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Incidents related to Issue 28 incidents related to this issue.

Issue: displays (visual and aural) may be poorly designed (Issue #92)
Description: Displays (including aural warnings and other auditory displays), display formats, and display elements may not be designed for detectability, discriminability, and interpretability. This may cause important information to be missed or misinterpreted.

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  2. Accession Number: 54353
    Synopsis: ACR MLG OVERSHOT CLRNC ALT DURING DESCENT TO FL210. F/O PF SELECTED WRONG PMS MODE CANCELLING AUTO CAPTURE.
    Narrative: FROM CHS TO CLT I WAS FLYING THE ACFT VIA AUTOPILOT INPUTS THROUGH THE FMA. PMS WAS NOT ENGAGED. AT APPROX 100 MILES FROM CLT, I ASKED THE CAPT TO REQUEST DESCENT CLRNC FROM ATC. ATC ADVISED US THAT HE WAS UNABLE TO DESCEND US DUE TO TRAFFIC AND TO STANDBY FOR LOWER. AT APPROX 60 MILES FROM CLT, WE WERE GIVEN A DESCENT CLRNC. I INITIATED THE DESCENT AND THE CAPT PROCEEDED TO GET THE ATIS INFO AND COMPANY CHANGEOVER INFO. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, WE WERE GIVEN ANOTHER DESCENT CLRNC TO FL210, FOLLOWED QUICKLY BY A HEADING CHANGE AND A REQUEST TO SLOW TO 250 KNOTS, AND EXPEDITE OUR DESCENT. I ACKNOWLEDGED THE TRANSMISSIONS TO ATC. THE REQUEST TO SLOW TO 250 KNOTS CAME AS WE WERE APPROACHING FL210, HOWEVER, I DID NOT NOTICE THAT WE WERE THIS CLOSE TO LEVEL OFF DUE TO MY PREOCCUPATION WITH FLYING THE ACFT, COMMUNICATING WITH ATC, AND TRYING TO CONFIGURE THE ACFT FOR AS RAPID A DESCENT AS POSSIBLE WHILE SLOWING SIMULTANEOUSLY TO 250 KTS. DUE TO THIS ERROR ON MY PART, I SELECTED IAS HOLD ON THE FLT GUIDANCE CONTROL PANEL. MY ACTION OF SELECTING IAS HOLD JUST AS FL210 WAS BEING CAPTURED DISARMED THE ALT HOLD FUNCTION. AT 20700', THE ALT WARNING SOUNDED. I DISCONNECTED THE A/P AND BEGAN A CLIMB BACK UP TO OUR ASSIGNED ALT OF 21000'. HOWEVER, THE DESCENT WAS NOT ARRESTED UNTIL THE ACFT REACHED 20300'. HAD I OBSERVED ON THE FMA DISPLAY THAT ALT CAPTURE HAD TAKEN PLACE, I WOULD NEVER HAVE SELECTED "IAS". SEVERAL THINGS CONTRIBUTED TO THE DEVIATION: THE CAPT WAS PREOCCUPIED WITH GETTING THE ARRIVAL ATIS, COMPANY CHANGEOVER, AND FAILED TO MAKE THE CALLOUT OF 1000' ABOVE ASSIGNED ALT. NUMEROUS CLRNCS BEING ISSUED BY ATC, REQUIRING SIMULTANEOUS CHANGES IN DESCENT RATE, HEADING, AND AIRSPEED. OVER-RELIANCE ON AUTOMATIC FEATURES OF FLT GUIDANCE SYSTEM WHICH CREATED A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY. THE FLT GUIDANCE SYSTEM CONTROLS ON THE MLG ARE LOCATED BELOW THE CENTER GLARESHIELD, WHILE THE FMA ARE LOCATED ABOVE EACH PLT'S FLT INSTRUMENT GROUP. WHEN I PUSHED THE "IAS" BUTTON ON THE FLT GUIDANCE PANEL, THE FMA WOULD SHOW THE GREEN "ALT HOLD" ANNUNCIATION REPLACED WITH "IAS", THUS INDICATING THAT THE ALT HOLD FUNCTION IS NO LONGER ENGAGED. HOWEVER, BECAUSE THE FMA DISPLAY WAS OUT OF MY FIELD OF VISION WHEN I SELECTED "IAS", THIS WENT UNNOTICED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 53983: FOR REASONS UNKNOWN, IT DID NOT CAPTURE FL210.

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  4. Accession Number: 60408
    Synopsis: ACR MLG DEVIATION FROM CLRNC ROUTE ON SID FROM LAX.
    Narrative: WHILE FLYING THE GORMAN 6 SID FROM THE LAX 24 COMPLEX, THE ACFT FAILED TO FLY THE DEPICTED ROUTING RESULTING IN AN ALLEGED TRAFFIC CONFLICT. FLT LAX TO SEA WAS ASSIGNED A HEADING OF 360 DEG TO INTERCEPT THE GORMAN 322 DEG RADIAL PER THE DEPARTURE ROUTING AND WAS CLEARED TO CLIMB TO FL230. THE ACFT'S FLT GUIDANCE SYSTEM WAS PROPERLY SET UP AND ARMED TO INTERCEPT THIS RADIAL PER THE CLEARANCE. HOWEVER, THE SYSTEM APPARENTLY INTERCEPTED A "GHOST" RADIAL AND INITIATED A LEFT TURN TO INTERCEPT. AS THE ACFT HAD COMPLETED APPROX 80 DEG OF TURN TO THE LEFT ATC ASKED, "WHAT ARE YOU DOING". WE WERE THEN INSTRUCTED TO TURN RIGHT TO 045 DEG TO REINTERCEPT AND SUBSEQUENTLY CLEARED DIRECT TO GORMAN VOR. WE WERE ALSO ASKED TO STOP THE CLIMB AT 15000'. FAILURE OF THE ACFT FLT GUIDANCE SYSTEM TO PROPERLY CAPTURE THE PROGRAMMED RADIAL AND FAILURE OF THE FLYING PLT TO MONITOR THE SYSTEM RESULTED IN THIS SITUATION. UNCLEAR COMMUNICATIONS FROM ATC MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE ALLEGED TRAFFIC CONFLICT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM 60407: AT 10000' THE F/O MADE THE NORMAL REQUIRED SEAT BELT ANNOUNCEMENT AND MADE A BEVERAGE REQUEST. AS WE CLIMBED THROUGH APPROXIMATELY 13500' A MALE FLT ATTENDANT RANG FOR ADMITTANCE. MY ATTN WAS MOMENTARILY DISTRACTED. BECAUSE OF ACFT DESIGN I AM NOT ABLE TO SEE THE HORIZONTAL SITUATION INDICATOR WHEN PROPERLY SEATED AND ALIGNED AS IT IS POSITIONED BEHIND THE CONTROL COLUMN. APPROACHING SEA WE WERE ADVISED TO CALL LAX CENTER. THIS INCIDENT COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED BY BETTER COCKPIT DESIGN, ATTENTIVE FLT CREW, AND NOT ALLOWING ADDITIONAL NONESSENTIAL PERSONNEL IN THE FLT STATION DURING CRITICAL PERIODS OF FLT.

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  6. Accession Number: 74321
    Synopsis: CLEARED TO 6000 AND WHEN SETTING ALT ALERTER INADVERTENTLY SET 5000.
    Narrative: WE WERE CLRD BY HOU APCH TO DESCEND TO 6000'. THE F/O CHANGED THE MODE CONTROL PANEL ALT SETTING TO 6000' (VERIFIED BY ME). WE BECAME DISTRACTED BY TFC CALLOUTS AND HAD NOT NOTICED THAT THE ALT SETTING HAD BEEN MISREAD OR HAD SLIPPED TO 5000'. THE ACFT AUTOMATICALLY LEVELED AT 5000' RESULTING IN A CALL BY APCH TELLING US WE WERE ONLY CLRD TO 6000'. WE DISCOVERED THAT THE ALT SET KNOB COULD BE SLIGHTLY OUT OF DETENT AND LATER BUMPED INTO A DIFFERENT ALT. ALSO, WITH GLARE THE NUMERALS ARE VERY DIFFICULT TO READ. (LEAD CRYSTAL READOUT). THE NUMERICAL SIX ALSO RESEMBLES THE NUMERAL GIVE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FROM ACN 74381: REGARDLESS A CONFLICT WAS RECORDED.

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  8. Accession Number: 106435
    Synopsis: FLT FAILED TO INTERCEPT ON COURSE RADIAL. REPORTER BELIEVES THIS WAS CAUSED IN SOME PART BY THE ACFT COCKPIT DESIGN.
    Narrative: CLRED BY DEP TO FLY HDG 060 DEGS TO INTERCEPT 090 DEG R DALLAS 6. I THOUGHT I HAD SET VOR INTERCEPT ON THE FLT MANAGEMENT PANEL (AUTOMATED COCKPIT). NEXT HEARD CENTER (AFTER FREQ CHANGE) SAY TURN RIGHT 100 DEGS TO INTERCEPT 090 DEG R DALLAS 6 DEP. I HAD GONE THROUGH THE RADIAL (NOT MORE THAN 5-10 MI DUE TO X ANGLE). FLT ANNUNCIATOR SHOWED HDG SELECT, NOT VOR. I SHOULD HAVE MONITORED INTERCEPT. IN MLG ACFT THIS TAKES A CONSTANT AWARENESS AS THE ONE COURSE LINE IN THE HSI IS HIDDEN BY THE YOKE AND AN EFFORT TO LOOK AROUND THE YOKE IS REQUIRED. TO SEE THE HSI DISPLAY IN ALL BUT THE MOST FORWARD SEAT POS.

