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Incidents related to Issue 15 incidents related to this issue.

Issue: data entry and programming may be difficult and time consuming (Issue #112)
Description: Procedures for data entry and programming automation may be unclear, overly difficult, complex, and time consuming. This may cause errors and delays that may lead to unsafe conditions.

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  2. Accession Number: 92431
    Synopsis: ACR MLG DEVIATES FROM COURSE AND ENTERS RESTRICTED AREA.
    Narrative: FILED FLT PLAN FROM BUR TO DEN WAS THE VNY 5 DEP, PMD TRANSITION, PMD J6 J146 HBU. CLRNC DELIVERY GAVE US THE VNY 5, PMD TRANSITION, PMD--THE PMD 046 DEG R DAG 239 DEG R DAG FLT PLAN ROUTE. LAST WK I WAS ABLE TO REPROGRAM THE FMC WITH THE NEW ROUTING. THIS TIME IT WOULDN'T ACCEPT IT. AS WE PASSED PMD ON OUR CLBOUT I WAS STILL TRYING TO REPROGRAM. WE WENT OUT J6 (PMD 067 DEG R) FOR A COUPLE OF MILES BEFORE WE WENT TO MANUAL VOR NAV. IN MAKING A LEFT TURN TO ABOUT 020 DEGS TO INTERCEPT THE PMD 046 DEG R, WE ENTERED THE EDGE OF THE EDWARDS AFB RESTRICTED AREA AS WE LEVELED AT FL370. ATC INFORMED US WE WERE IN THE AREA, GAVE US A TURN TO 080 DEGS FOR DAG AND SAID WE WERE OUT OF THE RESTRICTED AREA. (THE CAPT WAS FLYING AND I WAS ON THE RADIO.) THE PROB BEGAN WITH THE NEW ROUTING WHICH THE FMC WOULD NOT ACCEPT. ALSO, THIS ROUTING BRINGS YOU RIGHT TO THE EDGE OF THE RESTRICTED AREA--J6/J146 GIVES YOU A LOT MORE CLRNC. WE'VE BECOME SO USED TO USING THE EFIS MAP MODE AND AUTOFLT, THAT WE'VE GOTTEN AWAY FROM VOR NAV. PARTLY COMPLACENCY, PARTLY CONFUSION. UNFORTUNATELY, MY AIRLINE'S MLG B TRNING WAS ATROCIOUS AND THE FAA'S RUBBER STAMP OF THE SYLLABUS WAS CRIMINAL. (A SURVEY OF THOSE OF US FLYING THIS ACFT OVERWHELMINGLY CONDEMNED THE TRNING AND ONLY BY THREATENING TO GO PUBLIC CONVINCED THE COMPANY TO SPLIT THE MLG B FLEET FROM THE MLG A.) THIS TYPE OF INCIDENT HAS HAPPENED TO SEVERAL OF OUR CREWS AND AFTER FLYING THE MLG B FOR 18 MONTHS I FINALLY SCREWED UP, TOO! CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: WHEN ANALYST POINTED OUT THAT THE PMD 046 DEG R DID NOT INTERCEPT THE DAG 239 DEG R, RPTR SEEMED FLUSTERED AND SAID HE WAS POSITIVE THAT THE RADIALS HE RPTED WERE THE RADIALS HE WAS GIVEN BY BUR CLRNC DELIVERY, AND THAT HE HAD READ THEM BACK. HE ALSO SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE ROUTE BTWN PMD AND DAG WAS AMENDED MORE OFTER THAN NOT AND HE WONDERED WHY THEY DIDN'T SIMPLY CHANGE THE CENTER STORED ROUTE.

