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All Evidence from Surveys 625 matching pieces of evidence found.


  1.  
  2. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: In response to the question: "If you feel that crew coordination/communication is impacted by the new technologies, do you see it as improved or reduced?" 11 pilots [22%] responded that crew coordination/communication is "Reduced", 16 pilots [31%] responded that crew coordination/communication is"Improved", 5 pilots [10%] responded that there is "More" crew coordination/communication on a flightdeck with the new technologies, the remaining 19 pilots [37%] did not respond to the question.
    Issue: crew coordination problems may occur (Issue #84) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Braune, R.J. (1989). Boeing/Deutsche Lufthansa Mixed Fleet Study 737-200/ -300 (EFIS). See Resource details

  3.  
  4. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: In response to the question: "If you feel that crew coordination/communication is impacted by the new technologies, do you see it as improved or reduced?" 11 pilots [22%] responded that crew coordination/communication is "Reduced", 16 pilots [31%] responded that crew coordination/communication is"Improved", 5 pilots [10%] responded that there is "More" crew coordination/communication on a flightdeck with the new technologies, the remaining 19 pilots [37%] did not respond to the question.
    Issue: crew coordination problems may occur (Issue #84) See Issue details
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: B737
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Braune, R.J. (1989). Boeing/Deutsche Lufthansa Mixed Fleet Study 737-200/ -300 (EFIS). See Resource details

  5.  
  6. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Moreover, the functionality of being able to pre-program the FMS to carry out complex automated tasks requires pilots to convey these plans and instructions to the system. Since more complex instructions can be communicated, the communication becomes more complex, too. Rudisill [10] reports that pilots often express problems with entering instructions through the keypad into the FMS, particularly when under time pressure. Likewise, pilots have mentioned this issue to us as a particular problem: P1: “...during the high workload phases, operating the FMS, especially the tasks that you don’t do very often ... you might forget to put a slash or a stroke, whatever the format should be that you are typing into the scratchpad ... that is very distracting, getting the format correct. (page 4)
    Issue: automation may adversely affect pilot workload (Issue #79) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: FMS keyboard
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (2004). Should Computers Function as Collaborators?. See Resource details

  7.  
  8. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Automation was perceived as beneficial by the pilots we spoke to, thus reflecting a widely observed opinion: P2: “The autopilot takes a lot of the workload off the pilot... it also helps you in being more accurate.” (page 2)
    Issue: automation may adversely affect pilot workload (Issue #79) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (2004). Should Computers Function as Collaborators?. See Resource details

  9.  
  10. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Moreover, it is essential to be able to develop a good understanding of the characteristics and functions of other collaborators (e.g. what they can do, how they do it; how they are structured; what they cannot do). Whilst the behaviour of the computer-based systems may make perfect sense to the automation logic, it does not necessarily to the pilots: … P1: “There is one area on the 777 ... to do the VNAV approach they want you to open the speed window again. So it’s in VNAV and you open the speed window to manually set the speed, as soon as you put VNAV, the thing blanks, the speed bug jumps, it usually goes back to a lower speed ... and then you have to open it again and as soon as you open it, it’s back to whatever speed, and you watch the throttles come back. It’s messy. (page 4)
    Issue: automation may be too complex (Issue #40) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B777
    Equipment: FMS VNAV
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (2004). Should Computers Function as Collaborators?. See Resource details

  11.  
  12. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Moreover, it is essential to be able to develop a good understanding of the characteristics and functions of other collaborators (e.g. what they can do, how they do it; how they are structured; what they cannot do). Whilst the behaviour of the computer-based systems may make perfect sense to the automation logic, it does not necessarily to the pilots: … P2: “You have situations where ... you get close to the airport and the controller now vectors you ... the guy says when you’re established give me a call... [when going] from heading back to NAV ... all that happens is that the plane swings round and it is going back to where is was going before ... you run the chance of being disorientated ... before you do that you have to have moved the plane in the system onwards to the next point so you come into position. (page 4)
    Issue: automation may be too complex (Issue #40) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: FMS & ATC
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (2004). Should Computers Function as Collaborators?. See Resource details

  13.  
  14. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Whilst the pilots we have talked to did not report mode reversions, they reported many situations in which to make decisions as to what parts of the automated systems to use when, as a prominent aspect in pilots’ tasks. For example, situational factors often require the use of less sophisticated equipment (e.g. adverse weather conditions, landings, Air Traffic Control (ATC) giving headings), or pilots may need to decide when the automated systems cannot cope: P1: “But invariably on every flight the route is changed to some degree by ATC ... even to a point where you disconnect it from the FMS and fly in another mode.” P2: “On our descent they changed the runway three times ... for some reason we didn’t change the frequencies [the third time]. We came in ... looked from a distance... thought ‘this is wrong’... so we knocked off the autopilot.” P2: “Sometimes you have situations where you know the plane is supposed to turn at 4 miles and if it doesn’t then, because it’s so much easier to use the automated system to fly this departure, you’ll find the pilot will sit there and go like, ‘OK, I’ll give it a little more time’.” P2: “[in bad weather]... what you do is you take off the height control... A lot of up- and downdrafts ... can confuse the sensors... If it bobs up and down, you don’t have the autopilot fighting it. But that’s not a company procedure.” P2: “...due to traffic etc. they can’t descend you ... you now find that the system is telling you ‘top of descent’ but you have to ignore it ...suddenly the controller announces to you that you are cleared to descend... Now ... you have to close the throttles and pull out the spoilers, the speed breaks, which gives you the right maximum rate of descent, and in most of the times the autopilot cannot comprehend what is going on ... you have to knock off the descent mode and descent it yourself at the very high rates, and when you’re closer to your level you put it back on ... for the 727 you definitely have to remove the descent mode, in the Learjet you go to speed. (page 3)
    Issue: automation may lack reasonable functionality (Issue #109) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (2004). Should Computers Function as Collaborators?. See Resource details

  15.  
  16. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Moreover, it is essential to be able to develop a good understanding of the characteristics and functions of other collaborators (e.g. what they can do, how they do it; how they are structured; what they cannot do). Whilst the behaviour of the computer-based systems may make perfect sense to the automation logic, it does not necessarily to the pilots: P1: “It’s understanding the technology, and if you are not doing a particular function often enough you forget ... If you can understand it, you would be able to remember it a lot longer. (page 4)
    Issue: automation skills may be lost (Issue #137) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (2004). Should Computers Function as Collaborators?. See Resource details

  17.  
  18. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Whilst the pilots we have talked to did not report mode reversions, they reported many situations in which to make decisions as to what parts of the automated systems to use when, as a prominent aspect in pilots’ tasks. For example, situational factors often require the use of less sophisticated equipment (e.g. adverse weather conditions, landings, Air Traffic Control (ATC) giving headings), or pilots may need to decide when the automated systems cannot cope: P1: “But invariably on every flight the route is changed to some degree by ATC ... even to a point where you disconnect it from the FMS and fly in another mode.” P2: “On our descent they changed the runway three times ... for some reason we didn’t change the frequencies [the third time]. We came in ... looked from a distance... thought ‘this is wrong’... so we knocked off the autopilot.” P2: “Sometimes you have situations where you know the plane is supposed to turn at 4 miles and if it doesn’t then, because it’s so much easier to use the automated system to fly this departure, you’ll find the pilot will sit there and go like, ‘OK, I’ll give it a little more time’.” P2: “[in bad weather]... what you do is you take off the height control... A lot of up- and downdrafts ... can confuse the sensors... If it bobs up and down, you don’t have the autopilot fighting it. But that’s not a company procedure.” P2: “...due to traffic etc. they can’t descend you ... you now find that the system is telling you ‘top of descent’ but you have to ignore it ...suddenly the controller announces to you that you are cleared to descend... Now ... you have to close the throttles and pull out the spoilers, the speed breaks, which gives you the right maximum rate of descent, and in most of the times the autopilot cannot comprehend what is going on ... you have to knock off the descent mode and descent it yourself at the very high rates, and when you’re closer to your level you put it back on ... for the 727 you definitely have to remove the descent mode, in the Learjet you go to speed. ” (page 3)
    Issue: company automation policies and procedures may be inappropriate or inadequate (Issue #166) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (2004). Should Computers Function as Collaborators?. See Resource details

  19.  
  20. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Moreover, the functionality of being able to pre-program the FMS to carry out complex automated tasks requires pilots to convey these plans and instructions to the system. Since more complex instructions can be communicated, the communication becomes more complex, too. Rudisill [10] reports that pilots often express problems with entering instructions through the keypad into the FMS, particularly when under time pressure. Likewise, pilots have mentioned this issue to us as a particular problem: P1: “...during the high workload phases, operating the FMS, especially the tasks that you don’t do very often ... you might forget to put a slash or a stroke, whatever the format should be that you are typing into the scratchpad ... that is very distracting, getting the format correct. (page 4)
    Issue: data entry and programming may be difficult and time consuming (Issue #112) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: FMS keyboard
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (2004). Should Computers Function as Collaborators?. See Resource details

  21.  
  22. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Likewise, input procedures and dialogue structures have to follow the logic of the pilot’s task. Again, pilots reported problems with programming instructions to the FMS: P2: “You have to make sure that the departure clearance is linked up, it would just be flashing and say ‘no link’, so you may have to delete it and then it becomes a link. (page 4)
    Issue: data entry and programming may be difficult and time consuming (Issue #112) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation & FMS
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (2004). Should Computers Function as Collaborators?. See Resource details

