FDAI logo   ::  Site Map  ::   
Home  |  About This Website  |  Contact Us
About This Website » ASRS Incident Report Analysis » Incidents related to Issue

Incidents related to Issue 15 incidents related to this issue.

Issue: flightdeck automation may be incompatible with ATC system (Issue #82)
Description: There may be incompatibilities between advanced automation aircraft and the existing ATC system, possibly increasing pilot workload, causing inconsistent information to be presented, or reducing the pilot's ability to use automation for the best results.

  1.  
  2. Accession Number: 50529
    Synopsis:
    Narrative: DESCENDING INTO SFO, CLRD TO 11,000', ACFT ON VERTICAL NAV ON FMC AND PROGRAMMED TO MAKE CROSSING RESTRICTION AND LATERAL NAV FLYING INBOUND COURSE, CTLR ISSUED "CLRD DIRECT BRIJJ (COMPASS LOCATOR), MNTN 16,000." BRIJJ WAS NOT A WAYPOINT IN THE FMC MEMORY, BUT ANTICIPATING WE MIGHT BE CLRD TO IT I HAD PREVIOUSLY PROGRAMMED IT INTO THE FMC TEMPORARY MEMORY BANK. I STARTED PRESSING BUTTONS TO HAVE THE FMC NAVIGATE US TO BRIJJ--THE ACFT STARTED TO TURN--AND I SELECTED ADF ON THE VOR TO COMPARE IT WITH THE FMC BEARING. THERE APPEARED TO BE ABOUT A 20 DEG DIFFERENCE IN BEARING FROM WHERE THE ACFT WAS HDG. I MENTIONED THIS TO THE COPLT AND HE BEGAN TO PULL UP THE WAYPOINT (BRIJJ). WE HAD SET IN TO CONFIRM IT. AT THIS POINT THE CTLR CALLED "OBSERVE YOU GOING 400' LOW, MAINTAIN 15,000 AND TURN LEFT HDG (?) FOR TFC." NEITHER OF US HAD SET THE NEW ALT IN THE MCP. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS--THIS WAS MY SECOND TRIP SERIES IN THE MLG--LESS THAN 35 HRS. THE FMC AND INDEED R-NAV WAS NOT FAMILIAR TO ME. COPLT WAS ALSO NEW IN ACFT--LESS THAN 1 MONTH. BASIC CAUSE--ALLOWING UNUSUAL EVENT (NAVAID DISAGREEMENT) TO DISTRACT ME FROM ROUTINE HABIT PATTERN (SETTING ALT WHEN CLRD). DIFFICULT TO KEEP NEW "TOYS" IN COCKPIT FROM DISTRACTING AND PREOCCUPYING YOU. I FEEL FMC IS TOO TIME INTENSIVE FOR USE IN TERMINAL AREA, ESPECIALLY WHEN NEW IN ACFT AS WELL AS TO THIS SYSTEM. I HAVE REVERTED TO USING THE BASIC FAMILIAR INSTRUMENTS AND NAV SYSTEMS BELOW 18,000' UNTIL I AM MUCH MORE COMFORTABLE IN THE ACFT.

  3.  
  4. Accession Number: 128735
    Synopsis: ACR LGT ALT DEVIATION UNDERSHOT ALT CROSSING RESTRICTION BECAUSE FIX WAS NOT IN THE FMC.
    Narrative: TOLD TO CROSS 60 MI W OF FNT AT FL230. FNT WAS NOT ON OUR ROUTE, NOR HAD IT BEEN PROGRAMMED INTO THE FMC. BY THE TIME WE HAD PROPERLY PROGRAMMED THE FMC, WE WERE ONLY ABLE TO DSND TO 23900' AT 60 ME W OF FNT. FLT PLAN HAD US FILED TO A POINT FORMED BY V450 AND THE DXO 342 DEG R, THEN DIRECT POLAR. THE POINT FORMED BY V450 AND THE DXO 342 DEG R WAS NOT PROGRAMMED IN THE FMC DATA BASE. WHEN IN INSERTED THE ORIGINAL ROUTE, I SKIPPED THE POINT, INTENDING TO FIGURE THE PROPER PROGRAMMING WHILE ENRTE, AND THEN FORGOT ABOUT IT. TO CORRECT BOTH THESE SITUATIONS, I WOULD RECOMMEND THAT ON AUTOMATED COCKPITS, THE NECESSARY CHKPOINTS BE IN THE FMC DATA BASE, OR ATC NOT USE POINTS NOT PROGRAMMED INTO THE DATA BASE. ALSO, BOTH THESE SITUATIONS COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED IF WE HAD NOT DEPENDED SO MUCH ON THE AUTOMATION AND GONE BACK TO BASIC FLYING.

