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Incidents related to Issue 8 incidents related to this issue.

Issue: mode awareness may be lacking (Issue #95)
Description: Pilots may not be able to tell what mode or state the automation is in, how it is configured, what it is doing, and how it will behave. This may lead to reduced situation awareness and errors.

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  2. Accession Number: 77914
    Synopsis: ALT OVERSHOT ON CLIMBOUT WHEN DESCENT CLRNC WITH ALT RESTRICTION GIVEN BEFORE REACHING ASSIGNED ALT AND FMC REPROGRAMMED.
    Narrative: WE HAD RECEIVED A CLRNC TO CLB TO 16000', DIR TO THE SRP VORTAC ON THE 23 MIN FLT FROM TUS TO PHX. SOMEWHERE BTWN 11000' AND 15000' (SLIGHTLY LESS THAN 1 MIN'S TIME) WE WERE CLRD TO CROSS 35 SE OF SRP AT OR BELOW 14000', 250 KTS, MAINTAIN 10000'. AS IS STANDARD PRACTICE AT OUR COMPANY, I SET THE NEW CLRNC LIMIT ALT (10000') IN THE ALT SELECTOR OF THE AUTOPLT/FLT DIRECTOR SYSTEM MODE CTL PANEL, MENTALLY ASSURING MYSELF THAT THE AUTOPLT WOULD LEVEL THE ACFT AT 16000' SINCE THAT WAS THE CRS ALT PROGRAMMED IN THE FLT MANAGEMENT COMPUTER (FMC). I REACHED INTO MY FLT BAG TO PULL OUT A BINDER TO STOW MY TUCSON PLATES, AND WAS JUST OPENING IT WHEN THE ABQ CENTER CTLR CALLED, "PHX ALTIMETER 29.84." I RESET THE ALTIMETER AND NOTED THAT THE INDICATED ALT WAS NOW 16400' AND CLBING RAPIDLY. I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND MANUALLY LEVELED AT 16000'. THE MAX INDICATED ALT WAS 16700'. COMMON PRACTICES CAN LEAD TO CRITICAL ERRORS UNDER SITUATIONS ONLY SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT FROM THE NORM. NORMALLY, WE DON'T RECEIVE DES CLRNCS BEFORE REACHING THE ASSIGNED CRS ALT. NORMALLY, WE SET THE ALT SELECTOR OR ALERTER TO THE NEW CLRNC LIMIT ALT AS SOON AS WE RECEIVE IT. I DID THIS AUTOMATICALLY W/O CONSIDERING THAT IT MIGHT BE AN INVALID RESPONSE. WE'RE PSYCHOLOGICALLY PROGRAMMED TO EXPECT THINGS TO HAPPEN WITH A MACHINE BASED ON OUR EXPERIENCE WITH WHAT USUALLY HAPPENS. WITH THIS AIRPLANE'S EFIS DURING A CLB OR DES IN THE VNAV MODE, THE AIRPLANE WILL LEVEL OFF AT THE CRS ALT PROGRAMMED IN THE FMC EVEN IF THE ALT SELECTOR IS SET AT A HIGHER (DURING CLB) OR LOWER (DURING DES) ALT. EX: FMC CRS ALT FL330, CLRD TO FL370, ALT SELECTOR SET TO 370, AUTOPLT LEVELS THE AIRPLANE AT FL330. HAPPENS ALL THE TIME, SO I KNEW THE AUTOPLT WOULD LEVEL THE ACFT AT 16000'. WRONG! WHAT I DID, IN FACT, WAS TELL IT TO STOP AT AN ALT I WASN'T ON THE WAY TO. THE AUTOPLT THEN REVERTED TO THE CWS PITCH MODE, IN WHICH THE AIRPLANE KEEPS ON GOING IN THE LAST DIRECTION IT WAS POINTED, UNTIL THE PLT POINTS IT SOMEWHERE ELSE WITH THE YOKE. THERE IS NO AURAL WARNING WHEN THIS HAPPENS, THE AUTOPLT HASN'T DISCONNECTED, IT'S JUST HLDG A PITCH