  23.  
  24. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Whilst the pilots we have talked to did not report mode reversions, they reported many situations in which to make decisions as to what parts of the automated systems to use when, as a prominent aspect in pilots’ tasks. For example, situational factors often require the use of less sophisticated equipment (e.g. adverse weather conditions, landings, Air Traffic Control (ATC) giving headings), or pilots may need to decide when the automated systems cannot cope: P1: “But invariably on every flight the route is changed to some degree by ATC ... even to a point where you disconnect it from the FMS and fly in another mode.” P2: “On our descent they changed the runway three times ... for some reason we didn’t change the frequencies [the third time]. We came in ... looked from a distance... thought ‘this is wrong’... so we knocked off the autopilot.” P2: “Sometimes you have situations where you know the plane is supposed to turn at 4 miles and if it doesn’t then, because it’s so much easier to use the automated system to fly this departure, you’ll find the pilot will sit there and go like, ‘OK, I’ll give it a little more time’.” P2: “[in bad weather]... what you do is you take off the height control... A lot of up- and downdrafts ... can confuse the sensors... If it bobs up and down, you don’t have the autopilot fighting it. But that’s not a company procedure.” P2: “...due to traffic etc. they can’t descend you ... you now find that the system is telling you ‘top of descent’ but you have to ignore it ...suddenly the controller announces to you that you are cleared to descend... Now ... you have to close the throttles and pull out the spoilers, the speed breaks, which gives you the right maximum rate of descent, and in most of the times the autopilot cannot comprehend what is going on ... you have to knock off the descent mode and descent it yourself at the very high rates, and when you’re closer to your level you put it back on ... for the 727 you definitely have to remove the descent mode, in the Learjet you go to speed. ” (page 3)
    Issue: flightdeck automation may be incompatible with ATC system (Issue #82) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: FMS & ATC
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (2004). Should Computers Function as Collaborators?. See Resource details

  25.  
  26. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Automation was perceived as beneficial by the pilots we spoke to, thus reflecting a widely observed opinion: … P1: “In all the planes I have flown, the 777 has been the most user-friendly ... if you think about how the system would function, it’s generally how it does function, they obviously thought about it in the design. (page 2)
    Issue: human-centered design philosophy may be lacking (Issue #100) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B777
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (2004). Should Computers Function as Collaborators?. See Resource details

  27.  
  28. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Whilst the pilots we have talked to did not report mode reversions, they reported many situations in which to make decisions as to what parts of the automated systems to use when, as a prominent aspect in pilots’ tasks. For example, situational factors often require the use of less sophisticated equipment (e.g. adverse weather conditions, landings, Air Traffic Control (ATC) giving headings), or pilots may need to decide when the automated systems cannot cope: P1: “But invariably on every flight the route is changed to some degree by ATC ... even to a point where you disconnect it from the FMS and fly in another mode.” P2: “On our descent they changed the runway three times ... for some reason we didn’t change the frequencies [the third time]. We came in ... looked from a distance... thought ‘this is wrong’... so we knocked off the autopilot.” P2: “Sometimes you have situations where you know the plane is supposed to turn at 4 miles and if it doesn’t then, because it’s so much easier to use the automated system to fly this departure, you’ll find the pilot will sit there and go like, ‘OK, I’ll give it a little more time’.” P2: “[in bad weather]... what you do is you take off the height control... A lot of up- and downdrafts ... can confuse the sensors... If it bobs up and down, you don’t have the autopilot fighting it. But that’s not a company procedure.” P2: “...due to traffic etc. they can’t descend you ... you now find that the system is telling you ‘top of descent’ but you have to ignore it ...suddenly the controller announces to you that you are cleared to descend... Now ... you have to close the throttles and pull out the spoilers, the speed breaks, which gives you the right maximum rate of descent, and in most of the times the autopilot cannot comprehend what is going on ... you have to knock off the descent mode and descent it yourself at the very high rates, and when you’re closer to your level you put it back on ... for the 727 you definitely have to remove the descent mode, in the Learjet you go to speed. ” (page 3)
    Issue: pilots may be reluctant to assume control (Issue #26) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (2004). Should Computers Function as Collaborators?. See Resource details

  29.  
  30. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Collaboration requires the maintenance of (mutual) awareness (e.g. what others are doing, intending, have done, found out). Whilst the above-mentioned implications of role switches between pilot and automation (e.g. ironies of automation, automation surprises) may sometimes be unavoidable, their effects may be mitigated by enabling better awareness of computer collaborator’s activities. Human collaborators would consider mode reversions very bad practice without announcing them clearly, ensuring that they have been noticed, and coordinating their effects in relation to collaborators’ activities and plans. Likewise, the supervisory role of pilots needs to be supported by providing suitable indications of automation progress, status, and predictions [13]. Pilots need to constantly double-check what the automation is doing since responsibility remains with them: P1: “you tend to double-check, although the longer you are on the airplane, the more confident you become. I certainly do that with the descent and the approach, double-check using my little method, a lot of guys I guess do the same sort of thing.” P2: “Generally no matter what system you are using you have to monitor it all the time ... you know in three minutes you are going to be here and the plane is going to turn right. (page 4)
    Issue: pilots may lack confidence in automation (Issue #46) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (2004). Should Computers Function as Collaborators?. See Resource details

  31.  
  32. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Collaboration requires the maintenance of (mutual) awareness (e.g. what others are doing, intending, have done, found out). Whilst the above-mentioned implications of role switches between pilot and automation (e.g. ironies of automation, automation surprises) may sometimes be unavoidable, their effects may be mitigated by enabling better awareness of computer collaborator’s activities. Human collaborators would consider mode reversions very bad practice without announcing them clearly, ensuring that they have been noticed, and coordinating their effects in relation to collaborators’ activities and plans. Likewise, the supervisory role of pilots needs to be supported by providing suitable indications of automation progress, status, and predictions [13]. Pilots need to constantly double-check what the automation is doing since responsibility remains with them: P1: “you tend to double-check, although the longer you are on the airplane, the more confident you become. I certainly do that with the descent and the approach, double-check using my little method, a lot of guys I guess do the same sort of thing.” P2: “Generally no matter what system you are using you have to monitor it all the time ... you know in three minutes you are going to be here and the plane is going to turn right.” (page 4)
    Issue: pilots may lack confidence in automation (Issue #46) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (2004). Should Computers Function as Collaborators?. See Resource details

  33.  
  34. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Whilst the pilots we have talked to did not report mode reversions, they reported many situations in which to make decisions as to what parts of the automated systems to use when, as a prominent aspect in pilots’ tasks. For example, situational factors often require the use of less sophisticated equipment (e.g. adverse weather conditions, landings, Air Traffic Control (ATC) giving headings), or pilots may need to decide when the automated systems cannot cope: P1: “But invariably on every flight the route is changed to some degree by ATC ... even to a point where you disconnect it from the FMS and fly in another mode.” P2: “On our descent they changed the runway three times ... for some reason we didn’t change the frequencies [the third time]. We came in ... looked from a distance... thought ‘this is wrong’... so we knocked off the autopilot.” P2: “Sometimes you have situations where you know the plane is supposed to turn at 4 miles and if it doesn’t then, because it’s so much easier to use the automated system to fly this departure, you’ll find the pilot will sit there and go like, ‘OK, I’ll give it a little more time’.” P2: “[in bad weather]... what you do is you take off the height control... A lot of up- and downdrafts ... can confuse the sensors... If it bobs up and down, you don’t have the autopilot fighting it. But that’s not a company procedure.” P2: “...due to traffic etc. they can’t descend you ... you now find that the system is telling you ‘top of descent’ but you have to ignore it ...suddenly the controller announces to you that you are cleared to descend... Now ... you have to close the throttles and pull out the spoilers, the speed breaks, which gives you the right maximum rate of descent, and in most of the times the autopilot cannot comprehend what is going on ... you have to knock off the descent mode and descent it yourself at the very high rates, and when you’re closer to your level you put it back on ... for the 727 you definitely have to remove the descent mode, in the Learjet you go to speed. ” (page 3)
    Issue: pilots may over-rely on automation (Issue #106) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (2004). Should Computers Function as Collaborators?. See Resource details

  35.  
  36. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: However, their responses also reflect the significance of change. P2: “People say to me ‘what do you do?’... I say I am a systems operator. (page 2)
    Issue: pilot's role may be changed (Issue #144) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (2004). Should Computers Function as Collaborators?. See Resource details

  37.  
  38. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Moreover, it is essential to be able to develop a good understanding of the characteristics and functions of other collaborators (e.g. what they can do, how they do it; how they are structured; what they cannot do). Whilst the behaviour of the computer-based systems may make perfect sense to the automation logic, it does not necessarily to the pilots: P1: “It’s understanding the technology, and if you are not doing a particular function often enough you forget ... If you can understand it, you would be able to remember it a lot longer. (page 4)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (2004). Should Computers Function as Collaborators?. See Resource details

  39.  
  40. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Moreover, it is essential to be able to develop a good understanding of the characteristics and functions of other collaborators (e.g. what they can do, how they do it; how they are structured; what they cannot do). Whilst the behaviour of the computer-based systems may make perfect sense to the automation logic, it does not necessarily to the pilots: … P1: “There is one area on the 777 ... to do the VNAV approach they want you to open the speed window again. So it’s in VNAV and you open the speed window to manually set the speed, as soon as you put VNAV, the thing blanks, the speed bug jumps, it usually goes back to a lower speed ... and then you have to open it again and as soon as you open it, it’s back to whatever speed, and you watch the throttles come back. It’s messy. (page 4)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B777
    Equipment: FMS VNAV
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (2004). Should Computers Function as Collaborators?. See Resource details

  41.  
  42. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Moreover, it is essential to be able to develop a good understanding of the characteristics and functions of other collaborators (e.g. what they can do, how they do it; how they are structured; what they cannot do). Whilst the behaviour of the computer-based systems may make perfect sense to the automation logic, it does not necessarily to the pilots: … P2: “You have situations where ... you get close to the airport and the controller now vectors you ... the guy says when you’re established give me a call... [when going] from heading back to NAV ... all that happens is that the plane swings round and it is going back to where is was going before ... you run the chance of being disorientated ... before you do that you have to have moved the plane in the system onwards to the next point so you come into position. (page 4)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: FMS & ATC
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (2004). Should Computers Function as Collaborators?. See Resource details