  5.  
  6. Accession Number: 130037
    Synopsis: ALT DEVIATION. DESCENT CROSSING RESTRICTION NOT MET.
    Narrative: WE WERE FLYING FROM LAS TO SNA IN AN MLG EQUIPPED WITH A SINGLE FMS CDU ON THE LEFT SIDE OF THE FORWARD ELECTRONIC PANEL (FORWARD OF THE THRUST LEVERS), AND ELECTRO-MECHANICAL FLT INSTRUMENT DISPLAYS. WE HAD BEEN CLEARED TO FLY THE KAYOH ONE ARR, AND HAD PROGRAMMED THE FMC FOR A VNAV DSNT TO CROSS DAWNA (HDF 353/29) AT 13,000, AND THEN CROSS KAYOH (SLI 075/23) AT 210 KTS AND 8000. BEFORE REACHING DAWNA WE WERE CLEARED DIRECT TO HDF. ZLA BROADCAST A SIGMET THAT FORECAST OCCASIONAL SEVERE TURBULENCE BELOW 10,000 IN THE AREA THAT WE WOULD BE MAKING OUR FINAL DSNT, FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY BY A CLRNC FOR US TO CROSS 20 NE OF HDF AT 14,000. WE BOTH REMARKED THAT HDF WAS NOT SHOWING A DME SIGNAL, SO RAW DATA DISTANCE WAS NOT AVAILABLE. I ASKED THE F/O IF HE WOULD LIKE ME TO ENTER THE RESTRICTION INTO THE FMC (SINCE IT'S AWKWARD TO MAKE DATA ENTRIES FROM HIS SIDE OF THE COCKPIT) AND ENTERED HDF 010/20 AT 14,000. THE F/O INDICATED AGREEMENT WITH THE DATA ENTRY, AND I TOLD HIM I'D BE "OFF THE RADIO" WHILE I DISCUSSED THE ANTICIPATED TURBULENCE WITH THE CABIN CREW. DURING THAT DISCUSSION I OBSERVED THE F/O INITIATE A RAPID DSNT, CHECKED THE CDU, AND WAS SURPRISED TO SEE THAT THE WAYPOINT I HAD JUST ENTERED WAS NO LONGER DISPLAYED (SINCE WE HAD JUST PASSED IT). THE F/O TOLD ME THAT WE HAD CROSSED THE 20 MI FIX PASSING THROUGH 17,000, AND THAT CENTER'S ONLY COMMENT WAS, "YOU MISSED IT". I BELIEVE THAT THIS INCIDENT WAS NOT DUE TO ANY INATTENTION, BUT RATHER TO HUMAN FACTORS PROBLEMS INVOLVED WITH THE AUTOMATED COCKPIT AND ATC. I ALSO BELIEVE THAT IT WOULDN'T HAVE HAPPENED IN AN OLDER-TECHNOLOGY ACFT (WHICH I ALSO FLY). FOR EXAMPLE: 1) IN THE OLDER-TECHNOLOGY ACFT, I WOULDN'T'T HAVE ACCEPTED THIS CLRNC, ONCE I REALIZED THAT HDF HAD NO DME. I ASSUME THAT THE CTLR WOULDN'T HAVE ISSUED IT UNLESS HE KNEW THE ACFT WAS RNAV EQUIPPED. 2) I'M NOT USED TO RECEIVING CLRNCS TO A "DISTANCE" POINT ASSOCIATED WITH A NON-DME FAC. I ASSOCIATE THE PHRASEOLOGY, "CROSS TWENTY NE OF XYZ" WITH A DME FIX, WHERE I CAN QUICKLY LOOK AT A RAW-DATA DME DISPLAY AND MAKE AN IMMEDIATE JUDGEMENT THAT A DSNT MUST BE INITIATED. I LOOKED FOR RAW DATA. IT WASN'T AVAILABLE, SO I MENTALLY SHIFTED FROM THE OLD-TECHNOLOGY (RAW DATA) MODE TO THE AUTOMATED COCKPIT (DATA ENTRY AND COMPUTED SOLUTION) MODE. 3) MOST CLRNCS I'VE RECEIVED THAT REQUIRE RNAV INVOLVE NAMED FIXES WHICH ARE USUALLY IN THE FLT PLAN OR DATABASE. I CAN MAKE A RAPID (4 KEYSTROKES) DATA ENTRY FOR A RNAV POSITION/ALT IF IT WAS PREVIOUSLY PROGRAMMED INTO THE ROUTE, IE, DIRECT HDF. THE CLRNC IN THIS INCIDENT REQUIRED 15 KEYSTROKES, AND TOOK CONSIDERABLY MORE TIME. 4) WHEN I FLY AN AUTOMATED ACFT, I HAVE TO SPEND SOME AMOUNT OF TIME PROGRAMMING AND MONITORING THE COMPUTER. THE DECISION OF WHEN TO DO THIS AND WHEN IT ISN'T APPROPRIATE IS A SUBTLE ONE, AND LENDS ITSELF TO GENERALITIES SUCH AS, "DON'T PROGRAM IN THE TERMINAL AREA." IN THIS CASE, "DON'T PROGRAM IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA" WOULD HAVE BEEN APPROPRIATE. THE DATA WE NEEDED (PRESENT DISTANCE TO HDF) WAS AVAILABLE IN THE CDU, SO IF WE HAD TREATED IT AS IF WE DIDN'T HAVE RNAV AVAILABLE WE MIGHT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MAKE THE MENTAL CALCULATION IN TIME TO MEET THE RESTRICTION. IN THE ENRTE ENVIRONMENT HOWEVER, EXPERIENCE LED ME TO THE SUBCONSCIOUS DECISION THAT THERE WAS TIME AVAILABLE TO REPROGRAM THE FMC. 5) THE CTLR ISSUED A CLRNC THAT WAS PROBABLY DELAYED DUE TO THE SIGMET BROADCAST. AS IT WAS, THE CLRNC WAS MADE SO CLOSE TO THE FIX THAT BY THE TIME IT WAS PROGRAMMED INTO THE FMC AND DSNT COMPUTATIONS MADE, IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO MEET THE RESTRICTION. 6) IT WASN'T UNTIL THE NEXT DAY AND A DISCUSSION EXPLORING BOTH OF OUR THOUGHT PROCESSES THAT WE FOUND ANYTHING WE (AS OPPOSED TO THE CTLR) COULD HAVE DONE DIFFERENTLY UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES TO PREVENT THIS INCIDENT. WHEN EITHER OF US IS THE PLT FLYING AND MAKES A DATA ENTRY, WE EACH MAKE A MENTAL VALIDITY CHECK USING SOME RULE OF THUMB, IE, "I'M 13 MI FROM THE FIX AND 6000' HIGH, SO I'VE GOT TO START DOWN NOW!" IN THIS CASE, ALTHOUGH I MADE THE DATA ENTRY I DIDN'T MAKE THE VALIDITY CHECK BECAUSE I WAS NOT FLYING, AND PREOCCUPIED WITH MY CONCERN FOR THE SAFETY OF THE PAX AND CABIN CREW IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EXPECTED SEVERE TURBULENCE. I HAD SUBCONSCIOUSLY PLACED A HIGHER PRIORITY ON COMMUNICATING WITH THE CABIN CREW THAN ON DOUBLE-CHECKING THE COMPUTER. IT HAS NOT ESCAPED ME THAT NOT DOUBLE-CHECKING THE COMPUTER OR THE PLT FLYING CAN LEAD TO A BUSTED ALT AND HENCE A MIDAIR COLLISION, WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN A HIGHER PRIORITY. THE F/O INDICATED THAT SINCE I HAD MADE THE DATA ENTRY HE ASSUMED THAT THE DATA WAS VALID (IT WAS, BUT TOO LATE) AND DIDN'T DOUBLE-CHECK IT.

