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Incidents related to Issue 4 incidents related to this issue.

Issue: manual skills may be lost (Issue #65)
Description: Pilots may lose psychomotor and cognitive skills required for flying manually, or for flying non-automated aircraft, due to extensive use of automation.

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  2. Accession Number: 92431
    Synopsis: ACR MLG DEVIATES FROM COURSE AND ENTERS RESTRICTED AREA.
    Narrative: FILED FLT PLAN FROM BUR TO DEN WAS THE VNY 5 DEP, PMD TRANSITION, PMD J6 J146 HBU. CLRNC DELIVERY GAVE US THE VNY 5, PMD TRANSITION, PMD--THE PMD 046 DEG R DAG 239 DEG R DAG FLT PLAN ROUTE. LAST WK I WAS ABLE TO REPROGRAM THE FMC WITH THE NEW ROUTING. THIS TIME IT WOULDN'T ACCEPT IT. AS WE PASSED PMD ON OUR CLBOUT I WAS STILL TRYING TO REPROGRAM. WE WENT OUT J6 (PMD 067 DEG R) FOR A COUPLE OF MILES BEFORE WE WENT TO MANUAL VOR NAV. IN MAKING A LEFT TURN TO ABOUT 020 DEGS TO INTERCEPT THE PMD 046 DEG R, WE ENTERED THE EDGE OF THE EDWARDS AFB RESTRICTED AREA AS WE LEVELED AT FL370. ATC INFORMED US WE WERE IN THE AREA, GAVE US A TURN TO 080 DEGS FOR DAG AND SAID WE WERE OUT OF THE RESTRICTED AREA. (THE CAPT WAS FLYING AND I WAS ON THE RADIO.) THE PROB BEGAN WITH THE NEW ROUTING WHICH THE FMC WOULD NOT ACCEPT. ALSO, THIS ROUTING BRINGS YOU RIGHT TO THE EDGE OF THE RESTRICTED AREA--J6/J146 GIVES YOU A LOT MORE CLRNC. WE'VE BECOME SO USED TO USING THE EFIS MAP MODE AND AUTOFLT, THAT WE'VE GOTTEN AWAY FROM VOR NAV. PARTLY COMPLACENCY, PARTLY CONFUSION. UNFORTUNATELY, MY AIRLINE'S MLG B TRNING WAS ATROCIOUS AND THE FAA'S RUBBER STAMP OF THE SYLLABUS WAS CRIMINAL. (A SURVEY OF THOSE OF US FLYING THIS ACFT OVERWHELMINGLY CONDEMNED THE TRNING AND ONLY BY THREATENING TO GO PUBLIC CONVINCED THE COMPANY TO SPLIT THE MLG B FLEET FROM THE MLG A.) THIS TYPE OF INCIDENT HAS HAPPENED TO SEVERAL OF OUR CREWS AND AFTER FLYING THE MLG B FOR 18 MONTHS I FINALLY SCREWED UP, TOO! CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: WHEN ANALYST POINTED OUT THAT THE PMD 046 DEG R DID NOT INTERCEPT THE DAG 239 DEG R, RPTR SEEMED FLUSTERED AND SAID HE WAS POSITIVE THAT THE RADIALS HE RPTED WERE THE RADIALS HE WAS GIVEN BY BUR CLRNC DELIVERY, AND THAT HE HAD READ THEM BACK. HE ALSO SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE ROUTE BTWN PMD AND DAG WAS AMENDED MORE OFTER THAN NOT AND HE WONDERED WHY THEY DIDN'T SIMPLY CHANGE THE CENTER STORED ROUTE.