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  4. Accession Number: 130037
    Synopsis: ALT DEVIATION. DESCENT CROSSING RESTRICTION NOT MET.
    Narrative: WE WERE FLYING FROM LAS TO SNA IN AN MLG EQUIPPED WITH A SINGLE FMS CDU ON THE LEFT SIDE OF THE FORWARD ELECTRONIC PANEL (FORWARD OF THE THRUST LEVERS), AND ELECTRO-MECHANICAL FLT INSTRUMENT DISPLAYS. WE HAD BEEN CLEARED TO FLY THE KAYOH ONE ARR, AND HAD PROGRAMMED THE FMC FOR A VNAV DSNT TO CROSS DAWNA (HDF 353/29) AT 13,000, AND THEN CROSS KAYOH (SLI 075/23) AT 210 KTS AND 8000. BEFORE REACHING DAWNA WE WERE CLEARED DIRECT TO HDF. ZLA BROADCAST A SIGMET THAT FORECAST OCCASIONAL SEVERE TURBULENCE BELOW 10,000 IN THE AREA THAT WE WOULD BE MAKING OUR FINAL DSNT, FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY BY A CLRNC FOR US TO CROSS 20 NE OF HDF AT 14,000. WE BOTH REMARKED THAT HDF WAS NOT SHOWING A DME SIGNAL, SO RAW DATA DISTANCE WAS NOT AVAILABLE. I ASKED THE F/O IF HE WOULD LIKE ME TO ENTER THE RESTRICTION INTO THE FMC (SINCE IT'S AWKWARD TO MAKE DATA ENTRIES FROM HIS SIDE OF THE COCKPIT) AND ENTERED HDF 010/20 AT 14,000. THE F/O INDICATED AGREEMENT WITH THE DATA ENTRY, AND I TOLD HIM I'D BE "OFF THE RADIO" WHILE I DISCUSSED THE ANTICIPATED TURBULENCE WITH THE CABIN CREW. DURING THAT DISCUSSION I OBSERVED THE F/O INITIATE A RAPID DSNT, CHECKED THE CDU, AND WAS SURPRISED TO SEE THAT THE WAYPOINT I HAD JUST ENTERED WAS NO LONGER DISPLAYED (SINCE WE HAD JUST PASSED IT). THE F/O TOLD ME THAT WE HAD CROSSED THE 20 MI FIX PASSING THROUGH 17,000, AND THAT CENTER'S ONLY COMMENT WAS, "YOU MISSED IT". I BELIEVE THAT THIS INCIDENT WAS NOT DUE TO ANY INATTENTION, BUT RATHER TO HUMAN FACTORS PROBLEMS INVOLVED WITH THE AUTOMATED COCKPIT AND ATC. I ALSO BELIEVE THAT IT WOULDN'T HAVE HAPPENED IN AN OLDER-TECHNOLOGY ACFT (WHICH I ALSO FLY). FOR EXAMPLE: 1) IN THE OLDER-TECHNOLOGY ACFT, I WOULDN'T'T HAVE ACCEPTED THIS CLRNC, ONCE I REALIZED THAT HDF HAD NO DME. I ASSUME THAT THE CTLR WOULDN'T HAVE ISSUED IT UNLESS HE KNEW THE ACFT WAS RNAV EQUIPPED. 2) I'M NOT USED TO RECEIVING CLRNCS TO A "DISTANCE" POINT ASSOCIATED WITH A NON-DME FAC. I ASSOCIATE THE PHRASEOLOGY, "CROSS TWENTY NE OF XYZ" WITH A DME FIX, WHERE I CAN QUICKLY LOOK AT A RAW-DATA DME DISPLAY AND MAKE AN IMMEDIATE JUDGEMENT THAT A DSNT MUST BE INITIATED. I LOOKED FOR RAW DATA. IT WASN'T AVAILABLE, SO I MENTALLY SHIFTED FROM THE OLD-TECHNOLOGY (RAW DATA) MODE TO THE AUTOMATED COCKPIT (DATA ENTRY AND COMPUTED SOLUTION) MODE. 3) MOST CLRNCS I'VE RECEIVED THAT REQUIRE RNAV INVOLVE NAMED FIXES WHICH ARE USUALLY IN THE FLT PLAN OR DATABASE. I CAN MAKE A RAPID (4 KEYSTROKES) DATA ENTRY FOR A RNAV POSITION/ALT IF IT WAS PREVIOUSLY PROGRAMMED INTO THE ROUTE, IE, DIRECT HDF. THE CLRNC IN THIS INCIDENT REQUIRED 15 KEYSTROKES, AND TOOK CONSIDERABLY MORE TIME. 4) WHEN I FLY AN AUTOMATED ACFT, I HAVE TO SPEND SOME AMOUNT OF TIME PROGRAMMING AND MONITORING THE COMPUTER. THE DECISION OF WHEN TO DO THIS AND WHEN IT ISN'T APPROPRIATE IS A SUBTLE ONE, AND LENDS ITSELF TO GENERALITIES SUCH AS, "DON'T PROGRAM IN THE TERMINAL AREA." IN THIS CASE, "DON'T PROGRAM IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA" WOULD HAVE BEEN APPROPRIATE. THE DATA WE NEEDED (PRESENT DISTANCE TO HDF) WAS AVAILABLE IN THE CDU, SO IF WE HAD TREATED IT AS IF WE DIDN'T HAVE RNAV AVAILABLE WE MIGHT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MAKE THE MENTAL CALCULATION IN TIME TO MEET THE RESTRICTION. IN THE ENRTE ENVIRONMENT HOWEVER, EXPERIENCE LED ME TO THE SUBCONSCIOUS DECISION THAT THERE WAS TIME AVAILABLE TO REPROGRAM THE FMC. 5) THE CTLR ISSUED A CLRNC THAT WAS PROBABLY DELAYED DUE TO THE SIGMET BROADCAST. AS IT WAS, THE CLRNC WAS MADE SO CLOSE TO THE FIX THAT BY THE TIME IT WAS PROGRAMMED INTO THE FMC AND DSNT COMPUTATIONS MADE, IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO MEET THE RESTRICTION. 6) IT WASN'T UNTIL THE NEXT DAY AND A DISCUSSION EXPLORING BOTH OF OUR THOUGHT PROCESSES THAT WE FOUND ANYTHING WE (AS OPPOSED TO THE CTLR) COULD HAVE DONE DIFFERENTLY UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES TO PREVENT THIS INCIDENT. WHEN EITHER OF US IS THE PLT FLYING AND MAKES A DATA ENTRY, WE EACH MAKE A MENTAL VALIDITY CHECK USING SOME RULE OF THUMB, IE, "I'M 13 MI FROM THE FIX AND 6000' HIGH, SO I'VE GOT TO START DOWN NOW!" IN THIS CASE, ALTHOUGH I MADE THE DATA ENTRY I DIDN'T MAKE THE VALIDITY CHECK BECAUSE I WAS NOT FLYING, AND PREOCCUPIED WITH MY CONCERN FOR THE SAFETY OF THE PAX AND CABIN CREW IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EXPECTED SEVERE TURBULENCE. I HAD SUBCONSCIOUSLY PLACED A HIGHER PRIORITY ON COMMUNICATING WITH THE CABIN CREW THAN ON DOUBLE-CHECKING THE COMPUTER. IT HAS NOT ESCAPED ME THAT NOT DOUBLE-CHECKING THE COMPUTER OR THE PLT FLYING CAN LEAD TO A BUSTED ALT AND HENCE A MIDAIR COLLISION, WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN A HIGHER PRIORITY. THE F/O INDICATED THAT SINCE I HAD MADE THE DATA ENTRY HE ASSUMED THAT THE DATA WAS VALID (IT WAS, BUT TOO LATE) AND DIDN'T DOUBLE-CHECK IT.

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  6. Accession Number: 174356
    Synopsis: ADVTECH ACR LGT FAILS TO MEET CROSSING RESTRICTION IN DESCENT.
    Narrative: CTR GAVE US CLRNC TO CROSS DJB 180 DEG R AT 30 DME AT FL310. I (PNF) READ BACK CLRNC. CAPT (PF) ENTERED CLRNC INTO FMS, BUT IT WOULD NOT ACCEPT DATA ENTRY. SO HE TRIED AGAIN, BUT STILL NO ACCEPTANCE. SO I TRIED IT, BUT STILL NO ACCEPTANCE. BY NOW ABOUT 1 MIN HAD GONE BY. CTLR ASKED US IF WE WERE GOING TO MAKE XING RESTRICTION. I SAID, "NO," WE WOULD BE UNABLE TO MAKE. THE PF HAD NOT EVEN LEFT THE PREVIOUS ALT (FL390). WE IMMEDIATELY BEGAN DSNDING.