  43.  
  44. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Whilst the pilots we have talked to did not report mode reversions, they reported many situations in which to make decisions as to what parts of the automated systems to use when, as a prominent aspect in pilots’ tasks. For example, situational factors often require the use of less sophisticated equipment (e.g. adverse weather conditions, landings, Air Traffic Control (ATC) giving headings), or pilots may need to decide when the automated systems cannot cope: P1: “But invariably on every flight the route is changed to some degree by ATC ... even to a point where you disconnect it from the FMS and fly in another mode.” P2: “On our descent they changed the runway three times ... for some reason we didn’t change the frequencies [the third time]. We came in ... looked from a distance... thought ‘this is wrong’... so we knocked off the autopilot.” P2: “Sometimes you have situations where you know the plane is supposed to turn at 4 miles and if it doesn’t then, because it’s so much easier to use the automated system to fly this departure, you’ll find the pilot will sit there and go like, ‘OK, I’ll give it a little more time’.” P2: “[in bad weather]... what you do is you take off the height control... A lot of up- and downdrafts ... can confuse the sensors... If it bobs up and down, you don’t have the autopilot fighting it. But that’s not a company procedure.” P2: “...due to traffic etc. they can’t descend you ... you now find that the system is telling you ‘top of descent’ but you have to ignore it ...suddenly the controller announces to you that you are cleared to descend... Now ... you have to close the throttles and pull out the spoilers, the speed breaks, which gives you the right maximum rate of descent, and in most of the times the autopilot cannot comprehend what is going on ... you have to knock off the descent mode and descent it yourself at the very high rates, and when you’re closer to your level you put it back on ... for the 727 you definitely have to remove the descent mode, in the Learjet you go to speed. (page 3)
    Issue: workarounds may be necessary (Issue #107) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (2004). Should Computers Function as Collaborators?. See Resource details

  45.  
  46. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Whilst the pilots we have talked to did not report mode reversions, they reported many situations in which to make decisions as to what parts of the automated systems to use when, as a prominent aspect in pilots’ tasks. For example, situational factors often require the use of less sophisticated equipment (e.g. adverse weather conditions, landings, Air Traffic Control (ATC) giving headings), or pilots may need to decide when the automated systems cannot cope: P1: “But invariably on every flight the route is changed to some degree by ATC ... even to a point where you disconnect it from the FMS and fly in another mode.” P2: “On our descent they changed the runway three times ... for some reason we didn’t change the frequencies [the third time]. We came in ... looked from a distance... thought ‘this is wrong’... so we knocked off the autopilot.” P2: “Sometimes you have situations where you know the plane is supposed to turn at 4 miles and if it doesn’t then, because it’s so much easier to use the automated system to fly this departure, you’ll find the pilot will sit there and go like, ‘OK, I’ll give it a little more time’.” P2: “[in bad weather]... what you do is you take off the height control... A lot of up- and downdrafts ... can confuse the sensors... If it bobs up and down, you don’t have the autopilot fighting it. But that’s not a company procedure.” P2: “...due to traffic etc. they can’t descend you ... you now find that the system is telling you ‘top of descent’ but you have to ignore it ...suddenly the controller announces to you that you are cleared to descend... Now ... you have to close the throttles and pull out the spoilers, the speed breaks, which gives you the right maximum rate of descent, and in most of the times the autopilot cannot comprehend what is going on ... you have to knock off the descent mode and descent it yourself at the very high rates, and when you’re closer to your level you put it back on ... for the 727 you definitely have to remove the descent mode, in the Learjet you go to speed. ” (page 3)
    Issue: workarounds may be necessary (Issue #107) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (2004). Should Computers Function as Collaborators?. See Resource details