  7.  
  8. Accession Number: 140512
    Synopsis: ACR ADVTECH WDB FLT CREW OBJECTS TO AMENDED DEP CLRNC.
    Narrative: OUR CLRNC READ: EWR 3 DEP, RADAR VECTORS TO WHITE INTXN AS FILED, EXPECT FL390 10 MINS AFTER DEP. AS WE WERE FLYING A 220 DEG HDG PER THE DEP, WE WERE CLRED TO FLY 230 DEG HDG TO INTERCEPT 357 DEG R OF COL. WE REQUESTED RADAR VECTORS TO WHITE INTXN AS PER OUR CLRNC SO AS TO AVOID REPROGRAMMING OUR FMS AT 6000' MSL IN TFC WHEN WE BOTH NEED TO LOOK OUTSIDE FOR SAFETY. THE CTLR DID RESPOND BY SAYING HE WAS VECTORING US TO THE 357 DEG R OF COL. WE REPROGRAMMED OUR FMS AND WHEN IT CAME ON WE WERE RIGHT ON THE RADIAL, SO WE TURNED TOWARD COL AND ASKED THE CTLR IF HE WAS GOING TO VECTOR US TO WHITE AS REQUESTED. HE THEN READ THE PROC ON THE DEP THAT SAYS TO EXPECT VECTORS TO COL 350 DEG R TO COL, THEN THE 204 DEG R TO WHITE INTXN. THIS IS A VERY AMBIGUOUS DEP PROC IF THEY EXPECT US TO FLY RADIALS ON VOR'S IN RNAV EQUIPPED ACFT. THE CLRNC SHOULD NOT READ VECTORS TO WHITE INTXN. IT IS VERY DIFFICULT (AND UNSAFE) TO REPROGRAM THE FMS BELOW 10000' IN HEAVY TFC WHILE BEING ISSUED TURNS BY DEP CTL AS WELL AS TRYING TO WATCH FOR OTHER TFC. IF DEP WANTS US TO EXPECT TO FLY CERTAIN RADIALS THEY SHOULD MAKE THAT A DEFINITE PART OF THE DEP PROC OF CLRNC.