ATTITUDE. THERE'S A SMALL YELLOW CWS PITCH WARNING ON THE EADI, BUT IT HAS TO BE LOOKED AT TO BE SEEN (MUCH LIKE TFC AND ALTIMETERS). I ALSO KNEW I'D HAVE TIME TO STOW MY DEP PLATES BEFORE APCHING 16000', AS THE AUTOPLT STARTS A SMOOTH LEVEL OFF AS A FUNCTION OF RATE OF CLB AND WOULD BE REDUCING IT'S RATE OUT OF ABOUT 13000'. WRONG AGAIN! SINCE IT DEFAULTED TO CWS PITCH AND I DIDN'T NOTICE IT, WE WERE STILL CLBING AT 4 TO 6000 FPM. NO TIME FOR ANY INATTN OR DISTR. SO WHERE WAS THE NFP WHO WOULD NORMALLY BE CROSSCHECKING ALT AND MAKING APPROPRIATE CALLOUTS? THE SAME PLACE HE ALWAYS IS DURING MOST OF THE TIME SPENT ABV 10000' ON THIS RUN: DEEP IN THE MIDDLE OF COPYING ATIS AND MAKING REQUIRED FLT-FOLLOWING RADIO CALLS TO THE COMPANY. IT'S COMMON KNOWLEDGE THAT THE PF HAS LITTLE BACKUP ON A SHORT FLT LIKE THIS, BECAUSE THERE IS SO MUCH RADIO WORK TO DO. ALL THE MORE REASON FOR THE PF TO DO NOTHING BUT FLY (OR, THESE DAYS, MONITOR). SOMEWHERE IN ABQ CTR THERE WAS AN ALERT CTLR WHO TACTFULLY BROUGHT MY ATTN BACK WHERE IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN IN THE FIRST PLACE. MY HAT IS OFF TO HER! THE NEW TECHNOLOGY MACHINERY (FMC, EFIS, ETC) IS MARVELOUS, BUT IT SUCKERS US INTO COMPLACENCY. IN THE OLDER SERIES AUTOPLT, THE CWS MODE WAS THE NORM, RATHER THAT THE EXCEPTION. THIS WAS FINE, AS YOU KNEW YOU WERE IN IT. IN MY EXPERIENCE, THERE'S A MUCH HIGHER INCIDENCE OF ALT/SPD/ROUTE BUSTS IN THE FMC-EQUIPPED ACFT, LARGELY (I THINK) BECAUSE THE SYSTEM IS SO COMPLEX THAT THERE ARE MANY OPPORTUNITIES FOR FAULTY PROGRAMMING. SUGGESTIONS: ALT AWARENESS! ALT ALERTERS ARE WONDERFUL, BUT WE'VE BECOME TOO DEPENDENT ON THEM. LET'S ALL TAKE A HARD LOOK AT OUR PROCS FOR THEIR USE AND BE SURE THEY'RE VALID FOR THE INTENDED RESULT. CONTINUALLY EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF DEVOTING YOUR FULL ATTN TO MONITORING THE FLT WHENEVER THE OTHER CREWMEMBERS ARE INVOLVED WITH OTHER DUTIES. TRY TO MINIMIZE DISTRS DURING CLBS/DES, NOT JUST BELOW 10000'. ALWAYS FOLLOW UP ANY CHANGES IN AUTOPLT/FLT DIRECTOR MODE WITH A CHK OF THE MODE ANNUNCIATOR. IN NEW TECHNOLOGY ACFT, THIS MEANS EVERY TIME YOU PUSH A BUTTON. FOR R & D: IF WE MUST HAVE AN AURAL WARNING FOR AN AUTOPLT DISCONNECT, IS IT ANY LESS DANGEROUS TO HAVE IT REVERT TO A CWS MODE W/O THE PLT BEING AWARE? THIS IS A VERY COMMON OCCURRENCE. A CANCELLABLE AURAL WARNING AFTER, SAY, 3 SECS OF CWS WOULD DO THE TRICK. PERHAPS IF THE MACHINE CAN LEAD US ASTRAY, IT SHOULD WARN US. IS IT ACCEPTED PRACTICE FOR ATC TO GIVE DES CLRNCS PRIOR TO REACHING THE ASSIGNED CRS ALT? THIS COULD LEAD TO VARIOUS ERRORS AND CONFUSION.

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  4. Accession Number: 206160
    Synopsis: ACR FLC SUFFERS HDG TRACK DEV WHEN FAILING TO CAPTURE VOR AIRWAY RADIAL.