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  8. Accession Number: 209413
    Synopsis: CAPT OF MLG ACR ACFT ALLOWED THE ACFT TO UNDERSHOOT DURING DSCNT CAUSING AN ALT XING RESTRICTION NOT TO BE MET. THERE WAS NO KNOWN CONFLICT WITH OTHER TFC.
    Narrative: PROBLEM: MISSED XING RESTRICTION ALT. SUCCESSIVE DSCNTS AND XING RESTRICTIONS WITH EACH CHANGING CTLR. HAD BEEN CLRED TO FL190, TO CROSS 30 NM S OF SIE VOR AT 15000 FT. RESTRICTION HAD BEEN PROGRAMMED INTO FMC COMPUTER, BUT I MUST NOT HAVE PROPERLY ENGAGED THE COMPUTER. WHEN CHANGED TO FREQ 127.70, THE CTLR QUERIED OUR CLRNC TO 15000 FT. I CONFIRMED IT -- BELIEVING I STILL HAD APPROX 30 MI TO GO -- BUT IN FACT, I WAS ABOUT 3 MI FROM THE XING. CTLR SAID OK -- JUST DSND TO 15000 FT, WHICH I DID. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: REPEATED DIFFICULTY HAD BEEN EXPERIENCED WITH SETTING LOWER ALTS INTO THE FMC TO SATISFY EACH NEW RESTRICTION. SOMETIMES WITHOUT SUCCESS. OFTEN WHEN MAKING DSCNTS WITH RAPIDLY CHANGING PARAMETERS, THE AUTOMATED COCKPIT BECOMES UNWIELDY -- AND BECOMES A DISTR TO FLYING THE ACFT. HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS: FLT WAS LAST LEG OF A 4-DAY TRIP -- ACCUMULATING 25+ HRS IN THE LAST 80 HRS. A LAYOVER OF ABOUT 3 HRS WAS EXPERIENCED BTWN PREVIOUS AND CURRENT FLT. A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF FATIGUE WAS FELT -- PLUS ANGER AT KNOWING CREW WAS SUBJECT TO POSSIBLE DRUG TEST ON ARR -- COMBING WITH FRUSTRATION AND INABILITY TO MANAGE THE FMC -- ADDED TO THE DISTR OF ADHERING TO THE CLRNC.

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  10. Accession Number: 370840
    Synopsis: ALT XING NOT MADE WHEN FO FAILS TO SET THE XING ALT INTO THE ALT SELECT PANEL. THE FO, PF, HAD TO 'BUILD' A XING FIX WITH AIRSPD CHANGE INTO THE FMS. THE CAPT WAS ON THE PA WITH PAX INFO. LACK OF COCKPIT COORD AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS.
    Narrative: WE WERE INBOUND TO CLT ON THE CHESTERFIELD ARR DSNDING TO 14000 FT AND EXPECTING A CLRNC TO CROSS BOOZE INTXN AT 11000 FT. BEFORE WE LEVELED AT 14000 FT WE WERE GIVEN A CLRNC TO CROSS 13 NM S OF BOOZE AT 11000 FT AND 210 KTS. I WAS THE PF AND I SET UP THE FMS TO DISPLAY A FIX 13 NM S OF BOOZE. THEN I PROGRAMMED THE FMS TO DISPLAY THE 210 KTS, 11000 FT RESTR ON THE MOVING MAP DISPLAY. HOWEVER, I DID NOT SET 11000 FT ON THE ALT SELECT PANEL AND THIS IS NECESSARY FOR THE ACFT TO RESPOND TO THE FMS INPUTS. THEREFORE THE ACFT LEVELED AT 14000 FT AND WE MISSED THE XING RESTR. ZJX TOLD US WE MISSED THE RESTR JUST AS WE CROSSED THE 13 DME FIX. I THINK THE AUTOMATION OF THE F100 WAS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR. IN THIS ACFT WHEN RECEIVING A XING RESTR, ESPECIALLY ONE THAT IS NOT OVER AN ESTABLISHED INTXN, THE PLTS MUST 1) BUILD THE POINT IN THE FMS, 2) PROGRAM THE ALT AND SPD IN THE FMS, 3) SET THE ALT SELECT PANEL. IN A LESS AUTOMATED ACFT, THE SAME CLRNC MEANS SIMPLY DIALING IN THE ALT ON THE ALT SELECT PANEL. OVER RELIANCE ON THE AUTOMATION WAS ANOTHER FACTOR. A BREAKDOWN OF THE ESTABLISHED ALT AWARENESS PROGRAM WAS THE THIRD AND MOST CRITICAL CONTRIBUTING FACTOR. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 370841: I WAS BUSY PERFORMING THE ARR ANNOUNCEMENT ON THE PA SYS. THIS INTERRUPTED MY STANDARD FOLLOW-UP WITH OUR COMPANY ALT AWARENESS PROCS. CONSEQUENTLY I DID NOT CHK THE ALT SET AT THE FMC PANEL.

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  12. Accession Number: 372329
    Synopsis: WDB ACFT CLRED FOR ILS APCH AFTER PASSING INTXN WAS RECLRED TO ANOTHER RWY AFTER FMS AND LOC ILS CAPTURE. FLC DISTR BY REPROGRAMMING FMC AND HDG CHANGE DSNDED THROUGH 7000 FT AND WAS RECLRED TO 6000 FT. THEN WHILE DSNDING TO 6000 FT AND BEING DISTR BY TFC, FLC DSNDED THROUGH 6000 FT.
    Narrative: EXECUTING CIVET 1 ARR TO LAX. CLRED FOR ILS RWY 25L AFTER PASSING ARNES. APCH FLOWN IN AUTOFLT, APCH MODE, LOC AND GS CAPTURED. AT ABOUT (?) 8000 FT, SOCAL INSTRUCTED 'TURN R 10 DEGS, INTERCEPT ILS RWY 24R, DSND TO 7000 FT.' DURING THE CONFUSION OF TRYING TO LOCATE THE RWY 24R APCH PLATE, THE TURN WAS INITIATED BUT THE AUTOPLT FLT DIRECTOR SYS STILL HAD LOC AND GS CAPTURE, COMMANDING A DSCNT ON THE FLT DIRECTORS. WHILE TRYING TO SET UP TO INTERCEPT RWY 24L, DSNDED BELOW CLRED ALT. RECLRED TO 6000 FT, AND WHILE STILL FOLLOWING AUTOPLT FLT DIRECTOR SYS COMMANDS FOR RWY 25L, DSNDED 300 FT BELOW CLRED ALT. IN MY BELIEF, THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED BECAUSE OF THE DELAYED ABANDONMENT OF AUTOFLT COMMANDS UPON RECEIPT OF A DRASTIC CLRNC CHANGE AND THE RESULTANT CONFUSION AND INCREASED WORKLOAD. ALSO, SINCE WE HAD BEEN CLRED FOR THE RWY 25L APCH, OUR MINDSET WAS TO TRACK GLIDE PATH, EVEN THOUGH ONLY CLRED TO INTERCEPT RWY 24R. IN ANY EVENT, THIS EVENT DICTATES THE IMMEDIATE ABANDONMENT OF AUTOFLT UPON RECEIPT OF A CLRNC CHANGE THIS DRASTIC. WITH THE TIME INVOLVED IN REPROGRAMMING THE FMC AND RETUNING THE ILS, AUTOFLT DSCNT ON THE OLD APCH MUST BE CHKED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 372334: THE CTLR THEN CLRED US TO MAINTAIN 6000 FT MSL. AT THIS TIME AN ACFT WAS SPOTTED APPROX 5 MI AHEAD. WHILE I WAS DISTR WITH THE AIRPLANE AND THE OTHER PLT REPROGRAMMING THE FMC AND SELECTING THE LOC FREQ, THE ACFT DSNDED TO APPROX 5700 FT MSL WHEN A CLB WAS IMMEDIATELY INITIATED BACK TO 6000 FT MSL. WE WERE THEN CLRED FOR THE APCH WELL ABOVE SGS FOR RWY 24R ILS.