  9.  
  10. Accession Number: 147878
    Synopsis: ACR MLG ALT DEVIATION OVERSHOT DURING DESCENT INTO LAX.
    Narrative: FLT FROM SAN TO LAX AT 10000' I HAD TO LEAVE ATC FREQ TO GET ATIS INFO. I ADVISED F/O TO MONITOR ATC (HE WAS FLYING) AND WHILE I WAS OFF FREQ HE ACKNOWLEDGED A DSNT CLRNC FROM COAST APCH. WHEN I RETURNED TO FREQ I SAW HE HAD 6000' SET IN THE ALT ALERT AND THAT HE HAD PROGRAMMED THE RNAV TO CROSS SEAL BEACH VOR AT 6000'. I ASKED HIM TO CONFIRM THAT WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO CROSS SEAL BEACH AT 6000' AND HE DID CONFIRM IT. AFTER CHANGING TO LAX APCH CTL, APCH ASKED US TO SAY OUR ALT. WE WERE LEAVING 6300' FOR 6000' ABOUT 1 MI FROM SEAL BEACH. I SAID "WE ARE LEAVING 6300'; WE'LL CROSS SEAL BEACH AT 6000'", I ASSUMED HE WAS CONCERNED THAT WE WOULD MAKE OUR XING RESTRICTION. LAX APCH DID NOT MENTION THAT HE EXPECTED US AT A DIFFERENT ALT AND SIMPLY SAID "ROGER, MAINTAIN 6000'." I THOUGHT HIS QUERY WAS ODD, HOWEVER, AND THEN REMEMBERED THE NORMAL SEAL BEACH XING ALT WAS 7000'. I THEN PRESSED THE F/O ON HIS CERTAINTY THAT WE WERE CLRED TO 6000'. HE THEN SEEMED A LOT LESS CERTAIN THAN HE HAD BEEN. I ASKED APCH FOR A LAND-LINE NUMBER AND CALLED THEM AFTER LNDG. I WAS TOLD THERE WAS NO PROB BUT THEY HAD EXPECTED US AT 7000' INSTEAD OF 6000'. THE QUESTION REMAINS, DID COAST APCH MIS-SPEAK AND SAY 6000' INSTEAD OF 7000' OR DID THE CTLR MIS-HEAR THE READBACK? THERE ARE MANY LOOSE THREADS IN THIS SITUATION, FIRST, IDEALLY BOTH PLTS SHOULD MONITOR BOTH ATC AND ATIS FREQS. EASY TO SAY BUT USUALLY UTTERLY IMPOSSIBLE. WITH ATIS MESSAGES WHICH ARE ENTIRELY TOO LENGTHY AND NON-STOP XMISSIONS ON ATC, IT IS NORMALLY NECESSARY FOR ONE PLT TO LEAVE ATC IN ORDER TO RECEIVE THE ATIS. THIS INCIDENT HAS MOVED ME TO IMPLEMENT A PROC WHICH I HAVE CONSIDERED FOR SOME TIME. REGARDLESS OF WHO IS FLYING, I, THE CAPT, WILL NEVER AGAIN LEAVE THE ATC FREQ. IF IT IS NECESSARY FOR SOME ONE TO LEAVE THE FREQ, IT WILL BE THE F/O, OVEN IF HE IS FLYING THE LEG. AS FOR THE F/O'S PROCS, HE, LIKE MANY PLTS, IS A VERY "TAKE-CHARGE" TYPE PERSONALITY, NOT PRONE TO REALIZE HIS OWN HUMAN FALLIBILITY. HE MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE TAKEN THE CLRNC AS GIVEN, BUT HIS FAULT LIES IN NOT BEING SURE. I, OF COURSE COUNSELLED HIM ABOUT THIS BUT IT WILL LIKELY NOT HAVE ANY LASTING EFFECT. HUMAN BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION IS A CHALLENGING TASK. THE LAST THING I WOULD LIKE TO SAY ON THE SUBJECT IS THAT THIS AND PROBABLY 90% OF OTHER ATC PROBS WOULD BE PREVENTED IF WE HAD DATA-LINK XMISSION OF ATC AND ATIS INFO. I WILL PROBABLY BE RETIRED BEFORE IT BECOMES A REALITY. IT'S A CRYING SHAME, SINCE THE TECHNOLOGY HAS BEEN AVAILABLE FOR MANY YRS. AS YOU CAN SEE, THIS IS MORE THAN A CYA RPT, A CHANCE TO SAY A FEW THINGS I'VE BEEN STORING UP. I HAVE A GREAT DEAL OF RESPECT FOR THE ASRS SYS. LET'S HOPE THE FOLKS IN WASHINGTON KEEP LISTENING TO WHAT YOU HAVE TO SAY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 147766. WE WERE IN THE 12TH HR OF A 14 HR DUTY DAY. WE WERE AT 290 KTS, AND THE FMC IS SUPPOSED TO FIRST SLOW YOU TO 250 KTS BEFORE DSNDING BELOW 10000', BUT, AS I FOUND OUT, IF YOU ARE AT 10000' ALREADY, IT WON'T DO THAT. I HAVE FLOWN THAT LEG ABOUT 500 TIMES AND WE ARE ALWAYS CLRED TO CROSS SLI AT 7000', NOT 6000'. I WAS SO TIRED AT THE TIME I COULDN'T REMEMBER IF WE WERE CLRED TO 6000' OR 7000'.

  11.  
  12. Accession Number: 363151
    Synopsis: SUPER MD80 MAINTAINING 4000 FT ON VECTOR TO RWY 27. CLRED DSND TO 3800 FT AND CLRED RWY 27 APCH. GOT GPWS AND EXECUTED CLB TO 4500 FT. CTLR REMARKS HAPPENS FREQUENTLY.
    Narrative: ON A VFR APCH TO SAN APPROX 25 NM NE OF THE ARPT WE WERE GIVEN A VECTOR HDG 190 DEGS FOR THE INTERCEPT OF LOC RWY 27 APCH AND 4000 FT. UPON LEVELING 4000 FT AND APPROX 16 DME SOCAL APCH CLRED US TO TURN R HDG 250 DEGS AND DSND TO 3800 FT CLRED RWY 27 LOC APCH. WHEN TURNING INBOUND WE RECEIVED A GPWS WARNING 'TERRAIN, TERRAIN, WHOOP, WHOOP, PULL UP.' I RESPONDED AND CLBED TO 4500 FT TO SILENCE THE GPWS WARNING. HIS RESPONSE WAS THAT IT HAPPENS VERY OFTEN AND THAT BECAUSE WE WERE LEVEL AT 4000 FT HE DIDN'T THINK WE WOULD GET THE WARNING. WE THEN FINISHED THE APCH. IN RETROSPECT MAYBE A NOTATION IN THE PART 2 MAY BE IN ORDER OF POSSIBLE GPWS WARNINGS IN THE AREA.

  13.  
  14. Accession Number: 368279
    Synopsis: FLC OF AN MD88 CLBED IN RESPONSE TO A TCASII RA DURING DSCNT ON A STAR ARR.
    Narrative: WE WERE LEVEL AT 13000 FT ON IRONS 3 ARR TO DCA. ATC (DCA APCH) CALLED OUT VFR TFC 500 FT BELOW US, 12 - 1 O'CLOCK, OPPOSITE DIRECTION. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, WHILE LOOKING FOR THE TFC, WE RECEIVED AN RA FOR A CLB OF AT LEAST 2000 FPM. WE FOLLOWED THE RA UNTIL WE WERE VISUAL WITH THE TFC. DURING THE MANEUVER WE DEVIATED 800-900 FT. PROB: WHY DOES TCASII ACTIVATE TO RESOLVE A SIT WHERE EVERYBODY INVOLVED WAS IN COMPLIANCE WITH REGS?