    Narrative: DURING DEP FLT WAS ASSIGNED A HDG TO INTERCEPT J70 E OF SVM (SALEM) VOR. THE ACFT WAS BEING HAND FLOWN WITH MANAGED NAV (IRS COUPLED TO THE FLT DIRECTOR). PRIOR TO INTERCEPT, THE CAPT'S (PF) FMGC1 (FLT MGMNT GUIDANCE COMPUTER) EXPERIENCED A MOMENTARY 'TIMEOUT.' THIS RESULTED IN A LOSS OF THE PF'S NAV DISPLAY UNTIL HIS ND RANGE/MODE SELECTOR IS SET TO THE SAME SETTING AS THE PNF'S DISPLAY. HIS DISPLAY IS NOW MERELY A REPEATER OF THE OPERATIVE SYS. IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO INTERCEPT, FMGC1 INDICATED IT WAS READY TO RETURN TO NORMAL OP. ONE OF US (I THINK IT WAS ME), SELECTED A SMALLER ND RANGE TO OBTAIN A BETTER VIEW OF THE INTERCEPT. ALTHOUGH THIS IS NORMAL OP OF THE ND'S, WE AGAIN LOST THE PF'S NAV DISPLAY. FMGC1 HAD RECOVERED, BUT THE PF'S DISPLAY MGMNT COMPUTER (DMC) MYSTERIOUSLY REMAINED LATCHED TO FMGC2. AGAIN REQUIRING IDENTICAL ND RANGE/MODE SELECTION FOR PROPER NAV DISPLAYS. EXCEPT FOR THE ND LOSS, THERE WAS NO ECAM INDICATION OF THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM. WHEN WE RETURNED TO THE FMGC 'TIMEOUT' CONFIGN, WE THEN REALIZED THAT WE HAD MISSED THE J70 INTERCEPT BY 3-5 NM. I AM NOT SURE IF WE HAD FAILED TO REARM THE MANAGED NAV MODE AFTER FMGC REINSTATEMENT OR WERE DISTRACTED FROM EVER ARMING IT. IN EITHER EVENT, WE SHOULD HAVE PAID CLOSER ATTN TO OUR FLT MODE ANNUNCIATOR. THE FMA DISPLAYS WHICH MODES THE AP, FD, AND AUTOTHRUST ARE SELECTED OR ARMED. SUGGESTED REMEDIES: ALWAYS BE ACUTELY AWARE OF FMA INDICATIONS. IT'S A REQUIREMENT FOR 'SITUATIONAL AWARENESS.' ONCE A BACKUP MODE IS OPERATING NORMALLY, DON'T CHANGE IT JUST PRIOR TO ANY INTERCEPT/MANEUVER, ETC. WE THOUGHT WE HAD PLENTY OF TIME, BUT THE ADDITIONAL DMC ANOMALY DISTRACTED US LONG ENOUGH TO MISS COURSE INTERCEPT.

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  6. Accession Number: 358300
    Synopsis: MLG ACFT CLRED FOR XING RESTR, FO PROGRAMS FMC FOR VNAV DSCNT. CAPT LEAVES COCKPIT. ACFT FAILS TO DSND AND XING RESTR MISSED. FMC PROGRAMMING ERROR.