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  10. Accession Number: 130973
    Synopsis: REPORTER CITES A VARIETY OF REASONS FOR OVERSHOOTING ALT IN DESCENT. BOTTOM LINE IS THAT THE ALT CALLOUT WAS OMITTED. THE DISTRS OF GEAR WARNING, BUSY COCKPIT, COM PROCS AND NO ALT WARNING LIGHT MAY HAVE BEEN CONTRIBUTORY. PLT TECHNIQUE
    Narrative: OUR CLRNC HAD BEEN "DSND TO 9000', SPD 210 KTS." ORD APCH CTL WAS VERY BUSY. WHILE DSNDING AT 210 KTS THROUGH APPROX 10000', WE WERE ASKED TO SLOW TO 170 KTS. PLEASE NOTE THAT THE ACFT IN QUESTION HAS A LOUD DISTRACTING VOICE WARNING SYS, WHICH AT 210 KTS AND IDLE PWR WARNS YOU "LNDG GEAR." WITH THE LNDG GEAR WARNING GOING OFF AND THE CTLR ISSUING A NEW SPD AT THE SAME TIME, THE 1000' CALL WAS TO BE MADE ("10000 FOR 9000"). BOTH THE CAPT AND I FAILED TO NOTICE THAT THE ALT ARMING AMBER "ALT" LIGHT WAS NOT ON. WHETHER THE CAPT FAILED TO ARM IT OR THE ALT MODE WAS DISARMED BY MY USE OF THE VERT SPD MODE OF THE FGS, IS UNKNOWN. AT 8700' THE CAPT NOTICED OUR ALT DEVIATION, AT WHICH TIME I TURNED OFF THE AUTOPLT AND CLBED BACK TO THE ASSIGNED ALT OF 9000'. IN MY OPINION, THE ALT DEVIATION WAS CAUSED BY A VARIETY OF DISTRS: 1) VERY BUSY ATC ENVIRONMENT, 2) DISTRACTING WARNING HORN FOR LNDG GEAR AT 210 KTS, 3) NO WARNING ON ACFT OF 1000' TO LEVEL-OFF (IT WARNS YOU ONLY AFTER ALT DEVIATION, NOT BEFORE AS ON OTHER ACFT IN FLEET), AND 4) RADIO CALL FROM ATC TO FURTHER SLOW ACFT TO 170 KTS AT CRITICAL TIME (DSNDING FROM 10000 TO 9000'). MY RECOMMENDATIONS: 1) REQUIRE WARNING OTHER THAN LIGHT (AURAL) OF IMPENDING LEVEL-OFF, 2) REMOVE "LNDG GEAR" WARNING UNTIL FLAPS ARE AT LEAST DOWN TO 15 DEGS AND THROTTLES IDLE, AND 3) MODIFY AUTOPLTS SO THAT MOVEMENT OF VERT SPD WHEEL WHILE AUTOPLT IS IN CAPTURE MODE DOES NOT DISENGAGE CAPTURE MODE. (PLEASE NOTE THAT OUR AIRLINES IS CURRENTLY MAKING THIS MODIFICATION, BUT THE ACFT WE WERE ON WAS NOT MODIFIED.)

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  12. Accession Number: 181926
    Synopsis: TRACK DEVIATION FOR ACR ADVTECH MLG DEP PHX.
    Narrative: WE WERE USING THE NEW ACARS AUTOMATED CLRNC SYS WHICH SHOWS OUR CLRNC ON THE ACARS TOUCH SCREEN, ALONG WITH THE SQUAWK. NO CALL TO CLRNC DELIVERY IS REQUIRED TO VERIFY WE PROPERLY RECEIVED IT. THIS IS BAD. ALSO NO HARD COPU IS GENERATED. ALSO BAD. THE F/O WAS FLYING AND HAD SET-UP THE COCKPIT FOR THE DRAKE 4 DEP. OUR FLT PLAN (FILED CLRNC) WAS OHX DIRECT DRAKE AS FILED TO SFO. THE ACARS SCREEN MODIFIED THIS CLRNC BY SAYING DRAKE 4... AS FILED, BUT IT ALSO DISPLAYS THE ORIGINAL UNMODIFIED CLRNC (ALSO BAD). AS THE F/O HAD THE FMC SET-UP FOR THE DRAKE 4, I THOUGHT HE KNEW OF THE MODIFICATION. AT THE 13 MI FIX WHERE WE TURN TO 360 DEG, HE WOULD NOT TURN, EVEN WHEN I TOLD HIM TO DO SO. HE SAID WE WERE NOT CLRED FOR THE DRAKE 4. I LOUDLY AND FIRMLY COMMANDED HIM TO TURN, AND HE SLOWLY AND BEGRADINGLY STARTED A VERY SLOW TURN AND SAID HE DIDN'T HAVE A DRAKE 4 PAGE. AND THEN SAID WE WERE SUPPOSED TO DO THE PAYSO DEP. I WAS TRYING VERY HARD TO CONTACT DEP BUT DUE TO LIGHT ACFT FREQ CONGESTION HAD TROUBLE. FINALLY DID AND THEY ISSUED AN IMMEDIATE TURN TO 050 DEG. CANNOT EXPLAIN F/O ACTIONS. ANY TIME THERE IS A MODIFICATION TO AUTOMATED CLRNC, THE MODIFICATION TO RTE SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO BE READ BACK.

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  14. Accession Number: 182888
    Synopsis: ACR MLG ALT DEVIATION UNDERSHOT ALT CROSSING RESTRICTION.
    Narrative: WHILE CRUISING AT FL370 IN VMC CONDITIONS, ZNY ISSUED US A XING RESTRICTION (30 W OF SWEET INTXN AT FL180). AT THIS TIME WE WERE ABOUT 800 DME FROM THE FIX. THE XING RESTRICTION AND ALT WERE CORRECTLY PROGRAMMED INTO THE FMC. THE NEW ALT WAS SELECTED INTO THE ALT ALERT WINDOW OF THE MCP, AND VNAV WAS SELECTED AND VERIFIED OPERATIONAL (VNAV LIGHT ON). THE CAPT'S FMC WAS IN THE "LEGS" PAGE (FLT PLAN) AND MY FMC WAS DISPLAYING THE "DSNT" PAGE (FLT PATH ANGLE, RATE OF DSNT REQUIRED ARE DISPLAYED ON THIS PAGE). MY PARTICULAR FMC DISPLAY ON THIS ACFT WAS VERY DIM AND THE LIGHT INTENSITY COULD NOT BE INCREASED AND FURTHER. BOTH PLTS WERE FLYING INTO THE SUN AND WEARING SUNGLASSES, WHICH MADE MONITORING MY PARTICULAR FMC EVEN HARDER. SOMETIME BTWN 80 DME AND 60 DME FROM THE FIX, WITH FMC AND MCP ACCURATELY PROGRAMMED AND WITH THE APPROPRIATE DISPLAYS IN VIEW, THE VNAV PORTION OF THE FMC/MCP INTERFAC MALFUNCTIONED AND DID NOT COMMAND THE REQUIRED DSNT AT THE TOP OF DSNT POINT (NO MESSAGE WAS EVER DISPLAYED ON THE FMC'S TO ALERT US OF THE MALFUNCTION). AT 60 DME FROM THE FIX I BECAME AWARE THAT THE FMC WAS NOT INITIATING THE EXPECTED DSNT, AND ADVISED THE CAPT (WHO WAS FLYING) OF THE NEED TO GET DOWN. THIS DAY WE HAD IN EXCESS OF 80 KTS OF WIND ON THE TAIL. THE CAPT INITIATED A HIGH RATE OF DSNT, AND I ADVISED ZNY IMMEDIATELY THAT WE WERE UNABLE TO COMPLY WITH THE RESTRICTION. ZNY DID NOT RESPOND, EVEN AFTER A SECOND RADIO CALL. EVENTUALLY WE WERE VECTORED (CENTER DID NOT SEEM ALARMED). THE FAILURE OF THE VNAV MODE W/O A STATUS (MALFUNCTION) DISPLAY EITHER IN THE FMC OR MCP, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE "DIM" FMC DISPLAY ON THE COPLT'S SIDE CONTRIBUTED TO THE "TOP OF DSNT" POINT BEING OVERFLOWN W/O THE REQUIRED DSNT BEING INITIATED.

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  16. Accession Number: 196343
    Synopsis: MLG GETS OFF COURSE WHEN FMS COMPUTER IS LOADED INCORRECTLY.
    Narrative: THE FLT WAS FROM ATL TO GSO WITH A FLT PLAN ROUTING OF ATL...SPA...SPA041/GSO281...GSO. IT WAS THE CAPT'S LEG AND FOLLOWING OUR COMPANY PROCS HE LOADED THE RTE INTO THE NAV COMPUTER (FMS). THIS WAS THE CAPT'S SECOND TRIP SINCE UPGRADE AND HE HAD JUST COME OFF 2 WKS VACATION. HE OMITTED THE SPA041/GSO281 WAYPOINT AND INSTEAD ENTERED ATL...SPA...GSO-30...GSO USING THE FIX 30 MI PRIOR TO GSO AS A DSCNT REF POINT. AS THE FO I CHKED THE RTE AND SAW THAT THE THIRD POINT WAS GSO-01 WHICH I ASSUMED WAS THE SPA041/GSO281 WHEN IT WAS REALLY THE POINT 30 MI PRIOR TO GSO. ON THE DIRECT COURSE FROM SPA TO GSO. (THE FMS WE USE ASSIGNS AN ARBITRARY NUMERICAL DESIGNATION TO ANY WAYPOINT NOT ENTERED IN IT'S DATA BASE, IE, GSO-01). IT IS NECESSARY TO PULL THE POINT DOWN TO THE BOTTOM OF THE PAGE TO VERIFY THE CORRECT RADIAL/DME WAS ENTERED AND I FAILED TO DO THIS. I HAVE BEEN FLYING THIS RTE FOR SEVERAL MONTHS AND SEEING THE GSO-01 DESIGNATION EACH TIME LED ME TO COMPLACENCY. AS THE ACFT PASSED OVER SPA AND TURNED TO GSO RATHER THAN OUT THE 410 RADIAL. ATC ADVISED US TO TURN TO A 030 DEG HDG. I THEN FOUND OUR MISTAKE AND WE REPROGRAMMED THE FMS. HUMAN FACTORS CONSIDERATIONS: EARLY PICK-UP. INEXPERIENCE ON ACFT TYPE. AUTOMATION, FMS DOES NOT SHOW ACTUAL RADIAL/DME ON RTE PAGE. COMPLACENCY.