  47.  
  48. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the questionnaire data: (#26) "Sometimes what the automatics do or don't do takes me by surprise." 26% of the pilots strongly or slightly agreed, 62% of the pilots strongly or slightly disagreed with the statement, and 13% neither agreed nor disagreed. (page 44-45)
    Issue: automation behavior may be unexpected and unexplained (Issue #108) See Issue details
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  49.  
  50. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Some pilots, in their response to the question 'Have you ever been surprised by the automatics' answered in the affirmative" (page 24)
    Issue: automation behavior may be unexpected and unexplained (Issue #108) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  51.  
  52. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Nearly 20% of the pilots reported that at one time or another, the autopilot either turned the wrong way (usually on LOC intercept or when passing over a waypoint), or did not capture the desired route or course." (page 24)
    Issue: automation behavior may be unexpected and unexplained (Issue #108) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  53.  
  54. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: During the cockpit observation: "On at least four of the segments we experienced the early-capture-at-low-altitude phenomenon reported by the pilots. In every case, both pilots were surprised by the sudden reduction in thrust as the aircraft leveled off, even though they had selected a higher altitude by that time." (page 19-20)
    Issue: automation behavior may be unexpected and unexplained (Issue #108) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: autoflight
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  55.  
  56. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the questionnaire data: (#26) "Sometimes what the automatics do or don't do takes me by surprise." 26% of the pilots strongly or slightly agreed, 62% of the pilots strongly or slightly disagreed with the statement, and 13% neither agreed nor disagreed. (page 44-45)
    Issue: automation behavior may be unexpected and unexplained (Issue #108) See Issue details
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  57.  
  58. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the questionnaire data: "47% agree and 36% disagree, that 'Automation reduces overall workload' (#32)" while 17% neither agree nor disagree with the statement. (page 21)
    Issue: automation may adversely affect pilot workload (Issue #79) See Issue details
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  59.  
  60. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "A large number of pilots felt that the response time for the Flight Management Computer was excessive. When a specific instance was mentioned, it usually involved complying with ATC requests while maneuvering in the terminal area." (page 22)
    Issue: automation performance may be limited (Issue #126) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  61.  
  62. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "An almost traditional complaint of computer users is the slow response time, and these pilots were no exception. Usually the complaint concerned their time in the terminal area where they perceived fast flight crew response as a necessity due to ATC changes" (page 13)
    Issue: automation performance may be limited (Issue #126) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  63.  
  64. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the questionnaire data: "31% ... agreed to some degree that they 'use automatic devices mainly because the company wants me to' (#35)" while 43% slightly or strongly disagreed with the statement and 27% neither agreed nor disagreed. (page 21)
    Issue: company automation policies and procedures may be inappropriate or inadequate (Issue #166) See Issue details
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  65.  
  66. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the questionnaire data: "31% ... agreed to some degree that they 'use automatic devices mainly because the company wants me to' (#35)" while 43% slightly or strongly disagreed with the statement, and 27% neither agreed nor disagreed. (page 21)
    Issue: company automation policies and procedures may be inappropriate or inadequate (Issue #166) See Issue details
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  67.  
  68. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the questionnaire data: (#16) "I can find the exact location of important controls and switches without any hesitation." 58% of the pilots strongly or slightly agreed, 33% of the pilots strongly or slightly disagreed with the statement, and 10% neither agreed nor disagreed. (page 44-45)
    Issue: controls of automation may be poorly designed (Issue #37) See Issue details
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation controls
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  69.  
  70. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the questionnaire data: (#16) "I can find the exact location of important controls and switches without any hesitation." 58% of the pilots strongly or slightly agreed, 33% of the pilots strongly or slightly disagreed with the statement, and 10% neither agreed nor disagreed. (page 44-45)
    Issue: controls of automation may be poorly designed (Issue #37) See Issue details
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation controls
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  71.  
  72. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the questionnaire data: (#27) "It is easier to cross-check the other pilot in the 767 than in our other airplanes." 37% of the pilots strongly or slightly agreed, 34% of the pilots strongly or slightly disagreed with the statement, and 30% neither agreed nor disagreed. (page 44-45)
    Issue: cross checking may be difficult (Issue #72) See Issue details
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  73.  
  74. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "A significant number of pilots wished to have more experience hand flying the simulator" (page 17)
    Issue: deficiencies in basic aircraft training may exist (Issue #63) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  75.  
  76. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "One check airman suggested that an incorrect setting of the FRONT CRS knob on the Instrument Landing System (ILS) receiver would cause the aircraft to turn the wrong way on LOC intercept; the aircraft will start turning to the incorrect course, but the ILS signals will eventually cause the aircraft to track the localizer correctly. (One respondent mentioned he felt the ILS receiver was too far from the normal scan pattern, and so an incorrect setting might be missed.) There is also the possibility, mentioned by another check airman, that the appearance of the trend vector and the wind correction both contribute to a perception that the aircraft is turning away from the localizer when it is not." (page 24)
    Issue: displays (visual and aural) may be poorly designed (Issue #92) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  77.  
  78. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the questionnaire data: (#19) "The ADI and EHSI displays are always legible and easy to read." 79% of the pilots strongly or slightly agreed, 16% of the pilots strongly or slightly disagreed with the statement, and 5% neither agreed nor disagreed. (page 44-45)
    Issue: displays (visual and aural) may be poorly designed (Issue #92) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation displays
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  79.  
  80. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Eleven pilots [out of 104 pilots, 11%] reported confusion between the heading orientation and the track up nature of the map display; as they describe it, this almost always occurs during vectoring in the terminal area when they are controlling aircraft heading, not track." (page 16)
    Issue: displays (visual and aural) may be poorly designed (Issue #92) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation displays
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  81.  
  82. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Regardless of the value displayed in the speed-select window at the time FLCH is engaged, this displayed value is changed to the existing speed and the pitch autopilot holds the existing IAS. The autohrottles advance to maximum allowable thrust (if climbing) or reduced thrust (if descending). Most pilots who reported this confusion felt the target speed should have been that which was displayed in the window at the time of engagement." (page 15)
    Issue: displays (visual and aural) may be poorly designed (Issue #92) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: autoflight: MCP
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  83.  
  84. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Incident Reports Two incident reports were examined for the relevant human factors and automation elements. ... [One of the incident reports involved] an inflight spool-down of engines, resulting in temporary loss of the CRT displays. When the CRT displays were present, the EICAS was filled with messages, and he had difficulty assimilating the information except for the only red message (a cabin altitude warning). He could not discriminate between the second-level caution messages (yellow, starting in the left margin) and the advisory messages (yellow, indented one space margin). Furthermore, he had many questions: 'I turned on the APU, is it coming up to speed or not? Are the engines really running or are they windmilling?' He felt another crew member might have been useful, not as much for executing procedures as for helping diagnose the problem." (page 20)
    Issue: displays (visual and aural) may be poorly designed (Issue #92) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  85.  
  86. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "The Electronic Flight Instrument System (EFIS), or Attitude director Indicator (ADI) and Horizontal situation Indicator (HSI) Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) displays received enthusiastic response. Most of the comments were general in nature, and referred to the information on the displays and the clarity of the displays." (page 10)
    Issue: displays (visual and aural) may be poorly designed (Issue #92) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: EFIS
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  87.  
  88. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "The Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System ... received many favorable, if general, comments about the quality and quantity of information on the display. ... specifically mentioned by several pilots were the explicit display of engine limits as well as the ability to monitor a large number of variables." (page 12)
    Issue: displays (visual and aural) may be poorly designed (Issue #92) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: EICAS
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  89.  
  90. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the questionnaire data: (#19) "The ADI and EHSI displays are always legible and easy to read." 79% of the pilots strongly or slightly agreed, 16% of the pilots strongly or slightly disagreed with the statement, and 5% neither agreed nor disagreed. (page 44-45)
    Issue: displays (visual and aural) may be poorly designed (Issue #92) See Issue details
    Strength: -4
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation displays
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  91.  
  92. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "A large number of pilots felt that the response time for the Flight Management Computer was excessive. When a specific instance was mentioned, it usually involved complying with ATC requests while maneuvering in the terminal area." (page 22)
    Issue: flightdeck automation may be incompatible with ATC system (Issue #82) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  93.  
  94. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Almost 10% of the pilots reported some discomfort with the speed synchronization at the time the Flight Level Change (FLCH) mode is engaged. FLCH is designed to climb at the existing IAS and climb thrust. The reason for the confusion seems to be that the SPD window shows a value at the same time FLCH is engaged, but this value has no bearing on FLCH operation since the displayed speed automatically changes to the existing speed when FLCH is engaged. These pilots felt that FLCH should hold the speed displayed in the window, instead of the existing speed." (page 24)
    Issue: interface may be poorly designed (Issue #39) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: autoflight
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  95.  
  96. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "The pilots feel positively about the airplane. More than 86% agreed they 'enjoy flying the 767 more than the older aircraft' (#11)." (page 21)
    Issue: job satisfaction may be reduced (Issue #13) See Issue details
    Strength: -4
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  97.  
  98. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the questionnaire data: "80% agree that 'pilots who overuse automation will see their flying skills suffer' (#18)." while 15% disagreed with the statement and 6% neither agreed nor disagreed. (page 22)
    Issue: manual skills may be lost (Issue #65) See Issue details
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  99.  
  100. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the questionnaire data: "87% agree that they 'hand-fly part of every trip to keep my skills up' (#14)" while 9% disagreed with the statement and 4% neither agreed nor disagreed. (page 22)
    Issue: manual skills may be lost (Issue #65) See Issue details
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  101.  
  102. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the questionnaire data: "Interestingly, this concern for other pilots [who overuse automation and consequently see their flying skills suffer] did not always carry over to themselves because only 63% agreed that 'I am concerned about a possible loss of my flying skills with too much automation' (#31)" while 29% disagreed with the statement and 8% neither agreed nor disagreed. "It is felt, however, that some pilots did not agree with this statement because [italicized by author] they do a lot of hand-flying." (page 22)
    Issue: manual skills may be lost (Issue #65) See Issue details
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  103.  
  104. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the questionnaire data: "80% agree that 'pilots who overuse automation will see their flying skills suffer' (#18)." while 15% disagreed with the statement and 6% neither agreed nor disagreed. (page 22)
    Issue: manual skills may be lost (Issue #65) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  105.  
  106. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the questionnaire data: "87% agree that they 'hand-fly part of every trip to keep my skills up' (#14)" while 9% disagreed with the statement and 4% neither agreed nor disagreed. (page 22)
    Issue: manual skills may be lost (Issue #65) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  107.  
  108. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the questionnaire data: "Interestingly, this concern for other pilots [who overuse automation and consequently see their flying skills suffer] did not always carry over to themselves because only 63% agreed that 'I am concerned about a possible loss of my flying skills with too much automation' (#31)" while 29% disagreed with the statement and 8% neither agreed nor disagreed. "It is felt, however, that some pilots did not agree with this statement because [italicized by author] they do a lot of hand-flying." (page 22)
    Issue: manual skills may be lost (Issue #65) See Issue details
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  109.  
  110. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Pilots feel that flying with partial automation is different [than manual flying], and requires more monitoring." (page 35)
    Issue: monitoring requirements may be excessive (Issue #5) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  111.  
  112. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "On several of the line observation trips, the NASA observer noticed the following. When things did not go as planned, or when the pilot was 'surprised' by the automatics (e.g., the early altitude capture with high rate of climb), the pilot would try to 'program' his way out of the anomalous condition. The situation would sometimes get worse and more confusing, not better." (page 30)
    Issue: pilots may be reluctant to assume control (Issue #26) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  113.  
  114. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the questionnaire data: "27% agreed that they were 'worried about sudden failures of the new devices like the FMS computer and the CRT displays' (#9), although the majority, 64%, disagreed with the statement" while 10% neither agreed nor disagreed. (page 21)
    Issue: pilots may lack confidence in automation (Issue #46) See Issue details
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  115.  
  116. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the questionnaire data: "26% agreed that they 'have serious concerns about the reliability of this new equipment,' and ... the majority disagreed (62%)." (#25) while 13% neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement. (page 22)
    Issue: pilots may lack confidence in automation (Issue #46) See Issue details
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  117.  
  118. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the questionnaire data: "Twenty percent of the pilots disagree with the statement 'The new equipment is more reliable than the old' (#29) (45% agreed with the statement, and 35% neither agreed nor disagreed)." (page 21)
    Issue: pilots may lack confidence in automation (Issue #46) See Issue details
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  119.  
  120. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "27% agreed that they were 'worried about sudden failures of the new devices like the FMS computer and the CRT displays' (#9), although the majority, 64%, disagreed with the statement" while 10% neither agreed nor disagreed. (page 21)
    Issue: pilots may lack confidence in automation (Issue #46) See Issue details
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  121.  
  122. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the questionnaire data: "26% agreed that they 'have serious concerns about the reliability of this new equipment,' and ... the majority disagreed (62%)." (#25) while 13% neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement. (page 22)
    Issue: pilots may lack confidence in automation (Issue #46) See Issue details
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  123.  
  124. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "The tendency for some pilots to program a recovery, and not 'turn it off',' was also confirmed by interviews and discussions with line training pilots and check airmen. It does not appear to be a fascination with the new equipment. Instead, it appears to be a habit learned during simulator training and most line training, where the instructor's job is to ensure that the student learns the operation of the automatic equipment. It seems to be taken for granted that the student knows there is an airplane behind the panel, and the student knows when to turn it all off." (page 30)
    Issue: training may be inadequate (Issue #133) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  125.  
  126. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "... questionnaire respondents asked for some instruction on computer concepts." one respondent stated " 'From what I've seen so far, we could use a bit more emphasis on the 'background' of some of the automatics to better able a crew to understand what's happening or not happening when things don't go as programmed...' " (page 29)
    Issue: training may be inadequate (Issue #133) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  127.  
  128. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "... questionnaire respondents asked for some instruction on computer concepts." one respondent stated " 'Ground school should not teach just function of the CDU/computers, but a philosophy of computer applications and programming as applicable to our aircraft.' " (page 29)
    Issue: training may be inadequate (Issue #133) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: FMS CDU
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  129.  
  130. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Several of the pilots would have liked more training with the AFDS and Mode Control Panel." (page 17)
    Issue: training may be inadequate (Issue #133) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: autoflight
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  131.  
  132. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "When asked on the questionnaire what material they wanted more or less of in training, the strongest responses were requests for: more FMS and CDU training (in general); more 'hands on' experience and training with the FMS/CDU; more line-oriented CDU experiences; and less nonoperational CDU material." (page 26)
    Issue: training may be inadequate (Issue #133) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: FMS CDU
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  133.  
  134. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Four of the pilots [4%] felt their training was adequate and did not require any changes." (page 16)
    Issue: training may be inadequate (Issue #133) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  135.  
  136. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "About 25% or [in sic] the pilots reported experiencing some confusion, or seeing others become confused about the interaction of the autothrottles and autopilot." (page 23)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot & autoflight
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. See Resource details

  137.  
  138. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Q.53. Have you ever experienced situations in which automated equipment acted against your intentions?" 66.9% of the respondents answered 'Yes', 31.5% answered 'No' and 1.6% gave no response. (page 36)
    Issue: automation behavior may be unexpected and unexplained (Issue #108) See Issue details
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Gras, A., Moricot, C., et. al. (1994). Faced with automation. See Resource details

  139.  
  140. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Q.53. Have you ever experienced situations in which automated equipment acted against your intentions?" 66.9% of the respondents answered 'Yes', 31.5% answered 'No', and 1.6% gave no response. (page 36)
    Issue: automation behavior may be unexpected and unexplained (Issue #108) See Issue details
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Gras, A., Moricot, C., et. al. (1994). Faced with automation. See Resource details

  141.  
  142. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Q.59. Do you feel that aircraft designers' logic differs from pilot-users' logic?" 88.0% of the respondents answered either 'yes, absolutely' or 'yes, on the whole', 4.8% answered 'No, not at all' or 'No, on the whole not', and 7.2% answered 'Neither yes nor no' or gave no response. (page 37)
    Issue: automation may use different control strategies than pilots (Issue #122) See Issue details
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Gras, A., Moricot, C., et. al. (1994). Faced with automation. See Resource details

  143.  
  144. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Q.64. In your opinion what are the designers' chief preoccupations? (Maximum three answers)" 79.4% of the respondents answered "Resolving economic issues/profitability of the firm". (page 38)
    Issue: commercial incentives may dominate (Issue #127) See Issue details
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Gras, A., Moricot, C., et. al. (1994). Faced with automation. See Resource details

  145.  
  146. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Q.58. If somebody says to you <>, do you ..." 13.8% of the respondents answered either 'Absolutely agree' or 'Rather agree', 75.1% answered 'Absolutely disagree' or 'Rather disagree', and 11.1% answered 'Neither yes nor no' or gave no response. (page 37)
    Issue: human-centered design philosophy may be lacking (Issue #100) See Issue details
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Gras, A., Moricot, C., et. al. (1994). Faced with automation. See Resource details

  147.  
  148. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Q.58. If somebody says to you 'When designing an airplane the engineers take into account the needs of the users, i.e. the pilots', do you ..." 13.8% of the respondents answered either 'Absolutely agree' or 'Rather agree', 75.1% answered 'Absolutely disagree' or 'Rather disagree', and 11.1% answered 'Neither yes nor no' or gave no response. (page 37)
    Issue: human-centered design philosophy may be lacking (Issue #100) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Gras, A., Moricot, C., et. al. (1994). Faced with automation. See Resource details