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  4. Accession Number: 152852
    Synopsis: ACR MLG TRACK HEADINTG DEVIATION. THE FMC HAD FAILED AND THE FLT CREW SAYS THEY ARE NOT ACCUSTOMED TO TRACKING AN AIRWAY USING 'JUST CHARTS'.
    Narrative: FMC INOPERATIVE AFTER TKOF (SCREEN BLANK). CREW HAD TO CONTINUALLY ENTER MAGNETIC HDG CONFUSION AS TO WHAT WAS WORKING AND WHAT WASN'T. PNF MISREAD CHART AND INSTRUCTED PF TO TRACK J-191 INSTEAD OF J-193 AT THE DIVERGENCE POINT OF THESE 2 ARWYS. CTR ADVISED THAT WE WERE 7 MI W OF J-193 AND DIVERGING. INTERCEPT HDG ISSUED AND WE RESUMED CORRECT NAV. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS. FAILURE TO PAY ATTN TO DETAILS ON MY PART. CONFUSION REGARDING FMC FAILURE. NOT SEEN THAT OFTEN WHERE THE SCREEN IS COMPLETELY BLANK. HAD BECOME UNACCUSTOMED TO EXPLICITLY FOLLOWING JET ARWYS FROM A CHART RATHER THAN RELYING ON FMC AND IRS. CREW COORD, PF NOT CHALLENGING AN OBVIOUS ERROR BY THE PIC. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 152667. AT HUBBS INTXN WE HAD A DOUBLE FMC FAILURE. WITH THE ARWYS BECOMING MORE CONDENSED IT IS VERY EASY TO MISREAD AN ARWY R TO A VOR. WE HAVE EXCELLENT ENRTE CHARTS, BUT SOMETIMES THE CHARTS CAN BE CLUTTERED WITH TOO MUCH INFO.

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  6. Accession Number: 247365
    Synopsis: CAPT OF AN MLG ACR ACFT INADVERTENTLY SET THE WRONG VOR RADIAL IN THE FMC RESULTING IN BEING OFF COURSE BY 20 MI. ATC CTLR INTERVENED AND THE MISTAKE WAS CORRECTED.
    Narrative: WE WERE DEVIATING AROUND WX N OF ORLANDO ON J53. WE WERE HDG 320 DEGS TO CLR WX TRYING TO THEN GO OVER CRAIG AND THEN THE ARR INTO ATL. WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO FLY 270 DEGS AND INTERCEPT J119 TO TAYLOR THEN DUBLIN AND THE ARR. THE FO, WHO WAS FLYING, CHKED THE CHART. J119 WAS 186 DEG RADIAL. I SAID THAT'S 306 DEGS INBOUND. HE SAID OK AND WE TURNED INBOUND. CTR SAID AGAIN FLY 270 DEGS AND INTERCEPT J119 INTO TAYLOR 'DID YOU GET THAT?' WE REPLIED 'WE WERE WORKING ON IT.' THEY SAID HE HAD TFC OVER GAINESVILLE SBOUND AND HE NEEDED US ON J119. WE ROGERED, CHKED THE CHART AND YES 186 DEGS OUT IS '006' IN -- NOT '306' DEG. WE RESET AND GOT IN J119. COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED BY BETTER BASIC MATH. HOWEVER, WITH WX DEV GOING ON AND NOT TOO SURE HOW FAR AWAY J119 WAS, I FIGURED TOO QUICKLY AND FO DIDN'T CATCH IT. MAYBE CTR COULD HAVE SAID 'INTERCEPT J119 YOU ARE 20 MI E OF IT' OR SOMETHING LIKE THAT TO TAKE AWAY SOME OF THE URGENCY OF THE SIT. ALSO, WITH A GLASS COCKPIT, ONE GETS OUT OF THE HABIT OF SETTING COURSES ON AIRWAYS.

