FDAI logo   ::  Site Map  ::   
Home  |  About This Website  |  Contact Us
About This Website » ASRS Incident Report Analysis » Incidents related to Issue

Incidents related to Issue 271 incidents related to this issue.

Issue: automation behavior may be unexpected and unexplained (Issue #108)
Description: Automation may perform in ways that are unintended, unexpected, and perhaps unexplainable by pilots, possibly creating confusion, increasing pilot workload to compensate, and sometimes leading to unsafe conditions.

  1.  
  2. Accession Number: 49344
    Synopsis:
    Narrative: WE WERE APCHING THE DFW ARPT FROM THE NW IN AN MLG ACFT. WE WERE LEVEL AT 9000' AND 210 KTS AND RECEIVED A DSNT CLRNC TO 5000'. THE PLT FLYING THE ACFT WAS USING THE AUTOPLT AND FLT GUIDANCE SYSTEM DURING THIS APCH PHASE. I DIALED IN 5000' IN THE ALT WINDOW AND ARMED THE ALT FOR THE AUTOPLT. AS WE APCH 5000', I LOOKED AND CONFIRMED THAT THE CORRECT ALT WAS SELECTED AND ARMED. FEELING CONFIDENT THAT THE ACFT WOULD CAPTURE THE ALT, I TURNED TO MY SIDE TABLE WHERE I HAD THE APCH PLATE FOR DFW OPEN. I LOOKED UP THE ILS FREQ AND FRONT COURSE, IT WAS AT THIS TIME WE DESCENDED THROUGH 5000'. AT THE SAME TIME, THE CAPT WAS LOOKING FOR TFC. HE STATED HE HAD OUR TFC IN SIGHT IN OUR 12 O'CLOCK POSITION. WE HAD HEARD ALREADY THAT THIS TFC WAS AT 4000'. I LOOKED UP FROM THE APCH PLATE AND NOTICED THAT IT DID NOT APPEAR THAT WE WERE 1000' HIGHER THAN THE TFC. I IMMEDIATELY LOOKED AND OBSERVED THAT THE ALT WAS STILL ARMED BUT WE WERE AT 4700' AND DSNDING. THE CAPT AT THE SAME TIME, OR MAYBE SLIGHTLY BEFORE, NOTED THAT THE ACFT HAD NOT CAPTURED THE ALT, HE IMMEDIATELY DISENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND STARTED BACK UP TO 5000'. AT APPROX 4650' THE ALT ALERT SOUNDED. THE ACFT PROBABLY DESCENDED TO 4600 TO 4500' BEFORE THE DSNT WAS STOPPED AND A CLIMB BACK UP TO 5000 WAS INITIATED. AT NO TIME HAD THE CAPT TOUCHED THE PITCH WHEEL ON THE FLT GUIDANCE PANEL WHICH WOULD INHIBIT THE ALT CAPTURE PHASE. IN MY OPINION, WE HAD THE THROTTLES IN THE CLAMP MODE, THE ACFT ATTEMPTED TO LEVEL OFF, BUT THE THROTTLES FAILED TO MOVE FORWARD AS WE EXPECTED. CONSEQUENTLY ALLOWING US TO FALL THROUGH AN ALT WHICH WAS PROPERLY SELECTED AND ARMED. THERE APPEARED TO BE NO TFC CONFLICT NOR WAS THE ATC CTLR INVOLVED IN THIS ALT EXCURSION IN ANY WAY.

  3.  
  4. Accession Number: 49344
    Synopsis:
    Narrative: WE WERE APCHING THE DFW ARPT FROM THE NW IN AN MLG ACFT. WE WERE LEVEL AT 9000' AND 210 KTS AND RECEIVED A DSNT CLRNC TO 5000'. THE PLT FLYING THE ACFT WAS USING THE AUTOPLT AND FLT GUIDANCE SYSTEM DURING THIS APCH PHASE. I DIALED IN 5000' IN THE ALT WINDOW AND ARMED THE ALT FOR THE AUTOPLT. AS WE APCH 5000', I LOOKED AND CONFIRMED THAT THE CORRECT ALT WAS SELECTED AND ARMED. FEELING CONFIDENT THAT THE ACFT WOULD CAPTURE THE ALT, I TURNED TO MY SIDE TABLE WHERE I HAD THE APCH PLATE FOR DFW OPEN. I LOOKED UP THE ILS FREQ AND FRONT COURSE, IT WAS AT THIS TIME WE DESCENDED THROUGH 5000'. AT THE SAME TIME, THE CAPT WAS LOOKING FOR TFC. HE STATED HE HAD OUR TFC IN SIGHT IN OUR 12 O'CLOCK POSITION. WE HAD HEARD ALREADY THAT THIS TFC WAS AT 4000'. I LOOKED UP FROM THE APCH PLATE AND NOTICED THAT IT DID NOT APPEAR THAT WE WERE 1000' HIGHER THAN THE TFC. I IMMEDIATELY LOOKED AND OBSERVED THAT THE ALT WAS STILL ARMED BUT WE WERE AT 4700' AND DSNDING. THE CAPT AT THE SAME TIME, OR MAYBE SLIGHTLY BEFORE, NOTED THAT THE ACFT HAD NOT CAPTURED THE ALT, HE IMMEDIATELY DISENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND STARTED BACK UP TO 5000'. AT APPROX 4650' THE ALT ALERT SOUNDED. THE ACFT PROBABLY DESCENDED TO 4600 TO 4500' BEFORE THE DSNT WAS STOPPED AND A CLIMB BACK UP TO 5000 WAS INITIATED. AT NO TIME HAD THE CAPT TOUCHED THE PITCH WHEEL ON THE FLT GUIDANCE PANEL WHICH WOULD INHIBIT THE ALT CAPTURE PHASE. IN MY OPINION, WE HAD THE THROTTLES IN THE CLAMP MODE, THE ACFT ATTEMPTED TO LEVEL OFF, BUT THE THROTTLES FAILED TO MOVE FORWARD AS WE EXPECTED. CONSEQUENTLY ALLOWING US TO FALL THROUGH AN ALT WHICH WAS PROPERLY SELECTED AND ARMED. THERE APPEARED TO BE NO TFC CONFLICT NOR WAS THE ATC CTLR INVOLVED IN THIS ALT EXCURSION IN ANY WAY.

  5.  
  6. Accession Number: 50829
    Synopsis:
    Narrative: F/O FLYING ACFT ON FGS AND AUTOPLT CLRD TO 10,000. S/O HANDED UP ATIS WITH REMARK THAT ALL TXWYS WERE CLOSED S OF 27-21R INTXN. I DID NOT RECALL SEEING THIS ON THE NOTAMS SO REACHED FOR THE NOTAMS INCLUDED WITH OUR FLT PLAN TO REVIEW THEM. JUST AS THE F/O WAS APPLYING POWER TO LEVEL AT 10,000 EVERYTHING LOOKED FINE TO ME SO I PROCEEDED TO LOOK AT THE NOTAMS. THIS AIRPLANE HAS VERY SENSITIVE THRUST LEVERS AND THE F/O WAS DISTRACTED SETTING THE EPR FOR A COUPLE OF SECONDS. FOR SOME REASON THE ALT HOLD DID NOT CAPTURE AS IT SHOULD HAVE AND WE LOST 350' OF ALT BEFORE IT WAS CORRECTED. OUR FGS HAS ANNUNCIATOR WINDOWS WHICH INDICATE ALT CAPTURE AND ALT HOLD. I HAD SEEN THE ALT CAPTURE MODE INDICATED BUT DID NOT WAIT LONG ENOUGH TO SEE ALT HOLD INDICATED BEFORE LOOKING DOWN AT THE NOTAMS. LIKE THEY SAY, DON'T STOP FLYING THE AIRPLANE UNTIL IT'S AT THE GATE AND YOU'RE WALKING AWAY FROM IT. PRIORITIES - PRIORITIES. I COULD HAVE WAITED 2 SECONDS LONGER TO REVIEW THE NOTAMS.

  7.  
  8. Accession Number: 50835
    Synopsis: MLG HAD BEEN CLRD TO FL240 BUT FMS WAS SET TO FL220 CAUSING ALT BUST.
    Narrative: IN CRUISE AT FL290 F/O FLYING ACFT WITH (AFCS) AUTOPLT WITH FLT DIRECTOR AND AUTOMATIC ALT CAPTURE. ATLANTA CENTER GAVE US A DESCENT CLRNC TO FL240 AT OUR DISCRETION OUT OF FL250. I WAS GETTING LEX-ATIS AND F/O WAS FLYING ACFT AND TEMPORARILY WORKING COMMUNICATIONS WITH ATL CENTER. (THERE WAS DISTRACTING AND CONFLICTING RADIO NOISE IN 2-MAN COCKPIT. THERE WAS A LITTLE BIT OF CREW FATIGUE. THIS WAS THE LAST LEG OF 5-FLT DAY WITH AN EARLY AM SIGN-IN. ATL CENTER HANDED US OFF TO IND CENTER.) I HAD RECEIVED THE ATIS AND MADE A BRIEF ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE PAX WHEN IND CENTER ADVISED US TO LEVEL OFF AT FL230 AND STAND BY FOR LOWER. OUR SELECTED ALT WAS FL220. I ASSUMED THAT THIS LOWER ALT HAD BEEN GIVEN TO THE F/O AND HE THOUGHT THAT I HAD RECEIVED FURTHER CLRNC FROM FL240 TO FL220. WHEN WE QUESTIONED IND CENTER FOR CLARIFICATION THEY SAID THEY WERE NOT CERTAIN OF OUR ALT CLRNC BUT THERE WAS NO CONFLICT OR PROBLEM. THEY THEN GAVE US CLRNC TO 11000 FOR OUR APCH TO LEX. NEITHER THE F/O NOR MYSELF RECALL SETTING THE ALT SELECTOR TO FL220. IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THT THE ALT SELECTOR INADVERTENTLY "JUMPED" FROM FL240 TO FL220. THIS IS AN EQUIPMENT PROBLEM NOTED ON THE AFCS MODE CONTROL PANEL. ALL OUR FLT CREWS ARE AWARE OF THIS POTENTIAL PROBLEM. THERE WAS A LOT OF ACTIVITY IN OUR 2-MAN COCKPIT DURING THIS PHASE OF FLT AT THE END OF A LONG DAY. 1) PLAN DESCENT. 2) ATC COMM AND SWITCH CENTERS. 3) REVIEW AND PLAN FOR INSTRUMENT APCH. 4) PAX ANNOUNCEMENT. 5) FLY THE ACFT, AND 6) FOLLOW ATC CLRNC LIMITS. 7) GET LEX ATIS.

  9.  
  10. Accession Number: 59351
    Synopsis: ACR WDB ALT DEVIATION ALT OVERSHOT DURING DESCENT. POSSIBLE LESS THAN STANDARD SEPARATION WITH CROSSING TRAFFIC.
    Narrative: CREW WAS CLEARED TO 7000' BY NY ATC. ACFT WAS ON AUTOPLT AND FLT DIRECTOR WAS ARMED FOR 7000'. PASSING 7750' THE ALT ALERT SOUNDED AND WARNING LIGHT CAME ON INDICATING THE SYSTEM WAS WORKING NORMALLY. LIKEWISE AT 7300 ALL WAS NORMAL. ATC DISTRACTED THE CREW WITH A HDG CHANGE AT WHICH TIME THE CREW NOTICED THE AUTOPLT HAD NOT CAPTURED 7000' AND HAD CONTINUED TO 6500' AND FURTHER DESCENDED TO 6300' BEFORE CREW COULD START A CLIMB BACK TO 7000'. CENTER COMMENTED ON OUR ALT BUT WE WERE ALREADY BACK TO 6800 BY THEN. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FROM ACN 59324: WE WERE VISUALLY MONITORING AN ACFT PASSING RIGHT TO LEFT.

  11.  
  12. Accession Number: 60408
    Synopsis: ACR MLG DEVIATION FROM CLRNC ROUTE ON SID FROM LAX.
    Narrative: WHILE FLYING THE GORMAN 6 SID FROM THE LAX 24 COMPLEX, THE ACFT FAILED TO FLY THE DEPICTED ROUTING RESULTING IN AN ALLEGED TRAFFIC CONFLICT. FLT LAX TO SEA WAS ASSIGNED A HEADING OF 360 DEG TO INTERCEPT THE GORMAN 322 DEG RADIAL PER THE DEPARTURE ROUTING AND WAS CLEARED TO CLIMB TO FL230. THE ACFT'S FLT GUIDANCE SYSTEM WAS PROPERLY SET UP AND ARMED TO INTERCEPT THIS RADIAL PER THE CLEARANCE. HOWEVER, THE SYSTEM APPARENTLY INTERCEPTED A "GHOST" RADIAL AND INITIATED A LEFT TURN TO INTERCEPT. AS THE ACFT HAD COMPLETED APPROX 80 DEG OF TURN TO THE LEFT ATC ASKED, "WHAT ARE YOU DOING". WE WERE THEN INSTRUCTED TO TURN RIGHT TO 045 DEG TO REINTERCEPT AND SUBSEQUENTLY CLEARED DIRECT TO GORMAN VOR. WE WERE ALSO ASKED TO STOP THE CLIMB AT 15000'. FAILURE OF THE ACFT FLT GUIDANCE SYSTEM TO PROPERLY CAPTURE THE PROGRAMMED RADIAL AND FAILURE OF THE FLYING PLT TO MONITOR THE SYSTEM RESULTED IN THIS SITUATION. UNCLEAR COMMUNICATIONS FROM ATC MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE ALLEGED TRAFFIC CONFLICT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM 60407: AT 10000' THE F/O MADE THE NORMAL REQUIRED SEAT BELT ANNOUNCEMENT AND MADE A BEVERAGE REQUEST. AS WE CLIMBED THROUGH APPROXIMATELY 13500' A MALE FLT ATTENDANT RANG FOR ADMITTANCE. MY ATTN WAS MOMENTARILY DISTRACTED. BECAUSE OF ACFT DESIGN I AM NOT ABLE TO SEE THE HORIZONTAL SITUATION INDICATOR WHEN PROPERLY SEATED AND ALIGNED AS IT IS POSITIONED BEHIND THE CONTROL COLUMN. APPROACHING SEA WE WERE ADVISED TO CALL LAX CENTER. THIS INCIDENT COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED BY BETTER COCKPIT DESIGN, ATTENTIVE FLT CREW, AND NOT ALLOWING ADDITIONAL NONESSENTIAL PERSONNEL IN THE FLT STATION DURING CRITICAL PERIODS OF FLT.

  13.  
  14. Accession Number: 60474
    Synopsis: CLEARED TO CROSS FIX AT 7000. ACFT CONTINUED CLIMB TO 8000.
    Narrative: MAX ALT KARYN FIX 7000' ASSIGNED. AUTOPLT ON, ALT ARMED 7000', BUT ACFT WENT THROUGH 7000' TO 8000'. ATC SAID "NO PROBLEM", BUT NASA FORM FILED IN CASE. MUST HAVE DISARMED ALT HOLD SELECTION, BUT CAN'T UNDERSTAND WHY. BOTH PLTS REMEMBER IT AS ARMED.

  15.  
  16. Accession Number: 60527
    Synopsis: OVERSHOT ALT BY 700 FT ON DESCENT.
    Narrative: FIRST OFFICER DESCENDING TO 9000' AS ASSIGNED BY LAX CENTER. IS MONITORED F/O SET AND ARMED 9000 ON THE ALT SELECTION OF DIGITAL FLT GUIDANCE SYSTEM. WHILE HAVING PROBLEM TRYING TO CONTACT OPS AT BUR. I WAS DISTRACTED FROM KEEPING AN EYE ON THE DESCENT. WHILE TALKING TO BUR OPS I HEARD LAX CENTER ON VHF #1 ASK OUR ALT. WE WERE AT 8300. I LOOKED AT THE ALT SELECTOR WHICH WAS NOW SET TO 8000'. WE IMMEDIATELY CLIMBED TO 9000'--SADDER BUT WISER. F/O HAD NO IDEA HOW 8000' CAME INTO SELECTOR. NEITHER DO I. THERE WAS NO CONFLICT BUT MY NAVY TRAINING IN CONSTANT VIGILANCE NEEDS SOME DUSTING OFF AND READ OVER AGAIN. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM 60564: I SHALL ENDEAVOR TO MONITOR THE COMPUTER INPUTS MORE CAREFULLY IN THE FUTURE AND NOT ALLOW IT TO PUT ME IN THIS POSITION AGAIN.

  17.  
  18. Accession Number: 61880
    Synopsis: MLG WAS CLEARED TO DESCEND WITH AN ALT CROSSING RESTRICTION BETWEEN 17000' AND FL230 AT IOC. THIS RESTRICTION WAS PROGRAMMED INTO THE FMS BUT FOR SOME REASON THE ACFT DESCENDED TO 15500' PRIOR TO THE FIX BEFORE THE PROBLEM WAS RECOGNIZ
    Narrative:

  19.  
  20. Accession Number: 67462
    Synopsis: ACR MLG OVERSHOT ALT ON CLIMG.
    Narrative: THE ACFT HAD BEEN WRITTEN UP BY THE PREVIOUS CREW AS HAVING AN INTERMITTENT #1 VHF. IT WAS REPLACED IN MEM PRIOR TO OUR DEP AND APPEARED TO OPERATE NORMALLY WHEN WE CHECKED IT. THE AUTOLAND CHECK INDICATED THE AUTOPLT SYSTEM WAS OK ALSO. AFTER TKOF I ATTEMPTED TO ENGAGE THE #1 AUTOPLT. IT WOULD NOT ENGAGE. (OUR #1 VHF APPEARED TO WORK NORMALLY WHEN IN FACT IS WAS CUTTING IN AND OUT.) IN AN EFFORT TO RESTORE THE AUTOPLT SYSTEM, AS NEITHER #1 NOR #2 WOULD ENGAGE, WE WENT THROUGH THE NORMAL CIRCUIT BREAKER PULL AND RESET ROUTINE AS WELL AS SWITCHING FLT DIRECTOR AND AIR DATA COMPUTERS FROM BOTH POSITION TO #1 AND #2 POSITION. DURING THE PROCESS WE "DUMPED" THE DIGITAL FLT GUIDANCE COMPUTER OFF THE LINE AND RESTORED IT WHEN THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS WERE RESET. ABOUT THE TIME WE WERE GOING THRU 22000-23000' I WAS ABLE TO ENGAGE THE #2 AUTOPLT, BUT FAILED TO NOTE THAT THE ALT READ 27000' ON THE DFGS (WHICH WAS NOT THE ALT WE HAD SET IN OR WERE CLRD TO). ALSO ABOUT THIS SAME TIME WE RECEIVED A CALL FROM MEM CENTER ASKING IF WE READ THEM. MY F/O ANSWERED TO THE AFFIRMATIVE AND THEN MEM CENTER SAID IT WAS HIS 4TH CALL TO US AND THAT WE WERE SUPPOSED TO LEVEL AT 24000'. I LOOKED UP FROM MY #1 VHF TO THE ALTIMETER JUST AS IT WAS READING 24000' (OUR INDICATED AIRSPEED APPROX 320 KIAS WITH ABOUT 1500-2000 FPM RATE OF CLIMB). I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND PUSHED THE ACFT OVER TO STOP THE CLIMB AT ABOUT 24700', THEN LEVELED AT 24000'. I DO NOT BELIEVE WE SET 27000' IN THE DFGS EITHER ACCIDENTALLY OR ON PURPOSE. AFTER TALKING TO OUR MECHANICS IN NEW YORK, I LEARNED THAT IF THE DFGS COMPUTER IS "DUMPED" AND COMES BACK ON THE LINE, THAT IT CAN RESET TO A RANDOM ALT, NOT NECESSARILY THE ALT TO WHICH IT HAD BEEN SET PRIOR TO BEING "DUMPED". THE POINT IS THAT THE DFGS ALT READOUT SHOULD EITHER GO TO ALL ZEROS AFTER BEING DUMPED AND COMING BACK ON THE LINE, OR RETURN TO THE PREVIOUSLY SET ALT. IF A FLT CREW DOES NOT CATCH THE ERROR OR RANDOM ALT SELECTED BY THE DFGS WHEN IT COMES BACK ON THE LINE, THE RESULT COULD BE DISASTROUS.

  21.  
  22. Accession Number: 67483
    Synopsis: AUTOPLT FAILED TO HOLD ALT AFTER LEVEL OFF.
    Narrative: WHILE DESCENDING THRU 12000' INTO IAH WITH THE ACFT ON AUTOPLT, VFR TFC WAS CALLED BY CTLR AT 12 O'CLOCK, 5 MI AT 10500'. CTLR GAVE VFR ACFT A LEFT TURN SO WE WOULD BE DIVERGING. AUTOPLT LEVELED THE ACFT AT 10000'. BOTH PLTS WERE SCANNING FOR THE TFC WHEN THE F/O REALIZED THE AUTOPLT HAD STARTED A CLIMB. F/O DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND DESCENDED TO 10000'. TFC WAS THEN SPOTTED AT 10 O'CLOCK APPROX 5 MI. NO EVASIVE ACTION WAS NEEDED. IN LIGHT OF THE RECENT ARTICLE ABOUT AUTOPLT ALT DEVIATION PROBLEMS WHILE IN AOT HOLD, I THOUGHT THAT IN THE BEST INTEREST OF SAFETY I SHOULD REPORT THIS OCCURRENCE. IT IS ALSO MY UNDERSTANDING FROM THE ARTICLE THAT THIS PROBLEM IS SOON TO BE SOLVED.

  23.  
  24. Accession Number: 73941
    Synopsis: ACR MLG HAD ALT EXCURSION.
    Narrative: THE FLT HAD DEPARTED RDU ENRTE ORD. LEVEL OFF AT CRUISE ALT WAS NORMAL WITH THE AUTOPLT ENGAGED IN THE PERFORMANCE MODE FOR BOTH THE CLIMB AND CRUISE. ABOUT 15 MINS AFTER LEVEL OFF THE ALT ALERT SOUNDED. THE ALT HOLD MODE BUTTON WAS IMMEDIATELY PUSHED WHICH STOPPED THE CLIMB AT 250' ABOVE THE ASSIGNED ALT. THE ACFT WAS DESCENDED BACK TO FL330. THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT WAS NORMAL. THIS TYPE ACFT DURING CRUISE USING THE "PERF" MODE MAINTAINS SPEED BY INCREASING AND DECREASING THE PITCH WHICH RESULTS IN A VERTICAL SPEED UP AND DOWN OF JUST A FEW FEET (20) TO AS MUCH AS 120 FPM. FOR SOME UNKNOWN REASON THE ALT HOLD TRIPPED OFF AND THE ACFT DRIFTED OFF ALT AT THE VERTICAL SPEED EXISTING AT THE TIME OF THE ALT HOLD TRIP OFF. THIS IS THE THIRD TIME THIS HAS HAPPENED ON THIS TYPE OF ACFT IN THE PAST 90 DAYS, ON AN ACFT I'VE BEEN A CREW MEMBER WORKING. IT WOULD BE A GREAT HELP IF THERE WAS AN AURAL WARNING OF SOME KIND PROGRAMMED INTO THE SYSTEM TO ALERT THE CREW THAT THE AUTOPLT/FLT DIRECTOR HAS CHANGED TO A MODE OF OPERATION OTHER THAN THAT WHICH WAS SELECTED AND OPERATING. THIS TYPE OF TRIP OFF IS VERY INSIDIOUS. THE FLT MODE ANNUNCIATOR DOES CHANGE BUT ONE WOULD HAVE TO BE LOOKING AT IT TO CATCH IT IMMEDIATELY.