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  18. Accession Number: 225086
    Synopsis: FLC OF ACR MLG ACFT EXPERIENCED A MULTI MASTER WARNING OF AN ENG PROBLEM RIGHT AFTER TKOF AND RETURNED TO LAND.
    Narrative: ON DEP FROM 27R AT PHL PASSING 2000 FT RECEIVED MULTIPLE WARNINGS/ALERTS FROM MFDU (MULTI-FUNCTION DISPLAY) RMFDU INOP. TGT OVERLIMIT #2 ENG, N1 OVERSPD #2 ENG, LIGHT ON START LEVER #2. MASTER WARNING TRIPLE CHIME ALERT. THE PRIMARY MFDU DISPLAYING ENG PARAMETERS WERE IN LIMITS AT ALL TIMES (WOULD CHANGE COLOR ON TAPE DISPLAY IF OUT OF LIMITS). I ALSO DISENGAGED AUTOTHROTTLES AND PULLED ENG #2 TO IDLE TO SEE IF THIS WOULD CHANGE ANYTHING AND IT DID NOT. THE WARNINGS/ALERTS DISPLAY WAS CONTINUOUSLY INTERMITTENT WHITE/RED (WHITE BEING -- CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS). I REQUESTED A RETURN TO FIELD FROM DEP AND WE MADE AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG AND SECURED ENG AFTER CLRING RWY. I NEVER SHUT DOWN #2 ENG AS I FELT THIS WAS A WARNING COMPUTER FAULT NOT AN ACTUAL EXCEEDANCE. NO EMER WAS DECLARED. ONE PROBLEM WITH THIS SITUATION WAS A TRIPLE CHIME ALERT (HIGHEST ALERT CONDITION) WHICH COULD NOT BE SELECTED WITHOUT SHUTTING DOWN THE ENG. I DID HAVE TO SECURE THE MASTER AUDIO WARNING (SECURING ALL AUDIO ALERTS) IN ORDER TO SILENCE THE ALERT. I BELIEVE THAT THIS WAS A DESIGN FLAW IN THE ACFT. YOU SHOULD BE ABLE TO SECURE ANY ALERT AUDIO BY PRESSING ON THE MASTER WARNING LIGHT WHICH WOULD CONTINUE TO FLASH RED. THE AUDIO WAS VERY DISTRACTING.

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  20. Accession Number: 358200
    Synopsis: MD88 FLC UNABLE TO UNDERSTAND COMPUTERIZED ATIS VOICE ON ARR AND ON THE GND.
    Narrative: THE AUTOMATED ATIS BROADCASTS, WITH THE SYNTHESIZED VOICE, SUCKS. (SCIENTIFIC TERM.) IT APPEARS FAA WENT WITH 70'S TECHNOLOGY. IT SOUNDS LIKE SAME SYS USED IN MIL P3 SIMULATORS FOR GCA PRACTICE. WE UNAFFECTIONATELY CALLED IT IGOR. IT IS JUST AS DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND NOW AS IT WAS 18 YRS AGO. LET'S USE CURRENT TECHNOLOGY OR RETURN TO HUMAN VOICE RECORDINGS.

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  22. Accession Number: 359619
    Synopsis: WDB FLC ON OCEANIC CTL USING DATALINK COM MISINTERPRETS THE PRINTED CLRNC AND HAS ALTDEV. FORMATTED PRESENTATION HARD TO READ.
    Narrative: OUR FLT LEFT LAX FOR OUR DEST, AKL (AUKLAND, NZ). AFTER ENTERING OAKLAND OCEANIC AIRSPACE, WE WERE USING A SATELLITE DATALINK SYS FOR COM WITH, AND CTL BY, OAKLAND CTL. THIS SYS IS KNOWN AS CPDLC (CTLR-PLT, DATALINK, COMS), AND IS THE FIRST PART OF CNS (COMS, NAV, AND SURVEILLANCE). CNS ARE THE COMPONENTS OF FANS-1 (FUTURE AIR NAV SYS). I ENDORSE THIS SYS, AND STRIVE TO FOLLOW THE PROCS WHICH ARE DESIGNED TO PREVENT ERRORS. ON THIS OCCASION, WE FOLLOWED THE PROC, AND STILL ERRED IN OUR INTERP OF THE CLRNC. AT XA38 UTC WE WERE AT (0630N 15740W) IE, 4.5 DEGS (270 NM) N OF CHRISTMAS ISLAND. WE HAD BEEN GIVEN A BLOCK ALT FL310-FL350 AND WERE CLBING IN SMALL INCREMENTS SO AS TO REMAIN NEAR OUR OPTIMUM ALT, (FOR FUEL CONSERVATION). WE RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE: XA38Z ATC UPLINK/CROSS 0100S AT AND MAINTAIN FL350/RPT REACHING FL350. THE MESSAGE SHOWN ABOVE IS AS CLOSE A DUPLICATION AS POSSIBLE OF THE ACTUAL PRINTOUT. OUR PROC IS TO PRINT THE MESSAGE SO AS TO CONFIRM THAT THE FLT NUMBER IS CORRECT, READ THE PRINTOUT, AGREE ON THE CLRNC, DETERMINE APPROPRIATE ACTION, AND RESPOND TO ATC. IN THIS CASE, 'WILCO.' WHAT DID WE DO WRONG? LOOKING AT THE THIRD LINE: '/CROSS 0100S AT AND MAINTAIN FL350,' WE BOTH 'SAW' 10 DEGS S NOT 01 (ONE) DEG S. WE AGREED ON 10 DEGS S, BUILT A FIX AT 10 DEGS S, PROGRAMMED THE FMC (FLT MGMNT COMPUTER) TO BE AT FL350 AT 10 DEGS S, AND ON CREW CHANGE, BRIEFED THE OTHER CREW ACCORDINGLY. AT XB53Z THE RELIEF CREW WAS AT FL343. THEY RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE: XB53Z ATC UPLINK/VERIFY YOU'LL BE XING 01 S AT FL350 FOR TFC. NOTICE HOW MUCH EASIER TO READ THIS SECOND MESSAGE IS. THE RELIEF CREW CLBED IMMEDIATELY, AND RPTED LEVEL FL350 AT XB55Z. NOTES AND CONCLUSIONS: 1) THE DATALINK REQUIRES 1-2 MINS, PLUS TYPING OR ENTRY TIME TO COMPLETE A MESSAGE. FOLLOWED BY DECISION MAKING TIME, TYPING OR ENTRY TIME, AND ANOTHER 1-2 MINS FOR THE RESPONSE. THIS IS FAR BETTER THAN THE OLDER TECHNIQUES (STILL IN USE), BUT AT 7-8 MI PER MIN WE'LL COVER 35-40 NM PER EXCHANGE. 2) THE ORIGINAL CLRNC WAS TIMELY, AND CORRECT IN CONTENT. HOWEVER, THE FORMAT OF THE MESSAGE, COMBINED WITH THE FONT USED BY THE PRINTER, CONTRIBUTED TO THE ERROR MADE BY 2 PLTS IN READING THE MESSAGE. THE FORMAT OF THE SECOND MESSAGE (PROBABLY FREE TEXT), IS LESS LIKELY TO BE MISUNDERSTOOD. 3) WITH VOICE COMS, THE PLT'S READBACK PROVIDES THE 'SYS' AN OPPORTUNITY TO 'CATCH' AN ERROR IN THE PLT'S INTERP OF A CLRNC. THE DATALINK SYS DOES NOT PROVIDE THIS SAFEGUARD. THE CTLR HAS TO TAKE IT ON FAITH THAT WE 'INTERPRET' THE CLRNC CORRECTLY. ALSO, THE PLT DOESN'T HAVE THE CTLR'S 'ROGER' TO CONFIRM 2 THINGS: A) THE CTLR KNOWS THAT THE CORRECT FLT HAS THE CLRNC. B) THE CTLR HAS FOUND NO ERROR IN YOUR INTERP OF THE CLRNC. HAVING JUST SWITCHED FROM DOMESTIC TO INTL FLYING, THE LOSS OF ITEMS A AND B ABOVE IS NOTICEABLE. THE PRINTOUT SHOULD BE LESS LIKELY TO BE MISUNDERSTOOD THAN VOICE, BUT IF IT IS, THERE IS NO WAY FOR THE CTLR TO CATCH IT. 4) I WILL CERTAINLY BE MORE CAREFUL WHEN READING THE PRINTOUTS. AT THE SAME TIME, IT WOULD BE PRUDENT TO UPLINK CLRNCS THAT ARE NOT AMBIGUOUS, NOR PRONE TO PLAYING 'TRICKS' ON ONE'S EYES.