  15.  
  16. Accession Number: 370430
    Synopsis: A B767 DEPARTS OUT OF ZURICH, SWITZERLAND, AND HAS A COURSE DEV FROM THE ASSIGNED SID. PLT FEELS IT IS A COMPUTER OR LNAV PROB AND SUGGESTS NOT TO USE IT ANY MORE.
    Narrative: ZRH DEP. ATC ASSIGNED THE MOROK 1U RNAV DEP. ADEQUATE TIME AT THE GATE TO BRIEF THE SID. AT RWY END, RWY SYMBOL TOUCHED ACFT SYMBOL WHICH ALLOWS FOR USE OF LNAV AFTER TKOF. WHEN WE WERE AIRBORNE A TURN TO THE L WAS INITIATED AT 1.1 DME KLO VOR WITH HEADING SELECT. AFTER INTERCEPTION OF MAGENTA RTE LINE OF THE SID, LNAV WAS ARMED AND THEN ENGAGED. CLB AIRSPD WAS AT 210 KIAS OR LESS. I WAS PNF, AND HAD PROGRESS PAGE #2 DISPLAYED TO CHK XTRACK ERROR. THE INITIAL DEV WAS 3H DEPICTION IS WHAT THE FMC DEPICTS WHEN AIRBORNE ON COURSE. WITH THE COMMAND BARS CTRED AND STILL ON THE LNAV TRACK, WE BOTH NOTICED THAT WE WERE BEING COMMANDED TO FLY AWAY FROM THE KLO 255 DEGS. AT THAT TIME WE CHANGED ROLL MODES TO HEADING SELECT AND MADE A FURTHER CUT TO INTERCEPT THE 255 DEGS. IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER, ZRH DEP ASKED FOR OUR HEADING AND I SAID WE ARE IN A L TURN TO INTERCEPT THE 255 DEG RADIAL. HE SAID WE WERE OFF COURSE. WE HAD NO MEANS TO MEASURE DEV FROM TRACK. REST OF DEP UNEVENTFUL. BEING AN RNAV DEP WE USED LNAV. HOWEVER, THE GND, THE FMC MAP AND LEGS PAGE SHOW A TRACK FROM RWY 16 TO D163A, KLO163 AT 1 NM TO D360A, KLO 360 DEGS AT 1 NM AND A COURSE OF 255 DEGS TO THE AARAU WAYPOINT. THIS WOULD NEVER WORK, THAT IS A PARALLEL TRACK OR HDG. HOWEVER, WHEN ONE LOOKS AT THE 10-3H, THE SID TRACK SHOWS XING THE 360 DEG RADIAL AT ABOUT 3 DME. IF THIS IS AN RNAV DEP, IT IS POORLY DRAWN IN THE FMC COMPUTER. IF WE ARE TO TURN L AFTER TKOF FROM RWY 16 AND INTERCEPT THE 255 DEG RADIAL AND DISREGARD THE RNAV COURSE, THEN THIS SHOULD BE STATED, THAT IS, DO NOT USE LNAV AT THE START. AND THEN I QUESTION THE PURPOSE OF THIS RNAV DEP. LET'S GO BACK TO THE SIMPLE TURN OVER THE ARPT, KLO VOR. IN SUM: THIS RNAV DEP IS REALLY A MANUAL DEAD-RECKONING SID TO INTERCEPT A VOR RADIAL. THIS ZRH RNAV DEP DOES NOT GIVE ANY GUIDANCE ON HOW WIDE IT MAY OR MAY NOT BE FLOWN. SUGGEST WE WITHDRAW THIS PARTICULAR SID UNTIL THIS MATTER IS CLRED UP. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 370431: AFTER LEVELING AT ATC ASSIGNED ALT OF 5000 FT AND RESETTING QNH, IT WAS NOTICED ON RAW DATA THAT THE FMC WAS NOT FOLLOWING THE PROPER GND TRACK AS DEPICTED ON THE CHART. HEADING SELECT WAS USED TO OVERRIDE LNAV AND THE RAW DATA DEP WAS RE- INTERCEPTED. DURING THE CORRECTION ATC QUESTIONED OUR HEADING AND ADVISED US THAT OTHER TFC HAD TO DEVIATE.

  17.  
  18. Accession Number: 373476
    Synopsis: A B757 ACR FLC CLBS ABOVE THEIR ASSIGNED ALT WHEN THEY ARE OVERWHELMED BY THE AUTOMATION WORKLOAD INVOLVED IN A LOW ALT LEVELOFF WHILE CHANGING THE ACFT'S CONFIGN AND MAINTAINING ITS SPD, WITHIN ITS CONFIGN-BASED, LIMITATIONS.
    Narrative: THE PROB AROSE ON DEP FROM LAX. OUR CLRNC CALLED FOR A DEP HDG OF 250 DEGS AND A CLB TO 2000 FT. AFTER RAISING THE GEAR AND MAKING THE INITIAL PITCH REDUCTION I REDUCED THE THRUST TO THE CLB SETTING AND STARTED RAISING THE FLAPS. 2000 FT ARRIVES VERY QUICKLY ON THIS DEP SO AS WE CLBED THROUGH ABOUT 1500 FT I REDUCED THE PITCH EVEN MORE SO AS TO NOT OVERSHOOT THE ALT. SHORTLY THEREAFTER I REALIZED THAT THE AIRSPD WAS BUILDING RAPIDLY AND WAS IN FACT ABOUT TO EXCEED THE FLAPS EXTEND SPD. THE FLAPS HAD ALREADY BEEN SELECTED TO THE UP POS BUT WERE STILL IN THE PROCESS OF MOVING UP, SO, TO NOT EXCEED FLAPS EXTEND SPD I DID WHAT I NORMALLY DO -- I INCREASED THE PITCH. BUT IN DOING SO I COMPLETELY FORGOT ABOUT MY PROXIMITY TO 2000 FT. THE FO YELLED A WARNING AS WE WENT THROUGH 2000 FT AND I PULLED THE THRUST TO IDLE AND PITCHED OVER TO REGAIN 2000 FT. THE HIGHEST ALT I SAW WAS ABOUT 2350 FT. HOW DID THIS HAPPEN? WELL, THIS IS A GLASS COCKPIT ACFT AND THIS IS ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THE CONFLICT BTWN REQUIRED MANEUVERS AND SOPS IN SUCH ACFT. IN THIS CASE THE MANEUVER TO LEVEL AT 2000 FT AND THE SOP TO FLY THE ACFT USING AUTOMATION SUCH AS AUTOTHROTTLES. THE AUTOTHROTTLES WOULD HAVE REDUCED THRUST TO MAINTAIN THE AIRSPD HAD THE AUTO FLT SYS CAPTURED THE ALT, BUT SINCE I HAD DECREASED THE PITCH SOMEWHAT SO AS TO NOT APCH 2000 FT TOO RAPIDLY THE SYS DELAYED THE ALT CAPTURE WHICH IN TURN LEFT THE THROTTLES IN THE CLB THRUST MODE WHICH IN TURN FORCED THE AIRSPD TO BUILD RAPIDLY. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS INCLUDE THE ALT ASSIGNMENT OF 2000 FT. ALL HIGH PERFORMANCE ACFT SHOULD HAVE AN INITIAL ALT ASSIGNMENT OF AT LEAST 5000 FT ABOVE THE ARPT OR HIGHER. ANOTHER FACTOR IS THE DISTR OF THE FREQ CHANGE AND RADIO CALLS REQUIRED AT THIS STAGE OF FLT.