    Narrative: WE WERE GIVEN CLRNC TO CROSS COFAX AT FL250 (WE WERE AT FL310 AT THE TIME). I WAS THE PF. I PROGRAMMED COFAX AT FL250 INTO THE FMC AND VERIFIED THAT I WAS ON VNAV. A FEW MINS LATER THE CAPT STATED HE WAS GOING TO GO TO THE BATHROOM AND GOT UP. JUST AS HE STARTED OUT THE COCKPIT DOOR, I LOOKED DOWN AND REALIZED WE WERE 1 MI FROM COFAX. FOR WHATEVER REASON, THE FMC/AUTOPLT DID NOT START THE DSCNT (STILL WAS ANNUNCIATING VNAV) AND I FAILED TO BACK UP THE MACHINE WITH BASIC AIRMANSHIP. I IMMEDIATELY STARTED DOWN MANUALLY, NOTIFIED ATC THAT I WAS STARTING OUT OF FL310 AT THIS TIME AND APOLOGIZED FOR MISSING THE XING RESTR. HE SAID NO PROB, DSND AND MAINTAIN FL250, AND CONTACT NEW YORK ON 132.2. UPON CONTACT, THEY CLRED US FOR DIRECT LRP AND A FURTHER DSCNT WITH NO XING RESTRS. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) WE HAD EARLIER BEEN SLOWED DOWN BY ATC TO 250 KTS WHICH I PROGRAMMED INTO THE FMC. THEN WHEN WE WERE GIVEN NORMAL SPD, I COULDN'T GET IT OUT. CAPT SAID LOOK AT CRUISE DSCNT PAGE -- THERE IT WAS. I TOOK IT OUT, PUT BACK ECONOMY CRUISE DSCNT AND THOUGHT EVERYTHING WAS OK. I THINK, IN RETROSPECT, I TOOK IT OUT OF PLANNED DSCNT MODE BY DOING THAT. 2) MY NOT BACKING UP BEGINNING OF DSCNT POINT WITH MANUAL CALCULATIONS. NO EXCUSE EXCEPT PERHAPS FATIGUE. (THIS WAS A RED-EYE FLT FROM SFO-PHL THAT WAS DELAYED IN SFO DUE TO LATE ARR OF ACFT. DEPARTED SFO AT XX38 AM LCL TIME.) 3) FAILURE OF CAPT TO BACK ME UP. DUE ALSO, I THINK, TO BACK SIDE OF THE CLOCK FLYING. ACTION: VOW NOT TO BE LULLED INTO A SENSE OF COMPLACENCY WITH FMC. SOMETHING I NORMALLY DON'T DO. BUT FOR WHATEVER REASON, IT HAPPENED THIS TIME.

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  8. Accession Number: 361890
    Synopsis: RPTR ERROR ADMITTED IN GROSS NAV ERROR, OVERWATER OP. AFTER AN AUTOPLT DISCONNECT, FLC FAILED TO RE-ENGAGE THE AUTOPLT MODE SELECTOR TO INS NAV POS FROM THE HDG POS.
    Narrative: SHORTLY AFTER REACHING CRUISE AND SELECTING INS NAV, AN ELECTRICAL SYS SPIKE TRIPPED OFF THE AUTOPLT. THE AUTOPLT WAS RE-ENGAGED USING THE NORMAL INITIAL SETUP OF 'F-H-A' FLT DIRECTOR HDG ALT. SIMULTANEOUSLY, ATC ISSUED A FREQ CHANGE, AND WE WERE PASSING THE FIRST RPTING POINT. CONTACT WAS MADE WITH NY RADIO AND THE STANDARD POS RPT MADE. THOUGH WE FAILED TO RE-ENGAGE INS/NAV THE NEXT POS RPT CAME WITHIN 1 MIN OF THE ETA AT THAT POINT. ALL APPEARED NORMAL UNTIL NY RADIO ADVISED US TO CONTACT ZNY ON VHF. WE WERE ADVISED THAT IT APPEARED THAT WE WERE APPROX 45 MI E OF THE AIRWAY. A CHK OF INS COORDINATES CONFIRMED OUR POS. THE FLT WAS CLRED DIRECT TO THE NEXT WAYPOINT AND WAS COMPLETED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. ALTHOUGH THE AUTOPLT RE-ENGAGEMENT TO 'F-H-A' WAS ANNOUNCED THE IMMEDIATE FREQ CHANGE AND POS RPT DISTR THE CREW FROM MAKING THE USUAL XCHK AND THE SUBSEQUENT RE- ENGAGEMENT OF INS NAV. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 361732: WHEN RE-ENGAGED AUTOPLT WAS IN HDG MODE AND NOT NAV MODE ALLOWING ACFT TO DRIFT OFF COURSE.

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  10. Accession Number: 362571
    Synopsis: PIC OF AN MLG SETS COCKPIT UP FOR A CAT III APCH. SELECTS #2 AUTOPLT PRIOR TO ARMING THE APCH MODE. AUTOPLTS DISCONNECT AND ACFT GOES THROUGH LOC, CREATING A POTENTIAL CONFLICT LTSS WITH ACFT Y.