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  24. Accession Number: 363303
    Synopsis: ACR MLG CLRED TO HOLD CON VOR L TURNS FL370. CAPT WAS ON #2 VHF WITH DISPATCH REGARDING PLAN OF OP. WHEN BACK IN THE COCKPIT HE SET UP THE HOLD PER CHART WITH A R TURN. FO HAD FAILED TO ADVISE OF THE L PATTERN. CTLR QUESTIONED THE DIRECTION OF TURN AFTER 1 CIRCUIT. NO CONFLICT AND THE FLT DIVERTED TO ALTERNATE.
    Narrative: CLRED TO HOLD AT CON NW ON 300 DEG RADIAL, L TURNS, 2O MI LEGS, FL370. FO COPIED HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS AS I WAS TALKING TO DISPATCH ABOUT THE WX AT PWM (WHICH WAS NOW BELOW MINIMUMS) AND OUR POSSIBLE DIVERSION TO BGR, WHICH WE EVENTUALLY DID. UPON RETURNING TO MY PF DUTIES, WAS TOLD OF OUR INSTRUCTIONS BY ATC BUT HE NEGLECTED TO MENTION L TURNS INSTEAD OF THE PUBLISHED HOLDING PATTERN WHICH WAS R TURNS. I ENTERED THE HOLD AND AFTER 1 COMPLETE PATTERN, ATC ASKED US IF WE WERE IN THE HOLD OVER CON L TURNS. WE REPLIED THAT WE WERE HOLDING AS PUBLISHED, IE, R TURNS AND THEN THE FO TOLD ME IT WAS L TURNS AS HE HAD WRITTEN DOWN BUT FAILED TO TELL ME THAT IT WAS L TURNS. THERE WAS NO CONFLICT. WE APOLOGIZED, AND REQUESTED AND RECEIVED A CLRNC TO BGR. ATC STATED THAT THERE WASN'T A PROB AND WE LANDED AT OUR ALTERNATE. THIS WAS CAUSED BY A VERY HVY WORKLOAD AS ALL THE SURROUNDING ARPTS WERE GOING BELOW MINIMUMS OR WERE CLOSED FOR SNOW REMOVAL. IN THE FUTURE I WILL ASK MORE POINTED AND DIRECT QUESTIONS AS I RE-ENTER THE LOOP. THIS WAS ALSO THE FIRST DAY (THIRD LEG) I HAD FLOWN WITH THIS FO AND I WAS OVERCONFIDENT IN HIS ABILITIES. I NEED TO BE MORE VIGILANT! SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 363490: THE CAPT SAID HE WAS BACK SO I TOLD HIM THE HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS. HE PROCEEDED TO BUILD THE HOLD IN THE FMC. UPON ME REVIEWING THE ENTRY IN THE FMC I NOTICED HE HAD ENTERED THE WRONG INBOUND HDG. HOWEVER, I DID NOT NOTICE THAT THE TURNS THAT CAME UP ON THE FMC WERE R. AS WE ENTERED THE HOLD THE CAPT WAS BACK ON #2 RADIO WITH COMPANY. WE DID NOT REALIZE OUR MISTAKE UNTIL ZBW ASKED US WHAT WE WERE DOING.

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  26. Accession Number: 363356
    Synopsis: COMPLAINT REGARDING THE AUTOMATED ATIS VOICE AT VARIOUS LOCATIONS.
    Narrative: THE PRESENT COMPUTER GENERATED VOICE THAT IS BEING USED FOR THE AUTOMATED ATIS INFO IS NOT CLR AND UNDERSTANDABLE. IE, 'WHISKEY' IS PRONOUNCED 'WILKY' AND 'VICTOR' IS 'WICTOR.' SOME OF THE WX PHENOMENA AND OBSERVATIONS ARE ALSO MISPRONOUNCED. THIS REQUIRES LISTENING TO THE ATIS INFO 2 OR MORE TIMES. DURING AN ARR INTO A HIGH DENSITY AREA IT RESULTS IN DIVERTING ONE'S ATTN FROM FLYING AND ATC FOR LONGER THAN NECESSARY. I BELIEVE THIS IS A 'MACINTOSH' COMPUTERIZED VOICE OF WHICH THERE ARE SEVERAL ACCEPTABLE ONES TO CHOOSE FROM. A SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF MY FELLOW PLTS AT ACR HAVE EXPRESSED THE SAME OPINION. I WOULD LIKE TO RECOMMEND THAT THE VOICE BE CHANGED BEFORE IT CONTRIBUTES TO AN INCIDENT DUE TO A MISUNDERSTANDING OR MISSING AN ATC FUNCTION WHILE OFF THE FREQ. THIS PROB IS MORE OF A DISTR TO THE GA PLT IN A SINGLE PILOTED ACFT.

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  28. Accession Number: 364000
    Synopsis: FLC OF A B737-400 FAILED TO DSND IN A TIMELY MANNER TO MAKE AN ALT XING RESTR. FMC WAS NOT PROGRAMMED WITH NEW DSCNT ALT.
    Narrative: RECEIVED DSCNT CLRNC TO CROSS JAYBO INTXN AT 15000 FT. I (PNF) READ BACK THAT CLRNC. FMC HAD 15000 FT AT HEDGE INTXN, WHICH IS 9 DME PAST JAYBO INTXN. AS I WAS ABOUT TO BRING THE ERROR TO THE CAPT'S ATTN, HE BROUGHT DOWN 15000 FT TO THE SCRATCH PAD. BEING DUSK, LOOKING INTO THE SUN, AND THE GLARE MAKING VIEWING HIS FMC DIFFICULT, I FAILED TO CONFIRM THE CHANGE. PAST JAYBO, I CHKED THE DSCNT PAGE AND REALIZED THE FMC HAD NOT BEEN CHANGED AND WE HAD MISSED THE RESTR. MY INACTION TO CONFIRM THE PROPER XING RESTR HAD BEEN EXECUTED BY THE PF WAS THE RESULT OF: 1) THE PF WAS COMPETENT AND NOT PRONE TO MAKING SUCH A MAJOR MISTAKE, THEREFORE, LEADING ME IN ASSUMING THE CORRECTION WAS MADE. 2) INTENSE GLARE MAKING VIEWING THE FMC DIFFICULT. 3) SEEING THE PF BRING DOWN 15000 FT TO THE SCRATCH PAD, I WAS CONFIDENT HE WAS AWARE OF THE ERROR IN THE FMC. 4) 15000 FT IS PLAINLY NOTED ON THE ARR AS THE ALT TO EXPECT AT JAYBO, NOT HEDGE. 5) I ASSUMED MY READBACK OF THE PROPER RESTR WAS HEARD BY THE PF, IN ADDITION TO ATC'S INSTRUCTION.

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  30. Accession Number: 364225
    Synopsis: LGT FLC DEPARTS WITHOUT USING XPONDER CODE AND WITHOUT OBTAINING ENRTE CLRNC. THEY CLB THROUGH ASSIGNED ALT DUE TO POSSIBLE FAILURE OF ALT CAPTURE. CHKLIST DEFICIENCIES CITED.
    Narrative: MANY DISTRS PRIOR TO DEP (STATION MGR CONVERSATIONS REGARDING CLEANING OF ACFT, 2 OTHER MEMBER CREWS), CONTINUED INTERRUPTION OF COCKPIT SETUP. WAS DISTR WITH 1 ITEM LEFT TO ACCOMPLISH -- XPONDER. SO, FAILED TO NOTICE NO CODE IN XPONDER. PUSH BACK AND TAXI OUT NORMAL. RECEIVED TKOF CLRNC AS USUAL. TKOF ROLL WAS EXTREMELY DISTR BY LENGTHY CONVERSATION BTWN THE TWR CTLR AND A SMALL ACFT THAT APPEARED TO BE DISORIENTED. DURING CLB OUT, IT TOOK AN UNUSUAL AMOUNT OF TIME (LONG) BEFORE THE CONVERSATION STOPPED, AND WE COULD GET IN A WORD TO ASK IF WE SHOULD GO TO DEP CTL FREQ. ALSO DURING CLB OUT, OUR TCASII SHOWED US RAPIDLY APCHING AN ACFT AHEAD OF US AND SLIGHTLY TO THE L. WHEN WE FINALLY CONTACTED TWR, THEY ASKED US TO CHK OUR XPONDER, THEN GAVE US A SQUAWK (CODE). WE WERE TURNED OVER TO DEP CTL AND GIVEN A HDG OF 350 DEGS, WHICH THE FO'S MISTUNED TO 250 DEGS. I CORRECTED HIM AND ASKED HIM TO VERIFY THE HDG WITH ATC. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, I NOTICED WE WERE AT 5900 FT MSL, CLBING RAPIDLY. THE AUTOFLT SYS HAD FAILED TO OPERATE NORMALLY, AND THE ALT ALERT WAS NOT NOTICEABLE ENOUGH TO CATCH OUR ATTN -- SMALL LIGHT ON ALTIMETER, NO AURAL WARNING. I IMMEDIATELY STOPPED THE CLB, REACHING 6280 FT MSL AS WE RETURNED TO 6000 FT MSL (NO ALT ALERT INDICATING 300 FT OFF ALT). I REALIZED THAT WE HAD NOT RECEIVED OUR ENRTE CLRNC, THEREFORE, WE HAD NOT SET THE XPONDER. DURING CLBOUT, WE WERE FLYING MANUALLY, WITH AUTOTHROTTLE ENGAGED, NOT FOLLOWING PITCH BAR TO KEEP SPD LOW AND CLB RAPIDLY. CAUSES: 1) NO DEFINITIVE 'XPONDER' ON BEFORE TKOF OR STARTING ENGS CHKLIST. THIS ITEM IS COMBINED WITH 'RADIOS AND NAV EQUIP.' IT'S A NO NAVAID DEP TO AN AUTO-FLT RTE, THEREFORE, EXCEPT FOR XPONDER, THERE'S NO NAVAIDS TO SET. 2) MULTIPLE DISTRS, COMBINED WITH PAVLOVEON CONDITIONING OF AUTO-FLT SYS, AUTOMATICALLY PULLING THROTTLES TO IDLE WHEN APCHING A LEVEL OFF ALT DURING CLB. 3) 2 PLT CREW -- A THIRD PLT COULD HAVE LOOKED FOR THE TFC, TAKEN CARE OF THE OTHER MEMBER CREW, VERIFIED THE XPONDER, POSSIBLY CAUGHT THE AUTO-FLT MALFUNCTION AND THE APCHING ALT LIMIT. 4) CAPT'S AND FO'S FAILURE TO GET ATC ENRTE CLRNC. I THOUGHT THE FO HAD GOTTEN THE CLRNC -- HE HAD NOT.