  19.  
  20. Accession Number: 383944
    Synopsis: FLC OF A FOKKER 100 FK10 CUT SHORT THEIR FLT PLAN RTE OVER THE VOR DURING A COURSE TURN CAUSED BY THE ACFT FMS PROGRAM LEADING THE COURSE TURN. CAPT NOTIFIED THE MANUFACTURER PRIOR TO THIS INCIDENT AND WAS GIVEN A REPLY THAT THE SYS WAS FAA CERTIFIED THE WAY IT WAS DESIGNED.
    Narrative: FLYING FILED RTE SYR TO DCA. A LARGE BEND OCCURRED AT PSB TO CHANGE COURSE FROM SWS TO ESE. ZNY MADE A COMMENT ABOUT MISSING THE VOR. I WATCHED IT PASS OFF TO THE R BY 3-5 MI. I HAVE SEEN THIS HAPPEN BEFORE ON OTHER RTES. THE FMS IS PROGRAMMED TO TAKE MANY PARAMETERS INTO CONSIDERATION TO STAY CTRLINE ON THE AIRWAYS DURING COURSE CHANGES. SOMETIMES IT LEADS THE TURN AND LEAVES THE 4 NM WIDTH OF THE AIRWAY. I PRESENTED THIS PROB TO MY FLT MGR ABOUT 6 YRS AGO. HE FORWARDED THE DATA TO FOKKER ACFT. THEIR RESPONSE WAS THAT THE NAV SYS IS FAA CERTIFIED AND THAT IS ACCEPTABLE. MOST ALL DRIFTING DURING FMS NAV HAS DISSIPATED AND ATC NEVER ASKS TO CORRECT HDG TO REJOIN THE AIRWAY AS WITH VORS. THIS ONE AREA OF LEADING TURNS NEEDS TO BE ADDRESSED SO ATC AND FMS OPERATORS ARE IN COMMON AGREEMENT ON TURNS.

  21.  
  22. Accession Number: 385079
    Synopsis: A B757-200 CROSSES POM, CA, 1000 FT ABOVE PUBLISHED ALT BECAUSE THE AUTOMATIC FLT CTLS WERE IN VNAV.
    Narrative: ON DEP ON POMONA 6 SID WITH AN 8000 FT AT OR BELOW RESTR AT POMONA WE WERE USING LNAV AND VNAV. THE CTLR QUESTIONED OUR ALT WHICH WAS 9000 FT AND SAID WE HAD A RESTR OF 8000 FT. OUR LNAV WAS AT THAT TIME DIRECTING A TURN TOWARD DAG 227 DEG RADIAL HAVING DROPPED THE LAST WAYPOINT POMONA AND ALLOWING US TO CLB TO OUR NEXT ALT. THAT WAS A NORMAL LNAV, VNAV SIT. IF THIS DEP DOES TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE NORMAL LNAV, VNAV OP IT NEEDS TO BE CHANGED TO ALLOW FOR HOW THESE FUNCTIONS OPERATE. IN OTHER WORDS OUR NAV SYS SHOWED US PAST THE RESTRICTIVE FIX AND ALLOWED US TO CLB TO OUR NEXT ALT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 385080: ATC CTLR ADVISED US OF ALTDEV DURING POMONA SIX DEP FROM ONTARIO ARPT. THERE IS AN ALT XING RESTR AT POMONA VOR AT OR BELOW 8000 FT. OUR NAV SYS SHOWED US AT VOR AND TURNING TO NEXT WAYPOINT. WE CONTINUED CLB TO 14000 FT ASSIGNED. ATC CTLR ADVISED US THAT WE WERE HIGHER THAN 8000 FT AT POMONA. OUR CLB RATE WAS 3000 FPM. OUR FMC WAS IN VERT NAV MODE AND LATERAL NAV MODE. WHEN WE ARRIVE AT WAYPOINT, THE WAYPOINT CHANGES DISTANCE AND TIME IN ZULU OF NEXT WAYPOINT. THIS HAD HAPPENED WHEN CTLR ADVISED US OF OVER POMONA VOR.