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  14. Accession Number: 387010
    Synopsis: B747-400 ACFT ON OCEANIC RTE ENCOUNTERED AREA OF SEVERE WX AND HAD TO DIVERT AROUND WX. FLC HAD SOME DIFFICULTY PROGRAMMING THE FMC PROPERLY FOR OFFSET PLUS HIGH WORKLOAD. FLC FORGOT TO PLOT POS AND GIVE POS RPT. BOTH PLTS IN COCKPIT WERE FO'S AND THE CAPT WAS ON BREAK SLEEPING. FLT WAS FANS FLT.
    Narrative: I WAS A RELIEF PLT AND HAD JUST ASSUMED MY SHIFT AFTER BEING ON BREAK. DISPATCH SENT US A MESSAGE VIA ACARS RECOMMENDING A REROUTE TO THE W OF CLRED CUS VIA 10 DEGS S 160 DEGS W TO AVOID CUMULO NIMBUS ACTIVITY ASSOCIATED WITH TROPICAL CYCLONE 'OSEA.' THE CAPT (JUST BEFORE LEAVING THE COCKPIT FOR HIS BREAK) SAID, THAT 'SHE (THE DISPATCHER) WAS OVERLY HELPFUL AND THAT MOST OF THE WX WAS BEHIND US AND WE SHOULD HAVE SMOOTH SAILING.' HE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN MORE WRONG. GOING BY WHAT THE CAPT SAID, I HAD THE OTHER (NON-FLYING) FO TELL DISPATCH THAT OUR CURRENT FLT PLAN LOOKED OK. WITHIN 15 MINS OF THAT, AN INTENSE, 100 NM WIDE RETURN STARTED TO GROW ON OUR RADAR 200 MI AHEAD. I TRIED TO CONVINCE THE OTHER FO THAT WE SHOULD ASK FOR 10 DEGS S 160 DEGS W REROUTE AS RECOMMENDED. HE THOUGHT IT WAS TOO FAR OFF COURSE AND SUGGESTED THAT IT LOOKED BETTER TO THE E. I AGREED TO THAT AND WE ASKED TO DEVIATE 40 NM L OF CUS. AS SOON AS WE STARTED L (S) THE LINE WE WERE TRYING TO GO AROUND APPEARED TO GROW ON OUR CRT. I HAD HIM ASK FOR 70 NM AND SOON FOR 99 NM (THE MOST THE SOFTWARE WILL ALLOW, THIS WAS A 'FANS' RTE). DURING THIS DEV IT GOT INCREASINGLY TURBULENT TO ALMOST CONTINUOUS MODERATE. THE OTHER FO WAS INVOLVED IN FANS COMS AS I WAS FLYING THE ACFT AND WE FORGOT TO GIVE A POS RPT AT 11 DEGS S AND 155 DEGS W. WE ALSO DIDN'T DO A PLOT WHILE DEVIATING. AS WE CLRED THE END OF THE CUMULO NIMBUS LINE AND ASKED FOR DIRECT TO 14 DEGS S 153 DEGS W, OR TO CONTINUE OUR L OFFSET FOR A WHILE LONGER, TAHITI RESPONDED 'UNABLE.' WE INQUIRED AS TO WHICH WAS UNABLE, THE DIRECT OR THE OFFSET, THE NEXT CTR, AUCKLAND ASKED FOR OUR POS WE WERE ABEAM 13 DEGS 27 MINS S 157 DEGS W (OUR FIR CHK POINT). SO WE GAVE AN ESTIMATE TO THAT POINT, AND AUCKLAND CLRED US TO GO DIRECT TO THE SUCCEEDING POINT, S 27 DEGS W 170 DEGS. DURING THIS DEV THE WORKLOAD SEEMED HIGH TO ME, BECAUSE THE OTHER FO (NON-FLYING) WAS HAVING SOME DIFFICULTY WITH THE FMC AND RESPONDING TO ATC. ON THE FMC WE MADE THE MISTAKE OF NOT 'EXECUTING' THE 99L OFFSET (JUST USING THE DOTTED LINE) AND THAT AFFECTED HIS ABILITY TO USE THE 'POS RPT' SCREEN TO RESPOND TO ATC QUICKLY. I THOUGHT ABOUT AWAKENING THE CAPT WHEN I REALIZED WE HAD MISSED A POS RPT AND A PLOT, BUT IT LOOKED LIKE SINCE WE WERE GIVING THE PRESENT POS TO AKL, THIS SIT WAS SOLVED. IN HINDSIGHT, I SHOULD HAVE ADVOCATED MORE STRONGLY TO FOLLOW DISPATCH'S RECOMMENDATION FOR A REROUTE REQUEST. I ALSO SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE AWARE OF HOW THE OTHER FO WAS KEEPING UP ON THE POS RPT AND PLOTTING CHART.