  149.  
  150. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Q.48. Do you feel that the machine is holding useful information but fails to provide it when you need it?" 48.7% of the respondents answered either 'yes, often' or 'yes, sometimes', 32.5% answered 'No, hardly ever' or 'No, never', and 18.8% answered 'Neither yes nor no' or gave no response. (page 35)
    Issue: insufficient information may be displayed (Issue #99) See Issue details
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Gras, A., Moricot, C., et. al. (1994). Faced with automation. See Resource details

  151.  
  152. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Q.48. Do you feel that the machine is holding useful information but fails to provide it when you need it?" 48.7% of the respondents answered either 'yes, often' or 'yes, sometimes', 32.5% answered 'No, hardly ever' or 'No, never', and 18.8% answered 'Neither yes nor no' or gave no response. (page 35)
    Issue: insufficient information may be displayed (Issue #99) See Issue details
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Gras, A., Moricot, C., et. al. (1994). Faced with automation. See Resource details

  153.  
  154. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Q.44. When interfacing have you ever felt or experienced difficulty in dialoguing with systems or in following automation logic?" 77.9% of the respondents answered 'Yes', 19.9% answered 'No' and 2.1% gave no response. (page 34)
    Issue: interface may be poorly designed (Issue #39) See Issue details
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation: interface
    Source: Gras, A., Moricot, C., et. al. (1994). Faced with automation. See Resource details

  155.  
  156. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Q.44. When interfacing have you ever felt or experienced difficulty in dialoguing with systems or in following automation logic?" 77.9% of the respondents answered 'Yes' , 19.9% answered 'No', and 2.1% gave no response. (page 34)
    Issue: interface may be poorly designed (Issue #39) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation: interface
    Source: Gras, A., Moricot, C., et. al. (1994). Faced with automation. See Resource details

  157.  
  158. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Automatic devices tend rather to reduce communication between crew members for 49% of pilots (half of them); 27.8% gave no opinion while 22.7% believe, on the contrary, that communication is enhanced by automation (Q.15). ... Q.15. Do you think that automation improves or reduces communication between crew members?" (page 25-26)
    Issue: inter-pilot communication may be reduced (Issue #139) See Issue details
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Gras, A., Moricot, C., et. al. (1994). Faced with automation. See Resource details

  159.  
  160. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Automatic devices tend rather to reduce communication between crew members for 49% of pilots (half of them); 27.8% gave no opinion while 22.7% believe, on the contrary, that communication is enhanced by automation (Q.15). ... Q.15. Do you think that automation improves or reduces communication between crew members?" (page 25-26)
    Issue: inter-pilot communication may be reduced (Issue #139) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Gras, A., Moricot, C., et. al. (1994). Faced with automation. See Resource details

  161.  
  162. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Q.37. Are you afraid of losing some manual dexterity through automation?" 58.9% of the respondents anwered 'Yes', 40.0% answered 'No.' and 1.1% gave no response. (page 31)
    Issue: manual skills may be lost (Issue #65) See Issue details
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Gras, A., Moricot, C., et. al. (1994). Faced with automation. See Resource details

  163.  
  164. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Q.37. Are you afraid of losing some manual dexterity through automation?" 58.9% of the respondents anwered 'Yes', 40.0% answered 'No.' and 1.1% gave no response. (page 31)
    Issue: manual skills may be lost (Issue #65) See Issue details
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Gras, A., Moricot, C., et. al. (1994). Faced with automation. See Resource details

  165.  
  166. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Q.62. Do you think that airline pilots and designers dialogue sufficiently with each other?" 6.6% of the respondents answered either 'yes, they definately dialogue with each other' or 'yes, with some reservations', 84.4% answered 'No, not at all' or 'No, not sufficiently', and 9.0% answered 'Neither yes nor no' or gave no response. (page 38)
    Issue: operational knowledge may be lacking in design process (Issue #121) See Issue details
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Gras, A., Moricot, C., et. al. (1994). Faced with automation. See Resource details

  167.  
  168. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Q.62. Do you think that airline pilots and designers dialogue sufficiently with each other?" 6.6% of the respondents answered either 'yes, they definately dialogue with each other' or 'yes, with some reservations', 84.4% answered 'No, not at all' or 'No, not sufficiently', and 9.0% answered 'Neither yes nor no' or gave no response. (page 38)
    Issue: operational knowledge may be lacking in design process (Issue #121) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Gras, A., Moricot, C., et. al. (1994). Faced with automation. See Resource details

  169.  
  170. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Q.33. Do you feel that you always understand your aircraft's systems and interactions?" 79.2% of the respondents answered 'No', 19.5% answered 'Yes' and 1.3% gave no response. (page 31)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Gras, A., Moricot, C., et. al. (1994). Faced with automation. See Resource details

  171.  
  172. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Q.33. Do you feel that you always understand your aircraft's systems and interactions?" 79.2% of the respondents answered 'No', 19.5% answered 'Yes' and 1.3% made no response. (page 31)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Gras, A., Moricot, C., et. al. (1994). Faced with automation. See Resource details

  173.  
  174. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the survey data: "In the automation of my current aircraft, there are still things that happen that surprise me." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 3=Neutral, 5=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 3.37 and the standard deviation was 1.04. (page 20)
    Issue: automation behavior may be unexpected and unexplained (Issue #108) See Issue details
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: B757 & B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Hutchins, E., Holder, B., & Hayward, M. (1999). Pilot Attitudes Toward Automation. See Resource details

  175.  
  176. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the survey data: "I spend more time setting up and managing the automation (CDU, FMS) than I would hand-flying or using a plain autopilot." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 3=Neutral, 5=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 3.17 and the standard deviation was 1.13. (page 21)
    Issue: automation may adversely affect pilot workload (Issue #79) See Issue details
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: B757 & B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Hutchins, E., Holder, B., & Hayward, M. (1999). Pilot Attitudes Toward Automation. See Resource details

  177.  
  178. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the survey data: "Automation helps me stay ‘ahead of the airplane’." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 3=Neutral, 5=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 3.51 and the standard deviation was 0.96. (page 21)
    Issue: automation may adversely affect pilot workload (Issue #79) See Issue details
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Hutchins, E., Holder, B., & Hayward, M. (1999). Pilot Attitudes Toward Automation. See Resource details

  179.  
  180. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the survey data: "Automation does not reduce total workload, because there is more to monitor now." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 3=Neutral, 5=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 2.69 and the standard deviation was 1.11. (page 21)
    Issue: automation may adversely affect pilot workload (Issue #79) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757 & B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Hutchins, E., Holder, B., & Hayward, M. (1999). Pilot Attitudes Toward Automation. See Resource details

  181.  
  182. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the survey data: "Automation frees me of much of the routine, mechanical parts of flying so I can concentrate on 'managing' the flight." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 3=Neutral, 5=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 3.79 and the standard deviation was 0.91. (page 20)
    Issue: automation may adversely affect pilot workload (Issue #79) See Issue details
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: B757 & B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Hutchins, E., Holder, B., & Hayward, M. (1999). Pilot Attitudes Toward Automation. See Resource details

  183.  
  184. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the survey data: "It is easier to bust an altitude in an automated airplane than in other planes." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 3=Neutral, 5=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 2.27 and the standard deviation was 2.67. (page 21)
    Issue: behavior of automation may not be apparent (Issue #83) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B757 & B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Hutchins, E., Holder, B., & Hayward, M. (1999). Pilot Attitudes Toward Automation. See Resource details

  185.  
  186. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the survey data: "I use the automation mainly because my company wants me to." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 3=Neutral, 5=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 2.38 and the standard deviation was 0.88. (page 20)
    Issue: company automation policies and procedures may be inappropriate or inadequate (Issue #166) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B757 & B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Hutchins, E., Holder, B., & Hayward, M. (1999). Pilot Attitudes Toward Automation. See Resource details

  187.  
  188. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the survey data: "I use automation mainly because it helps me get the job done." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 3=Neutral, 5=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 3.84 and the standard deviation was 0.76. (page 21)
    Issue: company automation policies and procedures may be inappropriate or inadequate (Issue #166) See Issue details
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: B757 & B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Hutchins, E., Holder, B., & Hayward, M. (1999). Pilot Attitudes Toward Automation. See Resource details

  189.  
  190. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the survey data: "The automation in my current aircraft works great in today's ATC environment." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 3=Neutral, 5=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 3.62 and the standard deviation was 0.90. (page 20)
    Issue: flightdeck automation may be incompatible with ATC system (Issue #82) See Issue details
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: B757 & B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Hutchins, E., Holder, B., & Hayward, M. (1999). Pilot Attitudes Toward Automation. See Resource details

  191.  
  192. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the survey data: "Sometimes I feel more like a ‘button pusher’ then a pilot." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 3=Neutral, 5=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 2.67 and the standard deviation was 1.11. (page 21)
    Issue: job satisfaction may be reduced (Issue #13) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757 & B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Hutchins, E., Holder, B., & Hayward, M. (1999). Pilot Attitudes Toward Automation. See Resource details

  193.  
  194. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the survey data: "I am concerned about a possible loss of my flying skills with too much automation." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 3=Neutral, 5=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 3.43 and the standard deviation was 1.15. (page 20)
    Issue: manual skills may be lost (Issue #65) See Issue details
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: B757 & B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Hutchins, E., Holder, B., & Hayward, M. (1999). Pilot Attitudes Toward Automation. See Resource details

  195.  
  196. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the survey data: "I always consult the flight mode annunciator to determine which mode the autopilot/flight director is in." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 3=Neutral, 5=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 3.61 and the standard deviation was 0.99. (page 21)
    Issue: mode awareness may be lacking (Issue #95) See Issue details
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: B757 & B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Hutchins, E., Holder, B., & Hayward, M. (1999). Pilot Attitudes Toward Automation. See Resource details

  197.  
  198. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the survey data: "It is easier to bust an altitude in an automated airplane than in other planes." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 3=Neutral, 5=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 2.27 and the standard deviation was 2.67. (page 21)
    Issue: mode awareness may be lacking (Issue #95) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B757 & B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Hutchins, E., Holder, B., & Hayward, M. (1999). Pilot Attitudes Toward Automation. See Resource details