  23.  
  24. Accession Number: 388404
    Synopsis: FLC OF A320 COMPLAINS OF ROUTING ON SHORT FLT WHICH REQUIRES REPROGRAMMING THE FMS. THEY FLEW MANUALLY INSTEAD OF REPROGRAMMING.
    Narrative: FIRST OF ALL, YOU CAN PROBABLY JUST FILE THIS WHOLE RPT UNDER 'COMPLAINING/BITCHING PLT.' I RECEIVED A CLRNC FROM SAN-LAX THIS MONTH WHICH I FOUND TO BE VERY CONFUSING AND NOT USER (PLT) FRIENDLY AT ALL. I WAS CAPT ON FLT FROM SAN-LAX ON DEC/XX/97, FLYING AN AIRBUS A320. DUE TO WX AND WINDS, WE WERE DEPARTING TO THE E AT SAN AND LNDG TO THE E AT LAX. (THESE 2 ITEMS ALONE SHOULD PROBABLY BE AN EMER PROC!) OUR FIRST CLRNC FOR TKOF TO THE W WAS CANCELED AND WE BACK-TAXIED FOR TKOF ON RWY 9 AT SAN. OUR NEW CLRNC WAS '...CLRED VIA THE LNSAY DEP TO INTERCEPT THE SLI 148 DEG RADIAL, TO THE VTU 114 DEG RADIAL, TO V8, TO TANDY...SQUAWK, ALTIMETER....' FOR ONLY A 26 MIN FLT (107 MI) I THOUGHT THIS WAS AN EXCESSIVE AMOUNT OF RADIAL INTERCEPTS AND TURNS. THE A320 (AS MOST ROMEO EQUIPPED ACFT) CAN EASILY LOAD WAYPOINTS INTO THE FMS, BUT NOT USER FRIENDLY WITH A CLRNC SUCH AS THIS. I ASKED TO 'GO DIRECT FROM HARBR (ON SLI 148 DEG RADIAL) TO TANDY' BUT WAS DENIED. THIS 'DIRECT' ROUTING WOULD HAVE PARALLELED THE ORIGINAL CLRNC BY APPROX 3 MI. RATHER THAN TAKING AN EXCESSIVE AMOUNT OF TIME TRYING TO LOAD THIS FLT PLAN, WE FLEW IT MANUALLY WITHOUT USE OF THE FMS. THE WX WAS MARGINAL (ALWAYS IS WHEN YOU HAVE OTHER PROBS!) AND OUR MEANS OF FLYING WAS SAFE, BUT VERY BUSY (CONFUSING?) FOR SUCH A VERY SHORT FLT. I ALSO HEARD NO OTHER ACFT ON THE FREQ UNTIL HANDED OFF TO LAX APCH CTL, SO TFC WAS NOT A FACTOR. THIS FLT OF 26 MINS REQUIRED US TO USE THE FOLLOWING CHARTS/MAPS TO PROPERLY IDENT ALL THE POINTS AND ROUTING: LNSAY 1, LO-ALT CHART 5/6, OCEAN 1, AND LAX APCH ILS RWY 7R. HERE COMES MY MAIN BEEF! (FINALLY) -- MOST OF THE WAYPOINTS SHOWN ON ANY OF THESE PAGES ARE NOT SHOWN ON ANY OTHERS! I HAVE NO IDEA WHY THERE HAS TO BE SO MANY DIFFERENT WAYPOINTS FOR ALL THE SIDS, VICTOR RTS, AND ARRS IN THIS AREA. FAA DEFINITELY NEEDS TO BE ABLE TO COORDINATE A BETTER ROUTING, ESPECIALLY WHEN WORKING ROMEO EQUIPPED ACFT. THERE WAS A LOT OF MEDIA PRESS GIVEN TO THE WORKLOAD OF THE ACR FLT AT CALI AND THE CONFUSION OF THE AIRCREW USING A GLASS COCKPIT. I DON'T THINK PLTS ARE GETTING LAZIER (ALREADY ARE) OR NOT AS COMPETENT AS THE 'I REMEMBER WHEN' DAYS, BUT FLYING 'GLASS' DOES REQUIRE A DIFFERENT MINDSET. IT WOULD BE MUCH SAFER IF FAA REALIZED THIS FACT AND TOOK MEASURES TO UPDATE THE SYS OR ELIMINATE SOME OF THE REASONS FOR CONFUSION AND EXCESSIVE WORKLOAD THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

  25.  
  26. Accession Number: 404370
    Synopsis: FLC OF A B757 OVERSHOT ASSIGNED DEP ALT SOON AFTER TKOF ON A SID DEP DUE TO CLRNC CHANGE AND THE AUTOTHROTTLES STILL ON TKOF SETTING AND NOT REDUCED TO CLB PWR. THEREFORE, IT TOOK MORE TIME TO LEVEL OFF ACFT.
    Narrative: WHILE CLEANING UP, ACCELERATING, AND CLBING, FULL PWR. DEP GAVE A TURN FROM 060 DEGS TO 280 DEGS. WENT FROM TAILWIND TO 40 KT HEADWIND INTO THE SUN. THROTTLES WERE IDLE (AUTOTHROTTLE DISCONNECT) TO LEVEL OFF AT 2500 FT. ACFT CONTINUED UP TO 2800 FT BEFORE DSNDING MOMENTUM TOOK OVER. SOLUTION: TOO LOW LEVELOFF ALT, CHANGING FREQS, ACFT CONFIGN, TURNING, TURB, WINDSHEAR, ETC. DUE TO EARLY CAPTURE OF ALT DUE TO HIGH RATE OF CLB, AUTOTHROTTLES WENT TO THROTTLE HOLD (TKOF PWR) BECAUSE CLB THRUST WASN'T SELECTED YET. NECESSITATING AUTOTHROTTLE DISCONNECT, PULLED TO IDLE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 404600: THIS WAS CAUSED BY MOMENTARY WORKLOAD SATURATION DUE TO ATC CLRNC CHANGE AND A PECULIAR FUNCTION OF THE AFDS DURING A LOW ALT LEVELOFF AT A HIGH RATE OF CLB. SOLUTION -- ALLOW SID TO BE FLOWN AS DEPICTED, OR AT LEAST, EDUCATE ATC CTLRS TO GIVE TIME FOR THE ACFT TO BE PROPERLY CONFIGURED BEFORE MAKING CHANGES TO THE CLRNC.