  31.  
  32. Accession Number: 366430
    Synopsis: B737-300 CLBING TO 16000 FT. 'A' AUTOPLT INDICATED ALT ACQUIRE AT 15000 FT. GIVEN VECTOR HDG AND IN SETTING HDG NOTICED AUTOPLT DID NOT CAPTURE AND ACFT WAS NEARING 17000 FT. REGAINED 16000 FT AND CHANGED TO 'B' AUTOPLT. NO COMMENT FROM CTLR.
    Narrative: THE B737-300 HAS 2 AUTOPLT SYS -- THE 'A' SYS NORMALLY USED BY THE CAPT AND THE 'B' SYS USED BY THE FO. THE FLT ORIGINATED OUT OF SAC TO BUR WITH MY FO FLYING THE FIRST LEG. THE ACFT HAD NO WRITE-UPS AND THE FIRST FLT WAS NORMAL. THE SECOND LEG WAS FROM BUR TO PHX FLOWN BY MYSELF. ON CLBOUT, WE WERE ASSIGNED 16000 FT BY DEP. AS WE WERE CLBING THROUGH 15000 FT, THE 'A' AUTOPLT WENT INTO THE ALT ACQUIRE MODE AND APPEARED TO BE WORKING PROPERLY. WE WERE GIVEN A HDG AND RADIAL TO INTERCEPT AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME. AFTER SETTING IN THE RADIAL AND HDG, I NOTICED THAT WE WERE STILL CLBING AND APCHING 17000 FT. OBVIOUSLY THE AUTOMATIC LEVELOFF FUNCTION OF THE 'A' AUTOPLT HAD FAILED. I STARTED A QUICK DSCNT BACK TO 16000 FT. THAT WAS CORRECTLY SET INTO THE ALT WINDOW. THE AUTOPLT AGAIN WENT INTO THE ALT ACQUIRE MODE BUT DID NOT CAPTURE THE ALT OR LEVELOFF, WHICH I HAD TO DO MANUALLY. NOTHING WAS SAID BY DEP ABOUT OUR ALTDEV AND WE WERE CLRED OVER TO ZLA. WHEN WE CHKED IN WITH CTR HE QUESTIONED OUR ASSIGNED ALT, WHICH WE STATED WAS 16000 FT. WE WERE THEN CLRED TO FL180 AND I SWITCHED TO THE 'B' AUTOPLT SYS, WHICH LEVELED OFF AND FUNCTIONED NORMALLY FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT. IN PHX WE HAD MAINT FIX THE 'A' AUTOPLT AND IT CHKED OUT OK TO OUR NEXT FLT TO STL. HAVING FLOWN THE 300 SERIES FOR OVER 10 YRS, THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME I'VE HAD A FAILURE OF THE AUTO LEVEL SYS. THE SYS IS SO RELIABLE AND WE DEPEND AND TRUST IT SO MUCH THAT WHEN IT FAILS IT CAN REALLY CATCH YOU OFF GUARD. I FEEL THAT IF THE AUTOPLT GOES INTO THE ALT ACQUIRE MODE BUT FAILS TO LEVEL OFF AT THE CORRECT ALT, A MORE POSITIVE WARNING THAN JUST A HORN SHOULD BE GIVEN, IE, A VERBAL 'ALT, ALT!' WOULD BE A FAR BETTER SYS.

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  34. Accession Number: 368880
    Synopsis: AN ACR B757 FLC FLEW THE WRONG COURSE ON DEP FROM MIA. ALERT DEP CTLR CORRECTED THEM.
    Narrative: I FLEW LEG AS CAPT. I DID NOT FOLLOW PROPERLY THE VALLY TRANSITION ON THE MIA 7 SID. AFTER TKOF, DEP CTL GAVE US 090 DEG HDG TO INTERCEPT VALLY TRANSITION. I SET 090 DEGS IN HDG WINDOW AND PRESSED HDG SELECT. I ARMED LNAV. HSI/FLT DIRECTOR ENGAGED LNAV A FEW SECONDS LATER. I OBSERVED THAT COURSE LINE ON HSI CONNECTED WITH VALLY INTXN. I FOLLOWED THE FLT DIRECTOR COMMANDS. DEP CTL THEN ASKED FOR VERIFICATION OF OUR HDG. WE REALIZED THEN THAT WE HAD FAILED TO CORRECT THE LNAV RTE TO REFLECT THE SID COURSE FROM VKZ TO VALLY, BUT HAD FLOWN INSTEAD THE MIA DIRECT VALLY COURSE THAT HAD BEEN DOWNLOADED TO THE FMS. CAPT AND FO HAD VERIFIED THAT ACARS PDC MATCHED FLT PLAN AND THAT FLT PLAN FIXES MATCHED FMC DOWNLOADED RTE FIXES. THESE ACTIONS ALONE DID NOT CATCH THE ERROR IN THE LNAV RTE RELATED TO THE SID. I SUSPECT THAT OURS WAS NOT AN UNCOMMON ERROR. PERHAPS PLACING THE SID ABOVE AND ADJACENT TO THE ACARS PDC RTE, INSTEAD OF IN THE TEXT AT THE BOTTOM OF THE MESSAGE, WOULD HELP PREVENT THIS TYPE OF MISTAKE. ALSO, A MESSAGE ADVISING CREWS TO BE ALERT FOR THIS PARTICULAR MISTAKE MIGHT HELP, SINCE THE POTENTIAL ERROR IS BUILT INTO THE DOWNLOADED FMC RTE. OF COURSE, BOTTOM LINE IS THAT MY INADEQUATE ATTN TO DETAIL CAUSED THE DEV. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE FATIGUE FROM SHORT LAYOVER AND PICKUP AND CONFUSION IN THE COCKPIT RELATED TO MAINT AND PAX PROBS, BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER WE LEFT THE GATE.

  35.  
  36. Accession Number: 369050
    Synopsis: MLG ACFT WITH XING RESTR ALT CLRNC, CAPT INSERTED INTO FMS BUT FAILED TO EXECUTE, REALIZED ACFT WASN'T DSNDING AND TOOK OVER MANUALLY, BUT DIDN'T MAKE RESTR.
    Narrative: ARRIVED AT OUR ASSIGNED ALT OF FL290 AT JAXSN INTXN APPROX 4 MI LATE (AFTER JAXSN INTXN). THE CAPT WAS FLYING AND WHEN HE WAS PROGRAMMING THE FMS FOR THE JAXSN RESTR OF FL290, HE APPARENTLY DID NOT HIT THE 'EXECUTE' BUTTON HARD ENOUGH TO ENTER IT IN THE FMS. I SAW THE RESTR IN THE BOX BUT THE THROTTLES WERE IN THE WAY OF HIS CTL PANEL, SO I DIDN'T SEE THE WHITE EXECUTE LIGHT 'ON.' AS WE APCHED THE FIX, THE ACFT DIDN'T DSND AND I ADVISED THE CAPT. HE TOOK OVER MANUALLY AND USED SPD BRAKES IN AN ATTEMPT TO MEET THE RESTR. NOTHING WAS SAID BY THE CTLRS.