  199.  
  200. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the survey data: "I always know what mode the autopilot/flight director is in." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 3=Neutral, 5=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 3.72 and the standard deviation was 0.98. (page 20)
    Issue: mode awareness may be lacking (Issue #95) See Issue details
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: B757 & B767
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot
    Source: Hutchins, E., Holder, B., & Hayward, M. (1999). Pilot Attitudes Toward Automation. See Resource details

  201.  
  202. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the survey data: "Automation does not reduce total workload, because there is more to monitor now." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 3=Neutral, 5=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 2.69 and the standard deviation was 1.11. (page 21)
    Issue: monitoring requirements may be excessive (Issue #5) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757 & B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Hutchins, E., Holder, B., & Hayward, M. (1999). Pilot Attitudes Toward Automation. See Resource details

  203.  
  204. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the survey data: "I make fewer errors in the automated airplanes than I did in the older models." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 3=Neutral, 5=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 3.02 and the standard deviation was 0.97. (page 20)
    Issue: new tasks and errors may exist (Issue #89) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B757 & B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Hutchins, E., Holder, B., & Hayward, M. (1999). Pilot Attitudes Toward Automation. See Resource details

  205.  
  206. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the survey data: "It is easier to bust an altitude in an automated airplane than in other planes." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 3=Neutral, 5=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 2.27 and the standard deviation was 2.67. (page 21)
    Issue: situation awareness may be reduced (Issue #114) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B757 & B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Hutchins, E., Holder, B., & Hayward, M. (1999). Pilot Attitudes Toward Automation. See Resource details

  207.  
  208. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the survey data: "Training for my current aircraft was as adequate as any training I have had." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 3=Neutral, 5=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 3.46 and the standard deviation was 1.13. (page 21)
    Issue: training may be inadequate (Issue #133) See Issue details
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: B757 & B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Hutchins, E., Holder, B., & Hayward, M. (1999). Pilot Attitudes Toward Automation. See Resource details

  209.  
  210. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the survey data: "There are still modes and features of the autoflight system that I don’t understand." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 3=Neutral, 5=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 2.48 and the standard deviation was 1.15. (page 21)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: 0
    Aircraft: B757 & B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Hutchins, E., Holder, B., & Hayward, M. (1999). Pilot Attitudes Toward Automation. See Resource details

  211.  
  212. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "The response to item seven [Item seven is a 5 point bi-polar statement: 1="Overall, automation increases pilot fatigue", 3 = neutral, and 5="Overall, automation reduces pilot fatigue", average response = 3.76, rating=percentage of respondents : 1=2%, 2=10%, 3=22%, 4=40%, 5=26%] ... reflects positively on automation, suggesting strongly that automation acts to reduce pilot fatigue." (page 194-195)
    Issue: fatigue may be induced (Issue #156) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: James, M., McClumpha, A., Green, R., Wilson, P., & Belyavin, A. (1991). Pilot attitudes to cockpit automation. See Resource details

  213.  
  214. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "The response to item seven [Item seven is a 5 point bi-polar statement: 1="Overall, automation increases pilot fatigue", 3 = neutral, and 5="Overall, automation reduces pilot fatigue", average response = 3.76, rating=percentage of respondents : 1=2%, 2=10%, 3=22%, 4=40%, 5=26%] ... reflects positively on automation, suggesting strongly that automation acts to reduce pilot fatigue." (page 194-195)
    Issue: fatigue may be induced (Issue #156) See Issue details
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: James, M., McClumpha, A., Green, R., Wilson, P., & Belyavin, A. (1991). Pilot attitudes to cockpit automation. See Resource details

  215.  
  216. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "The results of item one [Item one is a 5 point bi-polar statement: 1="Pilots who fly advanced automated aircraft have enhanced flying skills", 3 = neutral, and 5="Pilots who fly advanced automated aircraft have degraded flying skills", average response = 3.71, rating=percentage of respondents : 1=1%, 2=3%, 3=35%, 4=45%, 5=16%] reveal a firm belief that pilots who fly automated aircraft have degraded flying skills" (page 194-196)
    Issue: manual skills may be lost (Issue #65) See Issue details
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: James, M., McClumpha, A., Green, R., Wilson, P., & Belyavin, A. (1991). Pilot attitudes to cockpit automation. See Resource details

  217.  
  218. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "The results of item one [Item one is a 5 point bi-polar statement: 1="Pilots who fly advanced automated aircraft have enhanced flying skills", 3 = neutral, and 5="Pilots who fly advanced automated aircraft have degraded flying skills", average response = 3.71, rating=percentage of respondents : 1=1%, 2=3%, 3=35%, 4=45%, 5=16%] reveal a firm belief that pilots who fly automated aircraft have degraded flying skills" (page 194-196)
    Issue: manual skills may be lost (Issue #65) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: James, M., McClumpha, A., Green, R., Wilson, P., & Belyavin, A. (1991). Pilot attitudes to cockpit automation. See Resource details

  219.  
  220. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Pilots responded to the 5 point bi-polar survey item number 2, in which "Younger pilots are better able to cope with automated aircraft" is 1 and "Older pilots are better able to cope with automated aircraft" is 5. The following are the approximate percentages of the pilot responses to this 5 point bi-polar item: 10%=1, 48%=2, 35%=3, 6%=4, and 1%=5. (page 194)
    Issue: older pilots may be less accepting of automation (Issue #132) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: James, M., McClumpha, A., Green, R., Wilson, P., & Belyavin, A. (1991). Pilot attitudes to cockpit automation. See Resource details

  221.  
  222. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Pilots responsed to the 5 point bi-polar survey item number 2, in which "Younger pilots are better able to cope with automated aircraft" is 1 and "Older pilots are better able to cope with automated aircraft" is 5. The following are the approximate percentages of the pilot responses to this 5 point bi-polar item: 10%=1, 48%=2, 35%=3, 6%=4, and 1%=5. (page 194)
    Issue: older pilots may be less accepting of automation (Issue #132) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: James, M., McClumpha, A., Green, R., Wilson, P., & Belyavin, A. (1991). Pilot attitudes to cockpit automation. See Resource details

  223.  
  224. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "... item five [Item five is a 5 point bi-polar statement: 1="Pilots of automated aircraft rely too heavily on the automatics", 3 = neutral, and 5="Pilots of automated aircraft don't rely enough on the automatics", average response = 2.34, rating=percentage of respondents : 1=16%, 2=44%, 3=31%, 4=8%, 5=1%] indicates the opinion that these pilots also rely too heavily on the automatics." (page 194-196)
    Issue: pilots may over-rely on automation (Issue #106) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: James, M., McClumpha, A., Green, R., Wilson, P., & Belyavin, A. (1991). Pilot attitudes to cockpit automation. See Resource details

  225.  
  226. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "... item five [Item five is a 5 point bi-polar statement: 1="Pilots of automated aircraft rely too heavily on the automatics", 3 = neutral, and 5="Pilots of automated aircraft don't rely enough on the automatics", average response = 2.34, rating=percentage of respondents : 1=16%, 2=44%, 3=31%, 4=8%, 5=1%] indicates the opinion that these pilots also rely too heavily on the automatics." (page 194-196)
    Issue: pilots may under-rely on automation (Issue #146) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: James, M., McClumpha, A., Green, R., Wilson, P., & Belyavin, A. (1991). Pilot attitudes to cockpit automation. See Resource details

  227.  
  228. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "... item five [Item five is a 5 point bi-polar statement: 1="Pilots of automated aircraft rely too heavily on the automatics", 3 = neutral, and 5="Pilots of automated aircraft don't rely enough on the automatics", average response = 2.34, rating=percentage of respondents : 1=16%, 2=44%, 3=31%, 4=8%, 5=1%] indicates the opinion that these pilots also rely too heavily on the automatics." (page 194-196)
    Issue: pilots may under-rely on automation (Issue #146) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: James, M., McClumpha, A., Green, R., Wilson, P., & Belyavin, A. (1991). Pilot attitudes to cockpit automation. See Resource details

  229.  
  230. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "The lack of movement on the A320 does seem to reduce pilots' awareness of thrust demanded." As shown by the pilots' responses to the statement: 'A320 System: Lack of movement reduces awareness of thrust demanded', approximately 55% responded either 'almost always', 'often', or 'sometimes', and approximately 45% responded "almost never". (page 6)
    Issue: behavior of automation may not be apparent (Issue #83) See Issue details
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: A320
    Equipment: autoflight: autothrust
    Source: Last, S. & Alder, M. (1991). British Airways Airbus A320 Pilots' Autothrust Survey. See Resource details

  231.  
  232. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "The lack of movement on the A320 does seem to reduce pilots' awareness of thrust demanded." As shown by the pilots' responses to the statement: "A320 System: Lack of movement reduces awareness of thrust demanded", approximately 55% responded either "almost always", "often", or "sometimes", and approximately 45% responded "almost never". (page 6)
    Issue: behavior of automation may not be apparent (Issue #83) See Issue details
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: A320
    Equipment: autoflight: autothrust
    Source: Last, S. & Alder, M. (1991). British Airways Airbus A320 Pilots' Autothrust Survey. See Resource details

  233.  
  234. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: The following comment was made in response to the questionnaire statement, "Describe a problem you know of or a concern you have about flightdeck automation.": "Instead of changing one or two radio receivers only [emphasized] and making a slight turn, now one must change radio frequency on one receiver, re-program the FMC for the new runway, cycle both flight director switches (preferable simultaneously), then fly aircraft or program autopilot to new course." (aviation safety analyst, retired pilot) "Crew coordination on flight decks which are automated is a problem because one pilot must fly while the other programs the automated systems. Often, in busy periods, there is insufficient time to check programming for accuracy. This is true of aircraft control and navigation." (B747 Captain)
    Issue: automation may adversely affect pilot workload (Issue #79) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, B., Wilson, J., & Funk, K. (1997). Flightdeck automation issues: Phase 1 survey analysis. See Resource details