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  8. Accession Number: 383887
    Synopsis: AN A320 CAPT IN TRAINING DSNDS ON GS BELOW THE AUTH ALT WHILE OFF THE LOC COURSE. THE CHK PLT HAD INSISTED ON THE TRAINEE USING ONLY RAW DATA FOR THE APCH AND THE TRAINEE OVERSHOT THE TURN TO INTERCEPT THE ILS. TWR CTLR GAVE THE FLT A VISUAL APCH CLRNC.
    Narrative: WE WERE ON A REGULARLY SCHEDULED ACR PAX FLT FROM ORD TO ATL. THE FLT WAS AN IOE FLT FOR ME, CONDUCTED AS PART OF MY INITIAL CAPT QUALIFICATION ON THIS ACFT AND WITH A PART 121 ACR. A COMPANY LINE CHK AIRMAN (LCA) WAS ACTING AS MY FO. FOR TRAINING/EVALUATION PURPOSES, HE OPTED TO HAVE ME FLY THE ENTIRE FLT WITHOUT AUTOPLT, AND ONCE ESTABLISHED IN CRUISE AT FL330, THE AUTOTHROTTLES WERE DISCONNECTED FOR THE BAL OF THE FLT. ON THE RADAR DOWNWIND FOR AN ILS TO RWY 26R AT ATLANTA, FOLLOWING A 'ROME NINE ARR' (BWG.RMG9), THE LCA DISCONNECTED MY FLT DIRECTOR. THIS RESULTED IN A MANUAL, RAW DATA FLT SIT. APCH CTL GAVE US A R TURN TO A HDG OF 180 DEGS FOR A BASE LEG, WITH A DSCNT TO 4000 FT. THIS BASE LEG WOULD HAVE INTERCEPTED THE ILS RWY 26R LOC JUST INSIDE OF 'FREAL' AT APPROX 12 DME/ATL. THIS HEADING WAS SOON MODIFIED TO 240 DEGS AND THEN 250 DEGS TO JOIN THE LOC AT 4000 FT AND CLRNC FOR THE ILS RWY 26R. WE WERE ALSO INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT THE TWR AT THAT TIME. AT 4000 FT, PRIOR TO BEING ON THE LOC COURSE (I HAD OVERSHOT THE INTERCEPT HEADING) I BEGAN TO DSND ON THE GS. AT THIS TIME, THE LINE CHK AIRMAN (FO) WAS LOOKING UP THE TWR FREQ. HE LOOKED UP TO NOTICE MY PREMATURE DSCNT AND HEADING OVERSHOOT AND ADVISED ME TO CORRECT BACK TO 4000 FT UNTIL ON THE LOC. THE TWR CTLR, NOTING OUR POS, ASKED WHETHER WE HAD A PROB AND WHETHER WE HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT. THE LINE CHK AIRMAN REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NO PROB BUT THAT THERE WAS TRAINING IN PROGRESS AND THAT WE HAD THE FIELD IN SIGHT. THE TWR CTLR THEN CLRED US FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 26R. IN THE PREMATURE DSCNT, I NOTICED A MINIMAL ALT OF 3650- 3700 FT MSL, APPROX 15 DEGS N OF THE LOC COURSE AT ABOUT 10-12 DME/ATL. THE APCH WAS FULLY STABILIZED BY 2000 FT MSL (1000 FT AGL). FROM THAT POINT, WE COMPLETED AN UNEVENTFUL VISUAL APCH AND LNDG ON RWY 26R. HUMAN PERFORMANCE: I WAS WELL AWARE OF THE RESTR AND PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS TO MAINTAIN 4000 FT UNTIL ESTABLISHED ON THE LOC COURSE. I ALLOWED MYSELF TO BECOME FIXATED ON THE GS INDICATOR, SUBDUING MY AWARENESS OF LOC PROX. THAT FIXATION ALSO PLAYED A PART IN MY OVERSHOOTING THE ASSIGNED INTERCEPT HEADING AND DETAILED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: FOR THE PAST 5 YRS, I HAVE BEEN A FO ON B75/767/777 ACFT, FLYING ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY TRANS-ATLANTIC OPS WITH AUGMENTED CREWS. LEGS WERE INFREQUENT (2 OR 3 PER MONTH ON AVERAGE). MANUAL/RAW DATA ONLY OPS WERE LIMITED SINCE THE USE OF AUTOFLT IS PREFERRED IN THE OP OF THESE ACFT (AS WELL AS THE A320). AS A RESULT, I HAVE FOUND THAT MY MANUAL/RAW DATA FLYING SKILLS HAVE DETERIORATED SOMEWHAT. THEY ARE COMING BACK BUT THEY OBVIOUSLY STILL NEED IMPROVEMENT.
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