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  38. Accession Number: 379461
    Synopsis: ACR PIC RPT ON THE CROWDED CORRIDOR CONDITIONS BTWN RDU AND DCA. CITES VFR TFC AND PARACHUTE JUMPERS BEING ALLOWED OPS NEAR TO THE DEP ARR RTE CREATING POSSIBLE CONFLICTS.
    Narrative: 4 MINS AFTER LIFTING OFF FROM RDU ENRTE TO DCA, WE WERE CLRED DIRECT LVL AND TOLD TO CLB TO 12000 FT. DEP CTL ADVISED US OF A POSSIBLE VFR TARGET AT OUR 12 O'CLOCK POS SHOWING AN ALT OF 6500 FT. WE SAW SOMETHING HAD JUST POPPED UP ON THE TCASII BUT BECAUSE THE TCASII REPRESENTATION IS SUPERIMPOSED ON OUR NAV DISPLAY, ITS ALT AND DEFINITION WAS OBSCURED BY OTHER SYMBOLOGY. SHORTLY AFTER ATC CALLED IT TO OUR ATTN, WE RECEIVED A TA ANNUNCIATION ON THE TCASII, STILL NOT PICKING IT UP VISUALLY. THEN WE RECEIVED AN RA COMMANDING ME TO CLB. I KICKED OFF THE AUTOPLT AND INITIATED A CLB CONSISTENT WITH THE RA CUE. SHORTLY AFTERWARD, ATC ADVISED US OF A CONFLICT ALERT AND TO IMMEDIATELY TURN L 30 DEGS. AS I IMMEDIATELY BANKED, MY FO CALLED OUT THAT HE SPOTTED THE ACFT AND IT WAS TO HIS R AND BELOW US. HE ALSO SAID PRIOR TO OUR TURN, OUR ACFT WAS LINED UP WITH HIS TAIL WHICH MADE HIM EVEN MORE DIFFICULT TO SPOT. UPON COMPLETING MY 30 DEG TURN, I LOCATED THE VFR ACFT OFF ON THE R SIDE AND IT APPEARED TO BE 2-3 MI AWAY. THIS IS A HEAVILY USED DEP RTE USED BY OUR AIRLINE EVERY 4-5 HRS. I REALIZE THIS VFR PLT WAS WITHIN HIS LEGAL RIGHTS TO FLY AT HIS VFR ALT, HOWEVER, WHEN YOU ADD HIGH SPD TRANSPORT CATEGORY JETS CLBING THROUGH ALL ALTS USING STEEP DECK ANGLES AND COCKPIT CREW MEMBERS INVOLVED IN A VERY, VERY BUSY PHASE OF FLT, I QUESTION THE COMMON SENSE OF THE VFR PLTS AND THE REGULATORS WHO ALLOW IT. THIS KIND OF STUFF HAPPENS TOO FREQUENTLY. IN THIS SAME AREA THERE IS ANOTHER ARPT, RWI I BELIEVE, THAT IS ACTIVE TO PARACHUTE JUMPING. I CAN'T COUNT THE NUMBER OF TIMES I, IN AN ACFT MOVING AT JET SPDS, HAVE HAD TO DEVIATE AROUND JUMPERS WHO ARE PURSUING THEIR SPORT RIGHT ON THE ARR RTE! ONE AFTERNOON, AS I PICKED MY WAY THROUGH MULTIPLE TSTMS AND ON THE STAR TO RDU, I WAS TOLD TO TURN TO 'SUCH AND SUCH' HDG DUE TO JUMPING. I REFUSED AS THIS WOULD HAVE PLACED US IN A VERY THREATENING CELL. WHAT ARE THESE GUYS JUMPING IN TSTMS FOR AND WHY DOES THE FAA ALLOW IT? I ENDED UP DOING A 360 DEG TURN SO AS TO ACCOMMODATE THE JUMPERS. I FEEL THE RDU TO LVL CLB CORRIDOR SHOULD HAVE TIGHTENED AIRSPACE RESTRS PLACED ON IT AS WELL AS THE REVERSE DIRECTION STAR RTES. I REALIZE FULL WELL THAT (FORTUNATELY) ATC DID US A FAVOR OF CALLING EXTRA ATTN TO THE VFR TARGET FOR THEY ARE ONLY LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR SEPARATION FROM OTHER IFR ACFT. NO DOUBT OUR TCASII WOULD HAVE SAFELY HELPED US IF THEY HAD NOT. BUT I FEEL THAT IS TOO MANY 'PROBABLIES' AND 'MAYBES' FOR MY OWN COMFORT.

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  40. Accession Number: 379705
    Synopsis: FLC FLYING A B737-500 INTO IAH, TX, HAS DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING WHAT IS SAID ON AUTOMATED ATIS.
    Narrative: DIALED UP IAH ARR ATIS AUTOMATED VOICE SYS. REMARKS REGARDING A CONSTRUCTION CRANE WERE COMPLETELY UNINTELLIGIBLE. HAD TO ASK APCH CTL ON INITIAL CONTACT WHAT ATIS WAS REFERRING TO REGARDING A CRANE OPERATING ON OR NEAR ARPT. CTLR DIDN'T KNOW BUT SAID HE'D CHK IT OUT. CAME BACK WITH PARTIAL INFO BUT SAID NEXT CTLR WOULD HAVE REST OF INFO. INFO WAS PROVIDED BY SECOND CTLR. THIS COMPUTER GENERATED VOICE AUTOMATIC ATIS SYS IS UNSAFE. I LISTENED TO THE COMPLETE LOOP 3 COMPLETE TIMES AND COULD STILL NOT UNDERSTAND THE REMARKS. THE CAPT WAS BUSY FLYING THE ACFT, CONFIGURING THE ACFT, AND TALKING ON THE RADIOS WHILE I WAS TRYING TO DECIPHER THE UNINTELLIGIBLE COMPUTER VOICE ON ATIS. THESE AUTOMATED ATIS MACHINES ARE GOING TO KILL A BUNCH OF PEOPLE ONE OF THESE DAYS.

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  42. Accession Number: 382019
    Synopsis: AN A320 FLC PERFORMING AN ACR'S FMS TRANSITION STARTS A DSCNT BEFORE BEING CLRED.
    Narrative: OVER BROOKE VOR, LNDG AT IAD, GIVEN CLRNC TO PROCEED VIA OR CLRED FOR BARIN FMS TRANSITION. WE UNDERSTOOD THE CLRNC TO 'DSND ON' THE FMS TRANSITION AND RPTED OUT OF 10000 FT. AT APPROX 8000 FT, CTLR STATED HE DID NOT WANT US TO DSND AND STOPPED US AT 7000 FT. THERE WAS NO CONFLICT WITH OTHER ACFT. THE BARIN FMS TRANSITION 'PLATE' DOES NOT GIVE ANY EXPECT ALTS. ALL ALTS APPEAR TO BE FIRM ALT RESTRS. THERE IS A 'TINY' NOTE AT THE BOTTOM THAT DOES SAY DO NOT DSND UNLESS CLRED. THIS NOTE NEEDS TO BE MORE NOTICEABLE. WE CALLED DULLES APCH CTL ON PHONE AFTER LNDG. THEY SAID THERE HAVE BEEN NUMEROUS MISUNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT WHEN TO DSND ON THIS PROC. SAID THEY WERE IN THE PROCESS OF CHANGING THE WAY THEY ISSUE THIS CLRNC.

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  44. Accession Number: 385666
    Synopsis: AN ACR B737 FLC FINDS THAT THE AUTOPLT ENGAGEMENT PADDLES COULD BE ALMOST IN THE 'CMD' POS AND REMAIN THERE AND YET NOT BE ACTUALLY ENGAGED. THE ACFT CLBED ABOVE ITS ASSIGNED ALT AND TURNED OFF ITS COURSE SINCE THE AUTOPLT WAS NOT, IN FACT, ENGAGED.
    Narrative: COPLT WAS PF, I WAS PNF. AS WE WERE CLBING THROUGH FL290 TO THE ASSIGNED FL310, I TURNED OFF THE SEAT BELT SIGN AND PROCEEDED TO PERFORM THE ASSOCIATED PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS. I TOLD THE PNF I WOULD BE 'OFF THE AIR' DURING THIS TIME, DURING MY ANNOUNCEMENT. THE PNF LEVELED THE ACFT AT FL310 AND ENGAGED THE 'B' AUTOPLT. I FINISHED MY ANNOUNCEMENT, TURNED MY VHF-1 VOLUME BACK UP, LOOKED UP AND SAW WE WERE CLBING THROUGH FL314 IN A R TURN (APPROX 20 DEG ANGLE OF BANK). THE PF TOOK CTL AND MADE THE WINGS LEVEL, THEN CORRECTED OUR CLB BY LEVELING OFF AT ABOUT FL317 -- THEN BEGAN A DSCNT BACK TO FL310 WHILE TURNING BACK TO COURSE. THERE WAS INITIAL CONFUSION AS TO WHAT WAS HAPPENING. WE BOTH THOUGHT AT FIRST THAT THE FMC HAD MALFUNCTIONED, OR THAT THE COMPUTER WAS GIVING ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTION TO THE AUTOPLT. HOWEVER, THE AUTOPLT WAS NOT ENGAGED. I DID NOT SEE THE PF ENGAGE THE AUTOPLT, BUT HE SAID HE DID, AND THAT IT PROPERLY ENGAGED AND TRACKED THE LNAV-VNAV FUNCTIONS. WE HAD AN OMC OBSERVING, AND HE CONFIRMED THIS. THE OMC WAS A COMPANY NEW HIRE RECENTLY QUALIFIED IN OUR ACFT AS FO. AS WE DSNDED THROUGH FL313, ZLA QUERIED OUR ALT. I TOLD THEM WE WERE THROUGH FL312, THAT OUR AUTOPLT HAD DISENGAGED, AND WE WERE CORRECTING THE COURSE AS WELL. HE SAID 'NO PROB - - JUST KEEPING YOU HONEST.' WE THEN TRIED TO DIAGNOSE OUR PROB. WE TRIED TO RE-ENGAGE THE 'B' AUTOPLT. THE BUTTON LIT -- THEN WENT DARK. I TRIED 'A' AUTOPLT -- IT DID NOT LIGHT. I TRIED THE 'CWS' MODE TO NO AVAIL. AT THIS POINT, WE REALIZED THAT THERE NEVER WAS AN AUTOPLT DISCONNECT HORN. I ASKED THE OMC TO CHK AND RECHK ALL CIRCUIT BREAKERS. I THEN BECAME PF -- AND ASKED THE COPLT TO REVIEW OUR FLT MANUAL. ALL CIRCUIT BREAKERS WERE IN, THERE WAS NO FLT MANUAL GUIDANCE ON THIS PROB. THE FO THEN NOTICED THE AUTOPLT DISENGAGE BAR WAS SLIGHTLY DOWNWARD. HE PUSHED IT BACK UP. I ENGAGED THE 'B' AUTOPLT AND IT WORKED NORMALLY. THE BAR WAS DOWN JUST SLIGHTLY, NOT ENOUGH TO PROMINENTLY REVEAL THE YELLOW AREA BEHIND IT, OR ILLUMINATE THAT AREA, AS IT DOES WHEN FULLY DISENGAGED. THIS WAS OUR SECOND LEG IN THIS PLANE, AND IT WORKED FINE TO THIS POINT. NO OTHER TFC WAS VISIBLE OR APPEARED ON TCASII. THE FLT CONTINUED NORMALLY, AND NORMALLY FOR THE NEXT 3 LEGS WE FLEW IT. HOWEVER, WE DID HAVE QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS OCCURRENCE: 1) WHY THERE WAS NO AUTOPLT DISCONNECT WARNING HORN. BOTH THE PF AND OMC BELIEVED THE AUTOPLT DID ENGAGE, WHICH SHOULD HAVE PRODUCED THE HORN FOR A DISENGAGEMENT. 2) WE HEARD NO ALT WARNING HORN THROUGH FL313, AS WE SHOULD HAVE. IT MAY HAVE SOUNDED, BUT NOBODY RECALLED IT. 3) HOW DID THE AUTOPLT DISENGAGE BAR GET TO THE POS IT WAS IN. HOW LONG WAS IT LIKE THAT? BECAUSE OF THESE QUESTIONS, WE TESTED THESE SYS ON THIS LEG. THEY ALL WORKED NORMALLY. THE AUTOPLT HORN AND ALT WARNING HORN BOTH SOUNDED IN CASES THEY SHOULD HAVE. AS A PRECAUTION, I RPTED THE PROB TO OUR COMPANY MAINT FOR THEIR REVIEW OF THESE SYS. THE AUTOPLT DISCONNECT BAR WAS NOT FULLY DOWN -- IN A DISCONNECT POS. ON A FLT THE FOLLOWING DAY, I DISCOVERED (IN ANOTHER PLANE) THAT THE 'B' AUTOPLT ENGAGE BUTTON WILL ILLUMINATE FOR A BRIEF TIME (1 SECOND) AND THEN EXTINGUISH WITH NO HORN OR 'COMMAND' ANNUNCIATION. THE 'A' WILL STAY DARK IF PUSHED. I CONCLUDE THAT SINCE WE GOT NO HORN, AND THE PLANE WAS NOT TRIMMED FOR LEVEL FLT, THE AUTOPLT DID NOT ENGAGE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR WAS FLYING A B737-300 AT THE TIME AND SINCE HIS DISCOVERY HE HAS BEEN ABLE TO DUPLICATE THE ALMOST-ENGAGING OF THE AUTOPLT ON SEVERAL B737S. HE SAID THAT SINCE THIS EVENT HE ALWAYS CHKS THE ENGAGE PADDLES DURING HIS PREFLT PROC AND IF HE CAN HE DEMONSTRATES THE PHENOMENON TO HIS FO. HE STATED THAT HE WAS NEVER TRAINED TO COMPLETELY SEAT THE PADDLE IN THE 'CMD' (COMMAND) POS DURING HIS INITIAL TRAINING.