    Narrative: FOR CERTIFICATION PURPOSES IT WAS DECIDED THAT THE CAPT (PF) WOULD EXECUTE THE CAT III AUTOLAND TO RWY 36L AT CVG. CONDITIONS WERE DAYTIME AND VFR, APCH AGREED TO OUR REQUEST. AFTER BEING GIVEN A HEADING TO INTERCEPT THE FINAL APCH COURSE THE CAPT SELECTED THE SECOND AUTOPLT BEFORE ARMING THE 'APCH MODE.' THIS WAS INCORRECT AND CAUSED BOTH AUTOPLTS TO DISENGAGE. THIS THEN LED TO SOME CONFUSION IN THE COCKPIT AS WE ATTEMPTED TO CORRECT THE PROB. DURING THIS TIME WE WERE STILL ON OUR ASSIGNED INTERCEPT HEADING AND ULTIMATELY OVERSHOT THE FINAL APCH COURSE. THERE WAS PARALLEL TFC INBOUND TO RWY 36R WHICH WE CAME WITHIN 1 MI OF AND LED TO A TA FROM TCASII. AT THIS TIME WE ABANDONED THE AUTOLAND APCH, CORRECTED BACK TO THE FINAL APCH COURSE AND CONTINUED A MANUAL APCH. NO EVASIVE ACTION WAS NEEDED. THE DISENGAGEMENT OF THE BOTH AUTOPLTS WAS A DISTR FOR BOTH OF US WHICH LED TO REDUCED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 362570: I DECIDED TO FLY AN AUTOLAND APCH IN ORDER TO FINISH MY CERTIFICATION FOR CAT III OPS.

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  12. Accession Number: 390873
    Synopsis: FLC OF B757 HAS LEADING EDGE FLAP DISAGREE INDICATION ON DSCNT FOR APCH. RECEIVING CLRNC FOR A HOLD TO TROUBLESHOOT THE PROB, THEY NEGLECT TO REPROGRAM THE ALT. ALTDEV OCCURS.
    Narrative: ON ARR TO EGE WE WERE E OF RLG AT 15000 FT SLOWING THROUGH 220 KTS FOR 210 KTS WHEN FO, FLYING, CALLED FOR FLAPS 1 DEG. EICAS DISPLAYED TRAILING EDGE FLAP DISAGREE MESSAGE. I FELT PRETTY SURE WE WOULD NOT COMPLETE THE APCH TO EGE AND ASKED ZDV IF WE COULD HOLD AT RLG TO SORT IT OUT. THEY CLRED US TO HOLD N AT 15000 FT. AS WE WERE AT 15000 FT WE HAD ALREADY SET 13100 FT IN THE ALT WINDOW FOR THE NEXT LEG OF THE APCH. BY THE TIME WE GOT HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS WE WERE NEARLY OVER RLG AND THE FMC WOULD NOT ACCEPT A HOLD. I WAS IN VOR RAW DATA AND SET THE INBOUND RADIAL AND TOLD THE FO TO START OUT IN RAW DATA AND I WOULD SET HOLDING. AFTER PASSING RLG I WAS ABLE TO SET THE HOLD BY DIRECT INTERCEPT RLG, THEN SETTING UP THE HOLDING PAGE. THE FO SET EVERYTHING BACK UP AND AS WE PATTED OURSELVES ON THE BACK FOR OVERCOMING AUTOMATION AND GETTING OURSELVES SET TO SOLVE OUR FLAP PROB DEN ASKED OUR ALT AND THEN CLRED US TO 14000 FT. AS SOON AS WE HAD CROSSED RLG AND HEADING SELECTED OURSELVES INTO THE HOLDING PATTERN WITH VOR RAW DATA, VNAV CONTINUED TO OPERATE AS ADVERTISED AND BEGAN A SLOW DSCNT TO 13000 FT, OUR NEXT ALT. DEN WASN'T UPSET BUT IT WAS A SOBERING REMINDER THAT IF YOU KILL THE AUTOMATION MAKE SURE YOU KILL IT ALL.

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  14. Accession Number: 400910
    Synopsis: AN ACR MD80 FLC DSNDED BELOW THEIR ASSIGNED ALT WHEN THE FLC INADVERTENTLY SWITCHED THE MODE OF THE AUTOFLT SYS AFTER IT HAD GONE TO THE CAPTURE MODE AT A HIGH RATE OF DSCNT. THE CAPT FAILED TO MONITOR THE EFFECTS OF THE CHANGE HE INITIATED IN THE SYS AND THE FO DID NOT MONITOR THE ACFT DURING A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT.