  27.  
  28. Accession Number: 414985
    Synopsis: EA32 CREW WAS UNABLE TO PROGRAM ACFT FMC TO COMPLY WITH A 12000 FT XING RESTR.
    Narrative: AIRBUS FMC INCOMPATIBILITY WITH SAN BARET 4 ARR (TNP/EED/PKE TRANSITION). THE AIRBUS 319/320 FMS NAV COMPUTER CANNOT BE PROGRAMMED TO COMPLY WITH THE '25 NM NE OF PGY VOR' AT 12000 FT MSL. UNLIKE BOEING AND OTHER FMS SYS, THE AIRBUS FMS DOES NOT HAVE AN 'ALONG TRACK DISPLACEMENT' CAPABILITY. RECOMMENDATIONS: 1) CREATION OF A 'NAMED WAYPOINT' (LATITUDE/LONGITUDE) AT THE 25 DME POS, OR 2) MOVE THE XING RESTR TO THE DSS PGY FIX, WHICH IS IN THE AIRBUS DATABASE, OR 3) CONVINCE AIRBUS TO UPGRADE THEIR FMS (AIN'T GONNA HAPPEN!). CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: CAPT IS CONCERNED THAT WITH ALL THE EMPHASIS ON ALLOWING THE AUTOMATION TO FLY THE ACFT, THE SID AND STAR ROUTING SHOULD BE BUILT ACCORDINGLY. THE WAY THIS ARR IS BUILT, IT PRECLUDES THE USE OF ACFT AUTOMATION.

  29.  
  30. Accession Number: 415260
    Synopsis: B767 CREW UNABLE TO COMPLY WITH CHANGE OF STAR IN LAX AIRSPACE.
    Narrative: WE WERE ON OUR ORIGINAL CLRNC FLYING THE PARADISE 2 FOR LAX RWY 25L. NEAR PDZ ATC BEGAN GIVING US SOME SPACING VECTORS AND SLOWED US TO 250 KTS. AT SOME POINT, BACK ON THE ARR, WE WERE TOLD TO SPD UP TO 300 KTS, BUT THEN SLOWED AGAIN A VERY SHORT TIME LATER. I BELIEVE WE WERE INSIDE OF PDZ WHEN ATC TOLD US WE WERE NOW GOING TO RWY 24R, GAVE US THE NEW LOC FREQ, A HDG CHANGE TO INTERCEPT, AND HDOF. THE NEW CTLR TOLD US TO INTERCEPT THE MITTS 1 ARR ON OUR CURRENT HDG. BECAUSE WE WERE NOT PREPARED OR SET UP FOR THIS NEW ARR, I TOLD HIM WE WOULD CONTINUE TO ACCEPT VECTORS FOR THE RWY 24R LOC. WITH SEVERAL OTHER COMMENTS WITH THE CTLR, IT WAS APPARENT THAT HE WAS NOT HAPPY WE WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE NEW STAR. AFTER HE GAVE US SEVERAL STEPDOWNS, I BELIEVE WE WERE GIVEN ANOTHER HDOF AND THE NEW CTLR ASKED IF WE COULD ACCEPT RWY 25L AGAIN. WE DID AND WERE GIVEN A SLIGHT VECTOR BACK TO THE ILS/LOC FOR RWY 25L. I THINK THERE IS A MISCONCEPTION BY THE CTLRS THAT WE SHOULD JUST BE ABLE TO CHANGE STARS EASILY -- EVEN THOUGH WERE INSIDE THE STAR'S IAF. THIS IS NOT SO, UNLESS A CREW HAS ALREADY BRIEFED AND PLANNED FOR THE OTHER STAR. WE JUST RECEIVED A MESSAGE TO BEWARE, BE CAREFUL OF ALL THE ALT RESTRS ON THE LAX STARS. WHILE LATER REVIEW SHOWS THAT MITTS AND PARADISE STARS BOTH FLY OVER PDZ, THE APCHS INVOLVE DIFFERENT STEPDOWN FIXES, SOME ONLY 3 MI APART. THEY ALSO INTERCEPT THE FINAL COURSES ONLY 2 MI APART, LEAVING A POSSIBILITY OF OVERFLYING THE INTERCEPT IF BUSY LOADING THE NEW STAR OR REVIEWING THE CHARTS FOR NEW FREQS, ETC. ACCEPTING THE NEW STAR WOULD HAVE REQUIRED US TO INSURE THE STAR ALT RESTRS WERE MET, WHILE TRYING TO SET EVERYTHING UP, REVIEW THE CHARTS, AND REVIEW THE FMC FOR ACCURACY. I HAVE NO PROB REASONABLY CHANGING APCHS INTO LAX, BUT THE CTLRS WILL NEED TO ACCEPT THE ADDITIONAL WORKLOAD OF GIVING VECTORS AND ALT STEPDOWN CLRNCS UNTIL THOSE NEW APCHS ARE SETUP AND BRIEFED APPROPRIATELY IN THE COCKPIT.
Flight Deck Automation Issues Website  
© 1997-2013 Research Integrations, Inc.