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  46. Accession Number: 385762
    Synopsis: AN ACR B757 FLC HAD TO SWITCH TO THE ALTERNATE PITOT STATIC SOURCE TO RECOVER THE CAPT'S INSTS, BUT THEY WERE UNABLE TO INHIBIT THE GPWS WARNING SYS SO IT SOUNDED THE 'DON'T SINK' WARNING DURING THEIR APCH AT DEST.
    Narrative: WE HAD OBTAINED A 10000 FT RWY (4R) AT BOSTON FOR DEP, WHICH GAVE US MORE TIME TO REACT AT V1 '141 KTS' WHEN CAPT'S PITOT-STATIC INSTS FAILED. FO PERFORMED THE TKOF IN HIS USUAL OUTSTANDING PROFESSIONAL MANNER AS A SOLO UNTIL CAPT'S FLT INSTS COULD BE RECOVERED BY USE OF THE ALTERNATE AIR DATA SOURCE. ON LNDG AT LAX THE AURAL WARNING 'DON'T SINK' WAS PRESENT FROM 2000 FT AGL DOWN TO 200 FT AGL, WHILE ACFT WAS IN PROPER LNDG CONFIGN AND ON GS. BECAUSE THE WARNING WAS SO LOUD, OUR COMS WERE DANGEROUSLY COMPROMISED AND WE WERE UNABLE TO STOP THE GPWS WARNING IN SPITE OF HITTING ALL THE GPWS INHIBIT BUTTONS. WHY NO INFO ABOUT HOW TO SILENCE ERRONEOUS GPWS WARNINGS?

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  48. Accession Number: 391408
    Synopsis: A B737-400 FO SUFFERED A COURSE DEV WHEN ATTEMPTING A HAND FLOWN ILS INTO KTS, AK. FLT RECEIVED AN ENHANCED GPWS SIGNAL.
    Narrative: I ROUTINELY FLY INST APCHS IN THE WX USING RAW DATA AND FLT DIRECTOR OFF SO AS NOT TO LOSE MY INST FLYING SKILLS. THIS NIGHT, FOR THE FIRST TIME EVER, I INADVERTENTLY SET MY EHSI MODE SELECTOR TO 'EXP NAV' INSTEAD OF 'EXP VOR/ILS.' THIS MODE DISPLAYS LATERAL AND VERT NAV GUIDANCE ORIENTED TO AIRPLANE TRACK WITH THE FMC AS THE NAV SOURCE INSTEAD OF THE LOC AND GS. THERE WERE SEVERAL CLUES I DID NOT PICK UP ON DURING THE APCH. 1) BECAUSE OF STRONG HEADWINDS ON THE PROC TURN OUTBOUND, I DELAYED THE INBOUND TURN TO KEEP FROM OVERSHOOTING THE LOC. I HAVE DONE THIS NUMEROUS TIMES ON THIS APCH WITH STRONGER WINDS, AND WAS SURPRISED I OVERSHOT THIS TIME. I REINTERCEPTED WHAT I THOUGHT WAS THE LOC. 2) I PROGRAMMED A VNAV PATH TO THE RWY ON THE CDU WHICH GAVE ME A GS ON MY EHSI WHICH IS WHAT I NORMALLY SEE IN 'EXP VOR/ILS' MODE. HAD I NOT DONE THIS, I WOULD NOT HAVE HAD THE EHSI GLIDE PATH. 3) THE CAPT SELECTED EGPWS AND I HAD WX RADAR. MY EHSI SHOWED NUMEROUS WX RETURNS WHICH ALONG WITH THE YOKE, BLOCKED MY VIEW OF THE MISSING LOC FREQ THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN IN THE BOTTOM R CORNER OF THE EHSI. 4) I DID NOT NOTICE THAT 'TRK' WAS DISPLAYED AT THE TOP OF EHSI INSTEAD OF 'HEADING' (BIG CLUE). 5) THE CDI WAS TOO STABLE FOR A LOC SIGNAL. I THOUGHT I WAS FLYING A GOOD APCH. APPROX 2000 FT MSL, SEVERAL THINGS HAPPENED AT ONCE. WE BROKE OUT AND THE CAPT SAID THE RWY LIGHTS WERE SLIGHTLY TO THE L AND THE EGPWS TRIGGERED 'CAUTION TERRAIN.' WE BOTH CHKED OUR NAV SETUP AND I ASKED FOR WIPERS BECAUSE MY FORWARD VISIBILITY WAS LIMITED DUE TO RAIN. I STARTED TO CORRECT BACK TO CTRLINE AS A 2ND AND 3RD 'CAUTION TERRAIN' SOUNDED. AT THE FIRST 'CAUTION TERRAIN,' THE CAPT SAW YELLOW TERRAIN TO THE R OF OUR COURSE. OUR EGPWS GIVES US THIS 'SOFT ALERT' APPROX 60 SECONDS IN ADVANCE OF TERRAIN AND IS REPEATED AFTER 7 SECONDS, IF STILL IN THE CAUTION ENVELOPE. DURING A TERRAIN CAUTION ALERT, AREAS WHERE TERRAIN VIOLATES THE TERRAIN CAUTION ENVELOPE ALONG THE ACFT TRACK AND WITHIN +/-90 DEGS OF ACFT TRACK ARE PAINTED IN YELLOW. AFTER CORRECTING TO COURSE, IT WAS AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG. I SHOULD HAVE DOUBLE CHKED MY NAV SETUP EARLIER AND PURSUED THE NUMEROUS CLUES SOONER. THE CAPT WAS BACKING ME UP MAINLY WITH THE HUD AFTER RECENTLY BEING CHKED OUT ON THE SYS. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL HEED WARNING SIGNS EARLIER AND DOUBLE CHK EVERYTHING, AND MAKE SURE THE CAPT IS BACKING ME UP USING MORE THAN 1 SYS. I AM VERY GLAD WE HAVE THE EGPWS WHICH PROVIDES MORE ADVANCE NOTICE THAN THE OLD SYS.