    Narrative: WE WERE BEING VECTORED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 21 AND WERE QUITE HIGH. WE WERE BEING STEPPED DOWN FROM 9000 FT TO 7000 FT, BEING ASSIGNED HEADINGS AND LOOKING FOR THE ARPT. AFTER SETTING AND CONFIRMING THAT 7000 FT HAD BEEN SET, BOTH PLTS TURNED OUR ATTN BACK OUTSIDE THE ACFT. SPOILERS AND SLATS EXTENDED WE WERE DSNDING RAPIDLY. I NOTICED THE ACFT WAS IN VERT SPD MODE AND AIRSPD WAS SLOWING. I REACHED UP AND SWITCHED THE ACFT TO IAS SINCE I THOUGHT THE VERT SPD MODE WAS LEFT OVER FROM THE INTERMEDIARY DSCNT TO 9000 FT AND THEN WHEN WE WERE RECLRED TO 7000 FT THE ACFT WAS ALREADY CAPTURING 9000 FT. WHAT I BELIEVE WAS ACTUALLY HAPPENING WAS WE WERE DSNDING SO FAST THAT THE ACFT WAS ALREADY CAPTURING 7000 FT, SO WHEN I HIT IAS I INADVERTENTLY CANCELED THE ALT CAPTURE. SINCE OUR ATTN WAS DIVERTED OUTSIDE, THE ACFT DSNDED THROUGH 7000 FT AND WE DID NOT CATCH IT UNTIL WE WERE ALREADY DSNDING THROUGH 6700 FT. WHEN WE REALIZED IT I IMMEDIATELY CLICKED OFF THE AUTOPLT, STOPPED THE DSCNT AND BEGAN A CLB BACK TO 7000 FT. ABOUT THAT TIME APCH QUERIED US ABOUT WHAT ALT WE WERE DSNDING TO AND I RESPONDED WE WERE LEVELING AT 7000 FT. HE THEN RECLRED US FOR 6000 FT. THERE DID NOT APPEAR TO BE ANY TFC CONFLICT AND APCH DID NOT MAKE ANY FURTHER MENTION OF OUR DSCNT.

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  16. Accession Number: 415410
    Synopsis: FLC OF AN LGT UNDERSHOT DSCNT ALT FIX DUE TO NOT SETTING THE PROPER MODE OPTION WHEN PROGRAMMING THE FMC. THIS MISTAKE WAS NOT RECOGNIZED BY THE CREW IN SUFFICIENT TIME TO MAKE THE DSCNT REQUIRED FOR THE FIX XING AS THE CREW WAS DISTR BY COM WITH FLT ATTENDANT AND COMPANY CALLS.
    Narrative: WHILE WE WERE CRUISING AT FL290, ZNY CLRED US TO CROSS HARTY INTXN AT FL230, 250 KTS. FMS WAS PREPROGRAMMED FOR HARTY AT FL230. PF PLACED FL230 IN AUTOPLT MCP AND THEN ENTERED 'HARTY 250 DEG RADIAL, 230 KTS' INTO FMS. I BELIEVE THAT AS THIS INFO WAS BEING ENTERED, THE PREVIOUS 'TOP OF DSCNT' POINT WAS REACHED AND THE MCP WENT INTO AN 'ALT HOLD/SPD' CONFIGN. AS THE RESTRS WERE THEN EXECUTED, THE PF BELIEVED THE AUTOPLT WAS IN AN LNAV/VNAV MODE AND THE ACFT WOULD COMPLY. WE WERE BOTH SLIGHTLY DISTR BY CALLS FROM FLT ATTENDANTS AND COMPANY IN RANGE AND ATIS MONITORING. APPROX 4 MI W OF HARTY, CAPT NOTICED WE HAD NOT STARTED DOWN AND COMPLIANCE WITH THE RESTRS WAS IMPOSSIBLE. WE IMMEDIATELY BEGAN MAX RATE DSCNT AND REQUESTED RADAR VECTORS FOR SEPARATION AND DISTANCE TO COMPLY. CTR STATED THAT THEY NEEDED US BELOW FL250 AND THAT HARTY WAS BEHIND US. WE LEVELED AT FL230 ABOUT 3 MI E OF HARTY. NO CONFLICT WAS NOTED, AND IN LATER QUERY, ZNY STATED THAT 'THERE WAS NO PROB.'
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