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  16. Accession Number: 388404
    Synopsis: FLC OF A320 COMPLAINS OF ROUTING ON SHORT FLT WHICH REQUIRES REPROGRAMMING THE FMS. THEY FLEW MANUALLY INSTEAD OF REPROGRAMMING.
    Narrative: FIRST OF ALL, YOU CAN PROBABLY JUST FILE THIS WHOLE RPT UNDER 'COMPLAINING/BITCHING PLT.' I RECEIVED A CLRNC FROM SAN-LAX THIS MONTH WHICH I FOUND TO BE VERY CONFUSING AND NOT USER (PLT) FRIENDLY AT ALL. I WAS CAPT ON FLT FROM SAN-LAX ON DEC/XX/97, FLYING AN AIRBUS A320. DUE TO WX AND WINDS, WE WERE DEPARTING TO THE E AT SAN AND LNDG TO THE E AT LAX. (THESE 2 ITEMS ALONE SHOULD PROBABLY BE AN EMER PROC!) OUR FIRST CLRNC FOR TKOF TO THE W WAS CANCELED AND WE BACK-TAXIED FOR TKOF ON RWY 9 AT SAN. OUR NEW CLRNC WAS '...CLRED VIA THE LNSAY DEP TO INTERCEPT THE SLI 148 DEG RADIAL, TO THE VTU 114 DEG RADIAL, TO V8, TO TANDY...SQUAWK, ALTIMETER....' FOR ONLY A 26 MIN FLT (107 MI) I THOUGHT THIS WAS AN EXCESSIVE AMOUNT OF RADIAL INTERCEPTS AND TURNS. THE A320 (AS MOST ROMEO EQUIPPED ACFT) CAN EASILY LOAD WAYPOINTS INTO THE FMS, BUT NOT USER FRIENDLY WITH A CLRNC SUCH AS THIS. I ASKED TO 'GO DIRECT FROM HARBR (ON SLI 148 DEG RADIAL) TO TANDY' BUT WAS DENIED. THIS 'DIRECT' ROUTING WOULD HAVE PARALLELED THE ORIGINAL CLRNC BY APPROX 3 MI. RATHER THAN TAKING AN EXCESSIVE AMOUNT OF TIME TRYING TO LOAD THIS FLT PLAN, WE FLEW IT MANUALLY WITHOUT USE OF THE FMS. THE WX WAS MARGINAL (ALWAYS IS WHEN YOU HAVE OTHER PROBS!) AND OUR MEANS OF FLYING WAS SAFE, BUT VERY BUSY (CONFUSING?) FOR SUCH A VERY SHORT FLT. I ALSO HEARD NO OTHER ACFT ON THE FREQ UNTIL HANDED OFF TO LAX APCH CTL, SO TFC WAS NOT A FACTOR. THIS FLT OF 26 MINS REQUIRED US TO USE THE FOLLOWING CHARTS/MAPS TO PROPERLY IDENT ALL THE POINTS AND ROUTING: LNSAY 1, LO-ALT CHART 5/6, OCEAN 1, AND LAX APCH ILS RWY 7R. HERE COMES MY MAIN BEEF! (FINALLY) -- MOST OF THE WAYPOINTS SHOWN ON ANY OF THESE PAGES ARE NOT SHOWN ON ANY OTHERS! I HAVE NO IDEA WHY THERE HAS TO BE SO MANY DIFFERENT WAYPOINTS FOR ALL THE SIDS, VICTOR RTS, AND ARRS IN THIS AREA. FAA DEFINITELY NEEDS TO BE ABLE TO COORDINATE A BETTER ROUTING, ESPECIALLY WHEN WORKING ROMEO EQUIPPED ACFT. THERE WAS A LOT OF MEDIA PRESS GIVEN TO THE WORKLOAD OF THE ACR FLT AT CALI AND THE CONFUSION OF THE AIRCREW USING A GLASS COCKPIT. I DON'T THINK PLTS ARE GETTING LAZIER (ALREADY ARE) OR NOT AS COMPETENT AS THE 'I REMEMBER WHEN' DAYS, BUT FLYING 'GLASS' DOES REQUIRE A DIFFERENT MINDSET. IT WOULD BE MUCH SAFER IF FAA REALIZED THIS FACT AND TOOK MEASURES TO UPDATE THE SYS OR ELIMINATE SOME OF THE REASONS FOR CONFUSION AND EXCESSIVE WORKLOAD THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

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  18. Accession Number: 388490
    Synopsis: INBOUND TO EWR ARPT, ACR FLC WAS UNABLE TO MAKE A TIMELY FMS INPUT FOR AN INTXN ALT XING RESTR ON A STAR, CAUSING THE FLC TO TAKE BACK MANUAL CTL OF ACFT. FLC ADVISED ATC THAT THEY WERE UNABLE TO MEET RESTR. THOUGH ATC EXPRESSED DISPLEASURE, FLT PROCEEDED ON COURSE TO DEST.
    Narrative: ENRTE FROM BUF TO EWR, ZBW CLRED US DIRECT TO CRANK INTXN TO INTERCEPT SHAFF 3 ARR, TO CROSS CRANK INTXN AT 7000 FT MSL. FMC WAS PROGRAMMED AND DSCNT BEGUN. AT 10500 FT MSL, THE ACFT HAD NOT BEGUN TO SLOW DOWN TO 250 KTS. WE TOOK OVER MANUALLY AND REALIZED THAT WE WOULD NOT MAKE CRANK INTXN AT 7000 FT MSL. I NOTIFIED ZBW, HE WAS VERY MAD. I ASKED FOR A VECTOR FOR DSCNT. NOTHING ELSE SAID.