  235.  
  236. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: The following comments were made in response to the questionnaire statement, "Describe a problem you know of or a concern you have about flightdeck automation.": "At times the electronics take away the ability of the pilot to make corrections of to be flexible in order to accommodate changing situations." (B747 First Officer) "We spend too much time with our heads and eyes in the cockpit. ... The tiller is regulated how fast it turns the nosewheel. I can't turn or straighten immediately if need be. I am not in control of this aircraft." (A320 Captain) "In some situations, the amount of programming and/or button pushing can be a serious distraction in the cockpit. Also voltage surges, humidity, temperature can all cause glitches or anomalies that can't be reproduced or explained in a lab. At times the electronics take away the ability of the pilot to make corrections or to be flexible in order to accommodate changing situations." (B747 First Officer) "Increased heads-down time which causes loss or degradation of situational awareness. ... Many new technical applications become so compelling that the pilots inadvertently focus on the problem which creates an insidious safety concern. This problem is particularly noticeable in terminal areas." (B757/767 Captain)
    Issue: automation may demand attention (Issue #102) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, B., Wilson, J., & Funk, K. (1997). Flightdeck automation issues: Phase 1 survey analysis. See Resource details

  237.  
  238. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: The following comment was made in response to the questionnaire statement, "Describe a problem you know of or a concern you have about flightdeck automation.": "Training pilots I find a lack of basic navigation skills/techniques that cause a 'introspective' perception of where the aircraft is." (747 First Officer)
    Issue: deficiencies in basic aircraft training may exist (Issue #63) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment:
    Source: Lyall, B., Wilson, J., & Funk, K. (1997). Flightdeck automation issues: Phase 1 survey analysis. See Resource details

  239.  
  240. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: The following comments were made in response to the questionnaire statement, "Describe a problem you know of or a concern you have about flightdeck automation.": "FMAs (Flight Mode Annunciations) are cryptic and not well presented." (B737 Captain) "It takes at least 6 months for a transitioning pilot to get used to where the information regarding flight is displayed." (B747 Captain) "Standard FMC/CDU Display ..." (B737 Captain)
    Issue: displays (visual and aural) may be poorly designed (Issue #92) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, B., Wilson, J., & Funk, K. (1997). Flightdeck automation issues: Phase 1 survey analysis. See Resource details

  241.  
  242. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: The following comments were made in response to the questionnaire statement, "Describe a problem you know of or a concern you have about flightdeck automation.": "A number of audible information inputs we get while operating the A320, while designed with the intent of providing us useful info, have two problems: 1) we cannot 'cancel' the aural input after we are aware of it (much like pushing a master caution lite 'out' after understanding the cause) and 2) the volume level is not adjustable and its too loud. I believe that the whole point of an audio callout is to give me information, but that once I receive this info, I should be able to cancel such input, and I should be able to control/modify/stop the transmission of this info at will." (A320 Captain) "The Altitude Alert Warning horns and [emphasized] the TCAS Warning horns that send the tone through our headsets (as opposed to the overhead speaker) are way too loud. Not only is it painful to the ear, it makes it impossible to hear ATC's directions, etc. this is true for about 70-80% of 737-300[s] using this configuration. Solution: Simply turn down the volume or [emphasized] reroute the tone to the overhead speakers." (B737 Captain) "TCAS aural commands being sounded over headset while ATC could be trying to relay information or trying to communicate with other crew member." (B737 Captain)
    Issue: displays (visual and aural) may be poorly designed (Issue #92) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: A320
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, B., Wilson, J., & Funk, K. (1997). Flightdeck automation issues: Phase 1 survey analysis. See Resource details

  243.  
  244. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: The following comment was made in response to the questionnaire statement, "Describe a problem you know of or a concern you have about flightdeck automation.": "Not enough information is presented to the crew for them to make timely, informed decisions or corrective actions." (B737 Captain)
    Issue: insufficient information may be displayed (Issue #99) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, B., Wilson, J., & Funk, K. (1997). Flightdeck automation issues: Phase 1 survey analysis. See Resource details

  245.  
  246. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: The following comment was made in response to the questionnaire statement, "Describe a problem you know of or a concern you have about flightdeck automation.": "Feeling like a system monitor vs. a pilot." (A320 Captain)
    Issue: job satisfaction may be reduced (Issue #13) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: A320
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, B., Wilson, J., & Funk, K. (1997). Flightdeck automation issues: Phase 1 survey analysis. See Resource details

  247.  
  248. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: The following comment was made in response to the questionnaire statement, "Describe a problem you know of or a concern you have about flightdeck automation.": "As identified in recent research, unanticipated mode changes are a concern, particularly when transitioning from climbing/descending to level flight. Complicating this picture is that - in the ... fleet - we have 3 different glass cockpits (757, 737-300, A320) each with a particular philosophy and design . There are vexing differences even between the 757and 737, both Boeings." (B757 Captain) In response the questionnaire statement, "To your knowledge, has this ever contributed to an accident or incident? Describe.", this B757 captain stated: "The situation described above for the 757 results in missed crossing restrictions on virtually every descent ! Error can range from 50 to 200 feet and 10 to 30 knots. Many pilots compensate by building a 2 or more mile "pad" into the LNAV course, i.e. creating a waypoint ahead of the crossing restriction to reach the altitude early."
    Issue: mode transitions may be uncommanded (Issue #44) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, B., Wilson, J., & Funk, K. (1997). Flightdeck automation issues: Phase 1 survey analysis. See Resource details

  249.  
  250. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: The following comment was made in response to the questionnaire statement, "Describe a problem you know of or a concern you have about flightdeck automation.": "Training 'old' pilots to use technology." (A320 First Officer)
    Issue: older pilots may be less accepting of automation (Issue #132) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, B., Wilson, J., & Funk, K. (1997). Flightdeck automation issues: Phase 1 survey analysis. See Resource details

  251.  
  252. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: The following comments were made in response to the questionnaire statement, "Describe a problem you know of or a concern you have about flightdeck automation.": "At times the electronics take away the ability of the pilot to make corrections of to be flexible in order to accommodate changing situations." (B747 First Officer) "We spend too much time with our heads and eyes in the cockpit. ... The tiller is regulated how fast it turns the nosewheel. I can't turn or straighten immediately if need be. I am not in control of this aircraft." (A320 Captain) "In some situations, the amount of programming and/or button pushing can be a serious distraction in the cockpit. Also voltage surges, humidity, temperature can all cause glitches or anomalies that can't be reproduced or explained in a lab. At times the electronics take away the ability of the pilot to make corrections or to be flexible in order to accommodate changing situations." (B747 First Officer)
    Issue: pilots have responsibility but may lack authority (Issue #12) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, B., Wilson, J., & Funk, K. (1997). Flightdeck automation issues: Phase 1 survey analysis. See Resource details

  253.  
  254. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: The following comment was made in response to the questionnaire statement, "Describe a problem you know of or a concern you have about flightdeck automation.": "To fly an automated aircraft takes more planning. Few pilots plan far enough ahead to use automated systems." (B747 Captain)
    Issue: planning requirements may be increased (Issue #158) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, B., Wilson, J., & Funk, K. (1997). Flightdeck automation issues: Phase 1 survey analysis. See Resource details

  255.  
  256. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: The following comment was made in response to the questionnaire statement, "Describe a problem you know of or a concern you have about flightdeck automation.": "As identified in recent research, unanticipated mode changes are a concern, particularly when transitioning from climbing/descending to level flight. Complicating this picture is that - in the ... fleet - we have 3 different glass cockpits (757, 737-300, A320) each with a particular philosophy and design . There are vexing differences even between the 757and 737, both Boeings." (B757 Captain) In response the questionnaire statement, "To your knowledge, has this ever contributed to an accident or incident? Describe.", this B757 captain stated: "The situation described above for the 757 results in missed crossing restrictions on virtually every descent ! Error can range from 50 to 200 feet and 10 to 30 knots. Many pilots compensate by building a 2 or more mile "pad" into the LNAV course, i.e. creating a waypoint ahead of the crossing restriction to reach the altitude early."
    Issue: workarounds may be necessary (Issue #107) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, B., Wilson, J., & Funk, K. (1997). Flightdeck automation issues: Phase 1 survey analysis. See Resource details