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  50. Accession Number: 395666
    Synopsis: DUE TO DATA BLOCK OVERLAPPING, TRACON FINAL APCH CTLR FAILS TO TURN AN SF34 ONTO PARALLEL FINAL AT DFW. THE SF34 CONFLICTS WITH AN MD80 BEING WORKED BY AN ADJOINING APCH CTLR SECTOR. THE SF34'S TCASII EVASIVE ACTION ALERTS FINAL APCH CTLR, AND BOTH ACFT ARE VECTORED ONTO FINAL APCH COURSES FOR LNDG.
    Narrative: ACFT X, AN SF34, NWBOUND ON MODIFIED DOWNWIND, TOWARDS FINAL. ACFT Y, AN MD80, ON FINAL TO RWY 17C AT 5000 FT. HAD EQUIP PROBS WITH ANOTHER ACFT ON DOWNWIND. WHILE TRYING TO FIX THAT PROB, I FORGOT TO TURN ACFT X TO 350 DEGS DOWNWIND HEADING. ACFT X CONTINUED NWBOUND TOWARDS ACFT Y. TCASII HELPED RESOLVE THE DEAL AFTER THE ARR CTLR NEXT TO ME, ALERTED ME ABOUT ACFT X. I COULD NOT FIND THE ACFT FOR ALL THE DATA TAG OVERLAP ON FINAL. I BELIEVE, IF WE HAD COLOR SCOPES AS REQUESTED, I COULD HAVE FOUND ACFT X QUICKER, AND TURNED HIM TO AVOID A CONFLICT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 395758: A DATA TAG ON ACFT Y WOULD NOT SWAP OVER FROM A W DIRECTION TO AN E DIRECTION. THIS WAS SOMETHING MY TRAINER AND I WERE TRYING TO RECTIFY. THE PROB WAS NOT RESOLVED. THE FREQ HAD BLEED- OVER ON THE MAIN JUST PRIOR TO THE OCCURRENCE. WE WERE TRYING TO CHK THE STANDBY FREQ FOR BLEED-OVER. THE DATA TAGS WERE OVERLAPPING CONSTANTLY, SO THE SIT WASN'T RECOGNIZED UNTIL THE LAST MOMENT. CONFLICT ALERT DIDN'T ACTIVATE UNTIL THE ACFT WERE WELL INSIDE MINIMUM SEPARATION.

  51.  
  52. Accession Number: 400760
    Synopsis: A DC10 FLC WAS TOO BUSY TO NOTE THE AUTOPLT DISCONNECT AND THEIR DEV FROM ALT. BRIGHT DAY ON TOP AND NO AURAL WARNING. CREW WAS BUSY COPYING AN ACARS RE-RELEASE.
    Narrative: FLT DURING IFR -- VISUAL ON TOP. AUTOPLT DISCONNECTED WHILE CREW WAS READING AND COPYING THE RE-RELEASE. ALTDEV WAS 600 FT. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS -- VERY BRIGHT GLARE IN COCKPIT AND NO AURAL DISCONNECT WARNING.

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  54. Accession Number: 410212
    Synopsis: AN AIRLINE CAPT RPT REGARDING THE ACR'S DEACTIVATION OF THE GND PROX INHIBIT SWITCH ON THEIR B767'S. THIS SIT BECOMES AN EVENT WHENEVER THE CAPT'S AIR DATA COMPUTER MALFUNCTIONS. THEN, THE ONLY WAY TO STOP THE GPWS ALERT WHEN AN UNWANTED SIGNAL IS HEARD, IS TO PULL THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS. CAPT REQUESTS ACR TO INCLUDE THE INHIBITING OF THE GPWS FOR ANY AIR DATA COMPUTER FAILURES AND THE PARALLEL RESTORATION OF THAT SWITCH. HE CITES A DEFICIENCY IN THE B757 FLEET OF ANY INHIBITOR SWITCH.
    Narrative: REQUEST REVIEW OF MESSAGE NUMBER XXXX WHICH ANNOUNCES DEACTIVATION OF GND PROX INHIBIT SWITCH ON B767'S. FAILURE OF CAPT'S AIR DATA COMPUTER CAUSES BAD INPUTS TO GPWS EVEN AFTER BOOTSTRAPPING AIR DATA COMPUTER. ON B757'S AND ON B767'S WITH DEACTIVATED INHIBIT SWITCH FOR GPWS, NO METHOD EXISTS SHORT OF PULLING GPWS CIRCUIT BREAKERS TO QUIET INVALID GPWS WARNINGS ON APCH WITH FAILED CAPT'S AIR DATA COMPUTER, EVEN AFTER BOOTSTRAPPING, SO GPWS INPUT FROM L AIR DATA COMPUTER MUST BE UPSTREAM OF CAPT'S AIR DATA SELECTOR SWITCH SELECTING ALTERNATE. WHY NOT INSERT A PROC IN OPERATING MANUAL FOR FAILURE OF L AIR DATA COMPUTER WHICH INCLUDES INHIBITION OF GPWS, AND INSTEAD OF DEACTIVATING THE INHIBIT SWITCH ON B767'S, WHY NOT REACTIVATE THIS SWITCH ON B767'S AND INSTALL IT ON B757'S TO ENABLE PLTS TO QUIET INCORRECT GPWS WARNINGS AFTER FAILURE OF L AIR DATA COMPUTERS? CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR DID NOT KNOW WHY THE COMPANY DISCONNECTED THE FUNCTION OF THE GPWS INHIBIT SWITCH. THE COMPANY HAS NOT YET REPLIED TO HIS DEBRIEF OF THE INCIDENT. ON TKOF THE CREW HAD LOST THE CAPT'S SIDE OF HIS PANEL DUE TO THE AIR DATA COMPUTER FAILURE, WITH THE AIRSPD INDICATOR, RATE OF CLB AND ALTIMETER INFO BEING LOST. THE CREW USED THE 'BOOTSTRAP SWITCH' TO OBTAIN INFO FROM THE FO'S SIDE FOR THE PIC'S USE. THE CREW THEN DISCUSSED WHAT WAS GOING TO BE AFFECTED ON THEIR APCH WHEN THEY RETURNED FOR AN APCH TO MIA. THEY WERE UNPLEASANTLY SURPRISED TO RECEIVE THE LOUD GPWS ALERT. THE CAPT SAID IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO PULL THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS WHILE ON APCH AT 1000 FT. THE B757 IS BELIEVED TO NOT HAVE THIS SWITCH AT ALL AND THE CAPT THOUGHT THAT HIS INCIDENT WAS A GRAPHIC CASE OF WHY THOSE ACFT SHOULD HAVE A GPWS INHIBIT SWITCH INSTALLED INSTEAD OF JUST HAVING ALL OF THE B767 INHIBIT SWITCHES BEING DISCONNECTED. THE ACFT DESIGN FEATURE OF THE GPWS ALERT SENSOR BEING UPSTREAM OF THE ALTERNATE SOURCE SWITCH DOES NOT THEN DIVERT OR AVOID THE ALERT SIGNAL WHEN USING THE ALTERNATE SOURCE SELECTOR.

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  56. Accession Number: 412020
    Synopsis: A CLBING B737-300 OVERSHOT ITS ASSIGNED ALT OF 5000 FT BY 1000 FT. FO WAS IN TRAINING.
    Narrative: I LEVELED OUT AT 6000 FT INSTEAD OF 5000 FT AS ASSIGNED IN ATC CLRNC. I HONESTLY DON'T KNOW IF I MISREAD THE ACARS CLRNC AND MISDIALED THE INITIAL ALT OR IF I WAS DISTR WHILE SETTING UP AND 6000 FT WAS LEFT FROM PRIOR LEG. AT ANY RATE, 6000 FT WAS MISTAKENLY SET AND NOT CHALLENGED LATER. THIS WAS AN IOE TRIP AFTER FINISHING TRAINING. I MAY HAVE BEEN TOO FOCUSED ON PROPER PROGRAMMING OF FMC AND NOT ENOUGH ON BASICS. ALSO, A SHORT TAXI/HIGH WORKLOAD TAXI OUT HELPED TO KEEP US FROM CATCHING A BASIC ERROR. LONG AND SHORT IS -- ALL BASIC CLRNC INFO MUST BE DOUBLECHKED AND CONFIRMED EVERY TIME. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 411744: DURING CLBOUT THE STUDENT, FO IN TRAINING, SET 6000 FT IN THE ALT WINDOW. THE STUDENT HAD BEEN ON A SIMILAR FMC ACFT THAT HAD EFIS. ON CLBOUT FROM DCA, WHILE LEVEL AT 6000 FT, THE CTLR ASKED ABOUT OUR ASSIGNED ALT. DUE TO PREVIOUS INCORRECT LATERAL NAV ENTRIES, COCKPIT ATTN WAS DIVERTED FROM ALT READINGS/CHKS NORMALLY ACCOMPLISHED. BUSY, SHORT TAXI PATH INVOLVING HIGH WORKLOAD DURING BRIEFING. RADIO CONFUSION ABOUT XING RWY 33. GLARE ON ALT WINDOW LCD READOUT, MAKING IT DIFFICULT TO READ. SHORT TAXI RTE, TEACHING ENVIRONMENT DURING HIGH WORKLOAD. TWR RUSHING OUR ACFT TO FILL AN 'ARR SLOT' FOR OUR DEP RESULTING IN CHKLISTS BEING ACCOMPLISHED QUICKLY. ACARS DEP INFO BEING LOCATED WELL BEHIND THE PLT'S NORMAL FIELD OF VISION AND REQUIRING INFO TO BE READ SIDEWAYS. STUDENT'S INCORRECT ENTRY (LATER CORRECTED) IN THE LATERAL DATA NAV BASE REQUIRING SEVERAL CORRECTIVE ENTRIES BY BOTH PLT AND DIVERTING ATTN DURING CLBOUT. RECOMMENDATIONS: STUDY FEASIBILITY OF ACARS DATA BEING PLACED/REPEATED TO PLT'S NORMAL FIELD OF VISION.
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