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  20. Accession Number: 393280
    Synopsis: LGT FO ADMITS TO A NAV ERROR. HE HAD FAILED TO FOLLOW PROC WHEN ENTERING RWY AND DEP PROCS INTO THE FMC AND LATER FOUND, VIA ATC, THAT THE ACFT WAS HEADING TO OTHER PLACES NOT IN CLRNC.
    Narrative: WE WERE GOING FROM SFO-SNA. THE ORIGINAL RTE WAS: OFFSHORE 3 SXC SNA, THAT WAS ENTERED INTO THE FMC. LATER WE WERE GIVEN THE PORTE 2 FLW DEPARTING RWY 10R. ON TAXI OUT GND CTL TOLD US TO EXPECT RWY 10L, EACH TIME WE WOULD CHANGE THE FMC. APCHING RWY 10L WE WERE AGAIN SWITCHED TO RWY 10R, RESELECTING RWY 10R IN THE FMC. ON THE PORTE 2 DEP, BEFORE INTERCEPT OAK 135 DEG RADIAL, WE WERE CLRED DIRECT WAGES. AFTER PASSING WAGES INTXN ZOA ASKED US WHERE WERE WE GOING. WE TURNED UP THE SCALE ON OUR HSI AND REALIZED WE WERE HEADING TO MQO NOT FLW LIKE OUR CLRNC HAD STATED. NO SEPARATION PROB RESULTED FROM THE NAV ERROR. WHAT WE FEEL HAPPENED AFTER SOME INVESTIGATION WAS WHEN I ENTERED THE RWY CHANGES AND THE DEP CHANGE INTO THE FMC, I DID NOT ENTER RWY, SID, TRANSITION LIKE THE FLT MANUAL TELLS US. BUT I WENT L TO R AND ENTERED SID, TRANSITION, RWY, THIS LEFT MQO IN THE LEGS PAGE BUT NOT THE RTE PAGE. THE RTE PAGE WAS CHKED BUT NOT THE LEGS PAGE, THIS ALSO WOULD HAVE CAUSED MY MISTAKE.

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  22. Accession Number: 401200
    Synopsis: AN ACR CL65 FO RPTS THAT THE CAPT HAD PROGRAMMED THE FMC TO FLY THE WRONG RTE BY ENTERING A DIRECT RTE VS THE STAR RTE TO THEIR DESTINATION.
    Narrative: CAPT WAS FLYING THIS LEG FROM CVG-MCO. ROUTING TOOK US FROM SZW VOR TO PIE VOR AND THEN THE MINEE 3 ARR INTO MCO. THIS IS AN UNUSUAL ROUTING FOR US, AND CAPT HAD MANUALLY PROGRAMMED THE FMS FOR THIS FLT. MY SUSPICION IS THAT AFTER PIE VOR, HE SIMPLY TYPED IN MINEE, AND SO THE FLT PLAN IN THE FMS HAD US FLY FROM PIE DIRECT TO MINEE INTXN AND THEN TO MCO. HE SHOULD HAVE SELECTED MCO ARRS, AND THEN SELECTED THE MINEE 3 ARR. THAT WAY, THE FMS WOULD HAVE PLANNED US TO FLY THE CORRECT ROUTING FOR THE MINEE ARR. WE DID NOT CATCH HIS ERROR AND AFTER PIE VOR, CTR ASKED US TWICE ABOUT OUR ROUTING. HE SAID THAT A COMPANY AIRPLANE HAD MADE THE SAME MISTAKE THE NIGHT BEFORE, AND THEY HAD ALMOST HAD A CONFLICT. WE DID NOT HAVE ANY CONFLICT (AS FAR AS I KNOW) AND NO EVASIVE ACTION WAS TAKEN. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 401203: CTR TOLD US TO DSND TO CROSS PIE VOR AT FL210. BY THE TIME WE CROSSED PIE VOR WE WERE STILL DSNDING THROUGH FL225 ON THE WAY TO FL210. I QUERIED THE CAPT ABOUT THE XING RESTR ABOUT 10 MI BEFORE PIE VOR, AND HE REPLIED THAT HE WAS NOT AWARE OF ANY XING RESTR. HE DID NOT HEED MY ADVICE ON THE MATTER. ATC WAS BUSY AT THE TIME, SO I COULD NOT VERIFY THE SIT WITH THEM ON THE RADIO. THE NEXT TIME THIS OCCURS, I WILL BE MUCH MORE ASSERTIVE IN VERIFYING MY OPINIONS ABOUT THESE MATTERS.

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  24. Accession Number: 402750
    Synopsis: FLC OF A B737-300 OVERSHOT XING FIX RESULTING IN A LATE TURN ONTO THE AIRWAY AS CLRED. THIS WAS DUE TO FAILURE TO CONTACT CTR AT FIRST ON NEW FREQ AND DELAY IN MAKING THE PROPER MODE HDG OF THE FMC.
    Narrative: LEAVING BWI ON ZDC FREQ, WE WERE GIVEN DIRECT DAILY INTXN, FOLLOWED SHORTLY BY A FREQ CHANGE. WE TRIED 3 TIMES ON THE NEW FREQ TO CONTACT CTR BUT GOT NO RESPONSE AND RETURNED TO THE OLD FREQ. IN THE PROCESS, WE PASSED DAILY INTXN AND WERE QUESTIONED ABOUT OUR ROUTING. WE WERE THEN GIVEN A HDG OF 150 DEGS. ON THE NEW FREQ, WE WERE AGAIN QUESTIONED ABOUT OUR CLRNC, AND GIVEN A NEW HDG OF 220 DEGS AND A CLRNC TO HCM DIRECT TO ISO. WE COMPLIED WITH ALL INSTRUCTIONS DURING THE INITIAL FREQ CHANGE. WE MISSED THE TURN ONTO THE AIRWAY DUE TO PROBS CONTACTING THE CTR AND IN TRANSITIONING FROM HDG SELECT TO LNAV ON THE AUTOPLT.

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  26. Accession Number: 405080
    Synopsis: ATIS NOT UP TO DATE. FLC OF A320 IS GIVEN PARALLEL APCH TO EXPECT VISUAL APCH IN MARGINAL WX. GIVEN RWY CHANGE AT THE LAST MIN. CREW DSNDED BELOW THEIR CLRED ALT BEFORE BECOMING VISUAL.
    Narrative: SFO ATIS FEW 1200 FT, VISIBILITY 10 MI, PARALLEL CHARTED VISUAL APCHS IN USE, LNDG RWY 28L. ABOUT 15 MI OUT, AFTER ESTABLISHED ON SFO 095 DEG RADIAL INBOUND, INQUIRED ABOUT RWY ASSIGNMENT AND REPLY WAS RWY 28R. FO SPENT NEXT FEW MINS ENTERING DATA AND CLRING MAP DISPLAY. STARTED OUT ON GS BUT DESPITE IDLE PWR AND 1/2 SPOILERS (FRENCH LOGIC ALLOWS ONLY 1/2 SPOILERS IF AUTOPLT ON), WENT WELL ABOVE GS. THE 'FEW' CLOUDS ALL HAPPENED TO BE HUGGING THE W SIDE OF SAN FRANCISCO BAY BTWN US AND SFO. WE CONTINUED TO GET LOWER ALT ASSIGNMENTS BY ATC WITHOUT SFO BEING IN SIGHT. ANOTHER ACFT ON THE PARALLEL 'TIPP TOE' APCH RPTED US IN SIGHT AND PROMISED TO MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION. STILL ABOVE GS, I DISCONNECTED AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHROTTLE AND DIRTIED UP. ABOUT 8-10 MI OUT, FO SAID HE COULD SEE REILS, BUT I WASN'T CONFIDENT ENOUGH TO RPT FIELD IN SIGHT AND TAKE A VISUAL. APCHING BRIJJ (AT APPROX 6 MI FINAL) WE WERE CLRED TO 2000 FT. MY MAJOR CONCERNS WERE UNSEEN ACFT TO OUR L AND BEING TOO HIGH. INSIDE BRIJJ, FO SAID '2000 FT ASSIGNED' AS WE PASSED 1700 FT. I BELIEVE WE ENTERED THE THIN CLOUDS ABOUT 2000 FT. AS I STARTED TO ADD PWR, THE FIELD BECAME CLRLY VISIBLE, ALONG WITH THE OTHER TFC WHICH WAS NOW 2-3 MI AHEAD OF US. AS THE FO WAS POINTING OUT MY ALTDEV, ATC WAS ASKING IF WE COULD MAINTAIN VISUAL WITH THE ACFT AHEAD. AS WE CAME OUT OF THE CLOUDS, WE ANSWERED YES AND WERE CLRED FOR THE VISUAL. ALTHOUGH THE ALT ALERTER WAS SET TO 2000 FT, NEITHER THE FO NOR I RECALL HEARING IT. THE SFO ATIS FOR THE PREVIOUS 3 HRS (WE HAD BEEN GETTING IT ON ACARS) HAD BEEN SAYING ARRS RWY 28L ONLY AND THE NOTAMS SAID RWY 28R CLOSED AFTER XA00 (OUR ARR TIME). HOW CAN AN ACR PLT EXPECT TO MAINTAIN BASIC VFR CLOUD CLRNC, AT NIGHT, WITH ANY CLOUDS AT 1200 FT. I ACKNOWLEDGE MY SCREW UP IN BUSTING MY ALT. I ALSO SHOULD HAVE TOLD ATC 'FIELD NOT IN SIGHT AND NOT EXPECTED TO COME INTO SIGHT.' BUT, IT IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO COMMUNICATE WITH A BUSY APCH FACILITY. ALL YOU CAN USUALLY DO IS RESPOND, TERSELY, TO INSTRUCTIONS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 405081: CURRENT ATIS STATED THAT RWY 28R WAS CLOSED. WE PROGRAMMED THE FMS WITH THE QUIET BRIDGE VISUAL RWY 28R RECOMMENDED ALTS, DME'S, BUT HAD RWY 28L PROGRAMMED INSTEAD OF RWY 28R. WE ASSUMED WE WOULD FLY THE RWY 28R CHARTED VISUAL APCH WITH THE EXCEPTION THAT WE WOULD CONDUCT A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 28L ONCE WE ACQUIRED THE FIELD. WE HAD A DISCONTINUITY PROGRAMMED AFTER THE LAST DME FIX. AT APPROX 8-10 MI OUT, THE APCH CTLR TOLD US THAT TFC AT OUR 10 O'CLOCK POS HAD US VISUALLY AND WOULD MAINTAIN SEPARATION FROM US AND THAT HE WAS LNDG ON RWY 28L. WE THEN REALIZED THAT SFO WAS USING BOTH RWYS AND THEY WANTED US TO LAND ON RWY 28R. I HAD THE SFO 095 DEG RADIAL HARD-TUNED, SO, AS THE PNF, I SELECTED ILS RWY 28R ON THE FMS SO THE CAPT WOULD HAVE FINAL GUIDANCE TO RWY 28R. THIS ACTION ELIMINATED THE MANUALLY INPUTTED DME RECOMMENDED ALTS THAT HE HAD ENTERED FOR THE QUIET BRIDGE. IT TOOK ME A WHILE TO GET RWY 28R ENTERED BECAUSE I SELECTED THE MODESTO 2 ARR AND HAD TO ERASE A LOT OF WAYPOINTS INSTEAD OF SELECTING 'NO STAR.' THINGS WERE HAPPENING FAIRLY QUICKLY BY THIS TIME. I WAS CONCENTRATING ON ENTERING THE CORRECT ILS IN THE FMS AND WAS NOT FOCUSING ON THE ALTIMETER AS I WOULD HAVE BEEN HAD WE NOT BEEN GIVEN A RWY CHANGE LATE IN THE GAME. I NORMALLY PROGRAM THE 'SECONDARY FLT PLAN' WITH THE PARALLEL RWY, IF THERE IS ONE, BUT DECIDED NOT TO IN THIS CASE BECAUSE THE ATIS SPECIFICALLY STATED THAT RWY 28R WAS CLOSED.

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  28. Accession Number: 409993
    Synopsis: THE FLC OF A B747-400 HAS PROBS TRYING TO BAL THE FUEL AS THEY FLY IN RCTP FOREIGN AIRSPACE.
    Narrative: DURING FLT #YY NRT-HKG ON JUL/XX/98, WE HAD A MAJOR FUEL IMBALANCE SIT WHICH IF NOT DETECTED, COULD HAVE RESULTED IN THE FLAMEOUT OF ENGS #1 AND #4. THERE WAS PLENTY OF ACCESSIBLE FUEL IN TANKS #2 AND #3 WHICH WOULD HAVE ALLOWED A RESTART AND POSITIVE FUEL FLOW FOR CONTINUED FLT. THE CAPT AND FO HAD DIFFERENT FUEL PUMP CONFIGNS IN MIND AT ENG START, BOTH OF WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN ACCEPTABLE. HOWEVER ONLY HALF OF EACH CONFIGN WAS ESTABLISHED. 3 OUT OF 4 EICAS MESSAGE ADVISORIES WERE NEVER RECEIVED. HUMAN FACTORS AND DISTRACTIONS ALSO WERE INVOLVED RESULTING IN THE IMBALANCE. AT ENG START, I PUSHED THE APPLICABLE FUEL PUMPS ON FOR TANK TO ENG CONFIGN. AS THE FUEL LOAD WAS 121000 LBS, EITHER THE TANK TO ENG OR THE FUEL-OVERRIDE #2 AND #3 PUMPS ALONG WITH #1 AND #4 XFEEDS OPEN, ARE ACCEPTABLE CONFIGNS. MY CAPT WAS THINKING OF THE OVERRIDE/XFEED CONFIGN AND I WAS USING TANK TO ENG. THUS WE ENCOUNTERED HALF THE SET UP OF EACH. THE CHKLIST HAS A CHALLENGE OF 'XFEEDS #1 AND #4' OF WHICH THERE ARE TWO POSSIBLE RESPONSES. MY CAPT RESPONDED 'OPEN' WHICH WAS TRUE AND I SHOULD HAVE STOPPED AND ASKED: WHY? RATHER, BECAUSE THIS RESPONSE IS ACCEPTABLE, I CONTINUED ON. WE SHOULD HAVE RECEIVED 3 EICAS ADVISORY MESSAGES WARNING OF THIS NON STANDARD CONFIGN, BUT NEVER DID AND PUSHING THE RECALL BUTTON DISPLAYED NO APPLICABLE MESSAGES AS WELL (1) FUEL TANK/ENG, 2) XFEED CONFIGN, 3) XFEED FUEL IMBALANCE #1 AND #4). THE 4TH ADVISORY DID DISPLAY HALFWAY THROUGH THE FLT (LOW FUEL QUANTITY). AT THAT TIME WE PLACED THE OVERRIDE PUMPS #2 AND #3 ON, WHICH FED FUEL INTO ENGS #1 AND #4. THE REST OF THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL WITH A NORMAL LNDG IN HKG. I NOTED THE FUEL QUANTITY TOTALS ON THE FLT PLAN EVERY WAYPOINT WHICH SHOWED A CONSISTENT 2500 LBS UNDER BURN. THE LOGBOOK ARR FUEL WAS LOGGED AND A MECH BRIEFED. HUMAN FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE IMBALANCE WERE: 1) CAPT AND FO THINKING OF DIFFERENT FUEL CONFIGN SCENARIOS BEFORE ENG START UP, 2) DISTRACTIONS OF A COMPLEX SID FROM NRT ALONG WITH EXTENSIVE BRIEFING FOR APCH AND LNDG INTO THE NEW HONG KONG ARPT, 3) THE CHKLIST WAS FOLLOWED BUT DID NOT ADDRESS THIS SCENARIO, 4) THIS WAS MY FIRST TIME IN THE COCKPIT FOR TKOF IN 7 MONTHS. MECHANICAL FACTORS WERE: 1) NOT RECEIVING 3 EICAS ADVISORY MESSAGES, 2) MAIN PUMPS #1 AND #4 HAVING A HIGHER OUTPUT PRESSURE THAN #2 AND #3 MAIN PUMPS RESULTING IN FUEL DEPLETION (TANKS #1 AND #4) IF #1 AND #4 XFEEDS OPEN, 3) XFEED CONFIGN EICAS MESSAGE DISPLAYED AFTER COMPLETE ENG SHUTDOWN IN HKG. OTHER ITEMS TO NOTE ARE 1) THE L FMC WAS RELOADED WITH DATA DUE TO PREVIOUS FAILURE JUST BEFORE OUR FLT, 2) WE HAVE A TEMPORARY PROC OF TURNING ON THE ENG BLEED VALVES JUST BEFORE START, 3) THE FUEL LOAD OF 121000 LBS ALLOWED FOR EITHER FUEL CONFIGN SET UP, 4) LATE FLAP RETRACTION DUE TO NOISE ABATEMENT REQUIREMENTS IN NRT, 5) COCKPIT OPERATING MANUAL DOES NOT SOLVE THIS PARTICULAR 'LOW FUEL QUANTITY' SIT IN TANKS #1 AND #4. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT THE FUEL LEVEL WAS EVEN AT 120000 LBS TOTAL. THE EICAS MESSAGE INDICATED THE FUEL TANKS OF EACH WING TANK SHOULD BE TO EACH RESPECTIVE ENG. THEY GOT A FUEL IMBALANCE LIGHT AND NOTED THAT TANKS #1 AND #4 DIFFER BY 6000 LBS. ONE TANK GOT LOW ENOUGH TO SHOW FUEL QUANTITY. THEY CARRIED EXTRA FUEL, BUT THEY DID NOT CHK THE FUEL PANEL TO ASSURE HOW FUEL WAS BEING USED. WHEN IT WAS DECIDED TO REBALANCE THE FUEL, NO ONE PERSON WAS IN CHARGE. EACH PLT DECIDED WHICH TECHNIQUE THEY WOULD USE AND EACH PLT WAS DOING SOMETHING DIFFERENT THAN THE OTHER. THE L FMC WAS INOP WHICH DISTRACTED THE FLC. SOMEHOW, THE FUEL BEGAN TO COME WITHIN BAL RANGE IN TIME FOR NORMAL UNEVENTFUL LNDG AT DEST.

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  30. Accession Number: 417040
    Synopsis: FLC OF AN ACR MLG FAILED TO DSND IN SUFFICIENT TIME TO MAKE ALT XING RESTR DUE DISTR OF REPROGRAMMING THE FMC FOR THE XING RESTR AND AT AN INCREASED AIRSPD. THERE WAS NO COMMENT FROM CTR CTLR.
    Narrative: WELL INTO MINKS 1 STAR INTO LGA, PRIOR TO KERNO INTXN, ZDC ASKED US TO START DSCNT TO CROSS KERNO INTXN AT FL260 AND TO PICK UP THE AIRSPD ASAP AS WE DSNDED TO 320 KIAS. THIS WAS EXPLAINED BY CTLR THAT HE NEEDED THE INCREASED SPD 'REAL SOON' SO THEREFORE THE EARLY DSCNT. ACFT WAS TAKEN OUT OF VNAV AND USED VERT SPD AND MACH SPD CTL, SO AS TO PICK UP SPD, DURING THE TIME JUST PRIOR TO HDOF TO CTLR (NYC). SEVERAL EXCHANGES OCCURRED AND SOME CONFUSION EXISTED OVER OTHER ITEMS. UPON CONTACTING ZNY WE REALIZED WE WERE AT FL270 AT KERNO AND THROTTLED BACK AND DSNDED TO FL260 WITHIN 1.5 MI OF KERNO. NOTHING WAS SAID BY CTR AS HE ISSUED LOWER AT THAT POINT.
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