  257.  
  258. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 20 of the 30 (67%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc108 automation behavior may be unexpected and unexplained
    Issue: automation behavior may be unexpected and unexplained (Issue #108) See Issue details
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  259.  
  260. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 3 of the 30 (10%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc108 automation behavior may be unexpected and unexplained
    Issue: automation behavior may be unexpected and unexplained (Issue #108) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  261.  
  262. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 12 of the 30 (40%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc140 printed media may be inadequate
    Issue: automation information in manuals may be inadequate (Issue #140) See Issue details
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  263.  
  264. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 2 of the 30 (7%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc140 printed media may be inadequate
    Issue: automation information in manuals may be inadequate (Issue #140) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  265.  
  266. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 21 of the 30 (70%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc11 automation integration may be poor
    Issue: automation integration may be poor (Issue #11) See Issue details
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  267.  
  268. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 2 of the 30 (7%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc11 automation integration may be poor
    Issue: automation integration may be poor (Issue #11) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  269.  
  270. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 15 of the 30 (50%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc103 automation level decisions may be difficult
    Issue: automation level decisions may be difficult (Issue #103) See Issue details
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  271.  
  272. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 5 of the 30 (17%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc103 automation level decisions may be difficult
    Issue: automation level decisions may be difficult (Issue #103) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  273.  
  274. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 23 of the 30 (77%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc079 automation may adversely affect pilot workload
    Issue: automation may adversely affect pilot workload (Issue #79) See Issue details
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  275.  
  276. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 19 of the 30 (63%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc164 automation may increase workload
    Issue: automation may adversely affect pilot workload (Issue #79) See Issue details
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  277.  
  278. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 5 of the 30 (17%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc164 automation may increase workload
    Issue: automation may adversely affect pilot workload (Issue #79) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  279.  
  280. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 4 of the 30 (13%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc079 automation may adversely affect pilot workload
    Issue: automation may adversely affect pilot workload (Issue #79) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  281.  
  282. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 14 of the 30 (47%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc116 automation may be over-emphasized in pilot evaluation
    Issue: automation may be over-emphasized in pilot evaluation (Issue #116) See Issue details
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  283.  
  284. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 6 of the 30 (20%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc116 automation may be over-emphasized in pilot evaluation
    Issue: automation may be over-emphasized in pilot evaluation (Issue #116) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  285.  
  286. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 27 of the 30 (90%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc45 modes may proliferate
    Issue: automation may be too complex (Issue #40) See Issue details
    Strength: +5
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  287.  
  288. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 11 of the 30 (37%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc40 automation may be too complex
    Issue: automation may be too complex (Issue #40) See Issue details
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  289.  
  290. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 13 of the 30 (43%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc124 automation may be too complex and tightly coupled
    Issue: automation may be too complex (Issue #40) See Issue details
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  291.  
  292. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 1 of the 30 (3%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc45 modes may proliferate
    Issue: automation may be too complex (Issue #40) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  293.  
  294. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 14 of the 30 (47%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc40 automation may be too complex
    Issue: automation may be too complex (Issue #40) See Issue details
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  295.  
  296. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 10 of the 30 (33%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc124 automation may be too complex and tightly coupled
    Issue: automation may be too complex (Issue #40) See Issue details
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  297.  
  298. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 26 of the 30 (87%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc102 automation may demand attention
    Issue: automation may demand attention (Issue #102) See Issue details
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  299.  
  300. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 1 of the 30 (3%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc102 automation may demand attention
    Issue: automation may demand attention (Issue #102) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  301.  
  302. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 18 of the 30 (60%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc109 automation may lack reasonable functionality
    Issue: automation may lack reasonable functionality (Issue #109) See Issue details
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  303.  
  304. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 2 of the 30 (7%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc109 automation may lack reasonable functionality
    Issue: automation may lack reasonable functionality (Issue #109) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  305.  
  306. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 21 of the 30 (70%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc125 design specifications may be inadequate
    Issue: automation may not work well under unusual conditions (Issue #150) See Issue details
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  307.  
  308. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 16 of the 30 (53%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc120 automation operation may be based on few variables
    Issue: automation may not work well under unusual conditions (Issue #150) See Issue details
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  309.  
  310. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 13 of the 30 (43%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc150 automation performance may be reduced at margins of envelope
    Issue: automation may not work well under unusual conditions (Issue #150) See Issue details
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  311.  
  312. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 3 of the 30 (10%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc120 automation operation may be based on few variables
    Issue: automation may not work well under unusual conditions (Issue #150) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  313.  
  314. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 8 of the 30 (27%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc150 automation performance may be reduced at margins of envelope
    Issue: automation may not work well under unusual conditions (Issue #150) See Issue details
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  315.  
  316. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 13 of the 30 (43%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc122 automation may use different control strategies than pilots
    Issue: automation may use different control strategies than pilots (Issue #122) See Issue details
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  317.  
  318. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 10 of the 30 (33%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc122 automation may use different control strategies than pilots
    Issue: automation may use different control strategies than pilots (Issue #122) See Issue details
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  319.  
  320. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 14 of the 30 (47%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc126 automation performance may be limited
    Issue: automation performance may be limited (Issue #126) See Issue details
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  321.  
  322. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 3 of the 30 (10%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc126 automation performance may be limited
    Issue: automation performance may be limited (Issue #126) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  323.  
  324. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 5 of the 30 (17%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc160 automation requirements may conflict
    Issue: automation requirements may conflict (Issue #160) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  325.  
  326. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 2 of the 30 (6%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc160 automation requirements may conflict
    Issue: automation requirements may conflict (Issue #160) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  327.  
  328. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 10 of the 30 (33%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc137 automation skills may be lost
    Issue: automation skills may be lost (Issue #137) See Issue details
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  329.  
  330. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 3 of the 30 (10%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc137 automation skills may be lost
    Issue: automation skills may be lost (Issue #137) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  331.  
  332. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 21 of the 30 (70%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc161 automation use may slow pilot responses
    Issue: automation use may slow pilot responses (Issue #161) See Issue details
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  333.  
  334. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 1 of the 30 (3%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc161 automation use may slow pilot responses
    Issue: automation use may slow pilot responses (Issue #161) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  335.  
  336. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 24 of the 30 (80%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc101 automation use philosophy may be lacking
    Issue: automation use philosophy may be lacking (Issue #101) See Issue details
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  337.  
  338. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 1 of the 30 (3%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc101 automation use philosophy may be lacking
    Issue: automation use philosophy may be lacking (Issue #101) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  339.  
  340. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 27 of the 30 (90%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc083 behavior of automation may not be apparent
    Issue: behavior of automation may not be apparent (Issue #83) See Issue details
    Strength: +5
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  341.  
  342. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 20 of the 30 (67%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc147 pilots may misunderstand automation intent
    Issue: behavior of automation may not be apparent (Issue #83) See Issue details
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  343.  
  344. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 19 of the 30 (63%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc30 side-sticks may not be coupled
    Issue: behavior of automation may not be apparent (Issue #83) See Issue details
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  345.  
  346. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 20 of the 30 (67%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc051 feedback may be poor
    Issue: behavior of automation may not be apparent (Issue #83) See Issue details
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  347.  
  348. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 2 of the 30 (7%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc147 pilots may misunderstand automation intent
    Issue: behavior of automation may not be apparent (Issue #83) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  349.  
  350. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 3 of the 30 (10%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc083 behavior of automation may not be apparent
    Issue: behavior of automation may not be apparent (Issue #83) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  351.  
  352. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 5 of the 30 (17%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc051 feedback may be poor
    Issue: behavior of automation may not be apparent (Issue #83) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  353.  
  354. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 20 of the 30 (67%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc75 PF may help PNF program automation
    Issue: both pilots' attention simultaneously diverted by programming (Issue #75) See Issue details
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  355.  
  356. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 2 of the 30 (7%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc75 PF may help PNF program automation
    Issue: both pilots' attention simultaneously diverted by programming (Issue #75) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  357.  
  358. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 14 of the 30 (47%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc127 commercial incentives may dominate
    Issue: commercial incentives may dominate (Issue #127) See Issue details
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  359.  
  360. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 4 of the 30 (13%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc127 commercial incentives may dominate
    Issue: commercial incentives may dominate (Issue #127) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  361.  
  362. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 19 of the 30 (63%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc22 communication between computers may be unsupervised
    Issue: communication between computers may be unsupervised (Issue #22) See Issue details
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  363.  
  364. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 2 of the 30 (7%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc22 communication between computers may be unsupervised
    Issue: communication between computers may be unsupervised (Issue #22) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  365.  
  366. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 12 of the 30 (40%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc159 use may be required by company
    Issue: company automation policies and procedures may be inappropriate or inadequate (Issue #166) See Issue details
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  367.  
  368. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 9 of the 30 (30%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc159 use may be required by company
    Issue: company automation policies and procedures may be inappropriate or inadequate (Issue #166) See Issue details
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  369.  
  370. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 14 of the 30 (47%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc128 complex automation may have overly simplistic interface
    Issue: complex automation may have overly simplistic interface (Issue #128) See Issue details
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  371.  
  372. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 4 of the 30 (13%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc128 complex automation may have overly simplistic interface
    Issue: complex automation may have overly simplistic interface (Issue #128) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  373.  
  374. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 9 of the 30 (30%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc037 controls of automation may be poorly designed
    Issue: controls of automation may be poorly designed (Issue #37) See Issue details
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  375.  
  376. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 14 of the 30 (47%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc037 controls of automation may be poorly designed
    Issue: controls of automation may be poorly designed (Issue #37) See Issue details
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  377.  
  378. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 22 of the 30 (73%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc142 crew assignment may be inappropriate
    Issue: crew assignment may be inappropriate (Issue #142) See Issue details
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  379.  
  380. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 4 of the 30 (13%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc84 crew coordination problems may occur
    Issue: crew coordination problems may occur (Issue #84) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  381.  
  382. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 12 of the 30 (40%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc84 crew coordination problems may occur
    Issue: crew coordination problems may occur (Issue #84) See Issue details
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  383.  
  384. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 21 of the 30 (70%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc072 cross checking may be difficult
    Issue: cross checking may be difficult (Issue #72) See Issue details
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  385.  
  386. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 4 of the 30 (13%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc072 cross checking may be difficult
    Issue: cross checking may be difficult (Issue #72) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  387.  
  388. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 18 of the 30 (60%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc165 cultural differences may not be considered
    Issue: cultural differences may not be considered (Issue #165) See Issue details
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  389.  
  390. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 16 of the 30 (53%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc047 data access may be difficult
    Issue: data access may be difficult (Issue #47) See Issue details
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  391.  
  392. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 3 of the 30 (10%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc047 data access may be difficult
    Issue: data access may be difficult (Issue #47) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  393.  
  394. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 15 of the 30 (50%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc94 data entry format may be inflexible
    Issue: data entry and programming may be difficult and time consuming (Issue #112) See Issue details
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  395.  
  396. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 21 of the 30 (70%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc112 programming may be difficult
    Issue: data entry and programming may be difficult and time consuming (Issue #112) See Issue details
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  397.  
  398. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 17 of the 30 (57%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc96 data input prompts may be poor
    Issue: data entry and programming may be difficult and time consuming (Issue #112) See Issue details
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  399.  
  400. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 3 of the 30 (10%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc112 programming may be difficult
    Issue: data entry and programming may be difficult and time consuming (Issue #112) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  401.  
  402. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 3 of the 30 (10%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc94 data entry format may be inflexible
    Issue: data entry and programming may be difficult and time consuming (Issue #112) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  403.  
  404. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 1 of the 30 (3%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc96 data input prompts may be poor
    Issue: data entry and programming may be difficult and time consuming (Issue #112) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  405.  
  406. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 20 of the 30 (67%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc071 data entry errors on keyboards may occur
    Issue: data entry errors on keyboards may occur (Issue #71) See Issue details
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  407.  
  408. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 3 of the 30 (10%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc071 data entry errors on keyboards may occur
    Issue: data entry errors on keyboards may occur (Issue #71) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  409.  
  410. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 13 of the 30 (43%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc087 data may be too abstract
    Issue: data presentation may be too abstract (Issue #87) See Issue details
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  411.  
  412. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 4 of the 30 (13%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc087 data may be too abstract
    Issue: data presentation may be too abstract (Issue #87) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  413.  
  414. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 8 of the 30 (27%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc49 data re-entry may be required
    Issue: