to go unnoticed."
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  21.  
  22. Source: National Transportation Safety Board (1973). Trans World Airlines, Incorporated, Boeing 707-331C, N788TW, John F. Kennedy International Airport, Jamacia, New York, December 12, 1972. Washington, DC: National Technical Information Service.
    Source Type:   Accident
    Synopsis: "On December 12, 1972, Trans World Airlines, Inc., Flight 669, a Boeing 707-331C, N788TW, was a scheduled cargo flight from Friendship International Airport, Baltimore, Maryland, to John F. Kennedy International Airport, Jamacia, New York. At 2256 eastern standard time, the aircraft crashed at John F. Kennedy International Airport while executing an instrument landing system approach to Runway 4R. After the descent from cruising altitude, using the autopilot approach coupler, the aircraft was established on the instrument landing system. When nearing Decision Height, the aircraft continued below the glide slope until it struck approach light bars which were mounted on a wooden pier just short of the runway threshold area. The aircraft crashed onto the runway and slid approximately 2,600 feet. It came to rest on sandy ground about 500 feet to the right of the runway edge on a heading reversed to its initial direction. The official weather observation that was made at John F. Kennedy International Airport at 2251 eastern standard time was, in part: Ceiling indefinite 200 feet, sky obscured, visibility 1/2-mile, light drizzle, fog, wind 040° 5 knots, and runway visual range for Runway 4R 4,500 feet variable to more than 6,000 feet. The aircraft received substantial damage. The main landing gear and all of the engines separated along the deceleration path. There was no fire. The three flight crewmembers were the only persons aboard the aircraft, and none was injured. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was that the captain did not maintain a safe descent path by visual external reference during an instrument landing system approach."
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  23.  
  24. Source: National Transportation Safety Board (1980). Aeromexico DC-10-30 over Luxembourg, November 11, 1979. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-80-10. Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board.
    Source Type:   Accident
    Synopsis: "About 2138, on November 11, 1979, AEROMEXICO, Flight 945, XA-DUH, a McDonnell-Douglas DC-10-30 aircraft, entered a prestall buffet and a sustained stall over Luxembourg, Europe, at 29,800 ft while climbing to 31,000 ft en route to Miami, Florida, from Frankfurt, Germany. Stall recovery was effected at 18,900 ft. After recovery, the crew performed an inflight functional check of the aircraft and, after finding that it operated properly, continued to their intended destination. After arrival at Miami, Florida, it was discovered that portions of both outboard elevators and the lower fuselage tail area maintenance access door were missing. There were no injuries to the 311 persons on board Flight 945. No injuries or damage to personnel or property on the ground was reported. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the incident. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this incident was the failure of the flightcrew to follow standard climb procedures and to adequately monitor the aircraft's flight instruments. This resulted in the aircraft entering into a prolonged stall buffet which placed the aircraft outside the design envelope."
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  25.  
  26. Source: National Transportation Safety Board (1982). World Airways, Inc. Flight 30H McDonnell Douglas DC-10-3-CF, N113WA, Boston-Logan International Airport, Boston, Massachusetts, January 23, 1982. Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board.
    Source Type:   Accident
    Synopsis: "On January 23, 1982, World Airways, Inc. Flight 30H, a McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30, was a regularly scheduled passenger flight from Oakland, California, to Boston Massachusetts, with an en route stop at Newark, New Jersey. Following a nonprecision instrument approach to runway 15R at Boston-Logan International Airport, the airplane touched down about 2,500 feet beyond the displaced threshold of the 9,191-foot usable part of the runway. About 1936:40, the airplane veered to avoid the approach light pier at the departure end of the runway and slid into the shallow water of Boston Harbor. The nose section separated from the forward fuselage in the impact after the airplane dropped from the shore embankment. Of the 212 persons on board, two are missing and presumed dead. The others evacuated the airplane safely, but with some injuries. The weather was 800-foot overcast, 2 1/2-mile visibility, with light rain and fog. The temperature was 38° with the wind from 165° at 3 kns. The surface of runway 15R was covered with rain, hardpacked snow, and glaze ice. At 1736, 2 hours before the accident, runway braking was reported by a ground vehicle as fair to poor; subsequently, several pilots had reported braking as poor, and one pilot had reported braking as poor to nil in the hour before the accident. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the pilot landed the airplane without sufficient information as to runway conditions on a slippery, ice-covered runway, the condition of which exceeded the airplane's stopping capability. The lack of adequate information with respect to the runway was due to the fact that (1) the FAA regulations did not provide guidance to airport management regarding the measurement of runway slipperiness under adverse conditions; (2) the FAA regulations did not provide the flightcrew and other personnel with the means to correlate contaminated surfaces with airplane stopping distances; (3) the FAA regulations did not extend authorized minimum runway lengths to reflect reduced braking effectiveness on icy runways; (4) the Boston-Logan International Airport management failed to exercise maximum efforts to assess and improve the conditions of ice-covered runways to assure continued safety of heavy jet airplane operations; and, (5) tower controllers failed to transmit available braking information to the pilot of Flight 30H. Contributing to the accident was the failure of pilot reports on braking to convey the severity of the hazard to following pilots. The pilot's decision to retain autothrottle speed control throughout the flare and the consequent extended touchdown point on the runway contributed to the severity of the accident."
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  27.  
  28. Source: National Transportation Safety Board (1984). Scandinavian Airlines DC-10-30, J.F.K Airport, New York, February 2, 1984. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-84-15. Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board.
    Source Type:   Accident
    Synopsis: "On the 28th of February 1984, Scandinavian Airlines Flight 901, a McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30, was a regularly scheduled international passenger flight from Stockholm, Sweden, to New York City, New York, with an en route stop at Oslo, Norway. Following an approach to runway 4 right at New York's John F. Kennedy International Airport, the airplane touched down about 4,700 ft (1,440 meters) beyond the threshold of the 8,400-foot (2,560-meter) runway and could not be stopped on the runway. The airplane was steered to the right to avoid the approach light pier at the departure end of the runway and came to rest in Thurston Basin, a tidal waterway located about 600 ft from the departure end of runway 4R. The 163 passengers and 14 crewmembers evacuated the airplane safely, but a few received minor injuries. The nose and lower forward fuselage sections, wing engines, flaps, and leading edge devices were substantially damaged at impact. The weather was ceiling 200 ft overcast, 3/4-mile visibility, with light drizzle and fog. The temperature was 47°F with the wind from 100° at 5 knots. The surface of the runway was wet, but there was no standing water."
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  29.  
  30. Source: National Transportation Safety Board (1986). China Airlines B-747-SP, 300 NM Northwest of San Francisco, February 19, 1985. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-86-03. Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board.
    Source Type:   Accident
    Synopsis: "On the 19th of February 1985, the China Airlines flight 006, a Boeing 747-SP-09, enroute to Los Angeles, California from Taipei, Taiwan, suffered an inflight upset. The flight from Taipei to about 300 nm northwest of San Francisco was uneventful and the airplane was flying at about 41,000 feet mean sea level when the No.4 engine lost power. During the attempt to recover and restore normal power on the No. 4 engine, the airplane rolled to the right, nosed over, and entered an uncontrollable descent. The captain was unable to restore the airplane to stable flight until it had descended to 9,500 feet. After the captain stabilized the airplane, he elected to divert to San Francisco International Airport, where a safe landing was made. Although the airplane suffered major structural damage during the upset, descent, and subsequent recovery, only two persons among the 274 passengers and crew on board were injured seriously. "
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  31.  
  32. Source: National Transportation Safety Board (1994). Stall and Loss of Control on Final Approach, Atlantic Coast Airlines, Inc., United Express Flight 6291, Jetstream 4101, N304UE, Columbus, Ohio, January 7, 1994. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-94/07. Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board.
    Source Type:   Accident
    Synopsis: "On January 7, 1994, about 2321 EST, a Jetstream 4101, registration N304UE, operated by Atlantic Coast Airlines, Sterling, VA, and doing business as United Express flight 6291, crashed 1.2 nautical miles east of runway 28L at Port Columbus International Airport, Columbus, Ohio. The airplane was being operated as a regularly scheduled commuter flight under 14 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 135, from Washington Dulles International Airport, Chantilly, VA, to Columbus, OH. The flight had been cleared for an instrument landing system approach to runway 28L and was in contact with the local tower controller when it crashed into a storage warehouse. The pilot, copilot, flight attendant, and two passengers were fatally injured. Two of the other three passengers received minor injuries, while the third was not injured. The airplane was destroyed. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time, and the airplane was on an instrument flight rules flight plan."
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  33.  
  34. Source: National Transportation Safety Board (1997). Wheels-Up Landing, Continental Airlines Flight 1943, Douglas DC-9 N10556, Houston, Texas, February 19, 1996. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-97/01. Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board.
    Source Type:   Accident
    Synopsis: On February 19, 1996, at 0902 central standard time, Continental Airlines (COA) flight 1943, a Douglas DC-9-32, N10556, landed wheels up on runway 27 at the Houston Intercontinental Airport, Houston, Texas. The airplane slid 6,850 feet before coming to rest in the grass about 140 feet left of the runway centerline. The cabin began to fill with smoke, and the captain ordered the evacuation of the airplane. There were 82 passengers, 2 flightcrew members, and 3 flight attendants aboard the airplane. No fatalities or serious injuries occurred; 12 minor injuries to passengers were reported. The airplane sustained substantial damage to its lower fuselage. The regularly scheduled passenger flight was operating under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 and had originated from Washington National Airport about 3 hours before the accident. An instrument flight rules flight plan had been filed; however, visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the landing in Houston. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the captain’s decision to continue the approach contrary to COA standard operating procedures that mandate a go-around when an approach is unstabilized below 500 feet or a ground proximity warning system alert continues below 200 feet above field elevation. The following factors contributed to the accident: (1) the flightcrew’s failure to properly complete the in-range checklist, which resulted in a lack of hydraulic pressure to lower the landing gear and deploy the flaps; (2) the flightcrew’s failure to perform the landing checklist and confirm that the landing gear was extended; (3) the inadequate remedial actions by COA to ensure adherence to standard operating procedures; and (4) the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) inadequate oversight of COA to ensure adherence to standard operating procedures. Safety issues discussed in this report include checklist design, flightcrew training, adherence to standard operating procedures, adequacy of FAA surveillance, and flight attendant tailcone training. Safety recommendations concerning these issues were made to the FAA.
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  35.  
  36. Source: National Transportation Safety Board (1998). In-Flight Icing Encounter and Uncontrolled Collision with Terrain, COMAIR Flight 3272, Embraer EMB-120RT, N265CA, Monroe, Michigan, January 9, 1997. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-98/04. Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board.
    Source Type:   Accident
    Synopsis: About 1554 eastern standard time, on January 9, 1997, an Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica, S/A EMB-120RT, N265CA, operated by COMAIR Airlines, Inc., as flight 3272, crashed during a rapid descent after an uncommanded roll excursion near Monroe, Michigan. Flight 3272 was being operated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 as a scheduled, domestic passenger flight from the Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International Airport, Covington, Kentucky, to the Detroit Metropolitan/Wayne County Airport, Detroit, Michigan. The flight departed Covington, Kentucky, about 1508, with 2 flightcrew members, 1 flight attendant, and 26 passengers on board. There were no survivors. The airplane was destroyed by ground impact forces and a postaccident fire. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident, and flight 3272 was operating on an instrument flight rules flight plan. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) failure to establish adequate aircraft certification standards for flight in icing conditions, the FAA's failure to ensure that a Centro Tecnico Aeroespacial/FAA-approved procedure for the accident airplane's deice system operation was implemented by U.S.-based air carriers, and the FAA's failure to require the establishment of adequate minimum airspeeds for icing conditions, which led to the loss of control when the airplane accumulated a thin, rough accretion of ice on its lifting surfaces. Contributing to the accident were the flightcrew's decision to operate in icing conditions near the lower margin of the operating airspeed envelope (with flaps retracted) and Comair's failure to establish and adequately disseminate unambiguous minimum airspeed values for flap configurations and for flight in icing conditions. The safety issues in this report focused on procedures for the use of ice protection systems, airspeed and flap configuration information, stall warning/protection system capabilities, operation of the autopilot in icing conditions, aircraft icing certification requirements, and icing-related research. Safety recommendations concerning these issues were addressed to the FAA and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Also, as a result of this accident, on May 21, 1997, the Safety Board issued four safety recommendations to the FAA regarding EMB-120 minimum airspeed information, ice protection system operational procedures, and ice detection/warning systems.
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  37.  
  38. Source: National Transportation Safety Board (2000). Controlled Flight Into Terrain, Korean Air Flight 801, Boeing 747-300, HL7468, Nimitz Hill, Guam, August 6, 1997. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-00/01. Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board.
    Source Type:   Accident
    Synopsis: On August 6, 1997, about 0142:26 Guam local time, Korean Air flight 801, a Boeing 747-3B5B (747-300), Korean registration HL7468, operated by Korean Air Company, Ltd., crashed at Nimitz Hill, Guam. Flight 801 departed from Kimpo International Airport, Seoul, Korea, with 2 pilots, 1 flight engineer, 14 flight attendants, and 237 passengers on board. The airplane had been cleared to land on runway 6 Left at A.B. Won Guam International Airport, Agana, Guam, and crashed into high terrain about 3 miles southwest of the airport. Of the 254 persons on board, 228 were killed, and 23 passengers and 3 flight attendants survived the accident with serious injuries. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash fire. Flight 801 was operating in U.S. airspace as a regularly scheduled international passenger service flight under the Convention on International Civil Aviation and the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 129 and was on an instrument flight rules flight plan. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the Korean Air flight 801 accident was the captain’s failure to adequately brief and execute the nonprecision approach and the first officer’s and flight engineer’s failure to effectively monitor and cross-check the captain’s execution of the approach. Contributing to these failures were the captain’s fatigue and Korean Air’s inadequate flight crew training. Contributing to the accident was the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) intentional inhibition of the minimum safe altitude warning system (MSAW) at Guam and the agency’s failure to adequately manage the system. The safety issues in this report focus on flight crew performance, approach procedures, and pilot training; air traffic control, including controller performance and the intentional inhibition of the MSAW system at Guam; emergency response; the adequacy of Korean Civil Aviation Bureau (KCAB) and FAA oversight; and flight data recorder documentation. Safety recommendations concerning these issues are addressed to the FAA, the Governor of the Territory of Guam, and the KCAB.
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  39.  
  40. Source: Nepal Aircraft Accident Investigation Committee (1992). Report on the Accident of Thai Airways International A310 Flight TG 311 (HS-TID) on 31 July 1992. His Majesty's Government of Nepal.
    Source Type:   Accident
    Synopsis: Thai Airways International A310 Flight TG 311 (HS-TID) -- 31 July 1992 "The flight was conducting the Sierra (VOR/DME) approach to runway 02 at Tribhuvan International Airport, Kathmandu, in instrument weather conditions. A flap fault occurred while the flight was on the approach; this caused the crew to ask for clearance back to Calcutta, a decision that was in keeping with both Company and performance requirements, which necessitate the use of full flaps for the steep final approach. Shortly (21 seconds) after making this request, at a distance of approximately 12 nautical miles from the Kathmandu VOR, the flap fault was rectified by retracting and then reselecting the flaps. The crew determined that it was not possible to continue the straight-in approach, due to the steep descent angles required and the position of the aircraft. The crew stated to the Control tower that they wished to start their approach again and requested a left turn back to the Romeo fix, which is 41 nautical miles south south-west (202 radial) of the Kathmandu VOR. The Controller, in the non-radar environment, responded by clearing the flight to make the Sierra approach, which starts at the 202 radial and 16 nautical miles from the VOR. The crew response to the clearance was to report that, at the moment, they couldn't land and to ask again for left turn back to Romeo to start their approach again. After further dialogue with the Controller, which included requests for a left turn, the crew unilaterally initiated a right turn from the aircraft's 025 degree heading and commenced a climb from an altitude of 10,500 feet to flight level 180, when the flight was about 7 nautical miles south of the Kathmandu VOR. The crew reported to the Tower Controller that the flight was climbing and the Controller replied by instructing the crew to report at 16 nautical miles for the Sierra approach. During the turn, there was more discussion between the Tower Controller and the flight, where it was established that the aircraft was to maintain an altitude of 11,500 feet and was to "proceed to Romeo" and contact the Area Control Center (ACC) Controller. The flight, commencing a descent while in the turn, completed a 360-degree turn, momentarily rolling out on headings of 045 and 340 degrees, and again proceeded toward the north on a heading of 025 degrees magnetic. When the flight was about 5 nautical miles south-west of the Kathmandu VOR, the crew contacted the Area Control Center and stated that the aircraft was "heading 025" and they wished to proceed to Romeo to start their approach again; adding they had "technical problems concerned with the flight." It was again established that the flight was to proceed to Romeo and the crew agreed to "report over Romeo." It was determined from the cockpit voice recorder that the crew was in the process of inserting "Romeo" and other related navigational information in the Flight Management System, but were experiencing difficulties. The flight continued towards the north on a heading of 025 degrees and then, at about 16 nautical miles north, the heading was altered to the left to 005 degrees. Slightly over one minute later, the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) sounded the warning "terrain" "terrain" followed by "whoop whoop pull-up"; the aural warning continued until impact approximately 16 seconds later. Engine thrust was increasing and "Level Change" had been announced on the cockpit, just before the impact occurred at the 11,500-foot level of a 16,000-foot peak; the accident site was located on the 015 radial (north-north east) at 23.3 nautical miles from the Kathmandu VOR. All on board, 99 passengers and 14 crew members, lost their lives, and the aircraft was destroyed."
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  41.  
  42. Source: Strauch, B. (1997). Automation and decision making -- lessons from the Cali accident. In Proceedings of the 41st Annual Meeting of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 195-199.
    Source Type:   Accident
    Synopsis: "The accident involving an American Airlines Boeing 757 that crashed on approach to Cali, Colombia, in December 1995, was examined to better understand the errors that the pilots committed. Their loss of situation awareness about their proximity to terrain resulted from several factors involving their use of the flight management system under high workload conditions, The implications of FMS use on our understanding of situation awareness and decision making are explored."
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