  25.  
  26. Accession Number: 86759
    Synopsis: ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY LGT OVERSHOT ALT IN AUTOMATIC MODE.
    Narrative: THIS ACFT LGT IS EQUIPPED WITH THE LATEST AND GREATEST (ALMOST) FLT GUIDANCE/AUTOPLT SYSTEMS AVAILABLE. FORTUNATELY I DON'T BELIEVE ANYTHING IS FOOLPROOF. WE HAD BEEN CLEARED FROM 310 TO 350 WHICH WE SET INTO THE ALT WINDOW. THE AUTOPLT WAS ALREADY HOOKED UP SO THE COMMAND TO CLIMB WAS MADE AFTER THE ALT OF 350 WAS SET INTO THE WINDOW. NORMAL (BY OUR REQUIRED PROCEDURES) ALT CALLOUTS WERE MADE. AT APPROX 34800' WE BOTH REALIZED THAT PROPER ANNUNCIATION "ALT CAP" WAS NOT BEING DISPLAYED SOON ENOUGH FOR OUR RATE OF CLIMB. THE CAPT QUICKLY DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHROTTLES AND LEVELED THE ACFT. WE OVERSHOT 350 BY ABOUT 200-300' AT THE VERY MOST THANKS TO ALL COCKPIT MEMBERS' VIGILANCE. WE HAD A JUMP SEATER WHO ALSO SAW THE PROBLEM DEVELOP. THIS ACFT AND ITS ELECTRONIC WONDERMENT IS A FINE MACHINE AND IT IS ABSOLUTELY UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SUPPOSED TO VIOLATE ALT SET IN THE WINDOW DURING THIS TYPE OF FLT CONDITION. (CRUISE CLIMB OR DESCENT NOT ON AN ILS) THIS ACFT CONTINUES TO EXHIBIT BEWILDERING ELECTRONIC IDIOSYNCRASIES SUCH AS FALSE MALFUNCTION MESSAGES OF MANY VARIETIES. THIS ALT PROBLEM TURNS OUT TO BE MORE COMMON THAN I THOUGHT AT LEAST THREE OTHER PLTS HAVE HAD IT HAPPEN TO AN ALT ORAL TONE PRIOR TO THE SELECTED ALT BEING REACHED NOT AFTER YOU'VE BROKEN THROUGH BY APPROX 300'! A MAINTENANCE WRITEUP WAS MADE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH REPORTER REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: SINCE SENDING REPORT, RPTR HAS TALKED TO AT LEAST 10 OTHER PLTS AND ALL HAVE HAD ALT BUSTS. IN THIS INCIDENT THE FMC WAS IN THE FLC, FLT LEVEL CHANGE, MODE BUT ALT BUSTS ARE ALSO HAPPENING WITH THE FMC IN THE V-NAV, VERTICAL NAVIGATION, MODE. THE NEW ALT WAS IN BOTH THE ALT SELECT ON THE MODE CTL PANEL AND HAD BEEN ENTERED IN THE FMC AND ALT ARM WAS ANNUCIATED BUT THE SYSTEM DID NOT CHANGE TO ALT CAPTURE. RPTR HAD ALSO DISCUSSED PROBLEM WITH INSTRUCTOR PLT AND COMPANY IS AWARE OF THE PROBLEM. THE PROBLEM APPEARS TO HAVE SURFACED IN THE LAST YEAR AND ONE HALF AS THE ACFT GET OLDER AS IT WAS NOT A PROBLEM IN FIRST COUPLE YEARS OF OPERATION. RPTR WONDERS IF HEAT AND AGE ARE CAUSING BREAKDOWN IN THE SYSTEM OR SOFTWARE AS THEY ARE GETTING MORE SPURIOUS MESSAGES POSSIBLY FROM THE MULTIPLEXING WIRING SYSTEM. TO DATE MANUFACTURER HAS FAILED TO ACKNOWLEDGE PROBLEM WITH SYSTEM. SYSTEM'S FORMER PERFORMANCE HAS CAUSED FLT CREWS TO RELAX VIGILANCE BUT CONFIDENCE BASE IS NOW BEING ERODED AND MORE ARE HANDFLYING IN CLIMB AND DESCENT TO KEEP ATTN ON SYSTEM. RPTR ALSO FEELS STRONGLY THAT AURAL WARNING SHOULD BE RETURNED TO ALT ALERT SYSTEM 300' BEFORE ALT AS ON OLDER ACFT.

  27.  
  28. Accession Number: 87558
    Synopsis: ACR MLG OVERSHOT ALT IN CLIMB CAUSING LESS THAN STANDARD SEPARATION.
    Narrative: ON CLBOUT OF SLC IN VNAV AND DIRECT ABQ IN LNAV, AUTOPLT ON. WE VISUALLY SPOTTED TFC GIVEN CROSSING RIGHT TO LEFT. F/O DIRECTED HIS ATTN TO THE ACFT MANUALS TRYING TO RESOLVE A REVERSER LIGHT. I WATCHED THE CROSSING TFC FOR A PERIOD TO DETERMINE THE CLOSURE BEARING. SEEING THAT WE WERE GOING TO PASS BEHIND HIM STATED THAT TO THE F/O. AS THE RPTED TFC CONVERGED WE RECEIVED A FREQ CHANGE FROM 134.8 TO 132.55. THE F/O PUT HIS MANUALS ASIDE AND DIALED 132.55 ON #1 RADIO. HE EXPERIENCED A PROB WITH THE TUNING (ALL #'S WANTED TO ROTATE WITH THE LOWER KNOB, WHICH HE DEMONSTRATED TO ME). HE THEN SWITCHED TO THE OTHER SIDE OF THE RADIO HEAD AND MADE A CALL TO CENTER. NO ANSWER. MEANWHILE, I WAS WATCHING THE CLOSURE OF THE ACFT PASSING AND NOT WANTING TO FLY THROUGH HIS WAKE, I STOPPED THE CLB, GLANCING AT THE MCP ALT WINDOW TO CHK OUR RESTRICTION. WE HAD 36000' SHOWING. I STARTED TO ASK THE PREVIOUS CENTER FREQ. THE CENTER DIRECTED US TO DSND TO FL310. I LOOKED TO SEE WHAT ALT I HAD STOPPED THE CLB AND SAW FL 318. SHORTLY AFTER WE WERE ASKED TO VERIFY THAT OUR ALT LIMIT WAS FL310 AND I SAID THAT I COULD NOT BECAUSE WE SHOWED A HIGHER ALT IN OUR WINDOW. WE WERE OF COURSE CONCERNED HOW THE FL360 GOT IN THE MCP WINDOW. NOTING THAT EACH OF OUR ATTN WAS DIVERTED MOMENTARILY, IT IS MY BELIEF THAT IT CHANGED ITSELF AND WE DID NOT CHANGE IT. IT IS NOT AN ALT THAT WE WOULD SELECT AND WE DID NOT KNOWINGLY SELECT IT.

  29.  
  30. Accession Number: 90670
    Synopsis: ACR MLG OVERSHOT ALT IN CLIMB.
    Narrative: WE HAD BEEN CLEARED TO 5000' AFTER TKOF AND IN SUCCESSIVE STEPS, UP TO 8000', 10000', 12000' AND THEN UP TO 14000', WHICH MAINTAINING AN ASSIGNED 250 KTS AIRSPD. AT 11000' WE WERE CLRED TO 14000' AND TO RESUME NORMAL AIRSPD. I SET 14000' IN THE ALT MCP WINDOW AND IT WAS VERIFIED BY THE CAPT. I THEN BEGAN TO COMPLETE REQUIRED PAPERWORK, SUCH AS TIME LOGS AND THE ACFT LOG. WE WERE RELATIVELY LIGHT AND WERE CLBING AT A HIGH RATE OF CLB. WHEN THE ALT ALERTER SOUNDED, I LOOKED UP AND CALLED OUT, "1000 TO LEVEL OFF." SHORTLY THEREAFTER, CENTER CALLED ASKING US WHAT ALT WE WERE AT AND WHAT WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO. WE WERE AT 14700' AND 15000' WAS IN THE MCP ALT WINDOW. SINCE 15000' WAS SHOWING AND IT WAS ALSO OUR FILED CRUISE ALT, WE RESPONDED 15000'. CENTER THEN INSTRUCTED US TO DSND TO 14000' AND TURN 90 DEGS TO THE RIGHT. I DO NOT SPECIFICALLY RECALL BEING CLRED TO 15000' AND NEITHER PLT RECALLS TOUCHING THE MCP ALT SETTING AFTER 14000' WAS SET. APPARENTLY IT HAD CHANGED, AND SINCE THE ACFT WAS BEING FLOWN ON THE AUTOPLT, IT CLBED TO THAT ALT. MFRS HAVE RPTED MCP ALT DISPLAY CHANGES OCCURRING BY THEMSELVES, APPARENTLY CAUSED BY TRANSIENT ELECTRICAL SIGNALS. IT IS MY BELIEF THAT THIS IS WHAT HAPPENED TO US ALSO, PERHAPS MFR SHOULD INSTALL AN ALTERNATE SYS IN PLACE OF THE PRESENT ONE UNTIL THE PROB CAN BE CORRECTED IN THIS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT (SAFETY) DEVICE. SUBJECT: NONSELECTED MCP DISPLAY CHANGES. REASON: TO ADVISE FLT CREWS THAT NONSELECTED CHANGES IN ALT MCP WINDOW SETTINGS CAN OCCUR. BACKGROUND INFO: SEVERAL OPERATORS HAVE RPTED MCP ALT DISPLAY CHANGES OCCURRING W/O WARNING DURING CLB OR DSNT. THE MAJORITY OF THE CHANGES WERE BTWN 1000 AND 2000', HOWEVER, LARGER DEVIATIONS HAVE OCCURRED. THEY HAVE BEEN ATTRIBUTED TO TRANSIENT ELECTRICAL SIGNALS BEING XMITTED FROM THE MCP TO THE FCC. THE FCC INTERPRETS THE TRANSIENT SIGNALS AS SELECTED CHANGES AND STORES THEM IN MEMORY. THE FCC THEN XMITS THESE NONSELECTED CHANGES TO THE MCP WHICH DISPLAYS AND USES THE NONSELECTED VALUES AS THE TARGET ALT FOR AUTOPLT CLB OR DSNT. UNDETECTED CHANGES TO THE MCP DISPLAY MAY CAUSE THE AUTOPLT TO FLY THE AIRPLANE TO AN UNINTENDED ALT. RECOMMENDED OPERATING PROCS: ARE INVESTIGATING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS. UNTIL A SOLUTION TO THIS PROB IS FOUND, FLT CREWS SHOULD BE AWARE OF THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDED OPERATING PROCS: CHK MCP SETTINGS AFTER ANY ELECTRICAL PWR INTERRUPTIONS. FOLLOWING MCP ALT WINDOW CHANGES, MONITOR ALT DISPLAY TO ENSURE DESIRED ALT IS DISPLAYED. CLOSELY MONITOR THE ALTIMETER DURING ALL ALT CHANGES TO ENSURE THAT THE AUTOPLT ACQUIRES AND LEVELS OFF AT THE CORRECT ALT. STANDARD CALLOUTS, CREW COORD AND CROSSCHECKING OF MCP SETTINGS AND FLT INSTRUMENTS ARE RECOMMENDED TO DETECT ANY NONSELECTED MCP DISPLAY CHANGES.

  31.  
  32. Accession Number: 91522
    Synopsis: ACR WDB OVERSHOT ALT ON CLIMB.
    Narrative: DURING CLB, USING RIGHT AUTOPLT COMMANDED BY F/O FMC, IN FLT LEVEL CHANGE MODE, FLT WENT THROUGH THE PRESET 28000' LEVEL OFF ALT BY 400+'. RETURNED TO 28000'. LEFT FMC SHOWED THE PROPER INDICATIONS IN ALL MODES. THE F/O FMC SHOWED IMPROPER INDICATIONS IN ALL MODES EXCEPT VERTICAL NAV. RPTED THE PROB TO ATC, WROTE THE PROB UP IN THE ACFT LOGBOOK.

  33.  
  34. Accession Number: 92507
    Synopsis: ACR MLG ALT DEVIATION EXCURSION FROM CLRNC ALT. REPORTER SAYS FMA CHANGED FLT MODE AND ALT SELECT BY ITSELF.
    Narrative: THE F/O WAS FLYING THE ACFT. WE HAD BEEN ISSUED SEVERAL VECTORS AND TURNS BY ATC FOR FLOW CTL INTO CHICAGO O'HARE. I WAS ON THE P/A EXPLAINING THE ENRTE DELAY TO THE PAX WHEN I NOTICED THE FMA HAD CHANGED FROM "PERF CRUISE" TO "PERF DSNT," AND THE ALT SELECT HAD CHANGED FROM 35000 TO 33000'. I ASKED THE F/O IF WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO FL330. HE SAID NO. THE ACFT ALT WAS 34600' WHEN I NOTICED THE PROB. THE DSNT WAS STOPPED AT 34500'. I DON'T KNOW WHY THE AUTOPLT ENTERED A DSNT MODE. AN ALT WARNING DIDN'T OCCUR BECAUSE THE ALT SELECT HAD CHANGED ALSO. I SUSPECT A PWR SURGE IN THE ELECTRICAL SYS MAY HAVE CAUSED THE PROB. I HAVE EXPERIENCED THIS PROB IN THE PAST WITH THE MLG FLT GUIDANCE SYS WHEN A HYD PUMP IS TURNED FROM LOW TO HIGH.

  35.  
  36. Accession Number: 94016
    Synopsis: ACR WDB DEVIATED FROM CLRNC ROUTE AT THE START OF OCEANIC ROUTE.
    Narrative: ACFT WAS CLRED FROM FLE VORTAC (NORWAY) DIRECT TO 64N 00E-66N 10W. APCHING 64N 00E, I WAS BUSY OBTAINING THE OCEANIC CLRNC FROM ICELAND AND COMPLETING THE AIREP FOR XMISSION TO ICELAND RADIO AT 64N 003. I HAD MY SEAT TILTED SLIGHTLY BACK SO I COULD WORK MORE EASILY WITH THE PAPERWORK ON MY LAP. THIS CAUSED BY VIEW OF THE HSI TO BE PARTIALLY BLOCKED BY THE CONTROL COLUMN. HOWEVER, ALL 3 PLTS FOLLOWED COMPANY PROCS IN THAT THEY CHKED THE NEXT WAYPOINT ON THEIR RESPECTIVE INS'. (66N 10W) AFTER PASSING 64N 00E OOE I XMITTED THE POS RPT (AIRED) TO ICELAND RADIO AND WHEN THIS WAS COMPLETED, COMMENCED TO VERIFY THAT THE ACFT WAS MAINTAINING THE DESIRED TRACK (2 TO 3 MIN AFTER PASSING 64N 00E) PER COMPANY PROCS. THE PLOT SHOWED THE ACFT TRACKING ALMOST DUE N WHEN IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN TRACKING NW. I IMMEDIATELY SAT FORWARD AND LOOKED OVER MY CONTROL COLUMN AND SAW THAT MY INS INDICATED THAT THE ACFT WAS TRACKING NEARLY 55 DEG FROM THE DESIRED TRACK ON MY INS. I THEN LOOKED AT THE COPLT'S HSI AND SAW THAT HIS INS SHOWED ON TRACK. THE COPLT'S WAS FLYING AND HIS AUTOPLT AND INS WERE CONTROLLING. I THEN CHKED MY INS COORDINATES FOR THE NEXT POS AGAINST THE COPLT'S. I IMMEDIATELY SAW THAT THE COPLT'S INS (CTLING) HAD AS THE NEXT WAYPOINT 66N 01W, NOT 66N 10W. AN IMMEDIATE TURN WAS MADE BACK TO THE PROPER TRACK AND THE COPLT'S INS WAS CORRECTED TO 66N 10W. THIS EXCURSION WAS CAUSED BY A MALFUNCTION IN THE #2 INS (COPLT'S) AS IT WAS UNABLE TO LOAD OR BE LOADED (TO, FROM) THE OTHER INS! NORMALLY, THE CAPT LOADS ALL THE INS' VIA THE REMOTE FUNCTION FROM THE #1 INS. THEN EACH PLT, THE CAPT ALSO, CHKS THEIR RESPECTIVE INS TO SEE THAT THE PROPER POS HAVE BEEN LOADED. THIS IS DONE ON THE GND PRIOR TO DEP AND ENRTE AS NEW WAYPOINTS ARE INSERTED. THE PROPER WAYPOINTS WERE IN INS #1 AND INS #3 SO THE CAPTS AND THE SECOND OFFICERS WAYPOINTS CHKED AND BOTH WERE SATISFIED. BECAUSE OF THE REMOTE MALFUNCTION OF THE #2 INS (COPLT'S), IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE COPLT TO LOAD HIS OWN INS AND HE INCORRECTLY LOADED 66N 01W. THE COPLT WAS NEW TO THE ACFT AND TO THE INS, HAVING ONLY BEEN EXPOSED TO THE INS FOR APPROX 1 MONTH. EACH PLT FOLLOWED COMPANY PROC, BUT UNFORTUNATELY, THE PROCS DID NOT COVER THE FAILURE OF THE REMOTE FUNCTION OF AN INS. FORTUNATELY, THE PROCS DID REQUIRE THAT 1 PLT VERIFY THAT THE ACFT WAS ON THE PROPER TRACK AFTER PASSING A WAYPOINT.

  37.  
  38. Accession Number: 103884
    Synopsis: ACR LGT GETS INTO APCH TO STALL AND ALT EXCURSION WHEN AUTO THROTTLES DO NOT MAINTAIN SPEED.
    Narrative: DSNDED FROM FL410 OT ASSIGNED FL240 WITH CLRNC TO HOLD AT BUNKER INTXN ENRTE TO MSP. USED VERT SPD AND SPD INTERVENE ON MODE CONTROL PANEL. MSP ATC REQUESTED WE LEVEL AT FL330. WE DID SO. WE GOT ALT CAPTURE AND I WAS SATISFIED WE WERE AT FL330 AND CHKED AIRSPD. I WAS SATISFIED THAT IT WAS AT 220 KTS AS I HAD SELECTED. I THEN PROCEEDED TO VERIFY THAT THE FMC WAS PROPERLY PROGRAMMED TO HOLD AT BUNKER INTXN AS DIRECTED. WHILE CHKING FMC WE EXPERIENCED THE STICK SHAKER. I MANUALLY WENT TO FULL PWR AND NOTED AIRSPD TO BE QUITE LOW, APPROX 140 KTS. I TOOK ACFT OFF THE AUTOPLT AND PROCEEDED TO FLY THE ACFT OUT OF THE PENDING STALL. WE LOST 300-400' OF ALT AND COPLT INFORMED MSP ATC WE WERE OFF ALT AND CORRECTING. MSP ATC CLRED FLT TO FL290 AT THAT TIME AND WE PROCEEDED TO COMPLETE AIRSPD CORRECTION DURING OUR DSNT TO FL290. WE HAD 2 MORE DSNTS WHILE HOLDING AND WE TRIED TO RECREATE THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT LED TO THE LOST OF AIRSPD PROB. THE ACFT AND SYSTEMS SEEMED TO FUNCTION NORMALLY. MY PERSONAL EVALUATION IS: THAT WHILE I WAS IN SPD INTERVENTION ON THE MODE CONTROL PANEL DURING THE INITIAL DSNT PHASE THE ACFT ENDED UP NOT BEING IN A SPD MODE WHEN WE LEVELED OFF AT FL330. THE ACFT SYS RESPONDED TO COMMANDS DURING DSNT FROM FL410, BUT FAILED TO MAINTAIN SELECTED AIRSPD WHEN AT FL330. SELECTED MODES WERE NOT CHANGED. ALT CAPTURE/ALT HOLD WAS VERIFIED. I REMAINED IN SPD INTERVENE AND CONSCIOUSLY VERIFIED AIRSPD INDICATOR ON THE SALMON AIRSPD BUG PRIOR TO SHIFTING MY ATTN TO THE FMC PANEL TO CHK HOLDING PROGRAMMING. I VISUALLY CHKED ALT CAPTURE/ALT HOLD ON PITCH MODE STATUS ON ADI. THOUGH I CHKED AIRSPD INTERVENE, AIRSPD INDICATOR, SALMONBUG, AND GENERAL COCKPIT ENVIRONMENT, I CANNOT ACTUALLY REMEMBER CHKING THE AUTOTHROTTLE STATUS/MODE ON THE SAME PRIMARY ADI INSTRUMENT WHEN I CHKED ALT CAPTURE/ALT HOLD. THAT THE PRESTALL STICK SHAKER IS A VALUABLE ASSIST TO SAFETY. THAT I, THE PF, FAILED TO PROPERLY MONITOR THE FLT INSTRUMENTS. THAT HOW THE ACFT GOT OUT OF SPD MODE IS NOT KNOWN TO ME. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 103889: IN CLOSING DUE TO THE HIGH WORKLOAD IN THE COCKPIT (CAPT WAS REVIEWING THE HOLDING PATTERN AND I WAS PROGRAMMING THE COMPUTER) WE ALLOWED THE AUTOMATION TO FLY THE ACFT. THE CAPT HAD ENSURED THAT THE ACFT LEVELED PRIOR TO REVIEWING THE HOLD. AUTOTHROTTLES DID NOT ENGAGE AND SPD DECREASED TO STICK SHAKER.

  39.  
  40. Accession Number: 110142
    Synopsis: ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY ALT SELECTOR SPONTANEOUSLY CHANGED 1000' CAUSING ALT DEVIATION.
    Narrative: CLRED AFTER TKOF TO CLB ON S COURSE OF ILS (164 DEGS) TO 15000', ETC. ACFT IS MLG WITH FMC, AUTOPLT, ETC. ALT ON MCP OF AUTOPLT FLT DIRECTOR SYS (AFDS) WAS SET AT 15000' AND SHOULD GIVE NORMAL AUDIO & VIS WARNINGS APCHING AND ALSO IF AUTOPLT ENGAGED, LEVEL ACFT AT SET ALT. THE ALT IS SET BY MANUAL DRUM KNOB AND INDICATED ELECTRONICALLY. IT IS PART OF A SYS. THE COPLT WAS FLYING AND WE BOTH ASCERTAINED THE ALT SET AT 15000'. SOMETIME DURING CLB THE ALT SET (15000') IN MCP CHANGED TO 16000'. WE WERE DETRACTED OUTSIDE LOOKING FOR TFC AND COPLT NAVIGATING AND DID NOT REALIZE ALT CHANGE UNTIL APCHING 15000'. AS COPLT FLEW THROUGH 15000' AND TRYING TO SMOOTHLY CORRECT ERROR WE WERE CLRED HIGHER. WE OBVIOUSLY BOTH WERE SURPRISED TO SEE 16000' ALT SELECTED. I LATER CALLED RNO DEP CTLR (HE WAS A SUPVR) AND DISCUSSED THE SITUATION WITH HIM. HE DID AN EXCELLENT JOB AND WAS VERY PROFESSIONAL AND CAPABLE. HE SAID HE COULD SEE THE PROB COMING AND THERE WAS NO INCIDENT OR ANYTHING FURTHER. I DESIRE HE & ATC NOT BE BROUGHT INTO THIS AS WE HAD A VERY RESPECTFUL ATTITUDE OF COOPERATION AND TRUST AND I WOULDN'T WANT TO DAMAGE THAT. THE PROC OCCURRED WHEN WE WERE BUSY AND OCCUPIED WITH NUMEROUS OBLIGATIONS. TRUE, WE SHOULD NOT COMPLETELY RELY ON AN ALT WARNING AND AUTOMATIC LEVEL OFF, BUT AT TIMES, POSSIBLE DUE TO COMPLACENCY, WE DO RELY ON IT. FORTUNATELY IN THIS CASE, NOTHING SERIOUS OCCURRED, BUT IT COULD. MAINT ADVISED THIS HAS OCCURRED BEFORE W/THE SYS. A FIX SHOULD BE FOUND & IMPLEMENTED.

  41.  
  42. Accession Number: 113210
    Synopsis: MLG ON ARRIVAL TO PHX. ACFT BEING FLOWN BY FO IN TRAINING. FMC PROGRAMMED FOR INTXN CROSSINGS. ON AUTOPLT. ACFT FAILED TO MAKE ALT RESTRICTION AT PLSTN INTXN. FLT CREW HAD ALLOWED FMC TO PROCEED TO NEXT WAYPOINT AND DISREGARDED CROSSING
    Narrative: THIS WAS THE SECOND DAY OF FLYING FOR A COMPANY NEW HIRE WHO HAD NO PREVIOUS MLG OR PART 121 EXPERIENCE. I WAS THE CHECK AIRMAN AND HE WAS THE PF ACCOMPLISHING HIS IOE FROM THE RIGHT SEAT. WE HAD BEEN CLEARED THE KARLO 1 ARR WITH A CROSSING RESTRICTION OF 12,000' AND 280 KTS AT PLSNT INTXN. THIS WAS PROGRAMMED IN THE FMC AND THE ACFT WAS COUPLED TO THE AUTOPLT AND FMC, FLYING IN LNAV AND VNAV. WE WERE CLEARED ON A SHORTCUT DIRECT PLSNT AND COMPLIED USING THE VMC. AFTER BEING HANDED OFF TO APCH CTL, THE SPEED RESTRICTION WAS DELETED, HOWEVER, WE MADE NO ADJUSTMENTS AS THE FLT WAS ON SCHEDULE. PASSING PLSNT INTXN APCH CALLED AND ASKED FOR OUR ALT WHICH WAS 15,100 AND I RESPONDED AND THEN REALIZED WE HAD FAILED TO MAKE THE RESTRICTION. THE CTLR THEN CLEARED US TO 11,000 AND NOTHING ELSE WAS SAID. WE HAD BECOME DISTRACTED DURING THE TRAINING AND FAILED TO NOTICE THE FMC WAS NOT DESCENDING FAST ENOUGH TO MAKE THE CROSSING RESTRICTION. WHEN IT WAS BROUGHT TO OUR ATTN, THE FMC HAD ALREADY BEGUN NAVIGATING TO THE NEXT WAYPOINT, HENCE NO INFORMATION FOR PLSNT INCLUDING THE RESTRICTIONS WE PROGRAMMED WERE VISIBLE ON THE CDU ANY LONGER. CONSEQUENTLY I HAVE NO IDEA WHY THE VNAV FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE RESTRICTION OR IF IT WAS MISPROGRAMMED.

  43.  
  44. Accession Number: 116474
    Synopsis: LGT IN AUTO DESCENT INTO DEN OVERSHOT CROSSING ALT. CENTER CTLR INTERVENED ACCOUNT TERRAIN.
    Narrative: I WAS FLYING AND AT CRUISE ALT I PROGRAMMED THE FMC TO GUIDE THE AUTOPLT TO CROSS DRAKO INTXN BELOW FL230 AND ABOVE FL170 AT 250 K. THE RIGHT AUTOPLT WAS IN USE IN THE CMD POSITION. THE MODE CONTROL PANEL WAS SET IN LNAV AND VNAV. AFTER DESCENDING TO FL260 ZDV CLEARED US FOR THE PROFILE DSNT INTO DENVER. I PUT 13,000' IN THE ALT BOX ON THE MCP. AT APPROX FL210 I TUNED IN THE DEN ATIS, OUR RADIOS STARTED TO GET SCRATCHY AND WE ENTERED A BAND OF TURBULENCE. OUR RADAR DID NOT INDICATE HEAVY CELLS ONLY LIGHT PRECIPITATION. AT ABOUT THIS TIME THE CAPT TURNED ON OUR ENGINE AND WING ANTI-ICE SYSTEMS AND SHORTLY THEREAFTER AN "ICE DETECT" LIGHT INDICATED ON OUR EICAS CRT. APCHING 19,000' THE ATIS STARTED COMING THROUGH AND SHORTLY THEREAFTER WE STARTED GETTING HEAVY STATIC DISCHARGES AND MORE TURBULENCE. SOMEHOW BECAUSE OF NUMEROUS DISTRACTIONS I DID NOT DETECT THAT THE ACFT HAD NOT LEVELED AT 17,000' AS PROGRAMMED. ALL I REMEMBER IS WHILE COPYING THE ATIS I HEARD CENTER IN THE BACKGROUND TELLING US TO CLIMB IMMEDIATELY BECAUSE OF HIGH TERRAIN. TO CLIMB IMMEDIATELY BECAUSE OF HIGH TERRAIN. THE CAPT IMMEDIATELY TOOK OVER FLYING THE ACFT, APPLIED POWER, AND CLIMBED TO APPROX 17,000'. AS I RECALL WE WERE ABOUT 8 MI FROM DRAKO WHEN THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED AND I REMEMBER SEEING 15,000 PLUS SOMETHING ON MY ALTIMETER. BEFORE AND AFTER PASSING 17,000' WE EXPERIENCED A LOT OF DRAMATIC STATIC DISCHARGES AROUND THE NOSE OF THE ACFT THAT COULD HAVE CAUSED AN ELECTRICAL INTERRUPTION TO OUR FMC AND THE GLITCH THAT PREVENTED THE AUTOPLT FROM LEVELING AT 17,000'. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FROM ACN 116707: ZDV ASKED FOR OUR ALT. THIS ALERTED US THAT THE ACFT HAD CONTINUED ON DOWN TO 15,700 AND 8.4 MI W OF DRAKO. ZDV ADVISED THAT TERRAIN IN THE AREA WAS ABOUT 12,000'. I INITIATED A CLIMB TO 17,000'. THIS WAS REACHED 4.4 MI W OF DRAKO. THE AUTOPLT VNAV HAD NOT CAPTURED AT 17,000. AT NO TIME DID WE GET A "TERRAIN" OR "PULL UP" ALERT OR ANY INDICATION ON THE TAPE ALTIMETER. WE HAD NUMEROUS STATIC DISCHARGE OFF OF THE ACFT, DURING WHICH THE RIGHT ENGINE OIL PRESSURE EICAS MESSAGE CAME ON. AT THAT POINT THE LEFT ENGINE OIL PRESSURE WAS 189 PSI. THE RIGHT OIL PRESSURE WAS ABOUT 115 PSI AND CLIMBED TO 185 PSI OVER ABOUT 30 SECONDS. I SUSPECT THAT ONE OF THE DISCHARGES MAY HAVE BEEN A LIGHTNING STRIKE.

  45.  
  46. Accession Number: 119740
    Synopsis: ALT DEVIATION UNDERSHOOT IN DESCENT. REPORTER REQUESTS NO CALLBACK.
    Narrative: ON AUG/THU/89, I WAS THE CAPT ON AN LGT ACR FLT XX, LGA-DTW. OUR ROUTING WAS THE LGA 3 SID OUT OF LGA TO NEON INTXN J95 TO KOOPER DIR AYLMER V-2 RHYME DIR DTW ARPT. WE WERE ENRTE FROM KOOPER TO AYLMER AT FL350 AND WERE CLEARED TO CROSS 15 E OF AYLMER AT FL310. WE PROGRAMMED 15 E OF AYLMER AT 310 IN THE FMC AND SET 310 IN THE MODE CTL PANEL. A "TOP OF DESCENT" CIRCLE SHOWED UP ON THE SCREEN DEPICTING WHERE THE DESCENT WOULD BEGIN. HOWEVER, AT THE TOP OF DESCENT PT, THE ACFT DID NOT DESCEND AND DUE TO DISTRACTING CONVERSATION BETWEEN US, NEITHER I NOR THE F/O NOTICED IT UNTIL WE WERE ABOUT 20 MI E OF AYLMER. I IMMEDIATELY STARTED A FAIRLY RAPID DESCENT OF ABOUT 4000 FPM WITH SPEED BRAKES AND SAW WE WERE NOT GOING TO MAKE 15 E AYLMER AT FL310. I CALLED CLE AND SAID WE STARTED DOWN TOO LATE AND WERE NOT GOING TO MAKE 15 E AYLMER AT 310. IN FACT, WE WERE CROSSING 15 E AYLMER AT 330. CLE SAID THAT'S OK AND GAVE US A FREQ CHANGE. I DON'T KNOW WHY, WITH EVERYTHING APPARENTLY SET IN PROPERLY, THE ACFT DID NOT DESCEND AT THE PROPER TIME. I FEEL THE CAUSE OF THIS MISTAKE IS TOO MUCH RELIANCE ON AUTOMATED SYSTEMS AND A LACK OF VIGILANCE ON MY PART AS TO THE ALT AND POSITION OF MY ACFT.

  47.  
  48. Accession Number: 122251
    Synopsis: FO FLYING HVT AT FL390 MAKING A TURN WITH TURN KNOB ON AUTOPLT, ACFT LOST ALT AND ATTITUDE GYRO TUMBLED.
    Narrative: THE EVENT OCCURRED WHILE MAKING A TURN WITH THE AUTOPLT TURN KNOB THROUGH ABOUT 40-50 DEG USING 10-12 DEGS ANGLE OF BANK. DURING THIS TURN I WAS DISTRACTED FOR A FEW SECONDS BY "WAYPOINT PAPERWORK". THE AUTOPLT FAILED TO HOLD ALT AND WHILE REMAINING ENGAGED, BEGAN A 500-800 FPM DSNT. THE DSNT WAS NOTICED AT ABOUT 300' BELOW ASSIGNED ALT, HOWEVER, SPEED HAD ALREADY BUILT UP TO M .83 OR M .84. AT THE MOMENT THAT I REACHED FOR THE CONTROLS TO RECOVER, MY ATTITUDE GYRO TUMBLED LEAVING ME WITH NO PITCH REFERENCE. HIGH SPEED MACH BUFFET WAS EXPERIENCED AND THE CAPT RECOVERED FROM THE DSNT WITH A TOTAL ALT LOSS OF 1000'. NO TFC CONFLICT FROM THE DSNT WAS NOTED. SEVERAL FACTORS WERE CONTRIBUTING: 1) THERE HAD BEEN SEVERAL PREVIOUS WRITEUPS OF AUTOPLT PITCH MALFUNCTIONS. HOWEVER, THE AUTOPLT HAD BEEN MEL'ED WITH PITCH TRIM INOP. ON ALL PREVIOUS SEGMENTS OF THIS TRIP (16 HRS), WHEN THE PITCH TRIM FAILED, THE AUTOPLT DISCONNECTED WITH THE ASSOCIATED AURAL AND VISUAL WARNING -- MUCH LESS OF A PROBLEM THAN DIVING WITH NO WARNING. WITH THE PITCH TRIM INOP, THE AUTOPLT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN USED AT ALL. 2) THE F/O'S ATTITUDE GYRO HAD BEEN TUMBLING ON PREVIOUS SEGMENTS. THE MECHANIC SWAPPED GYRO'S BUT THE CAPT HAD ELECTED NOT TO WRITE THIS UP DUE TO LACK OF SPARES. 3) THE ALT ALERT HAD BEEN ACTIVATING RANDOMLY EVEN THOUGH ALT WAS CORRECT, LEADING TO A TENDENCY NOT TO BE AS ALERT TO IT (A "BOY CRIES WOLF" PROBLEM). AGAIN NOT WRITTEN UP DUE TO RANDOMNESS. AS OF THIS WRITING ALMOST A MONTH LATER, THE ACFT IS STILL FLYING WITH NO AUTOPLT PITCH AND A SICK ALT ALERTER. THIS IS IN VIOLATION OF MEL RULES AND SAFETY AND SHOULD NOT CONTINUE!

  49.  
  50. Accession Number: 129515
    Synopsis: ACR FLT CREW EXPERIENCES MALFUNCTIONING ALT CAPTURE HOLD FUNCTION OF AUTOPLT.
    Narrative: ACFT WAS CLRED IN STEP DSNTS FROM 37000 TO 24000'. DSNTS WERE MADE WITH AUTOPLT ON, WITH ALL CLRED ALTS SET AND ARMED. AUTOPLT DID NOT CAPTURE 24000'. OTHER PLT WAS TURNING ON ENG AND WING ANTI-ICE. AURAL ALT WARNING SOUNDED. ALT HOLD WAS ENGAGED AND ACFT WAS RETURNED TO 24000'. ACFT WAS THEN CLRED TO 9000' AND DSNT WAS MADE ON AUTOPLT, WITH 9000' SET AND ARMED. DURING THIS DSNT, PLTS DISCUSSED ALT EXCURSION AT 24000', AND COULD NOT DETERMINE WHAT CAUSED IT. ACFT WAS CLRED TO 6000' WITH 100' LEVEL OFF REQUIRED AT 9000'. AUTOPLT DID NOT CAPTURE 6000'. PLTS WERE ALSO SLOWING, CONFIGURING ACFT FOR LNDG AND RUNNING LNDG CHKLIST. AURAL ALT WARNING SOUNDED, ALT HOLD WAS ENGAGED AND ACFT WAS RETURNED TO 6000'. ALT DEVIATION 200-300' EACH TIME. AUTOPLT WAS DISENGAGED AT 3000' WHEN IT DID NOT CAPTURE 3000' SET AND ARMED DURING CLRED ILS APCH TO DFW 35R. HAND-FLOWN ILS AND LNDG. AUTOPLT WRITTEN UP IN ACFT MAINT LOG AS MALFUNCTIONING IN ALT CAPTURE.

  51.  
  52. Accession Number: 129589
    Synopsis: ACR MLG ALT DEVIATION OVERSHOT DURING DESCENT CAUSES LESS THAN STANDARD SEPARATION WITH COMMUTER ACFT IN ORD TCA.
    Narrative: WHILE IN DSNT IN A 2-M CREW, THE CAPT WAS OFF FREQ TRYING TO FOLLOW COMPANY PROC AND CONTACT MAINT, WHILE THE F/O WAS HANDLING BOTH COM AND THE ACFT. ATC ADVISED A HDG CHANGE AND ALT CHANGE, AND THE F/O SET IN AND ARMED THE ALT AND HDG IN THE DFGC. THE READBACK WAS MADE TO ATC AND THE ACFT MADE THE DSNT. THE CAPT FINALLY CAME BACK TO THE ATC RADIO AFTER CALLING MY SEVERAL TIMES. ATC ADVISED AN IMMEDIATE TURN AND THAT WE HAD DSNDED THROUGH THE ALT AND WERE IN CONFLICT WITH A COMMUTER ACFT. THE CAPT HAD ALREADY SEEN THIS ACFT AND HAD CHANGED BANK ANGLE TO AVOID THE ACFT. NEXT, THE CREW CLBED BACK TO THE HIGHER ALT. CAUSE OF THE ALT DEVIATION WAS NOT KNOWN OTHER THAN THE ALT DID NOT CAPTURE AS ASSIGNED AND THE F/O WAS OVERLOADED WITH RADIO COM AND ACFT FLT MANAGEMENT AND MISSED THE ALT. THIS PROB IS ENCOUNTERED QUITE OFTEN IN THE MLG ACFT THIS PLT FLIES AT THIS COMPANY. THE COMPANY HAS HAD MANY PROBS IN THIS DFGC SYS IN THIS AREA, AND IS WORKING WITH THE MFR TO CHANGE THE PROGRAM. ALT ASSIGNMENTS AND WARNINGS ARE EASILY LOST, AND THE AUTOPLT WILL NOT CATCH THE ASSIGNED ALT. BOTH PLTS MUST MONITOR THE SYS AT ALL TIMES WHILE IN FLT W/O DISTR, ESPECIALLY IN A CONGESTED TCA. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 129590: HE SAID HE RECEIVED CLRNC OF 070 DEG HDG AND 8000'. WE WERE LEVELING AT 7000'. ALT HAD NOT ARMED.

  53.  
  54. Accession Number: 130700
    Synopsis: ACR FLT CREW ASSIGNED HEADING, ALT AND SPEED CHANGE AT SAME TIME. FAILED TO TURN OR SLOW DOWN WHILE PROGRAMMING THE PERF (FMC).
    Narrative: WE WERE ASSIGNED A TURN FROM 260 TO 220 DEGS, AN ALT CHANGE AND AN AIRSPD CHANGE ALL AT ONCE. THE F/O WAS FLYING, THE ACFT WAS ON AUTOPLT AND THE PERF SYS WAS CONTROLLING THE AUTOPLT. PUT THIS OCCURRENCE TO PREOCCUPATION WITH FLT DECK AUTOMATED GADGETS AND LOSING SIGHT OF THE PRIMARY JOB: FLYING. WE WERE ASSIGNED 250 KTS AT 7000'. THEY SLOWED US TO 210 KTS AND THE F/O ENTERED THE COMMAND IN PERF. A COUPLE OF MINS LATER APCH SLOWED US AGAIN TO 170 KTS. THIS WAS WITH THE HDG AND ALT CHANGE ABOVE. THE CONFUSION OCCURRED WHEN WE SAW THE ACFT STILL DOING NEARLY 250 KTS! IT HAD NOT SLOWED. WE ENTERED THE ALT CHANGE, BEGAN DSNT AND WERE PLAYING THE "WHAT'S IT DOING NOW" GAME TO DETERMINE WHY IT HADN'T SLOWED DOWN AS COMMANDED. THE F/O FORGOT TO ACTIVATE HDG SELECT SO THE AIRPLANE DIDN'T TURN. THIS MADE THE CTLR UNHAPPY. I HAVE HAD MANY RUN-INS WITH THE PERF SYS. IT'S A COMPUTER DESIGNED TO BE SMOOTH AND EFFICIENT--MOSTLY EFFICIENT. IT HAS IDEAS OF ITS OWN AND OFTEN PUTS ITS OWN PRIORITIES AHEAD OF YOURS. TIME LOST TRYING TO DECIDE WHAT IT'S UP TO PUTS US BEHIND THE ACFT. I HATE PERF.

  55.  
  56. Accession Number: 135174
    Synopsis: ALT DEVIATION. OVERSHOOT IN CLIMB.
    Narrative: TKOF RWY 21R, DETROIT METRO, DETROIT METRO 7 DEP. AFTER TKOF WE WERE ISSUED A RIGHT TURN TO 230 HDG WITH FURTHER VECTORS TO A NE HDG TO INTERCEPT DXO 006 RADIAL. FLT DIRECTORS WERE ON. CENTER AUTOPLT WAS IN COMMAND MODE WITH VNAV ENGAGED, HDG SELECT ENGAGED AND LNAV ARMED. THE WIND READ OUT AT 3000' WAS 230/50 KTS. WE HAD BEEN CLEARED TO CLIMB TO 13,000' AND SAME HAD BEEN SELECTED ON THE (MCP) MODE CTL PANEL. WE HAD ALSO BEEN INSTRUCTED TO MAINTAIN 250 KTS. I HAD NOT HEARD THE SPEED RESTRICTION AND THE SPEED RESTRICTION HAD NOT BEEN ENTERED INTO THE (FMS) FLT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. THE WING FLAPS HAD BEEN RETRACTED ON SPEED SCHEDULE AND THE ACFT WAS MAINTAINING APPROX 285 KTS. 285 KTS WAS THE MINIMUM SPEED FOR THE ACFT CONFIGURATION (CLEAN). AT 10,000' THE ACFT STARTED TO ACCELERATE TO VNAV CLIMB SPEED. AT APPROX 310 KTS THE CTLR ASKED OUR SPEED AND AT THIS POINT MY F/O (PNF) SAID WE WERE SUPPOSED TO BE AT 250 KTS. I HAD THE F/O REQUEST 285 KTS AND WE WERE GRANTED SAME. SPEED INTERVENE - 285 KTS WAS SELECTED ON THE MCP AND THE ACFT WAS DECELERATING RAPIDLY. AT THIS POINT IT SEEMED THE AUTOFLT SYSTEM BECAME CONFUSED AND FAILED TO LEVEL THE ACFT AT 13,000'. I SELECTED ALT HOLD ON THE MCP AND THE ACFT LEVELED AT 13,300'. I FURTHER SELECTED VERTICAL SPEED AND 1000 FPM RATE OF DSNT ON THE MCP AND THE ACFT DESCENDED TO AND MAINTAINED 13,000'. I FEEL THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED BECAUSE I FAILED TO HEAR THE SPEED RESTRICTION AND WE FAILED TO ENTER THE SPEED RESTRICTION INTO THE FLT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. ALSO THE ACFT FLT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FAILED TO LEVEL THE ACFT AT 13,000' FOR REASONS UNKNOWN TO US. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH REPORTER REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: FURTHER INVESTIGATION REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: REPORTER STATES THAT THIS WDB AT MAX ATOG REQUIRES A SPEED OF 280-285 KTS IAS FOR CLEAN MANEUVERING. THE VNAV SYSTEM WILL AUTOMATICALLY USE THIS SPEED REGARDLESS OF ALT. THEREFORE, THIS ACFT REQUIRES GREATER THAN 250 KTS IAS BELOW 10,000' ON DEP. THIS IS APPARENTLY NOT WIDELY KNOWN IN ATC CIRCLES.

  57.  
  58. Accession Number: 135275
    Synopsis: CROSSING RESTRICTION NOT MET.
    Narrative: WE WERE ISSUED CROSSING RESTRICTION FOR SOMTO INTXN. I BELIEVE WE WERE AT 15,000' AND WERE TOLD TO CROSS SOMTO AT 11,000'. I AM NEW TO THIS ACFT AND THE CAPT WAS FLYING THE FIRST LEG OF THE TRIP. I'M VERY FAMILIAR WITH THE CROSSING RESTRICTION BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN PUBLISHED AS ONE OF THE MOST VIOLATED SPOTS IN OUR ROUTE SYSTEM. THE CAPT, A LINE INSTRUCTOR, USED TO "NEW GUYS" LIKE MYSELF, TOOK THE TIME TO SHOW ME HOW TO START A COMFORTABLE DSNT TO MAKE THE CROSSING RESTRICTION. 1) HE SELECTED VERTICAL SPEED OF 1000' ON THE MODE CONTROL PANEL (MCP), IE, AUTOPLT CONTROL. 2) HE PROGRAMMED THE CROSSING RESTRICTION INTO THE ROUTE PAGE OF THE RNAV COMPUTER. 3) HE SELECTED THE DSNT PAGE FUNCTION OF THE RNAV COMPUTER CHECKING THAT WE WERE BELOW WHAT THE COMPUTER CONSIDERED OUR MOST ECONOMICAL DSNT PATH TO MAKE THE CROSSING RESTRICTION. HE POINTED OUT THAT WE HAD A MINUS VALUE MEANING WE WERE BELOW GLIDE PATH AND THAT WE WERE SOME 8-10 MI FROM OUR COMPUTER GENERATED FLT IDLE DSNT POINT. 4) HE SELECTED THE "CAPTURE" COMMAND ON THE DSNT PAGE TO ALLOW THE AUTOPLT TO SWITCH FROM THE V/S 1000' TO THE FLT IDLE ECONOMICAL DSNT UPON GLIDE SLOPE INTERCEPT. 5) HE ARMED THE VERTICAL NAVIGATION (VNAV) MODE ON THE MCP. THE LIGHT ARMED AND IT APPEARED THAT ALL WAS NORMAL. HE PROGRAMMED THE COMPUTER THIS WAY TO MAKE A SMOOTH TRANSITION FROM CRUISE TO DSNT. I REMEMBER THESE POINTS BECAUSE HE WAS TAKING THE TIME TO SHOW ME HOW THE ACFT CAN BE FLOWN TO THE COMPUTER'S FULL CAPABILITIES GIVING THE PAX THE BEST POSSIBLE RIDE. AFTER THE COMPUTER WAS PROGRAMMED I SWITCHED OFF TO GET NEW YORK'S LGA AND ATIS. I LOOKED UP TO READ 3 DME FROM YARDLEY VOR AND THAT WE WERE STILL APPROX 500' FROM LEVEL OFF. ABOUT THIS TIME CENTER ASKED US OUR ALT. NOT WANTING TO INCRIMINATE OURSELVES I SAID "LEVELING AT ELEVEN". THE CTLR PERSISTED AND THE CAPT ADMITTED WE HAD MISSED THE RESTRICTION AND ASKED IF THERE WAS A CONFLICT. THE CTLR WAS NOT GOING TO PROVIDE ANY FURTHER INFO AND SWITCHED US TO NEW YORK APCH. BY LGA WE KNEW THAT THE COMPUTER HAD NOT DONE WHAT WE HAD ASKED IT TO. WE CALLED AVIONICS MAINTENANCE OUT AND ENTERED A WRITE-UP IN THE ACFT'S MAINTENANCE LOG. THE AVIONICS MAN PERFORMED ALL THE SELF-TEST FUNCTIONS HE KNEW. ALL THE FUNCTIONS OF THE COMPUTER CHECKED OUT PROPERLY. OUR NEXT LEG WAS MINE AND WHEN WE WERE GIVEN A CROSSING RESTRICTION GOING IN TO CLT ON THE MAGIC 2 ARR, I PROGRAMMED THE COMPUTER AS I HAD JUST BEEN TAUGHT. WE BOTH WATCHED AS THE SYSTEM GAVE US THE SAME PROPER INDICATIONS AS IT HAD DONE ON THE PREVIOUS LEG. BUT THIS TIME WE WATCHED AS THE COMPUTER TOOK US THROUGH OUR FLT IDLE DSNT PATH, MAINTAINING 1000 FPM RATE. I PULLED THE THROTTLES TO IDLE, EXTENDED THE SPEED BRAKE AND WE MADE OUR CROSSING RESTRICTION. A SECOND WX LOG ENTRY WAS MADE IN CLT AND THE VNAV FUNCTION WAS MEL'ED INOP. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) I WAS DISTRACTED FROM GIVING THE CAPT A GOOD BACK-UP. I WAS TUNED MANUALLY TO THE YARDLEY VOR BUT I WAS TOO INTENT ON GETTING THE LGA INFO. 2) THE ARTCC CENTER CTLR WAS NOT BUSY AND COULD HAVE QUESTIONED OUR DSNT PATH SOONER. I REALIZE IT IS NOT HIS RESPONSIBILITY BUT WHAT ABOUT SAFETY FROM HIS STANDPOINT? SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FROM ACN 135292: WE WERE TALKING ABOUT THE CAPTURE FEATURE, AND HOW IT WAS MAINTAINING 1000 FPM DSNT RATE SINCE IT WAS INDICATING WELL BELOW THE GLIDE PATH. ACTUALLY, WE WERE ABOVE THE GLIDE PATH BUT THE COMPUTER MALFUNCTIONED TELLING US WE WERE LOW. AS WE CROSS-CHECKED THE VOR (YARDLEY) AND DME WE REALIZED WE WERE IN FACT HIGH. WE WERE ALSO INVOLVED IN GETTING THE ATIS AND SENDING AN IN-RANGE REPORT TO OUR OPERATIONS AT LGA. SINCE THE F/O IS NEW ON THE AIRPLANE, I WAS MORE INVOLVED IN THE DUTIES THAT WOULD NORMALLY BE DONE WHILE I WAS FLYING.

  59.  
  60. Accession Number: 137229
    Synopsis: ACR ADVANCE COCKPIT LGT OVERSHOOTS ALT BY 700' DURING CLIMB, PARTLY AS A RESULT OF AUTOTHROTTLE MALFUNCTION.
    Narrative: AFTER TKOF FROM DTW WE WERE TOLD TO MAINTAIN 250 KTS AND TO CLB TO 13000'. PASSING THROUGH 10000' I SELECTED 250 KTS ON THE AUTOPLT "SPD SELECT". THE INDICATION ON THE FCU (FLT CTL UNIT) SHOWED THAT SELECTED SPD OF 250 KTS WOULD BE MAINTAINED, HOWEVER THE ACFT CONTINUED TO ACCELERATE AS IF IT WERE STILL IN "MANAGED" SPD. IT CONTINUED TO ACCELERATE. WHEN WE GOT THE OVERSPD WARNING THE AUTOPLT KICKED OFF. IN TRYING TO DETERMINE WHAT WAS HAPPENING WITH THE AUTOPLT/AUTOTHRUST SYS THE ACFT WAS ALLOWED TO CLB TO 13700'. I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOTHROTTLES AND PULLED THE PWR OFF AND DSNDED BACK TO 13000'. THE AUTOPLT WAS RECONNECTED AS WERE THE AUTOTHROTTLES AND EVERYTHING WORKED O.K. EVEN AT A SELECTED SPD OF 250 KTS. WE WERE THEN GIVEN 16000' AS AN ALT AND WHEN A "LEVEL CHANGE" WAS MADE EVERYTHING WORKED NORMAL. I STILL DON'T KNOW WHAT THE PROB WAS UNLESS THE AUTOTHRUST SYS WAS NOT ACTIVE AND WE HAD NO INDICATION THAT IT WAS NOT ENGAGED. IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ENGAGED OR SOME INDICATION THAT IT WASN'T ENGAGED. THIS WAS ONLY MY SECOND TRIP ON THE LGT AFTER MY INITIAL CHKOUT AND IT CAME AFTER BEING OFF FOR 2 WKS. HOWEVER, THE F/O AND I DISCUSSED THE SITUATION AND NEITHER OF US KNOWS WHY THE AUTOTHRUST SYS DID NOT RESPOND PROPERLY. I DID NOTICE THAT THE EXTREME LEFT HAND COLUMN ON THE FMA WAS BLANK BUT IN THE CONFUSION FAILED TO NOTICE IN THE FAR RIGHT HAND COLUMN OF THE FMA WHETHER THE AUTOTHRUST WAS ENGAGED. I ASKED THE F/O IF HE COULD HAVE ACCIDENTALLY DISCONNECTED THE AUTOTHRUST WHEN I ASKED HIM TO ENGAGE THE AUTOPLT WHEN WE LEFT 3000' AGL SINCE THE AUTOTHRUST ENGAGE/DISENGAGE PUSHBUTTON IS RIGHT NEXT TO THE AUTOPLT PUSHBUTTON. HE SAID "HE DIDN'T THINK SO". THIS WHOLE INCIDENT PROBABLY WOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED IF I HAD BEEN MORE OBSERVANT OF THE FMA (FLT MODE ANNUNCIATOR) INDICATIONS.

  61.  
  62. Accession Number: 138234
    Synopsis: AUTOPLT ON ACR MLG DEPARTING SNA TRIES TO CAPTURE SXC RADIAL ON SID, BUT OVERSHOOTS TURN FOR UNKNOWN REASON.
    Narrative: CURING CLBOUT FROM SNA MUSEL 5 DEP, WE WERE GIVEN A HDG OF 200 DEGS TO INTERCEPT A RADIAL (CANNOT REMEMBER WHICH ONE EXACTLY) OFF THE SANTA CATALINA VOR (SXC 111.4) AND PROCEED INBND TO THE VOR. THE FLT GUIDANCE PANEL WA ENGAGED AND IN HDG SELECT 200 DEGS AND THE SXC RADIAL AND VOR WERE ARMED FOR CAPTURE. THE FGS CAPTURED THE RADIAL AND THE ACFT STARTED TO TURN RIGHT TO INTERCEPT. AFTER PASSING THROUGH 300 DEG HDG IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THE TURN WAS NOT CORRECT AND THAT SOMEHOW THE INTERCEPT WAS A FALSE ONE. AT THIS TIME THE FGS WAS DISENGAGED AND A TURN BACK TO THE LEFT AND THE ORIGINAL 200 DEG HDG WAS COMMENCED. AT THIS TIME DEP CALLED AND REQUESTED US TO CONTINUE TO TURN TO HDG 180 DEGS AND STATED THAT WE SHOULD HAVE STILL BEEN ON A 200 DEG HDG. WE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT 200 DEGS WAS THE ASSIGNED HDG GIVEN. THE VOR SIGNAL FROM SANTA CATALINA (SXC 111.4) WAS STRONG AND IDENTED. THE RADIAL WAS INSERTED IN THE FGS AND ARMED AND THE INTERCEPT APPEARED TO BE NORMAL. LOOKING BACK IT WAS NOT A BIT EARLY, BUT WE DIDN'T CATCH THAT UNTIL WELL INTO THE TURN (APPROX 300 DEG HDG) AND THE DESIRED RADIAL WAS STILL WELL OFF TO THE LEFT ON THE DISPLAYS. I DON'T KNOW WHY WE GOT A FALSE INTERCEPT SIGNAL AND THE FGS WENT INTO CAPTURE MODE, BUT I FELT IT WAS WORTH MENTIONING SO AS TO ALERT OTHER PLTS OF THE POTENTIAL DANGER. IT IMPRESSED UPON ME TO DOUBLE-CHK THE FGS IN ALL PHASES OF OPERATION.

  63.  
  64. Accession Number: 139386
    Synopsis: TRACK DEVIATION. ACV TECH WDB ACFT.
    Narrative: WE WERE ON THE HANCOCK 5 ARR DSNDING TO FL200 BTWN HNK AND IGN. THE ARR WAS PROGRAMMED AND L-NAV WAS CAPTURED. WE WERE THEN GIVEN A VECTOR OF APPROX 140 DEG TO INTERCEPT THE IGN 225 DEG R TO LENDY INTXN. L-NAV WAS DISARMED BY "HDG SELECT" FOR THE 140 DEG VECTOR. THE FMS WAS THEN REPROGRAMMED WITH THE IGN 225 R TO LENDY AND EXECUTED. L-NAV WAS REARMED AND THE PFD ANNUNCIATIONS WERE NORMAL. I THEN PROCEEDED WITH OTHER PROGRAMMING AND COMS FOR THE APCH. WE WERE ALMOST ON THE IGN 225 R WHEN I NOTICED THAT WE WERE NOT GETTTING A CAPTURE. I IMMEDIATELY DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND TURNED, BUT COULD NOT PREVENT THE OVERSHOOT. NY APCH NOTICED RIGHT AWAY AND BEGAN GIVING US VECTORS AND REQUESTED THAT WE TIGHTEN THE TURN. I TURNED AS TIGHTLY AS I COULD. THE REST OF THE ARR, APCH AND LNDG WERE FLOWN W/O INCIDENT. ATC WAS VERY NICE ABOUT IT, BUT I FELT IT PRUDENT TO SUBMIT THIS RPT.

  65.  
  66. Accession Number: 139461
    Synopsis: ALT DEVIATION. EXCURSION FROM ASSIGNED.
    Narrative: WE WERE ON A SCHEDULED ACR FLT # XX BETWEEN SAN AND SLC. FLT HAD BEEN CRUISING AT FL370 WITH ZLC IN LNAV AND VNAV MODE. SLC GAVE CLRNC FROM 370 TO 310. F/O WAS FLYING AND SELECTED 310 IN MCP AND VERTICAL SPEED 1000' DSNT. THE 1000' ALT ALERT SOUNDED AT 32000 AND CALLOUT MADE. CAPT NOTICED ALT ACQUIRE ANNUNCIATE THEN ALT HOLD IN GREEN ON MODE ANNUNCIATOR PANEL. ACFT CRUISED AT FL310 FOR SEVERAL MINS, ALL NORMAL, IN ALT HOLD AT 310. SLC GAVE XX CLRNC TO CROSS 5 S OF FFU, AT 15000', 250 KIAS, ALTIMETER 29.99. 15000' WAS SELECTED IN MCP ALT WINDOW. F/O THEN PROCEEDED TO MAKE A WAYPOINT IN FMS CONSISTING OF THE FFU/188/5. WHILE IN THE PROCESS OF MAKING THE WAYPOINT AND DISCUSSING WITH CAPT, SLC REQUESTED ALT OF XX ACFT WAS NOTED CLIMBING THROUGH 31500' AT APPROX 1300 FPM CLIMB. ACFT WAS STOPPED AT 31700' AND IMMEDIATELY RETURNED TO 31000'. MCP WINDOW WAS STILL AT 15000', ALT HOLD AND VERTICAL SPEED ARMED. AT NO TIME WAS VNAV USED, AND AT NO TIME WAS ANYTHING ON FMS SCRATCH PAD PLACED IN THE FMS OR EXECUTED. WAYPOINT WAS BEING BUILT ON SCRATCH PAD, BUT NOT BROUGHT UP TO FMS, USED OR EXECUTED. IN ADDITION SCRATCH PAD WAS FOR DSNT AND VNAV NOT IN USE. AUTOPLT WAS IN "B" MODE USE BY F/O. LNAV WAS DISCONNECTED AND LNAV, VNAV MODES NOT USED REMAINDER OF FLT. ON ARR SLC, MAINTENANCE FOUND "B" AUTOPLT FAILED BYTE TEST, WROTE UP AND PLACED ON MCO AND DOWNED "B" AUTOPLT FOR MAINT. ON SUBSEQUENT LEG (SLC-JAC) WITH "A" AUTOPLT IN USE, WE WERE UNABLE TO ENGAGE VNAV MODE AND DISCONTINUED ALL AUTOPLT LNAV AND VNAV OPERATIONS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH REPORTER REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: REPORTER STATES THAT BOTH CREW MEMBERS WERE DISCUSSING THE CDU INPUTS AND THAT NEITHER WAS WATCHING THE ACFT SO THE ALT EXCURSION WENT UNNOTICED AS THERE WAS NO AURAL WARNING BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT THE ALT ALERTER WAS SET FOR DSNT. THE AUTOPLT EXPERIENCED SOME SYSTEM FAILURE AS IT FAILED THE MAINTENANCE TEST UPON ARR. THERE IS NO NORMAL CONDITION WHERE AN INPUT TO THE CDU WILL AFFECT THE AUTOPLT IN THE ALT HOLD MODE.

  67.  
  68. Accession Number: 142355
    Synopsis: ACR MLG TRACK DEVIATION USING IRS NAVIGATION SYSTEM.
    Narrative: ACFT WAS RPTED BY ATC AS 4 MI N OF COURSE. IRS NAV SHOWED ON COURSE. WHEN WE SWITCHED TO VOR'S TO VERIFY COURSE, WE FOUND ATC WAS CORRECT. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, WE GOT FMC MESSAGE, "VERIFY POS." SOMEHOW AN ERROR HAD ENTERED THE IRS NAV SYS AND THE MESSAGE WAS NOT DISPLAYED ON THE FMC BEFORE ATC HAD NOTED THE 4-5 MI ERROR. VOR/ILS WAS USED FOR THE REST OF THE FLT.

  69.  
  70. Accession Number: 148853
    Synopsis: ACR MLG ALT DEVIATION UNDERSHOT ALT CROSSING RESTRICTION.
    Narrative: ON AN ENRTE DSNT INTO DAYTON OUR CLRNC WAS DIRECT RID VOR, DIRECT DAYTON WITH A DSNT TO 11000'. THE CTLR GAVE US A NEW CLRNC TO CROSS 10 MI W OF RID AT 10000'. THE CAPT, BEING LESS EXPERIENCED IN USING THE FLT MGMNT COMPUTER THAN I, WANTED ME TO SHOW HIM HOW TO PROGRAM THE DSNT FOR NEW RESTRICTIONS. WE PUT THE RESTRICTION IN THE MAGIC BOX AND FOR SOME REASON, ALMOST CERTAINLY SOMETHING WE DID IMPROPERLY, THE MACHINE WANTED TO MAKE THE RESTRICTION 10 MI E OF RID. BY THE TIME WE CAUGHT THE ERROR IN THE MIDST OF DOING CHKLISTS AND THE USUAL COCKPIT DUTIES WE WERE TOO LATE TO MAKE THE RESTRICTION. NOTHING WAS SAID AND THERE WAS NO CONFLICT. THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT THIS MISTAKE WAS OUR FAULT BUT IT BRINGS UP A POINT. THESE WHIZ BANG COMPUTERS AND FLT MGMNT SYS ARE GREAT, BUT YOU NOT ONLY HAVE TO WATCH THEM LIKE A HAWK, THEY ARE A ERROR WAINTING TO SPRING. FLT MGMNT SYS AS THEY ARE CURRENTLY DESIGNED DO THE MOST AND ARE EASIEST TO USE WHEN YOU NEED THEM LEAST; AT CRUISE. THE CLOSER YOU ARE TO THE GND, THAT IS ON TKOF OR APCH, THE MORE DEMANDING OF ATTN THEY ARE. REPROGRAMMING FOR CONSTANTLY CHANGING CLRNS, WHICH HAPPENS MOST IN THE TKOF OR APCH PHASES DISTRACTS ATTN FROM OUTSIDE AND INSIDE VIGILANCE AS WELL AS STEPS UP SITUATIONS WHERE MISTAKES ARE LIKELY TO OCCUR AS THE WORKLOAD INCREASES. TO BE SURE, THE PLTS ARE ALWAYS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING WHATEVER RESTRICTIONS THERE ARE, NOT THE COMPUTERS. IF WE'RE GOING TO HAVE THESE SOPHISTICATED AND REALLY WONDERFUL MACHINES IN THE COCKPITS DESIGN EFFORT SHOULD BE PUT INTO MAKING THEM MORE USEFUL AND LESS PRONE TO INDUCING ERRORS IN THE TKOF AND APCH PHASES.

  71.  
  72. Accession Number: 152053
    Synopsis: MLG CLEARED TO DESCEND TO 12000' OVERSHOOTS TO 11300' BEFORE CORRECTING.
    Narrative: ENRTE TO SMF USING AUTOPLT (WITH AUTO LEVEL OFF FEATURE) WE WERE ISSUED DSNT CLRNC TO 12000. CLTR QUESTIONED OUR ALT AS ACFT DSNDED TO ABOUT 11300; AS OUR ATTN WAS DIVERTED OUTSIDE FOR PREVIOUS TFC CALL OUT. 11000 WAS SET IN ALT ALERT WINDOW INSTEAD OF 12000, EITHER INADVERTENTLY OR MALFUNCTION. PERHAPS LONG FLT TIME DAY, TFC CALL OUT CAUSED US TO MISS DOUBLE CHK OF ALT ASSIGNMENT AGAINST ALT ALERT WINDOW SETTING. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH REPORTER REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: THEY HAD BEEN CLRED FOR THE WRAPS 4 ARR. IN ANTICIPATION OF XING SAC VOR AT 11000', F/O ENTERED IT IN THE FMC TO GET AN IDEA ABOUT WHERE HE WOULD BE STARTING HIS DSNT. HE FORGOT TO TAKE IT OUT AND WHEN THEY WERE CLRED TO 12000' THE FMC STILL HAD 11000' LOADED IN IT. ALT ALERT WAS ALSO SET TO 11000' AND RPTR COULD NOT EXPLAIN WHY.

  73.  
  74. Accession Number: 170932
    Synopsis: ALT OVERSHOT ON DESCENT.
    Narrative: WE WERE LEVEL AT 11000' AND GIVEN A TURN BY APCH CTL TO A HDG OF 180 DEGS. THE AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED AND IN THE ALT HOLD MODE. I STARTED A TURN FROM 225 TO 180 DEGS. AS WE WERE ROLLING OUT OF THE TURN, APCH CTL TOLD US TO MAINTAIN 11000'. I LOOKED AT THE ALTIMETER AND NOTICED IT WAS READING 10800' AN DSNDING VERY SLOWLY. I IMMEDIATELY STARTED A CLB BACK TO 11000'. AT THE SAME TIME WE GOT A TCAS TFC ADVISORY. I LOOKED AT THE TCAS AND IT SHOWED TFC SEVERAL MILES AWAY AT OUR 12 O'CLOCK POS AND 800' BELOW US. FOR REASONS UNKNOWN THE AUTOPLT HAD SLIPPED OFF OF ALT HOLD. THE MAX ALT DEVIATION I SHOWED WAS 250'. THE CAPT AND I DISCUSSED THE PROB AND COULD FIND NO REASON FOR THE AUTOPLT TO START DSNDING. ALL WARNING SYSTEMS WORKED AND PREVENTED A MORE SERIOUS ALT DEVIATION.

  75.  
  76. Accession Number: 177588
    Synopsis: ALT DEVIATION ALT OVERSHOT ON SID WHEN FMC DROPS SID AND ROUTE OUT OF DATA BASE.
    Narrative: AFTER TKOF AT APPROX 400' AGL, ALL INFO RE: CURRENT FLT DUMPED FROM THE FMC EXCEPT THE DEP ARPT AND THE DEST ARPT IN THE RTE. AFTER GEAR UP AND THROUGH 400', NOTICED NO MAGENTA LINE AND ADVISED CAPT. HE PROCEEDED TO FLY THE DEP PROC NOISE ABATEMENT VISUALLY. ALSO AFTER CALLING CLB DERATE 2, THE FMC WOULD NOT CTL THE AUTO THROTTLE, SO CAPT MANUALLY PULLED THROTTLES TO WHAT HE THOUGHT WAS A DERATED CLB. FURTHER WE WERE BOTH DISTRACTED BY THIS MISHAP AND WE WENT 250' ABOVE ASSIGNED ALT, BUT IMMEDIATELY RECAPTURED 3000'. I DON'T BELIEVE ANOTHER CREW COULD HAVE HANDLED THE SITUATION MUCH DIFFERENTLY. PERSONALLY I HAD NEVER BEEN TO SNA PRIOR TO THIS--THE CAPT HAD. IF WE WERE NOT VFR, WE WOULD HAVE HAD NO WAY TO NAV. LUCKILY, THE CAPT KNEW WERE THE VIS REFS WERE TO THE SID. I HAD LESS THAN 60 HRS IN TYPE AS WELL AS THE CAPT. ALTHOUGH I DON'T KNOW IF THIS WAS CONTRIBUTING, PERHAPS A MORE EXPERIENCED CREW COULD HAVE REACTED FASTER? PS: THE CAPT NOTIFIED SCHEDULING PRIOR TO THE TRIP SEQUENCE ABOUT THE LACK OF CREW EXPERIENCE. HE WAS ASSURED IT WAS LEGAL, BUT IN MY OPINION IT WAS NOT SAFE.

  77.  
  78. Accession Number: 192224
    Synopsis: ACR MLG ALTDEV EXCURSION FROM CLRNC ALT THEN ALT OVERSHOOT WHEN RETURNING TO CLRNC ALT. ALL WITH THE 'HELP' OF FMC AND AUTOPLT.
    Narrative: MLG WITH FMC-EFIS DSNDING INTO SFO FROM IAH. CAPT FLYING, FO PERFORMING ALL OTHER PNF DUTIES. ACFT JUST LEVELED AT 240 AFTER DSCNT FROM FL280. FO 'OFF THE AIR' GIVING FINAL PA ANNOUNCEMENT TO PAX. UPON RETURNING TO THE FREQ, FO HEARD CAPT ACKNOWLEDGE ATC TRANSMISSION FOR CLRNC TO 11000 FT. AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED THROUGHOUT ENTIRE FLT WITH NAV AND LNAV MODES ENGAGED. UPON CLRNC TO 11000 FT, CAPT POINTS TO ALT SELECTOR WINDOW AND FO SELECTS 11000. THEN FOLLOWED A BRIEF DISCUSSION AS TO FACT THAT FL240 SHOULD BE MAINTAINED UNTIL PASSING A FIX ABOUT 3 MI IN FRONT OF ACFT AT WHICH POINT FO SELECTS FL240 ON ALT SELECTOR ALTHOUGH MOMENTARILY OVERSHOOTING SELECTED ALT TO FL250. DURING THIS TIME, ACFT HAD BEGUN DSCNT FROM FL240 TO ABOUT FL236 AT WHICH TIME AIRSPD DROPPED ABRUPTLY FROM 280 KIAS TO 210 KIAS AND NOSE PITCHED SHARPLY UP TO 15 DEG. ACFT BEGAN RAPID CLB OF ABOUT 2500-3000 FPM AND REACHED 24800 FT, BY THE TIME CAPT DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT TO LEVEL ACFT AND BEGIN DSCNT TO APPROPRIATE ALT. THE CAUSE OF THIS UNCOMMANDED CLB WAS NEVER DETERMINED BY CREW AND DID NOT RESULT IN ANY TFC CONFLICT TO OUR KNOWLEDGE. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE COMPLEXITY OF THE MLG FMC AND ITS ABILITY TO REVERT AUTOMATICALLY FROM ONE MODE TO ANOTHER AS WELL AS THE HIGH COCKPIT WORKLOAD AT THIS POINT, ONE HAS NO TIME TO TRY AND DIAGNOSE THE REASON BEHIND AN UNWANTED AUTOPLT ACTION AND DISCONNECTION IS THE ONLY PRUDENT ACTION.

  79.  
  80. Accession Number: 200719
    Synopsis: ALTDEV ALT XING RESTRICTION NOT MET.
    Narrative: DURING DSCNT INTO KLGA ON THE NANCI ARR, WE WERE GIVEN THE STANDARD CLRNC TO CROSS SOMTO INTXN AT 11000 FT. WE WERE LEVEL AT FL260 HAVING MADE A VNAV PATH DSCNT TO CROSS THE KERNO INTXN AT FL260. UPON RECEIPT OF THE CLRNC, WE SET 11000 FT IN THE MCP ALT WINDOW AND VERIFIED THAT WE HAD INDEED PROGRAMMED SOMTO AT 11000 FT. WE ALSO NOTED THAT OUR TOUCHDOWN POINT FROM OUR INTERMEDIATE ALT OF FL260 WAS 25 NM. OUR PITCH AT THAT POINT WAS VNAV. ATC THEN REQUESTED THAT WE START OUR DSCNT IMMEDIATELY TO CROSS SOMTO AT 11000 FT. AFTER SELECTING THE DSCNT PAGE WE OBSERVED OUR CAPTURE PROMPT TO BE MISSING, (INDICATING AT ACTIVE CAPTURE DSCNT IN PROGRESS). WE THEN SELECTED A VERT SPD DSCNT OF 1000 FPM AND AFTER DSNDING APPROX 500- 600 RESELECTED VNAV AND OBSERVED AN IMMEDIATE RETURN TO THE CAPTURE MODE. WE THEN ENTERED INTO A BRIEF DISCUSSION CONCERNING THE RELATIVE MERITS OF A SPD DSCNT VERSUS A PATH DSCNT AND DID NOT NOTICE THE FMC'S APPARENT FAILURE TO COMPUTE A PATH BASED ON SOMTO AT 11000 FT, AND ITS FAILURE TO CAPTURE A PATH THAT WOULD HAVE CROSSED SOMTO AT 11000 FT. THAT DISCUSSION WAS INTERRUPTED BY ATC'S QUERY OF 'ARE YOU GOING TO BE ABLE TO MAKE SOMTO AT 11000 FT?' WE BOTH QUICKLY REFERRED TO: A) VERT DEV ON THE DSCNT PAGE AND B) DISTANCE FROM SOMTO ON OUR RTE LEGS PAGE. IT WAS THEN THAT WE NOTICED THE FAILURE OF THE FMC TO COMPUTE AND CAPTURE THE PROPER PATH. WHEN I SAW HOW CLOSE WE WERE TO SOMTO (4 NM) I EXPECTED TO SEE A +10000 FT OR SO ON MY VERT DEV, BUT IN FACT IT WAS SHOWING A - 400 FT FROM A DOWNTRACK WAYPOINT CONSTRAINT, WEZUL AT 3000 FT. WE ADVISED ATC THAT WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO MEET THE RESTRICTION AND HE ASKED US TO EXPEDITE THROUGH 20000 FT, WHICH WE DID. NO FURTHER COMMENT WAS MADE TO ZDC CONCERNING THE SOMTO CLRNC AND WE SUBSEQUENTLY MADE A NORMAL FREQ CHANGE TO NEW YORK APCH CTL. ANALYSIS: DURING THE CAPTURE DSCNT THAT WE HAD BEEN SO CAREFUL TO VERIFY, OUR PATH SOMEHOW CHANGED (OR WAS DELETED). IT WAS OBVIOUSLY NOT DELETED BY EITHER PLT, BUT IT INEXPLICABLY DISAPPEARED FROM OUR DSCNT PAGE. (THIS IS WHERE I WISH I HAD A VIDEO TAPE OF THE DSCNT TO MORE CLOSELY SCRUTINIZE THE ACTUAL CHAIN OF EVENTS.) WE DO KNOW THIS, WHEN ATC QUESTIONED OUR ABILITY TO MAKE THE SOMTO RESTRICTION AND WE QUICKLY ANALYZED OUR RELATIONSHIP TO THE DISPLAYED PATH, THE VNAV 'LIGHT' WAS NOT ON. BY DEFINITION, THAT MEANS THE MODE CANNOT BE DISENGAGED. MORE ACCURATELY IN THIS CASE, I SUSPECT IT ALSO MEANT THAT THE MODE WAS NOT ENGAGED. THE FO WAS QUICK TO SELECT A DIFFERENT PITCH MODE, LEVEL CHANGE, DEPLOYED FULL SPD BRAKES, AND AN IAS COMMAND OF 340 KIAS TO EXPEDITE OUR DSCNT. WE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO FLY THE NANCI ARR 2 MORE TIMES DURING THIS 3-DAY TRIP PAIRING AND EACH TIME WE TRIED TO DUPLICATE THE CHAIN OF EVENTS WITH NO SUCCESS. (WE MADE THE SOMTO RESTRICTION EACH TIME WITH NORMAL INDICATIONS.) CONCLUSION: EVEN THOUGH WE PROPERLY PROGRAMMED THE DSCNT PATH, WE FAILED TO MONITOR THAT DSCNT AND ITS SUBSEQUENT CAPTURE OF THE PROPER PATH IN ORDER TO MEET THE SOMTO RESTRICTION. THANKFULLY, THERE WAS NO TFC CONFLICT. RECOMMENDATION: DUE TO COMPLAINTS FROM OTHER PLTS ON THIS PARTICULAR RTE, CONCERNING THEIR INABILITY TO PROGRAM CERTAIN ALT CONSTRAINTS, PERHAPS THERE IS A PECULIARITY ABOUT THIS PARTICULAR ARR THAT MAY CAUSE PROBLEMS WITHIN THE FMC REGARDING PATH COMPUTATIONS. I RECOMMEND THAT INDUSTRY EXPERTS EXAMINE THIS PARTICULAR XING RESTRICTION TO INSURE THAT SOME SORT OF ANOMALY DOES NOT EXIST THAT MIGHT CAUSE ANOTHER CREW TO MAKE THE SAME MISTAKE.

  81.  
  82. Accession Number: 204881
    Synopsis: HDG TRACK DEV ON DEP WHICH WAS CAUGHT BY ALERT DEP CTLR VIGILANCE.
    Narrative: AFTER TKOF WE ENGAGED THE RNAV TO THE AUTOPLT. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY WE GOT THE 'WHERE ARE YOU GOING?' FROM DEP CTL. ACCORDING TO OUR MAP DISPLAY, WE WERE PROCEEDING CORRECTLY, BUT DEP GAVE US VECTORS IN ALMOST THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION. IT TOOK QUITE AWHILE TO DECIPHER THE PROBLEM, WHAT WITH WORKLOAD, LOSS OF POSITIONAL AWARENESS, ETC, BUT IT APPEARED THAT I MISENTERED THE COORDS ON THE RAMP AND HAD A 2 DEG LONGITUDE ERROR. I THOUGHT THE CAPT HAD XCHKED IT BUT APPARENTLY HE NEVER DID. WE HAD OTHER IRS PROBLEMS DURING ALIGNMENT, SO WE DIDN'T CATCH THE POS ERROR AND THE IRS ACCEPTED IT. IT DIDN'T AT FIRST, BUT DUE TO THE OTHER PROBLEMS, WE MISSED THE POS PROBLEM. APPARENTLY, THE LGT IRS SYS WILL ACCEPT A GROSS ERROR AFTER A FEW TRIES. IN ANY EVENT, WE NAVIGATED THE REST OF THE TRIP THE OLD-FASHIONED WAY -- THANKFULLY, WE WERE NOT HEADED OVER THE OCEAN. ALSO, FORTUNATELY, ALTHOUGH WE STRAYED OFF COURSE, AND HAD A TFC CONFLICT, THERE WAS NO LOSS OF SEPARATION, THINKS TO A SHARP CTLR. ALL OF THIS COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED IF: I HAD BEEN MORE CAREFUL, THE CAPT HAD XCHKED, OR WE HAD BACKED UP THE DEP WITH VOR, ALL OF WHICH WE NORMALLY DO! GUESS IT ALL BOILS DOWN TO COMPLACENCY. ALSO, IT WOULD HELP IF THE IRS SYS WOULD TELL YOU IF YOUR POS WAS WAY OFF FROM THE LAST POS, SO THAT THE ERROR WOULD NOT BE MASKED BY OTHER ALIGNMENT PROBLEMS. LAST BUT NOT LEAST, AN UPDATE FEATURE WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL. IF WE HAD BEEN LAUNCHING ON AN OCEANIC XING, WE WOULD HAVE HAD TO LAND AND REALIGN.

  83.  
  84. Accession Number: 218507
    Synopsis: ALTDEV ALT EXCURSION.
    Narrative: ACFT WAS DSNDING TO CROSS PVD AT 14000 FT TO ENTER HOLD. BECAUSE ANTI-ICE SYS WAS TURNED ON IN DSCNT THE AUTO THROTLES HAD ADVANCED PWR AND ACFT WAS NOT HOLDING ASSIGNED AIRSPD. DISCONNECTED A/T'S AND WAS CONCERNED WITH PROPER AIRSPD AND PWR FOR ANTI-ICE. I DID NOT NOTICE IMMEDIATELY THAT ACFT ON AUTOPLT HAD DSNDED BELOW 14000 BY 300 FT. WHEN I REALIZED WE WERE OFF ALT, I IMMEDIATELY DISCONNECTED AUTOPLT AND CLBED 300 FT TO PROPER ALT. ATC ASKED IF WE WERE AT 14000 FT. I REALLY DON'T KNOW WHY THE AUTOPLT DID NOT ENGAGE 'ALT HOLD.' I AM NOW ON THE ACFT AND WAS SOMEWHAT DISTRACTED BY THE PWR PROBLEM/AIRSPD PROBLEM. JUST AS I NOTICED OUR ALT EXCURSION THE ALT ALERTER ON THE ACFT SOUNDED. EVEN THOUGH THIS ACFT HAS A GLASS COCKPIT AND FULL AUTOMATION, I HAVE LEARNED FROM THIS EXPERIENCE THAT EVEN WITH ALL THE MAGIC YOU DON'T DROP YOUR VIGILANCE FOR 1 SECOND. WE FLEW THE ACFT 1 MORE LEG AND FOUND THE ALT CAPTURE FUNCTION WORKED PROPERLY, SO IT MAY HAVE BEEN OPERATOR ERROR ON MY PART BUT AT THIS POINT I JUST CAN'T SAY FOR SURE. I WILL CONTINUE TO REVIEW THE OCCURRENCE AND MY TECHNIQUES AND OF COURSE WATCH THE AUTOFLT SYS MUCH MORE CAREFULLY IN THE FUTURE.

  85.  
  86. Accession Number: 238306
    Synopsis: AN ACR MLG CREW MADE A POOR AUTOPLT INTERCEPT AND LEFT THEIR ALT PRIOR TO THEIR CLRNC POINT.
    Narrative: ACFT WAS BEING OPERATED ON AUTOPLT BY CAPT. A TURN WAS STARTED FROM DOWNWIND TO BASE FOR ILS RWY 17 AT OMA AS THE AUTOPLT WAS ATTEMPTING TO LEVEL AT 3000 FT MSL FROM A DSCNT. THE AUTOPLT FAILED TO LEVEL AT 3000 FT AND MANUAL CTL WAS TAKEN OF ACFT AND LEVELED AT 3000 FT. A TURN TO INTERCEPT ILS WAS GIVEN AFTER AUTOPLT REENGAGED. ILS WAS ARMED FOR INTERCEPT. WE WERE BUSY RUNNING LNDG CHKLIST OR DOING SOMETHING ELSE PERTINENT WHEN APCH CALLED AND STATED THAT WE FLEW THROUGH THE LOC. APCH INQUIRED IF WE HAD THE FIELD IN SIGHT, WE STATED NO. THEY OFFERED TO TAKE US BACK OUT FOR ANOTHER INTERCEPT, WE DECLINED. I HAD PLANNED TO 'DIRTY UP,' INTERCEPT THE LOC, THEN COME DOWN FAST TO THE GS. (WE HAD GND CONTACT AT THIS POINT, BUT COULD NOT SEE THE FIELD YET.) AS I APCHED THE LOC AGAIN FOR THE INTERCEPT, THE FO CALLED RWY IN SIGHT. AS I WAS LOOKING FOR THE RWY THAT HE CALLED, THE AUTOPLT STARTED DOWN THE GS PRIOR TO LOC CAPTURE. APCH CLRNC WAS TO MAINTAIN 3000 FT UNTIL ESTABLISHED, CLRED APCH (ILS 17). I DON'T FEEL ANY SAFETY WAS COMPROMISED DUE TO GOOD VISIBILITY AHEAD AND BEING ON GS. I FEEL THAT THE AUTOPLT'S FAILURE TO LEVEL AT 3000 FT AND ITS FAILURE TO CAPTURE THE LOC WAS VERY DISTRACTING. TRYING TO FIGURE OUT WHAT HAPPENED MAKES IT TOUGH TO CONCENTRATE ON WHAT'S AHEAD. FO'S CALLING FIELD IN SIGHT WAS ALSO DISTRACTING DUE TO FACT THAT HE DID NOT ACTUALLY HAVE IT IN SIGHT, BUT MUST HAVE BEEN LOOKING AT SOME ROADS. IN RETROSPECT, WE SHOULD HAVE TAKEN UP OFFER FROM APCH CTL FOR ANOTHER INTERCEPT.

  87.  
  88. Accession Number: 242851
    Synopsis: MLG CREW CAUSES A TCASII RA AND THEN DOES NOT COMPLY WITH TCASII INSTRUCTIONS.
    Narrative: INBOUND TO BNA DSNDING THROUGH FL280 TO FL270, FMA ANNUNCIATED 'ALT CAPTURE' AND FO ANNOUNCED 'CAPTURE.' AT FL272 AUTOPLT CONTINUED TO DSND, FMA DROPPED CAPTURE AND AUTOPLT INCREASED RATE FROM MINUS 1000 FPM TO MINUS 3500 ON FLT GUIDANCE SYS VSI INDICATOR. FO DISCONNECTED AUTOPLT AND PULLED BACK ON YOKE TO STOP DSCNT AND RETURN TO FL270. (DSCNT BOTTOMED OUT AT APPROX 26750 FT.) SIMULTANEOUSLY TCASII COMMANDED 'DSND, DSND' WE DID NOT FOLLOW COMMAND AS TFC WAS IN SIGHT AHEAD AND BELOW AND NOT POSING A PROB. TCASII FOLLOWED WITH 'MONITOR VERT SPD' AND THEN 'CLB, CLB' STILL REMAINED AT FL270 AS OTHER ACFT STILL IN SIGHT XING FROM L TO R. LATER INFORMED BY CTLR THAT OTHER ACFT HAD RESPONDED TO A TCASII ALERT BY CLBING. IT WOULD SEEM THAT IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN A TCASII COMMANDS A RESOLUTION, WHEREBY 1 ACFT HOLDS STATUS QUO DUE TO OTHER ACFT IN SIGHT, BUT OTHER ACFT RESPONDS TO COMMAND, THE SIT CAN AGGRAVATE RAPIDLY (AND EVEN REVERSE). SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 242769: ATC LATER ADVISED US OTHER ACFT AT FL260 RECEIVED A TCASII RA TO CLB. OTHER ACFT CLBED TO FL270 (FOLLOWING TCASII COMMANDS). TCASII CAUSED OTHER ACFT TO CLB INTO OUR ASSIGNED ALT WHILE OUR TCASII INSTRUCTED US TO DSND INTO OTHER ACFT'S ALT. COULD HAVE CAUSED SERIOUS SEPARATION PROBS IF WE HADN'T HAD VISUAL CONTACT WITH OTHER ACFT.

  89.  
  90. Accession Number: 252165
    Synopsis: AN ACR MLG CLBED AFTER RECEIVING A CLRNC TO DSND.
    Narrative: WE WERE GIVEN A DSCNT FROM 31000 FT BY CTR. THE ACFT WAS ON AUTOPLT WITH LNAV AND VNAV ENGAGED, USING THE FMC AND AREA NAV. I WAS THE PF. THE FO SET MODE CTL PANEL ALT TO 28000 FT WITH THE AUTOPLT ENGAGED. THE FMC DID NOT ACCEPT 28000 FT INTO THE PROGRAM AND IT TOOK 3 ENTRIES TO ACTIVATE IT. AFTER ENTERING THE ALT IN THE FMC, I LOOKED AT THE INSTS AND THOUGHT THAT THE ALTIMETER HAD FAILED BECAUSE IT WAS SHOWING A CLB THROUGH 31600 FT. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, CTR CALLED FOR OUR ALT AS I WAS TAKING THE ACFT OFF AUTOPLT AND CORRECTING THE CLB. WE WERE CLOSE TO 31900 FT BEFORE WE COULD LEVEL AND START DOWN MANUALLY. THE FO WAS INVOLVED IN PAPERWORK AND WAS CAUGHT BY SURPRISE ALSO. IT APPEARED THAT WHEN THE FMC WOULD NOT ACCEPT 28000 FT THAT THE VNAV LOST THE ALT INPUT. THIS PROBABLY CAUSED THE AUTOPLT TO TRIP FROM COMMAND TO CTL WHEEL STEERING PITCH, WHICH WAS THE INDICATION WHEN I TOOK OVER MANUALLY. WHY THE AUTOPLT WENT INTO A CLB WHEN TRIPPED TO CTL WHEEL STEERING PITCH IS A MYSTERY. NEITHER THE FO NOR MYSELF HAD FELT THE ACFT GO INTO A CLB. OUR NORMAL ALT WARNING DID NOT GIVE ANY SIGNAL IN THIS CASE BECAUSE THE MODE CTL PANEL HAD BEEN SET TO 28000 AND WE HAD ENTERED A CLB OUT OF 31000 INSTEAD OF A DSCNT. THE AUTOPLT DID NOT GIVE AN AURAL WARNING BECAUSE IT DID NOT TRIP OFF COMPLETELY, BUT ONLY SWITCHED TO CTL WHEEL STEERING IN PITCH MODE. ON AUTOFLT ACFT, ANY PROB WITH PROGRAMMING THE FMC CAN DISTRACT THE PLTS' ATTN FROM THE FLT INSTS. USUALLY, NORMAL INST SCAN OR ANY ONE OF THE WARNING DEVICES WOULD HAVE BROUGHT MY ATTN TO THE ERROR IN THE FLT CTL BEFORE ALT COULD CHANGE BY 600 FT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 252364: THE CAPT (THE PF) HAD THE AUTOPLT ENGAGED, IN THE 'CTL WHEEL STEERING' MODE. WE RECEIVED AND ACKNOWLEDGED A DSCNT CLRNC TO FL280. WE WERE ALSO ASKED TO KEEP OUR SPD UP. THE CAPT SELECTED A HIGHER SPD IN THE AUTOPLT MODE CTL PANEL, THEN PROCEEDED TO LEAN DOWN OVER THE COMPUTER TO SET IN THE LOWER ALT. MEANWHILE, WITH THE FASTER SPD DIALED IN, THE AUTOTHROTTLES ADVANCED, WHICH MUST HAVE PITCHED THE NOSE OF THE AIRPLANE UP AND CAUSED IT TO CLB. THE 'CTL WHEEL STEERING' MODE OF THE AUTOPLT ONLY HOLDS WHATEVER FLT ATTITUDE THE ACFT IS PRESENTLY HOLDING. NEVER USE 'CTL WHEEL STEERING' MODE OF THE AUTOPLT UNDER NORMAL LINE OPS.

  91.  
  92. Accession Number: 252461
    Synopsis: FLC OF A WDB ACR ACFT BECAME DISTRACTED BY A MALFUNCTIONED AUTO THROTTLE CTL INPUT AND FAILED TO TURN AS REQUIRED BY SID RESULTING IN LESS THAN LEGAL SEPARATION TO ANOTHER DEPARTING ACFT ON SEPARATE PARALLEL RWYS.
    Narrative: WE DEPARTED ON RWY 25R AT LAX AND OUR CLRNC WAS FOR A LOOP 9 DEP TO MAINTAIN 2000 FT. THE LOOP 9 DEP CALLS FOR A TURN TO A HDG OF 235 DEGS UPON XING THE SANTA MONICA VOR (SMO) 160 DEG RADIAL. THIS IS AN AUTOMATED AIRPLANE SO WE WERE USING THE FLT DIRECTOR AND AUTO THROTTLES. THE TKOF WAS NORMAL. WE LEVELED AT 2000 FT, AND THE AUTO THROTTLES CAME BACK AND SET THE THRUST TO MAINTAIN 250 KIAS. JUST PRIOR TO XING THE SMO 160 DEG RADIAL, LAX DEP CTL ISSUED US A CLB CLRNC. IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR FLT MANUAL PROC, I COMMANDED THE FO TO PUSH THE FLT LEVEL CHANGE BUTTON ON THE MODE CTL PANEL AND SET 250 KTS IN THE SPD WINDOW: 'FLCH 250.' PUSHING THE 'FLCH' BUTTON CAUSES THE AUTO THROTTLES TO MOVE THE THRUST LEVERS TO CLB THRUST, AND IT ALSO CAUSES THE PITCH COMMAND BARS TO COMMAND AN ANU PITCH THAT WILL MAINTAIN THE SELECTED SPD (IN THIS CASE 250 KTS). FOR SOME REASON, THE AUTO THROTTLES DID NOT RESPOND. THEY REMAINED AT THEIR PRESENT THRUST SETTING AND THE ACFT DID NOT GO INTO A CLB MODE. WE WERE DISTRACTED BY THIS MALFUNCTION AND WERE LATE IN INITIATING OUR TURN TO 235 DEGS. BECAUSE OF OUR LATE TURN AND BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT WE WERE ALSO LATE IN STARTING OUR CLB, WE CAME CLOSE ENOUGH TO TFC THAT HAD DEPARTED RWY 24L THAT WE GOT AN RA ON OUR TCASII SYS. THE FO MADE VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE TFC AND ESTIMATED THAT OUR LATERAL SEPARATION WAS AROUND 6000 FT AND THE TCASII READOUT INDICATED A VERT SEPARATION OF 400 FT. WE MANUALLY SET THE THROTTLES TO CLB THRUST, AND AS SOON AS WE INITIATED THE TURN AND STARTED THE CLB THE RA ENDED.

  93.  
  94. Accession Number: 357340
    Synopsis: LGT ACFT DURING CLB HAD OVERSPD WARNING RESULTING IN FLC DISTR AS ACFT FAILED TO LEVEL AT ASSIGNED ALT. RPTR CAPT DISCONNECTED AUTOPLT AND RETURNED TO ASSIGNED ALT.
    Narrative: I WAS THE CAPT ON THE FLT FROM ATL TO BHM. I WAS THE PF AND HAD THE ACFT ON AUTOPLT, VNAV AND HDG SELECTED AS WE WERE ON A RADAR VECTOR FOR BHM. WE WERE ASSIGNED 14000 FT. LEAVING ABOUT 12500 FT, THE AUTOTHROTTLES FAILED TO CTL THE AIRSPD, AND WE WENT THROUGH THE LIMIT MMO/IAS AND RECEIVED THE OVERSPD WARNING. THE AUTOPLT ALSO FAILED TO CAPTURE ALT, AND FLEW THE ASSIGNED 14000 FT. I CAUGHT THE ALT EXCURSION AT ABOUT 14700 FT, DISENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHROTTLES AND PUSHED OVER TO REGAIN ALT AND SLOW THE ACFT TO A NORMAL INDICATED AIRSPD. THE OVERSPD WARNING PROBABLY CAUSED BOTH PLTS TO MISS THE ALT ALERT WE SHOULD HAVE RECEIVED ON APCHING 14000 FT, AS NEITHER OF US HEARD THE WARNING. THERE WAS NO COMMENT OR QUESTION FROM ATC ABOUT OUR ALT AND WE SAW NO OTHER ACFT VISUALLY OR ON TCASII. THERE WAS NO CONFLICT. WE WERE LATER ASSIGNED FL220 AND COMPLETED THE FLT TO BHM UNEVENTFULLY. WE WILL IN THE FUTURE BE MORE CONCERNED WITH ALT THAN AIRSPD OVERSHOOT

  95.  
  96. Accession Number: 357721
    Synopsis: B737-300 IN IMC UNDER AFDS CTL GETS OFF THE LOC AND NEVER RECOVERS. FLC FAILS TO TAKE CTL AND RECOVER. THEY ARE FINALLY CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO A PARALLEL RWY ON THE FAR SIDE OF THE ARPT.
    Narrative: DEN APCH CLRED US TO MAINTAIN 210 KTS, 040 DEG HDG TO INTERCEPT ILS RWY 35L LOC, CLRED FOR APCH. CAPT THEN ARMED THE AUTOPLT/FLT DIRECTOR (AFDS) TO CAPTURE THE LOC AND GS. WITH THE HIGH GND SPD AND GREATER THAN NORMAL INTERCEPT ANGLE THE AFDS CAPTURED THE LOC, FLEW THROUGH THE COURSE MAKING THE L TURN TO GET BACK ON COURSE. ATC (APCH) ASKED US TO MAINTAIN 190 KTS. (I BELIEVE THIS WAS THE CLRNC) TO DYMON, THE OM (6.6 DME). THE AFDS ROLLED OUT ON A 335-340 DEG HDG TO GET BACK ON COURSE. THE ACFT FLEW THROUGH THE COURSE NWBOUND AND FAILED TO TURN TO TRACK INBOUND. I BROUGHT THIS TO THE CAPT'S ATTN AT WHICH TIME HE TRIED TO GET THE ACFT BACK ON COURSE USING THE AFDS. ATC CLRED US TO A LOWER ALT AND SHORTLY AFTER TOLD US WE WERE L OF COURSE AND TO TURN R TO INTERCEPT. THE CAPT HAD STILL NOT DISENGAGED THE AFDS AND HE WAS NOW PARALLELING THE LOC AND DSNDING. ATC STARTED TO GIVE US MISSED APCH INSTRUCTIONS L TURN 260 DEGS CLB AND MAINTAIN 8000 FT OR 9000 FT? (CAN'T REMEMBER) AND IN SAME BREATH ASKED IF WE COULD REINTERCEPT AND CONTINUE APCH? THE CAPT DISENGAGED AUTOPLT AND SAID THAT WE COULD CONTINUE. APCH TOLD US TO TURN R (CAPT IS STILL PARALLELING COURSE, I HAVE REMINDED HIM OF THIS 3-4 TIMES NOW) AND CONTACT TWR. TWR CLRED US TO LAND RWY 35L AND ASKED IF WE WERE TURNING TO REGAIN COURSE. AROUND THIS TIME WE HAD ACQUIRED VISUAL REF WITH THE TERRAIN AND IDENTIFIABLE PORTIONS OF ARPT (PARKING LOTS, TERMINAL, TWR). TWR ASKED IF WE HAD RWY 35L IN SIGHT. WE DID NOT AND STATED SO. TWR ASKED IF WE HAD RWY 34 IN SIGHT. WE DID HAVE RWY 34 IN SIGHT AND TWR THEN CLRED US TO LAND ON RWY 34. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS WAS APCH HIGH SPD/LARGE INTERCEPT ANGLE, CAPT'S FAILURE TO DISENGAGE AFDS AND FLY MANUALLY, MY FAILURE TO GET CAPT'S ATTN TO TURN FURTHER R, FAILURE OF APCH CTL ASKING US IF WE CAN MAKE IT RIGHT AFTER THE MISSED CLRNC. I THINK THEY SHOULD HAVE MADE US MISS. AFTER THAT CLRNC WE THOUGHT THAT WE COULD REINTERCEPT AND WE COULD HAVE HAD WE BEEN AGGRESSIVE ENOUGH TO GET BACK ON COURSE. FAILURE ON TRAINING. NOT ENOUGH ON AFDS/FMC, TURNING IT OFF AND FLYING MANUALLY NEVER EMPHASIZED ENOUGH. WHAT STARTED OUT AS A PRECISION APCH AND FINISHED AS A NON PRECISION/VISUAL APCH SHOULD NEVER HAPPEN. AUTOPLT WAS TESTED ELECTRONICALLY ON THE GND WITH NO FAULTS DETECTED. NOTE: WE HAD GONE ABOVE GLIDE PATH (RWY 35L) AT SOME POINT NEVER TO REGAIN IT AND DID NOT USE EXCESSIVE (MORE THAN 1200 FPM) DSCNT RATES TO RE-ESTABLISH IT.

  97.  
  98. Accession Number: 357872
    Synopsis: B737-300 FLC HAS A DIFFICULT TIME WITH THE APCH WHEN THE AUTOPLT FAILS TO TRACK THE LOC COURSE DURING AN IAP ILS APCH PROC INTO DEN.
    Narrative: ON A DOG LEG L BASE TO INTERCEPT ILS LOC RWY 35L AT DIA, DSNDING OUT OF 13000 TO 10000 FT. AUTOPLT A ENGAGED ON HDG SELECT, VOR LOC ARMED, #1 NAV TUNED IN MANUAL AND IDENTED. IHSI IN THE MAP MODE. APFDS INDICATED CAPTURE ON VOR LOC AND ACFT INITIATED L TURN TO TRACK THE LOC INBOUND. HOWEVER, THE ACFT CONTINUED ITS L TURN TO APPROX HDG OF 320 DEGS. MAP SHOWS W OF COURSE. APCH INQUIRES, RAW DATA VERIFIES, SELECT HDG MODE AND DIAL IN 020 DEGS TO REINTERCEPT. APFDS ARMS IN THE APCH MODE (NOW CLRED ILS RWY 35L APCH). APFDS INDICATES CAPTURE BUT ACFT IS NOT RESPONDING CORRECTLY -- DISCONNECT AUTOPLT AND ATTEMPT TRANSITION TO RAW DATA. BY THIS TIME WE ARE HIGH AND I AM CONFUSED AS TO WHAT IS GOING ON. APCH QUERIES US ON OUR ABILITY TO COMPLETE THE APCH. WE RESPOND THAT WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO RECAPTURE AND COMPLETE THE APCH. AT THIS TIME I AM HAND FLYING AND WE ARE STILL W OF COURSE. GND CONTACT IN COMING INTO VIEW AND WE SEE THE TERMINAL, WE ARE LINED UP ON THE TWR BTWN RWY 34 AND RWY 35L. WE GET CLRNC TO LAND ON RWY 34. I HAVE HAD APPROX 3 YRS EXPERIENCE ON EFIS B757 EQUIP. I HAVE NEVER EXPERIENCED ANYTHING LIKE THIS AND HAVEN'T A CLUE WHAT HAPPENED. IF IT WAS AN ERROR ON MY PART, I DON'T KNOW WHAT. THIS IS MY THIRD OR FOURTH IN THIS ACFT. MY LAST TIME TO FLY EFIS (1500 TOTAL HRS IN B757) WAS 1992. WE CURRENTLY FLY 5 B737 BASIC ACFT, 2 B737 ADVANCED, 2 B737-300 HARD BALL, AND 1 B737-300 EFIS ACFT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE CAUSE OF THE INCIDENT ISN'T KNOWN. MAINT HAS NOT GIVEN THE RPTR ANY INFO RELATIVE TO THE NATURE OF THE FAILURE TO CAPTURE THE ILS COURSE. THE PIC SAID THAT HE HAD INITIALLY OVERSHOT THE ILS COURSE ON THE INITIAL VECTOR BUT WAS UNDER THE GS. ATC THEN HELD HIM TO AN ALT THAT TOOK THE ACFT THROUGH THE GS. THE ACFT AT THAT POINT WENT TO A 320 DEG HDG, PASSING THROUGH THE LOC COURSE. RPTR ALSO SAID THAT HE HAS HAD 1 OTHER EVENT OF A PARALLEL NATURE WHERE HE WAS HIGH AND FAST. THE SOFTWARE SYS IN THE ADVANCED B737-300 SEEMS TO 'LOSE ITS LOCK' ON THE ILS WHEN THIS SCENARIO IS PRESENTED TO IT. RPTR ALSO ADDED THAT IN THE RPTED EVENT, THAT HIS ILS COURSE INDICATOR WENT FROM R DEV TO A FULL L DEV. THE FO'S DID NOT. SEEMED TO BE A DISCONTINUITY BTWN THE #1 AND #2 ILS COURSE SENSING.

  99.  
  100. Accession Number: 358000
    Synopsis: GPWS ALERT DURING A NIGHT OP SENDS AN SF340 INTO A CLB. ALTDEV ALT EXCURSION. PIC ASKED TO CALL SUPVR WHEN APCH CTLR NOT AWARE OF WHAT THE PROB WAS.
    Narrative: WE WERE DSNDING FROM INTERMEDIATE ALT TO LEVELOFF AT 2100 FT AND TURNING FOR FINAL VECTOR TO INTERCEPT LOC RWY 10 AT SYR. JUST PRIOR TO LEVELOFF, THE GPWS TERRAIN WARNING WAS ACTIVATED. CREW TOOK IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION AND INITIATED A CLB. (NO OTHER ACFT WERE NOTED ON OUR OPERATIONAL TCASII IN THE VICINITY. APCH HADN'T INFORMED US OF ANY ACFT TO BE CONCERNED WITH.) NOTIFIED APCH THAT WE WERE CLBING. WARNING ENDED AT ABOUT 2500-2600 FT. CTLR DIDN'T APPARENTLY UNDERSTAND WHAT WAS GOING ON, SO WE SPELLED IT OUT TO HIM THAT WE HAD A GPWS ALERT AND WE HAD TO CLB. CTLR WANTED US TO CALL HIS SUPVR. I CALLED AND TALKED TO A MR X. HE SAID THAT HE HAD TO FILL OUT A RPT ON THE INCIDENT SO IT COULD BE PREVENTED IN THE FUTURE, BECAUSE HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT CONFLICTING TFC. HE THOUGHT THAT THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN SOMETHING WRONG WITH OUR GPWS. I EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT I WAS NEW TO THE AIRPLANE BUT WAS FAMILIAR WITH GPWS OPS, BUT NEVER HAD ANYTHING LIKE THIS. I FELT THAT THE WARNING COULD HAVE BEEN TRIGGERED BY A 900 FT ANTENNA OR OUR RATE OF DSCNT. SYS WAS OPS CHKED NORMAL PRIOR TO TKOF AND NO ABNORMAL INDICATIONS NOTED DURING OUR FLT OR ANY PREVIOUS WRITE- UPS. I CAN'T THINK OF ANYTHING THAT WE COULD HAVE DONE DIFFERENTLY. IF THERE WAS CLOSE TFC, APCH (USUALLY) WOULD HAVE INFORMED US. WE WERE IN SEMI VFR CONDITIONS AND HAD GOOD INFLT VISIBILITY. NO TCASII CONFLICT WAS OBSERVED EITHER. I AM NOT GOING TO FLY INTO TERRA FIRMA WHILE I AM TRYING TO TROUBLESHOOT THE GPWS WARNING SO NOT TO UPSET A CTLR.

  101.  
  102. Accession Number: 358118
    Synopsis: MLG, DSNDING TO 1000 FT ABOVE A DASH 8, GOT A FALSE GPWS WARNING WHEN THE EQUIP PERCEIVED THE OTHER ACFT TO BE THE TERRAIN. COMPLYING WITH THEIR COMPANY'S FOM, THEY CLBED FROM 11000 FT ASSIGNED ALT TO ALMOST 12000 FT.
    Narrative: LINE CHK BTWN DENVER AND SEATTLE. CLRED FOR CHINS 2 ARR (CHINS.CHINS2) SEATTLE, WA. IN VICINITY OF CHINS INTXN, SEA APCH ADVISED US OF DASH 8 TFC BELOW US, FLYING THE SAME ARR. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, WE WERE GIVEN CLRNC TO DSND TO 11000 FT MSL. UPON REACHING 11000 FT, THE DASH 8 WAS 1000 FT BELOW US AS INDICATED ON TCASII. AS WE OVERTOOK THE DASH 8, WE GOT A GPWS 'TERRAIN, TERRAIN' ANNOUNCEMENT. OUR COMPANY FLT MANUAL CALLS FOR THE FOLLOWING RESPONSE IN NIGHT CONDITIONS: IMMEDIATE ACTION: THRUST -- MAX. PITCH ATTITUDE -- ROTATE TO 15 DEGS (INCREASE PITCH ATTITUDE UNTIL WARNING STOPS). ATC -- ADVISE. WARNING: DO NOT DELAY PULL-UP FOR DIAGNOSIS. BECAUSE OF OUR TRAINING, THE CAPT INITIATED THE IMMEDIATE ACTION ITEMS. PRIOR TO REACHING 12000 FT MSL (1000 FT ABOVE ASSIGNED ALT) THE AURAL WARNING STOPPED. WE ADVISED ATC OF OUR ALTDEV AND WERE GIVEN CLRNC AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT TO RETURN TO 11000 FT MSL. THE GPWS REACTED TO AN ACFT TARGET WITH 1000 FT SEPARATION AS IF IT WERE TERRAIN. WE WERE AWARE OF THE TFC PRIOR TO THE 'TERRAIN, TERRAIN' WARNING, BUT RESPONDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE IMMEDIATE ACTIONS FOR AN EMER PROC AS WRITTEN IN OUR COMPANY FLT MANUAL.

  103.  
  104. Accession Number: 358501
    Synopsis: CL65 SLC-EUG AT CRUISE ALT HAD ELECTRONIC INTERFERENCE WITH EICAS SYS. ON DSCNT TO EUG EXPERIENCED AIRSPD DEV BTWN CAPT AND FO. HAD CABIN ATTENDANT CHK FOR ELECTRONIC DEVICES USE AND HAD THEM TURNED OFF. BAL FLT NORMAL.
    Narrative: FLT FROM SLC TO EUG BEGAN AS JUST ANOTHER ROUTINE FLT. BEGINNING WITH THE PUSHBACK, TKOF, AND CLBOUT, THE FLT WAS PROGRESSING NORMALLY. ONCE WE CLBED THROUGH 10000 FT, THE FO PERFORMED THE APPROPRIATE CHKLIST AND NOTIFIED THE FLT ATTENDANT THAT IT WAS SAFE TO BEGIN CABIN SVC. THE FLT ATTENDANT NORMALLY MAKES HER CABIN BRIEFING INFORMING THE PAX THAT THE USE OF PORTABLE ELECTRONIC DEVICES IS NOW ALLOWED. ROUGHLY 5-10 MINS LATER, WE OBSERVED A CAUTION MESSAGE ON OUR EICAS DISPLAY INDICATING AN 'EFIS COMP MON.' THIS PARTICULAR MESSAGE IS DISPLAYED ANY TIME THERE IS DISAGREEMENT BTWN THE CAPT'S AND THE FO'S FLT INSTS. IN THIS CASE WE HAD A DISAGREEMENT OF HDG INDICATORS. AFTER FOLLOWING OUR QRH, THE MESSAGE STILL REMAINED. AFTER XCHKING THE STANDBY INSTS, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE FO'S HDG WAS THE MOST ACCURATE. THE QRH NOW DIRECTS THE CREW TO SELECT ATTITUDE AND HDG #1 OR #2 ON THE SOURCE SELECT PANEL, WHICHEVER HAS BEEN DETERMINED TO BE MORE ACCURATE. WX CONDITIONS AT THE TIME WAS SMOOTH AIR AND ON TOP OF AN OVCST. FINALLY WE REACH OUR FINAL ALT OF FL330 AND FOR THE NEXT HR THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL. SOMEWHERE AROUND 150 MI E OF EUG, ZSE GAVE US A PLT'S DISCRETION DSCNT TO FL240. I ELECTED TO BEGIN THE DSCNT TO TRY TO GET OUT OF THE STRONG HEADWINDS WE'D BEEN FIGHTING MOST OF THE WAY. AS THE ACFT APCHED THE DSCNT PROFILE SPD OF 320 KTS, THE EICAS DISPLAYED ANOTHER 'EFIS COMP MON' CAUTION MESSAGE. THIS TIME THE PROB WAS WITH A DIFFERENCE IN OUR AIRSPD INDICATORS. MINE WAS READING 310 KTS AND THE FO'S WAS READING 320 KTS. I AGAIN HAD THE FO REFER TO QRH TO CORRECT OUR PROB. BUT BEFORE HE COULD COMPLETE THE FIRST FEW ITEMS, THE PROB HAD CORRECTED ITSELF. MINS LATER THE 'EFIS COMP MON' APPEARED A THIRD TIME. THIS ONE WAS CAUTIONING US ON AN ALTIMETER DIFFERENCE. AS USUAL, WE PULLED OUT THE QRH, BUT BEFORE IT COULD BE READ, THE DISCREPANCY IN AIRSPD INDICATORS HAD ONCE AGAIN APPEARED. ONCE ALL OF THE PROB MESSAGES HAD STOPPED BLINKING ON AND OFF, WE WERE ABLE TO BEGIN THE APPROPRIATE QRH ITEMS. THESE ITEMS INCLUDE XCHKING THE STANDBY INSTS AND DETERMINING THE RELIABLE AIR DATA SOURCE (#1 AND #2). AGAIN THE FO'S INSTS WERE THE RELIABLE SOURCE. AFTER ALL CHKLISTS WERE COMPLETED, THE FO ASKED 'YOU DON'T SUPPOSE THIS COULD BE CAUSED BY THE PAX USING COMPUTERS OR CD PLAYERS?' MY FIRST THOUGHT WAS NO, ONLY BECAUSE I'VE NEVER HAD ANY PROBS LIKE THIS IN THE PAST. BUT AT THIS POINT, I WAS OPEN TO ANY SUGGESTIONS. THE FO THEN CALLED BACK TO THE FLT ATTENDANT AND ASKED IF THERE WERE ANY PORTABLE ELECTRONIC DEVICES IN USE IN THE CABIN. SHE SAID SHE WOULD CHK AND GET BACK TO US. AS IT TURNED OUT, THERE WERE 6 CD PLAYERS AND 1 LAPTOP COMPUTER IN USE AT THAT TIME. AS WE WERE STILL ABOVE 10000 FT, THE FLT ATTENDANT HAD NOT HAD A CHANCE TO MAKE HER CABIN BRIEFING REGARDING DISCONTINUATION OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES. THE FLT ATTENDANT AT THIS TIME WAS INSTRUCTED TO MAKE HER BRIEFING AND TO ENSURE THAT ALL PORTABLE ELECTRONIC DEVICES WERE IN THE OFF POS. THE FLT ATTENDANT THEN RPTED BACK TO INFORM US THAT ALL SUCH ITEMS WERE OFF. JUST TO SEE IF THIS WAS THE CAUSE OF SOME, ALL, OR NONE OF OUR PROBS, I ELECTED TO PLACE ALL OF THE SOURCE SELECT SWITCHES BACK TO THEIR NORMAL POS. WITHIN ABOUT 1 MIN, MY AIR DATA COMPUTER WAS WORKING AND SHORTLY AFTER THAT MY 'AHRS' REALIGNED TO THE APPROPRIATE HDG. THE FLT CONTINUED TO EUG WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. ONCE WE ARRIVED, I ADVISED THE NEXT CREW OF WHAT HAD HAPPENED AND TO BE AWARE OF ANY ABNORMAL INDICATIONS. I ALSO ASKED THEM TO LET ME KNOW IF THEY HAD ANY OF THESE TYPE OF PROBS ON THE WAY BACK TO SLC. THE NEXT DAY THE CAPT WHO TOOK THE ACFT SAID HE HAD IT FOR THE REST OF THE DAY AND HAD NO PROBS AT ALL.

  105.  
  106. Accession Number: 358740
    Synopsis: L1011 CLRED TO DSND TO 11000 FT, GOT TO 10200 FT BEFORE RETURNING TO 11000 FT. AUTOFLT CAPTURED ALT BUT ACFT CONTINUED TO DSND.
    Narrative: CLRED TO DSND TO 11000 FT BY APCH CTL. AUTOPLT ON. AUTOFLT MODE CAPTURED ALT, BUT ACFT CONTINUED TO DSND. OVERSHOOT TO 10200 FT WITH IMMEDIATE CLB BACK TO 11000 FT. NO WORD FROM ATC. REMAINDER OF FLT NORMAL.

  107.  
  108. Accession Number: 360144
    Synopsis: SUPER MD80 ON VECTOR TO RWY 27 MAINTAINING 3800 FT. GOT GPWS AND FOLLOWED SOP AND BEGAN CLB TO 4800 FT BEFORE WARNING CEASED. REMAINED AT 4800 TILL ON THE GS. NO FURTHER PROBS.
    Narrative: THIS IS A SECOND ATTEMPT TO SUBMIT THIS RPT -- RECEIVED MESSAGE THAT FIRST RPT WAS UNABLE TO BE PROCESSED. WHILE IN IMC CONDITIONS AND ON VECTORS FOR A LOC RWY 27 APCH AT SAN, WE WERE GIVEN A DSCNT TO 3800 FT MSL. WE WERE CLRED TO MAINTAIN 3800 FT UNTIL INTERCEPTING THE LOC. APCHING 3800 FT MSL, APPROX 15 NM E OF THE ARPT, WE GOT A GPWS WARNING 'TERRAIN, TERRAIN.' WE EXECUTED AN IMMEDIATE CLB PER S80 OM PROC TO APPROX 4800 FT MSL. GPWS WARNING STOPPED IN CLB. ONCE ESTABLISHED ON THE LOC AT 4800 FT, WE BEGAN A DSCNT WITH NO FURTHER GPWS WARNINGS. ATC WAS NOTIFIED OF EXCURSION AND REASON. RADIO ALTIMETER NEVER SHOWED MOVEMENT INDICATING GND CLOSURE DURING EVENT. CAPT WAS PF.

  109.  
  110. Accession Number: 360518
    Synopsis: B767 IN ALTDEV ALT EXCURSION. THRUST MGMNT COMPUTER REDUCED PWR TOO MUCH AT FL390. MULTIPLE ACFT EQUIP PROBS.
    Narrative: ATC FACILITY: ZAU. LOCATION: BDF/090/50. WITH CTR AUTOPLT IN CTL, THE ACFT WAS CLBED FROM FL350 TO FL390 USING FLT LEVEL CHANGE. NEARING FL390, ALT CAPTURE WAS INDICATED FOLLOWED BY ALT HOLD. SPD WAS STEADY AT MACH .80, THEN THE TMC COMPUTER REDUCED THRUST TOO MUCH, ALLOWING THE SPD TO DEGRADE TO MACH .75 AND THE ACFT BEGAN UNCOMMANDED DSCNT. FO APPLIED MAX THRUST AND SMOOTHLY RECOVERED TO FL390. ACFT LOST APPROX 500 FT. ATC SAID THERE WAS NO CONFLICT. ACFT HAD R ELEVATOR POS INDICATOR INOP AND A HISTORY OF STABILIZER TRIM ABNORMALITIES. ALSO DURING FLT WE RECEIVED AUTOPLT CAUTION MESSAGES WHILE USING R AUTOPLT. I WROTE UP THE STABILIZER TRIM, R AUTOPLT AND CTR AUTOPLT.

  111.  
  112. Accession Number: 361512
    Synopsis: SUPER MD80 ENRTE ORD-DFW NEAR STL RECYCLED XPONDER AND GOT A TA TARGET ON TCASII AT SAME ALT. TA DISAPPEARED IMMEDIATELY, FOLLOWED BY AURAL WARNING TO DSND. COMPLIED WITH WARNING AND CEASED AFTER 200-300 FT DEV. ADVISED CTLR WHO IMPLIED IT HAS HAPPENED BEFORE.
    Narrative: PART 2 OF 2. AFTER RECYCLING THE SWITCH A TA TARGET WAS CREATED, CO-ALT AT 12 O'CLOCK POS AT 2-3 NM WHICH DISAPPEARED IMMEDIATELY AND WAS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWED BY AN AURAL DSND, DSND. THE AUTOPLT WAS DISENGAGED, WE STARTED AN IMMEDIATE DSCNT AND THEN LOOKED FOR THE TARGET RATE OF DSCNT AND RA. THE RA NEVER OCCURRED NOR DID THE RATE OF DSCNT ON THE IVSI. BY THAT TIME WE WERE AT 250- 300 FT BELOW ALT WHERE WE BEGAN A GRADUAL ASCENT, BECAUSE THE WARNINGS HAD DISAPPEARED. WE ALSO INFORMED ATC THAT WE WERE FOLLOWING AN RA AND WERE RETURNING TO OUR ALT BECAUSE OUR WARNINGS HAD CEASED. HE SAID THAT HE HATED WHEN THAT HAPPENS. IT SOUNDED LIKE SIMILAR OCCURRENCES HAD HAPPENED WHEN PEOPLE HAD RECYCLED THEIR XPONDERS. I AM WONDERING IF THIS HAS HAPPENED MUCH BEFORE OR IF IT HAS AND I DIDN'T PAY CLOSE ENOUGH ATTN TO OTHER PEOPLE'S COMPANY FLC RPTS OR OUR ACR PUB NOTES.

  113.  
  114. Accession Number: 361546
    Synopsis: AN ACR B767 FLC HAS DIFFICULTY WITH THEIR FMCS AND RELATED NAV AND AUTOFLT SYS. THE PROBS WERE FINALLY RESOLVED AND THE SYS ARE RESTORED TO NORMAL OP.
    Narrative: FLT LEFT LHR ON TIME AT XX00Z. INITIALLY ON HDGS/ VECTORS BY LONDON AND SCOTTISH CTL. OCCASIONALLY WHILE CLBING OUT WE WOULD GET MESSAGE ON FMC 'RTE UPLINK READY TO LOAD.' SINCE WE HAD ALREADY DONE THIS ON THE GND AND EVERYTHING LOOKED NORMAL IT WAS JUST BOTHERSOME, BUT QUESTIONABLE WHY THIS FMC (BOTH ACTUALLY) WAS DOING THAT. NEAR GLASGOW WE WERE AT OUR FINAL, FL310 AND THE FO HAD FINISHED DOING ALL THE REQUIRED CHKS BEFORE ENTERING CLASS II AIRSPACE. IRS CHKED FINE, OUR VOR CHK WAS RIGHT ON, POS CHK WAS CORRECT AND OUR MAGNETIC COMPASS, HSI CHK WAS CORRECT. I WAS PF AND HAD ACFT HOOKED UP TO AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHROTTLE. WE WERE ABOUT TO RECEIVE OUR OCEANIC CLRNC WHEN ON THE ADI THE VNAV ANNUNCIATION AND LNAV ANNUNCIATION WENT AMBER WITH A YELLOW LINE THROUGH THEM. SIMULTANEOUSLY A MASTER CAUTION WENT OFF WITH ANNUNCIATION OF AUTOTHROTTLE DISCONNECT AND AUTOPLT DISCONNECT. THE AUTOTHROTTLE DID DISCONNECT, BUT THE ACFT'S AUTOPLT STAYED ENGAGED, BUT WITHOUT ANY GUIDANCE. TRYING TO RE-ENGAGE LNAV AND VNAV WAS UNSUCCESSFUL. WE DESELECTED CTR AUTOPLT AND TRIED THE L AND R AUTOPLT WITH NO SUCCESS. USING HEADING SELECT I WAS ABLE TO MAINTAIN DIRECTIONAL GUIDANCE AND SELECTING 'FLCH' WAS ABLE TO MAINTAIN AIRSPD AND ALT. SINCE THE AUTOPLT WAS WORKING, OBVIOUSLY SOMETHING WITH LNAV AND VNAV WAS NOT FUNCTIONING PROPERLY. WE HAD LOST OUR ACTIVE WAYPOINT, (WE WERE DIRECT 'MATIK' AT TIME) HOWEVER ALL OUR WAYPOINTS WERE STILL DISPLAYED. THE FMC STILL HELD OUR RTE, BUT NO ETA'S WERE ON LEG'S PAGES OR ON PROGRESS PAGE. WE RE-SELECTED 'MATIK' AS OUR ACTIVE WAYPOINT, AND WHILE VERY SLOW THE FMC FINALLY REENGAGED THE RTES AND WE TRIED 'LNAV' AND THE ACFT WAS ONCE AGAIN ON IRS NAV. THE CAPT THEN TOLD ME 'YOU FLY AND TALK, WE'LL WORK ON THE PROB' MEANING THE FO AND HIM. THEY CALLED MAINT AND DISPATCH AND APPARENTLY THEY WERE OF VERY LITTLE HELP. I DID NOT HEAR ANY OF THEIR CONVERSATION EXCEPT THE FO AND CAPT WERE VERY UPSET WITH THEM. DURING THIS TIME I HAD SCOTTISH CONFIRM OUR POS, AND I DID SOME CHKING ON FIX PAGE WITH VORS AND SUCH. ALL THE TIME, THE FMC DISPLAY A RTE, BUT IT WAS NOT ACTIVE, AND ABOUT THIS TIME MAINT HAD US PULL AND RESET CERTAIN CIRCUIT BREAKERS. AFTER THIS THE RTE HAD REMAINED IN THE FMC, BUT IT HAD NOW BECOME 'MOD RTE' WHICH MEANS IT WAS NOT ACTIVE, ALSO THE MESSAGE 'PERF/VNAV UNAVAILABLE' STARTED BEING DISPLAYED. THE FO AND I REALIZED ALMOST IMMEDIATELY THAT THAT MEANT WE'D LOST OUR PERFORMANCE PLATFORM, AND THAT WAS ONE REASON WE DID NOT HAVE ETA'S TO POINTS. I INDEXED THE FMC AND PULLED UP PERFORMANCE PAGE AND SURE ENOUGH ALL OUR PERFORMANCE DATA HAD BEEN DUMPED, PROBABLY DUE TO RESETTING CIRCUIT BREAKERS OF FMC AND OTHER EQUIP. AS SOON AS I ENTERED ALL THE DATA THE FMC IMMEDIATELY CAME UP WITH ALL THE PROPER DATA, ETA'S TO FIX, TIME ENRTE, GROSS WT, ETC. WE ONCE AGAIN DID ALL OUR CHKS FOR ENTERING CLASS II AIRSPACE, AND FELT COMFORTABLE THAT THE PROB WAS FIXED. WE AGREED AND WE WERE ON OUR WAY. DURING THE OCEAN XING WE WERE ALWAYS ON COURSE AND WHILE OVER ICELAND HAD OUR POS VERIFIED WITH REYKEVIC CTL. ON WHY THE FMC DID WHAT IT DID I HAVE SOME THOUGHTS. WHILE UNDER RADAR VECTORS, THE CAPT KEPT SWITCHING FROM HDG SELECT TO LNAV, FOR AS HE SAID 'TO KEEP THE CLOCK UPDATED.' OFTEN WHEN HE DID THIS THE MESSAGE 'NOT ON INTERCEPT HDG' WOULD COME UP. SINCE I WAS HAND FLYING AND KEEPING A HEADING IT MAY HAVE CONFUSED THE FMC ON WHAT IT WAS SUPPOSED TO DO. ALSO I KNOW THE CAPT WAS GOING TO UPLOAD THE WINDS, BUT I WONDER IF HE ACCIDENTALLY HIT 'UP LOAD RTE' INSTEAD AND THAT WAS WHY WE KEPT GETTING 'RTE UPLINK READY TO LOAD' MESSAGE. WE NEVER HAD FMC FAILURE, NOR DID WE GET THAT MESSAGE, THE RTE WAS ALWAYS IN THE FMC, AND MAP DISPLAY WAS GOOD, IT JUST FOR SOME REASON, PROBABLY HUMAN, CAUSED IT TO OVERLOAD AND GO INTO A DEGRADE MODE UNTIL IT HAD ALL THE FACTS. THAT WE WERE ABLE TO RESTORE IT POINTS TO SOME GLITCH, EITHER ELECTRONICALLY OR HUMAN, THAT CAUSED IT TO BEHAVE THE WAY IT DID. AT NO TIME WERE WE IN CLASS II AIRSPACE, AND AT NO TIME DID WE LOSE STANDARD NAV CAPABILITY (VOR, ADF, ILS). CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE INTL RELIEF FO SAID THAT HE SUSPECTED THAT THE CAPT HAD INITIALLY ATTEMPTED TO ENTER UPDATED WINDS BY INADVERTENTLY PUSHING THE 'UPLOAD RTE' BUTTON. THE RPTR SAID THAT LATER IN THE FLT, THE REGULAR FO AND HE TALKED ABOUT THESE EVENTS AND THEY AGREED THAT THE PRIMARY CAUSE OF THE PROB WAS HUMAN ERROR. THE RPTR ALSO SAID THAT ONE OF THE OTHER PROBS WAS THAT THE FMCS WERE BEING OVERLOADED WITH INPUTS AND WERE IN DANGER OF CEASING TO FUNCTION. THIS IS A COMMON PROB AND OR LIMITATION THE RPTR SAID WITH THE B767 AND B757 FMCS. HE SAID THAT YOU JUST CAN'T MOVE TOO FAST WITH YOUR TYPING OR THEY WILL QUIT.

  115.  
  116. Accession Number: 361969
    Synopsis: THE ACR FLC OF A B737-300 HAS BOTH IRU'S DRIFT OFF DURING THE DEP PROCESS AND THEY GET OFF COURSE BEFORE THEY COULD SELF-CORRECT. NEITHER OF THE FLC WAS MONITORING THE RAW DATA FROM THE DEP VORS.
    Narrative: WE DEPARTED ONT FROM RWY 8L WITH THE FO HAND FLYING USING THE FLT DIRECTOR IN VNAV AND LNAV WITH THE INITIAL COMMANDS BEING A HDG TO 250 DEGS. PRIOR TO INTERCEPTING THE 143 DEG RADIAL OF POM PER THE SID AND FMC ROUTING, WE WERE CLRED BY SOCAL DEP 'DIRECT TO POM AND THE REMAINDER OF THE ONT 2, COMPLY WITH RESTRS.' I SELECTED 'DIRECT INTERCEPT' TO POM AND WE PROCEEDED IN LNAV. JUST PRIOR TO REACHING POM WE HEARD A CLRNC FOR ANOTHER ACFT TO 'TURN IMMEDIATELY TO A 230 DEG HDG,' BUT HEARD NO MENTION OF THE LOCATION OF TFC NOR ANY MENTION FROM THE CTLR THAT OUR POS MAY HAVE CAUSED THE NECESSITY FOR ANOTHER ACFT TO DEVIATE. NO FURTHER MENTION EITHER TO ANOTHER ACFT OR OURSELVES WAS MADE, SO WE RESUMED OUR CLB AND LEVELED AT 9000 FT MSL PRIOR TO REACHING THE GASKI INTXN. UPON NOTING 'ALT HOLD' ANNUNCIATED ON THE EADI, I SELECTED THE CLRED ALT OF 14000 FT MSL INTO THE ALT WINDOW OF THE MCP AND AFTER PASSING GASKI, VNAV WAS SELECTED AND A CLB INITIATED. THE DEP CTLR ISSUED US A CLRNC TO 'TURN 20 DEGS L AND INTERCEPT THE POM 323 DEG RADIAL' AND ADDED THAT WE 'WEREN'T AT POM.' BOTH OF OUR FMC MAP TRACKS SHOWED US ON THE POM 323 DEG RADIAL SLIGHTLY PAST GASKI ON COURSE TO KELSE. DOUBTFUL OF THE CTLR'S CLRNC, I TYPED POM INTO THE FIX PAGE OF THE CDU AND ALSO TYPED IN THE 323 DEG RADIAL WHICH OVERLAPPED THE TRACK DISPLAYED ON BOTH EHSI'S. AFTER CONFIRMING OUR POS IN THIS MANNER, THE POS OF THE ACFT WAS DISPLAYED TO THE L (W) OF COURSE AND I QUERIED THE CTLR IF HE 'WANTED US TO INTERCEPT THE POM 323 DEG RADIAL, BUT I WAS SHOWING US TO THE L OF COURSE.' THE CTLR RESPONDED THAT WE WERE SHOWING TO THE 'R OF COURSE' AND THAT WE MUST HAVE SELECTED PDZ INSTEAD OF POM. AT THIS TIME, THE FO SELECTED HIS VOR INTO THE MANUAL MODE ON THE 323 DEG RADIAL OF POM (WHICH AS PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED, HAD BEEN BOTH PRESELECTED AND CONFIRMED ON THE GND PRIOR TO OUR DEP). TRUE TO THE CTLR'S INDICATIONS, THE VOR COURSE SHOWED US TO BE TO THE R (E) OF COURSE. WE BOTH SELECTED THE MANUAL MODE OF OUR VORS AND FLEW THE REMAINDER OF THE DEP IN THE MANUAL MODE WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. UPON RESELECTING THE MAP MODE ON MY EHSI, I NOTICED IN THE L-HAND CORNER 2 INDICATIONS THAT THE IRU POS WERE ABOUT 1.7 TO 1.8 MI OFF THE FMC POS. AS THE FLT CONTINUED TOWARD SFO, THE DISCREPANCY BTWN THE IRU'S AND THE FMC CLOSED UNTIL IT WAS ABOUT .4 TO .5 MI AND ALL LNAV FUNCTIONS OPERATED NORMALLY. OBVIOUSLY THERE WAS SOME ERROR IN THE POS INDICATION OF OUR FMC MAP TRACK. I HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO REACH A CONCLUSION ABOUT THE REASON FOR THE DISCREPANCY IN THE FMC POS ON THIS PARTICULAR FLT, AND HAVE NEVER BEFORE ENCOUNTERED AN INCIDENT LIKE THIS IN NEARLY 4000 HRS OF GLASS ACFT EXPERIENCE. I HAVE EXPERIENCED MINOR MAP SHIFTS, BUT NEVER SUCH A DISCREPANCY THAT WASN'T IMMEDIATELY VERIFIABLE. IN RETROSPECT, MY FIRST ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN TO IMMEDIATELY SELECT MY VOR TO MANUAL AND ASCERTAIN THE POS OF THE ACFT FROM POM RATHER THAN PLACING POM INTO THE FIX PAGE AND ESSENTIALLY CONFIRMING AN ERRONEOUS POS WITH MORE INCORRECT INFO.

  117.  
  118. Accession Number: 362229
    Synopsis: B737-300 RECEIVED AN ERRONEOUS GPWS TERRAIN WARNING AND CLBED PER COMPANY PROCS. THERE WAS MD80 TFC ABOVE THEM AND ATC WAS CONCERNED ABOUT A POTENTIAL CONFLICT. NO TCASII WARNING RECEIVED. GPWS PERFORMANCE WAS WRITTEN UP IN THE LOGBOOK.
    Narrative: INBOUND TO LAS ON THE CRESSO ARR. WE WERE GIVEN A VECTOR OFF OF THE ARR AND A DSCNT TO 6100 FT MSL IN PREPARATION FOR A L BASE ENTRY TO A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 25L. WHILE IN LEVEL FLT AT 6100 FT MSL, WE RECEIVED A GPWS TERRAIN WARNING. IN COMPLIANCE WITH OUR COMPANY PROCS, I INSTRUCTED THE FO TO INCREASE PWR AND CLB. WE LEVELED AT 6800 FT MSL AFTER THE TERRAIN WARNING WAS SILENCED. LAS APCH CTL WAS CONCERNED ABOUT MD80 TFC IN A L DOWNWIND ABOVE US APCHING FROM OUR 9 O'CLOCK POS. AFTER INSTRUCTING THE FO TO CLB, I INFORMED LAS APCH OF THE GPWS WARNING AND CLB. I MAINTAINED VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE MD80 THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE MANEUVER. WE WERE SUBSEQUENTLY CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH. IN A PHONE CONVERSATION WITH THE APCH CTL SUPVR, HE SAID THERE WAS NOT A SEPARATION CONFLICT WITH THE MD80 BUT THAT HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE POTENTIAL FOR ONE. HE WAS ALSO SURPRISED THAT WE RECEIVED A GPWS WARNING SINCE THEY VECTOR NUMEROUS ACFT OVER THE TERRAIN IN THAT AREA AT 6100 FT MSL. I ALSO EXPLAINED THAT OUR COMPANY PROCS REQUIRE AN IMMEDIATE CLB UPON RECEIVING A GPWS TERRAIN WARNING AT NIGHT OR IN IMC WHEN THE TERRAIN IS NOT IN SIGHT. AFTER TALKING TO OUR MAINT CTL, I WROTE A MAINT DISCREPANCY ON THE GPWS TO HAVE THE SYS CHKED FOR PROPER OP. SINCE WE WERE AT THE MVA OF 6100 FT MSL, I FEEL THAT WE WERE GIVEN AN INCORRECT TERRAIN WARNING.

  119.  
  120. Accession Number: 362630
    Synopsis: BA41 JETSTREAM CLBS THROUGH ASSIGNED ALT WITH ALT CAPTURE SELECTED. FLC CATCHES THE DEV AND CORRECTS ACFT'S ALT. NO LOSS OF SEPARATION.
    Narrative: ON CLBOUT FROM BTV THE AUTOPLT WAS IN HEADING MODE AND 'ALT CAPTURE,' VERT MODE AND CLBING AT A PREDICATED 170 KTS. AS WE APCHED ALT THE AUTOPLT INITIALLY LEVELED THEN CONTINUED TO CLB. MY FO AND MYSELF TURNED OFF THE AUTOPLT AND ARRESTED THE RATE OF CLB AT 16250 FT. THERE WERE NO ACFT ON TCASII WITHIN 40 NM AND ATC, ZBW, DID NOT COMPLAIN OF A CONFLICT.

  121.  
  122. Accession Number: 362777
    Synopsis: TCASII RA ALERT B757 CREW AT FL390 TO XING TFC BENEATH THEM. RA CALLS FOR CLB WHICH PIC DOES. ZOA CTLR STATES THAT ACFT Y, A T38, WAS AT FL350.
    Narrative: WHILE LEVEL AT FL390 IN SMOOTH AIR, WE RECEIVED A TCASII TA FOLLOWED ALMOST IMMEDIATELY BY A RESOLUTION COMMAND TO CLB. I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND BEGAN AN IMMEDIATE CLB. THE SEAT BELT SIGN WAS TURNED ON DURING THE MANEUVER. TCASII SHOWED A CONFLICTING ACFT 500 FT DIRECTLY BELOW US. AFTER WE WERE CLR OF CONFLICT, A SMALL MIL ACFT (POSSIBLY A T38/F5) WAS SIGHTED GOING AWAY TO OUR L, SEVERAL THOUSAND FT BELOW US. THE FO SAID HE HAD THAT ACFT INSIGHT APCHING FROM OUR R JUST PRIOR TO THE TCASII RESOLUTION. ZOA WAS NOTIFIED. THEY SAID THEY HAD THE MIL ACFT LEVEL AT FL350. OUR MAX ALT WAS FL396. I FEEL THERE MAY HAVE BEEN FAULTY XPONDER/TCASII COM WHICH CAUSED THE RESOLUTION. AT NO TIME DO I FEEL OUR ACFT OR OUR PAX WERE IN DANGER.

  123.  
  124. Accession Number: 362840
    Synopsis: B737-300 IS ALLOWED TO STRAY FROM COURSE WHEN THE FMC DROPPED A WAYPOINT.
    Narrative: FLYING LKV-FRA DIRECT. AFTER PASSING FRA, ATC ADVISED WE WERE 4 MI L OF COURSE (L OF J7), AND ADVISED TO TURN R AND INTERCEPT AIRWAY (J7). EVIDENTLY THE FMC DUMPED THE NEXT WAYPOINT (DERBB). WE WERE STILL WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF THE AIRWAY BUT WOULD HAVE HAD A COURSE DEV IF WE HAD CONTINUED ON PRESENT HDG. (FMC DID NOT RPT THE DISCONTINUITY WHICH IT GENERATED.)

  125.  
  126. Accession Number: 363071
    Synopsis: MLG ACFT IN CRUISE RECEIVED TCASII RA, FOLLOWED IT AND THEN THE FLC REALIZED THAT THE TARGET STAYED IN THE SAME RELATIVE POS. INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT THE TCASII HAD BEEN WRITTEN UP 3 TIMES RECENTLY.
    Narrative: WE WERE LEVEL FL350, RECEIVED TCASII TA 12 O'CLOCK POS AND 1 MI, THEN DSND RA, ZERO ALT DIFFERENCE. RESPONDED -- HAD TO DSND TO FL335. TARGET STAYED MERGED WITH US. SWITCHED XPONDERS AT FL335 AND TARGET DISAPPEARED. SUSPECT FALSE RA. FURTHER INVESTIGATION

  127.  
  128. Accession Number: 363330
    Synopsis: B737-300 MAX GROSS TKOF RWY 35R CLBING TO 10000 FT. COMPLETING AFTER TKOF CHKLIST AND VECTORED TO 100 DEGS PLUS TA GIVEN. AUTOPLT WOULD NOT ENGAGE AND NOTED ALT 10150 FT CLBING. DSNDED TO 9900 FT WHEN CTLR QUESTIONED ALT. TCASII TA AND RA AND SAW TFC VISUALLY 500 FT ABOVE. WHEN CLR OF TFC CLRED TO 16000 FT.
    Narrative: WE WERE MAKING A MAX GROSS WT TKOF ON RWY 35R AT COS USING IMPROVED CLB, BLEEDS OFF, FLAPS 1 DEG. THE CLRNC WAS RWY HEADING CLB TO 10000 FT MSL. AFTER LIFT-OFF I PROCEEDED ON RWY HEADING AND THE TWR TOLD US TO TURN TO 010 DEGS AND CONTACT DEP CTL. THE ACFT WAS BEING CLEANED UP AS WE CONTACTED DEP. HE GAVE US A TURN TO 100 DEGS TO INTERCEPT THE 349 DEG RADIAL OFF PUB. I CALLED FOR THE AFTER TKOF CHKLIST AND RESET THE BLEEDS AS WE LEVELED AT 10000 FT TURNING TO 100 DEGS. DEP CTL ADVISED US OF VFR TFC AT 2 O'CLOCK. THE COPLT WAS LOOKING FOR TFC AS I ATTEMPTED TO ENGAGE THE AUTOPLT. IT WOULD NOT ENGAGE SO I ATTEMPTED IT AGAIN WITHOUT SUCCESS. I LOOKED BACK AT THE ALTIMETER AND NOTICED WE WERE AT 10150 FT IN A CLB. I IMMEDIATELY PUSHED THE NOSE DOWN TO REGAIN 10000 FT. AT THIS TIME DEP CTL ASKED IF WE WERE CLBING BECAUSE OF A POSSIBLE CONFLICT WITH THE VFR TFC. BY THIS TIME WE WERE AT EXACTLY 9900 FT SO WE TOLD HIM WE WERE AT 10000 FT. WE THEN PICKED UP THE TFC VISUALLY AND ON TCASII, WHICH SHOWED HIM AT 500 FT ABOVE US CLOSING. SOON AFTERWARD WE GOT A TA FOLLOWED BY AN RA FROM THE TCASII. WE STAYED AT 9900 FT UNTIL HE PASSED BECAUSE WE HAD HIM VISUALLY. DEP CTL THEN GAVE US A CLB TO 16000 FT AND CONTACT ZDV. LOOKING BACK I SHOULD HAVE EITHER ENGAGED THE AUTOPLT EARLIER TO REDUCE THE WORKLOAD OR WAITED TILL WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO CLB TO 16000 FT. THERE IS JUST TOO MUCH GOING ON IN THE ATA ESPECIALLY WHEN VFR ACFT ARE FLYING OVER THE TOP.

  129.  
  130. Accession Number: 363466
    Synopsis: OPERROR OCCURRED WHEN A DA10 COULD NOT HOLD ALT AFTER LOSING AN ENG AND DSNDED THROUGH THE ALT OF THE ACR MD80. THE MD80 RECEIVED A TCASII RA AND BEGAN DSCNT. THE RPTR SAYS THE RADAR CTLR FROZE. THE RPTR TOOK ACTION TO STOP THE DSCNT AND TURNED THE ACFT AWAY FROM THE DA10.
    Narrative: I WAS WORKING D76 AT ZJX WHEN A DA01 SAID HE HAD ENG PROB. (I AM A PLT, THE RADAR CTLR WAS NOT.) SO I ASKED PLT ON FREQ IF HE WAS DECLARING AN EMER, OR HAD TO SHUT IT DOWN. HE SAID NO, BUT HE WAITED TO CHANGE DEST TO TLH. I DECIDED TO LOWER ALT. RADAR CTLR THEN GAVE HIM FL350 AND DIRECT TLH WHICH TURNED HIM DIRECTLY OVER AN ACR MD80 NBOUND ON J81. ABOUT 5 MI E OF THE ACR, THE DA01 SAID HE HAD TO SHUT DOWN THE ENG AND HAD TO HAVE A LOWER ALT AND COULD NOT MAINTAIN ALT. AFTER BEING TOLD TO MAINTAIN FL350 HE CAME BACK AND SAID AGAIN HE COULD NOT MAINTAIN ALT NOW AT FL345. THE ACR INTERRUPTS AND SAYS HE HAS A TCASII ALERT AND HE IS DSNDING. BOTH TARGETS ARE ON A PERFECT MERGER COURSE. RADAR CTLR FROZE, SO I TOOK FREQ AND TOLD THE ACR NOT TO DSND AND TO TURN L TO 090 DEGS IMMEDIATELY, IF HE DSNDS IT WOULD PUT HIM WITH THE DA10 WHO HAD LOST AN ENG AND WAS DSNDING. THE 2 ACFT GOT EACH OTHER IN SIGHT AND MISSED IN VERY CLOSE PROX. TCASII ALMOST PUT THESE 2 ACFT TOGETHER! I ONLY REACTED TO WHAT AT THE TIME SEEMED TO BE THE BEST SOLUTION.

  131.  
  132. Accession Number: 363531
    Synopsis: AN ACR LGT FLC EXPERIENCES PROBS TRACKING COLTS NECK VOR 350 DEG RADIAL INBOUND. THE FLC IS IN AGREEMENT THAT THEIR OPERATING PROC WAS CORRECT, THAT IS, THAT ALL SWITCHES WERE IN THE CORRECT POS AND THAT THEY DID NOT HAVE THE RECIPROCAL COURSE SET IN THE HSI. THEY THINK THAT THERE MAY BE A PROB WITH THE COLTS NECK VOR.
    Narrative: DURING DEP, WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO JOIN COL 350 DEGS TO TRACK INBOUND FROM A HDG OF 220 DEGS. BOTH CAPT AND FO CDI NEEDLES INDICATED FLY R, HOWEVER, CAPT NOTICED BY GND REF THAT WE WERE ACTUALLY ALREADY S OF THE 350 DEG COL RADIAL. ABOUT THE SAME TIME ATC ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS TO TURN L TO GET BACK ON COURSE. A CHK OF GPS/VOR SELECTOR SHOWED WE WERE BOTH STILL IN VOR/LOC. DURING THIS CONFUSION ATC ADVISED WE HAD TFC AND ISSUED NEW CLB AND HEADING. HOWEVER, SEPARATION MAY HAVE BEEN LOST, TCASII SHOWED THE TFC AT APPROX 4.8 MI, 1000 FT BELOW. WE RECEIVED NO TA OR RA FROM TCASII. AT THIS POINT MYSELF, THE CAPT AND SO ARE SURE NAV SWITCHES WERE VOR LOC CDI NEEDLES WERE CORRECT WITH 170 DEGS SELECTED. DURING REST OF THE FLT VOR ON ALL OTHER NAV STATIONS AND FREQS WERE CORRECT. SUGGEST THAT BAD SIGNAL SENT OUT OF COLTS NECK VOR. I DON'T KNOW IF POSSIBLE, BUT PERHAPS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 363543: ALL NAVAIDS CHKED AND SWITCHES POSITIONED IN THE ACFT CORRECTLY. ASSIGNED A CLB TO 17000 FT. WE DEPARTED 6000 FT, AND TFC CALLED AT 7000 FT. GOING THROUGH 8000 FT AND A TURN TO 260 DEGS, THE TCASII SHOWED THE TFC 1000 FT BELOW AND 5 MI AWAY! WITHOUT FURTHER PROB, WE INTERCEPTED THE 204 DEG RADIAL SBOUND AT 5 DME. THIS WAS ALSO CONFIRMED BY ATC DEP. ENGINEER LATER RPTED A SIMILAR SIT WITH THE SAME ACFT IN THE VICINITY OF COLTS NECK.

  133.  
  134. Accession Number: 363684
    Synopsis: MDT ACR JET OVERSHOOTS 3000 FT ALT WHEN ALT CAPTURE FEATURE ON AUTOPLT FAILS TO LEVEL ACFT AT 3000 FT. TCASII RA CREATES A FURTHER ALTDEV IN A CLB MANEUVER. FLC ADVISES ATC OF DEV.
    Narrative: XA45 LCL (ORF). ASSIGNED 3000 FT BY DEP. ACFT ON AUTOFLT MODE (AUTOPLT) DID NOT CAPTURE. AT 3400 FT, WE STARTED PUSHOVER THEN GOT TCASII ALERT, THEN TCASII CLB RESOLUTION. WE THEN CONTINUED CLB AND NOTIFIED DEP.

  135.  
  136. Accession Number: 364030
    Synopsis: MD88 FLC FAILS TO CATCH THEIR FMS PROGRAM ERROR WHILE ENRTE ON A STAR ARR. ATC CATCHES THE OFF COURSE DEV AND SENDS THEM DIRECT TO THEIR NEXT POINT.
    Narrative: FLT DEPARTED IND VIA THE DAWNN 1 DEP/BWG TRANSITION AND WAS FLT PLANNED TO ATL VIA THE ROME 8 ARR FROM BWG. SHORTLY AFTER PASSING BWG ZME REQUESTED OUR NEXT NAV FIX, WE RESPONDED RMG AND CTR STATED HE SHOWED OUR POS E OF COURSE. WE WERE NOW 20-40 NM S OF BWG HDG 160 DEGS TO RMG. FMS WAS OPERATIONAL AND BEING TRACKED BY AUTOPLT. AT THIS POINT WE DETERMINED THE TRANSITION OVER BWG HAD NOT TAKEN US VIA THE ROME 8 BWG TRANSITION BUT DIRECTLY TO RMG (HDG APPROX 15 DEGS E OF COURSE). AS WE WERE XREFING OUR POS, CTR STATED NO PROB AND JUST PROCEED DIRECT RMG. FLT CONTINUED WITHOUT INCIDENT. 2 POSSIBLE CAUSES WERE DISCUSSED BY FLC. 1) ON INITIAL FMS PROGRAMMING THE ARR TRANSITION WHICH SHARED A COMMON FIX WITH THE DEP TRANSITION ACCEPTED THE COMMON FIX OF BWG BUT WAS ENTERED IN SUCH A MANNER THE FMS TOOK THE ENTRY AS A REQUEST FOR DIRECT BWG-RMG AND NOT THE BWG TRANSITION TO RMG. 2) THE FMS WAS PROGRAMMED AS FLT PLANNED AND A SUBSEQUENT ENTRY CHANGED THE TRANSITION TO A DIRECT LEG. BOTH PLTS HAD REVIEWED THE DATA ENTRY ON PREFLT. RTE AND FLT PLAN WERE VERIFIED. CREW BELIEVES THEY WOULD HAVE NOTICED THE DIFFERENCE IN HEADING/RTE AS CHANGE FROM DEP CHART TO ARR CHART WAS MADE. THIS WAS IN PROCESS OF HAPPENING AFTER PASSING COMMON POINT OF BWG AND ABOUT THE TIME CTR CONTACTED THE FLT.

  137.  
  138. Accession Number: 364121
    Synopsis: AN ACR B727 DSNDED AND TURNED TO AVOID A GOV B737. THE B737 WAS FLYING VFR IN A DATA COLLECTION PATTERN KNOWN TO BWI TRACON APCH CTL. SEE AND AVOID.
    Narrative: WHILE CLBING THROUGH 13000 FT TCASII ALERT WITH RA ACTIVATED. RA CALLED FOR CLB. I SPOTTED A B737 AT 11 O'CLOCK POS, HIGHER, SBOUND. I CALLED FOR DSND (RA CALLED FOR CLB), THE CAPT PUSHED THE NOSE OVER WITH 40 DEGS R TURN. RA CHANGED TO DSND ADVISORY. THE B737 PASSED ABOVE AND BEHIND US AT 14500 FT. WE LEVELED OFF AT 14000 FT. I BELIEVE THAT IF WE WERE TO FOLLOW RA INSTRUCTION (CLB), A CLOSER SIT WOULD HAVE OCCURRED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 364135: COPLT FOR A DATA COLLECTION FLT. THE ACFT IS A NON TCASII B737-200. THE DATA COLLECTION WAS PLANNED FOR 2 RUNS AT 14500 FT. THE PIC PRECOORDINATED THE DATA COLLECTION PATTERN WITH BALTIMORE TRACON, AN OVAL PATTERN, 12 MI LONG AND 6 MI WIDE. THE ACFT WAS OPERATED ON A VFR CLRNC WITH RADAR TA'S FROM BALTIMORE APCH WITH A MODE 3 XPONDER CODE. ALTHOUGH THERE APPEARED TO BE NO REAL COLLISION THREAT, THE ACR AIRPLANE WAS MANEUVERING AGGRESSIVELY IN A POORLY PLANNED COLLISION AVOIDANCE TURN AND DSCNT. I WAS SURPRISED BY THE ACR AIRPLANE'S INEFFECTIVE PITCH AND ROLL DIRECTIONS, AS WELL AS THE AGGRESSIVE PITCH AND ROLL RATES. THE ACR AIRPLANE SHOULD HAVE REMAINED ABOVE OUR ALT AND INITIALLY TURNED L, TO PASS BEHIND OUR AIRPLANE. THE R TURN PROLONGED THE XING SIT. THE ACR AIRCREW COULD USE SOME TRAINING IN VISUAL MANEUVERING TO CTL ACFT SEPARATION IN ACFT XING SITS, OR TCASII ALT AND TURN DIRECTION ALGORITHMS FAILED TO RECOGNIZE A TURNING ACFT XING SIT. NO TA CALL WAS RECEIVED BY OUR AIRPLANE FROM BALTIMORE APCH. OUR ACFT WAS CLOSE TO THE BOUNDARIES OF 4 TFC CTL SECTORS AND THE ACR AIRPLANE WAS TALKING TO WASHINGTON.

  139.  
  140. Accession Number: 364225
    Synopsis: LGT FLC DEPARTS WITHOUT USING XPONDER CODE AND WITHOUT OBTAINING ENRTE CLRNC. THEY CLB THROUGH ASSIGNED ALT DUE TO POSSIBLE FAILURE OF ALT CAPTURE. CHKLIST DEFICIENCIES CITED.
    Narrative: MANY DISTRS PRIOR TO DEP (STATION MGR CONVERSATIONS REGARDING CLEANING OF ACFT, 2 OTHER MEMBER CREWS), CONTINUED INTERRUPTION OF COCKPIT SETUP. WAS DISTR WITH 1 ITEM LEFT TO ACCOMPLISH -- XPONDER. SO, FAILED TO NOTICE NO CODE IN XPONDER. PUSH BACK AND TAXI OUT NORMAL. RECEIVED TKOF CLRNC AS USUAL. TKOF ROLL WAS EXTREMELY DISTR BY LENGTHY CONVERSATION BTWN THE TWR CTLR AND A SMALL ACFT THAT APPEARED TO BE DISORIENTED. DURING CLB OUT, IT TOOK AN UNUSUAL AMOUNT OF TIME (LONG) BEFORE THE CONVERSATION STOPPED, AND WE COULD GET IN A WORD TO ASK IF WE SHOULD GO TO DEP CTL FREQ. ALSO DURING CLB OUT, OUR TCASII SHOWED US RAPIDLY APCHING AN ACFT AHEAD OF US AND SLIGHTLY TO THE L. WHEN WE FINALLY CONTACTED TWR, THEY ASKED US TO CHK OUR XPONDER, THEN GAVE US A SQUAWK (CODE). WE WERE TURNED OVER TO DEP CTL AND GIVEN A HDG OF 350 DEGS, WHICH THE FO'S MISTUNED TO 250 DEGS. I CORRECTED HIM AND ASKED HIM TO VERIFY THE HDG WITH ATC. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, I NOTICED WE WERE AT 5900 FT MSL, CLBING RAPIDLY. THE AUTOFLT SYS HAD FAILED TO OPERATE NORMALLY, AND THE ALT ALERT WAS NOT NOTICEABLE ENOUGH TO CATCH OUR ATTN -- SMALL LIGHT ON ALTIMETER, NO AURAL WARNING. I IMMEDIATELY STOPPED THE CLB, REACHING 6280 FT MSL AS WE RETURNED TO 6000 FT MSL (NO ALT ALERT INDICATING 300 FT OFF ALT). I REALIZED THAT WE HAD NOT RECEIVED OUR ENRTE CLRNC, THEREFORE, WE HAD NOT SET THE XPONDER. DURING CLBOUT, WE WERE FLYING MANUALLY, WITH AUTOTHROTTLE ENGAGED, NOT FOLLOWING PITCH BAR TO KEEP SPD LOW AND CLB RAPIDLY. CAUSES: 1) NO DEFINITIVE 'XPONDER' ON BEFORE TKOF OR STARTING ENGS CHKLIST. THIS ITEM IS COMBINED WITH 'RADIOS AND NAV EQUIP.' IT'S A NO NAVAID DEP TO AN AUTO-FLT RTE, THEREFORE, EXCEPT FOR XPONDER, THERE'S NO NAVAIDS TO SET. 2) MULTIPLE DISTRS, COMBINED WITH PAVLOVEON CONDITIONING OF AUTO-FLT SYS, AUTOMATICALLY PULLING THROTTLES TO IDLE WHEN APCHING A LEVEL OFF ALT DURING CLB. 3) 2 PLT CREW -- A THIRD PLT COULD HAVE LOOKED FOR THE TFC, TAKEN CARE OF THE OTHER MEMBER CREW, VERIFIED THE XPONDER, POSSIBLY CAUGHT THE AUTO-FLT MALFUNCTION AND THE APCHING ALT LIMIT. 4) CAPT'S AND FO'S FAILURE TO GET ATC ENRTE CLRNC. I THOUGHT THE FO HAD GOTTEN THE CLRNC -- HE HAD NOT.

  141.  
  142. Accession Number: 364385
    Synopsis: AN ACR FLC, FLYING AN MD88, RPT THAT THEY GOT AS MUCH AS 20 NM OFF COURSE ACCORDING TO ARTCC RADAR CTLR AND CONFIRMED WHEN THEY CHKED THEIR RAW DATA. THEY WERE ABLE TO UPDATE THEIR NAV SYS USING VOR INFO. NO FURTHER PROB.
    Narrative: AFTER 45 MINS OF FLT, THE FMS WAS CONTINUALLY RESORTING TO DR AND VORS WERE UPDATED. ARTCC CALLED AND ASKED OUR POS. THE RNAV SHOWED 5 MI R OF PSB AND ARTCC RADAR SHOWED 20 MI L OF PSB. XCHKING THE PSB VOR, WE SWITCHED TO VOR NAV AND AIRBORNE UPDATED THE MAP FUNCTION POS. NO FURTHER PROBS, BUT A CONSTANT XCHK WITH THE VOR WAS MADE FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR IS AN MD88 CAPT FOR A MAJOR ACR. THE MD88'S ARE EQUIPPED WITH HONEYWELL FMS WITH HONEYWELL SOFTWARE. HE SAID THAT HIS COMPANY HAD PROBS WITH THE EQUIP GETTING OFF COURSE ABOUT A YR OR 2 AGO AND HONEYWELL REPRESENTATIVES FLEW A NUMBER OF FLTS IN THE JUMP SEAT AND WERE ABLE TO SOLVE THE PROB. THIS EVENT WAS THE FIRST THAT HE HAD HEARD OF SINCE THAT TIME. AFTER HE LANDED, THE MAINT TECHNICIANS ALLEGEDLY TOLD HIM THAT THE SOFTWARE PROGRAM WAS NOT ALLOWING THE PRIMARY NAV SYS TO AUTOMATICALLY UPDATE. THEY DID REMIND HIM THAT HE SHOULD CHK THE SYS AGAINST RAW DATA AND MANUALLY UPDATE IF NECESSARY.

  143.  
  144. Accession Number: 364758
    Synopsis: MD88 ON MINKS 1 STAR LGA, CLRED CROSS KERNO INTXN FL260 PLTS DISCRETION. EFIS MAP FAILED AND DSCNT WAS BEGUN. WHEN MAP RESTORED CROSSED KERNO FL285. CTR ADVISED NO PROB.
    Narrative: ON THE MINKS 1 ARR INTO LGA WE WERE GIVEN CLRNC TO CROSS KERNO AT FL260. DISTANCE TO KERNO SHOWED 38 NM SO I DIDN'T START DOWN IMMEDIATELY. CAPT TUNED HIS VOR TO DCA (111.0), FO TUNED COL (115.4) WHICH IS NORMAL PROC. MOMENTS LATER THE EFIS MAP FAILED, FMC TIMED OUT, AND THE AUTOPLT ENTERED THE BASIC MODE. NO DEAD RECKONING WAS DISPLAYED ON PFD. I RE-ENTERED FMS DATA AND STARTED A DSCNT TO FL260. APCHING FL260 THE MAP DISPLAY SHIFTED AND SHOWED US ALMOST ON TOP OF KERNO INTXN. WE CROSSED KERNO AT FL285 AND ZNY CLRED US TO CROSS SOMTO AT 13000 FT. WE QUERIED ZNY AND THEY TOLD US THE HIGH XING WAS 'NOT A PROB.' THE FMC FUNCTIONED NORMALLY FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT.

  145.  
  146. Accession Number: 364771
    Synopsis: MD80 SUPER80 OVERSHOT ASSIGNED ALT WHEN AUTOPLT FAILED TO CAPTURE.
    Narrative: APCHING LEVELOFF CLBING TO FL240, THE AUTOPLT FAILED TO CAPTURE THE LEVELOFF. DISCONNECT AND MANUAL LEVELOFF ACCOMPLISHED RESULTING IN EXCEEDING THE PLANNED LEVELOFF OF FL240 BY APPROX 300 FT.

  147.  
  148. Accession Number: 364937
    Synopsis: MD88 ACFT IN CLB INCREASED PITCH AFTER ENG ANTI-ICE WAS TURNED OFF DUE TO INCREASED PWR AND VNAV MODE. CLB RATE VERY HIGH AND ALT CAPTURE WAS ANNUNCIATED ON MODE PANEL AT 31000 FT FOR A 35000 FT LEVELOFF. AIRSPD BLED OFF, AUTOTHROTTLES DIDN'T CORRECT NOR DID PITCH ATTITUDE. FLC HAD TO DISCONNECT AUTO SYS AND PUSH OVER TO REGAIN AIRSPD.
    Narrative: CLBING IN VERT AND HORIZ NAV MODES OF AUTOPLT (NORMAL OP) ON SCHEDULED FLT IN MD88 FROM BOS TO ATL. UPON LEAVING CLOUD DECK, ENG ANTI-ICE WAS TURNED OFF AT FL290. ADDITIONAL THRUST FROM THIS ACTION (APPARENTLY) CAUSED ACCELERATION TO MACH .78, ABOUT .02 ABOVE NORMAL CLB MACH. ACFT CLB RATE INCREASED TO 5000-6000 FPM AND VNAV CAPTURE APPEARED ON 'FLT MODE ANNUNCIATOR PANEL,' INDICATING AUTOPLT CAPTURE OF FL350. THIS OCCURRED AT FL310. MACH WAS APPROX .76 AT THIS POINT (APPROX 260 KIAS) AND DECREASING, HOWEVER, AUTOPLT DID NOT PITCH OVER TO MAINTAIN CLB SPD -- IT CONTINUED ON A CAPTURE PROFILE THAT WAS APPARENTLY BASED ON THE CLB RATE AT CAPTURE INITIATION. THE AIRSPD BLED OFF WITH FULL CLB PWR APPLIED UNTIL THE AUTOPLT WAS DISCONNECTED AT 214 KIAS ABOVE FL340. A DSCNT OF NEARLY 1000 FT WAS REQUIRED TO GAIN ENOUGH AIRSPD FOR THE ACFT TO ACCELERATE TO NORMAL CLB SPD OF APPROX 260 KIAS AT THIS ALT. LIGHT PRESTALL BUFFET WAS EXPERIENCED. I HAVE NO DOUBT THE ACFT WOULD HAVE STALLED AT NEARLY FL350 IF THE AUTOPLT HAD NOT BEEN DISCONNECTED. 'WHAT REALLY CAUSED THE PROB, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO PREVENT A REOCCURRENCE, OR CORRECT THE SIT?' THIS IS THE SAME PROB THAT CAUSED THE A330 FLT TEST ACCIDENT AT TOULOUSE. GIVEN DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES AND DISTRACTIONS IT COULD HAVE CAUSED SERIOUS INJURY OR AN ACCIDENT. PLTS ARE TERRIBLE MONITORS OF SYS THAT WORK WELL FOR 99.99% OF THE TIME, ESPECIALLY, SYS THAT REDUCE WORKLOAD SO THAT 2 PLTS CAN DO THE JOB. IF WE CAN'T TRUST AUTOPLTS TO WORK CORRECTLY OR TELL US WHEN THEY ARE MALFUNCTIONING, WE CANNOT OPERATE WELL IN HIGH WORKLOAD SITS. CERTIFICATION STANDARDS SHOULD BE CHANGED TO REQUIRE SAFE OP IN ALL POSSIBLE SITS AND NOT RELY ON PLT INTERVENTION TO INSURE SAFETY. SITS BEYOND NORMAL CTL OF THE AUTOPLT OR CONFLICTS BTWN DIFFERENT INPUT DEVICES (EG, PITCH WHEEL AND ALT SET WINDOW) SHOULD CAUSE ERROR MESSAGES AND INACTION UNTIL THE CONFLICT IS RESOLVED, OR DISCONNECTION OF THE AUTOPLT AND HIGH LEVEL DISCONNECT WARNINGS. WE MUST BE ABLE TO TRUST AUTOMATION!! AUTOMATION CERTIFICATION STANDARDS MUST BE IMPROVED.

  149.  
  150. Accession Number: 365130
    Synopsis: FLC OF A B767-200 OVERSHOT DSCNT XING ALT DURING A STAR ARR DUE TO THE CAPT SELECTING THE WRONG FMC MODE CTL.
    Narrative: FLT WAS ON BOARD A B767-200 AND WAS CLRED TO DSND VIA THE CIVIT ARR TO LAX. THE CAPT WAS PF. I WAS BUSY WITH COMPANY DUTIES, EG, CALLING COMPANY OPS FOR GATE ASSIGNMENT, ALERTING THE CABIN CREW TO PREPARE FOR ARR. ORIGINALLY, THE CAPT WAS DSNDING USING VNAV AND IT HAD BEEN PERFORMING SATISFACTORY. I RECALL BEING GIVEN AN AIRSPD ASSIGNMENT OF '300 KTS OR GREATER.' I NOTICED THAT HIS AIRSPD BUG DROPPED TO 250 KTS (DUE TO VNAV PREPARING TO DSND BELOW 10000 FT OR POSSIBLY BEING PROGRAMMED TO CROSS BREMR AT 250 KTS AND GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 12000 FT. WHEN PAUSING BTWN TASKS, I NOTICED WE WERE 8 NM FROM BREMR AND WERE DSNDING THROUGH APPROX 13300 FT. I NOTICED THAT THE CAPT WAS TRYING TO OVERRIDE THE SPD REDUCTION BY SELECTING 300 KTS ON THE MCP. I ASSUMED THAT HE WAS USING VNAV SPD INTERVENTION. THEREFORE, I ASSUMED THAT THE AUTOPLT WAS GOING TO LEVEL OFF AT 12000 FT TO MAKE THE XING AT BREMR AT OR ABOVE 12000 FT (D40 LAX). AFTER MY INCORRECT ASSUMPTION, I ADVISED THE CAPT THAT WE WERE GOING THROUGH 12000 FT -- A RECHK OF THE SID CONFIRMED THE REQUIREMENT. WE WERE 4 MI FROM BREMR AND DSNDING THROUGH 11700 FT! THE CAPT AND I WERE BOTH PERPLEXED AS TO WHY THE AUTOPLT DID NOT LEVEL OFF AT 12000 FT. IT TURNS OUT THAT THE AUTOPLT WAS DOING EXACTLY AS IT WAS TOLD TO DO. THE CAPT HAD SELECTED FLT LEVEL CHANGE, 10000 FT WAS THE SELECTED ALT -- THE LOWEST ALT ON THE ARR. THE CAPT WAS FIXATING ON HIS AIRSPD, I WAS DISTR BY MISC DUTIES AND FAILED TO XCHK THE AUTOFLT MODE IN USE.

  151.  
  152. Accession Number: 365306
    Synopsis: CAPT OF A L1011 OVERSHOT DSCNT XING RESTR ALT AND MADE SUCH AN ABRUPT CORRECTION THAT 2 FLT ATTENDANTS WERE INJURED. IN ADDITION, SINCE THE WRONG WAYPOINT HAD BEEN ENTERED INTO THE FMC, RPTR WAS NOT ON THE PRESCRIBED STAR ARR TRACK.
    Narrative: ACFT WAS CLRED TO LOGEN INTXN WHEN FO WAS ABSENT FROM COCKPIT FOR PERSONAL BIOLOGICAL REASONS. ACFT WAS LEVEL AT FL240. FO RETURNED TO COCKPIT AND WAS INFORMED OF CLRNC DIRECT TO LOGEN. UPON INSPECTION OF LATITUDE/LONGITUDE OF WAYPOINT THAT ACFT WAS PROCEEDING TO, DETERMINED WRONG WAYPOINT SELECTED. AT THAT TIME, ATC ISSUED DSCNT TO FL200. ALT SET, AND ANNUNCIATED, IN ALT SELECTOR. FO COMMENCED VERIFYING AND INPUTTING PROPER WAYPOINT LATITUDE/LONGITUDE. AT FL210, THE REQUIRED '1000 FT TO GO, OUT OF FL210 FOR FL200' WAS MADE BY THE FO AND 'ROGERED' BY THE CAPT. BEFORE THE FINALIZATION OF THE CORRECT WAYPOINT WAS COMPLETED, A RADICAL PULL-UP WAS INITIATED BY THE CAPT. WHEN QUESTIONED WHY, THE CAPT STATED THAT THE ACFT AUTOPLT FAILED TO CAPTURE THE SET ALT, FL200. THE ACFT DSNDED BELOW FL200 BY 400-450 FT BEFORE RETURNING TO THE CLRED ALT. FOR UNKNOWN REASONS, THE ACFT DID NOT LEVEL OFF. AFTER, THE ACFT WAS LEVELED OFF MANUALLY, (THE AUTOPLT WAS DISCONNECTED BY CAPT DURING HIS ATTEMPT TO RE-LEVEL THE ACFT) AND THE ALT SET KNOB WAS RESET TO FL200. 2 FLT ATTENDANTS WERE SHAKEN UP AND SUSTAINED MINOR INJURIES THAT WERE BROUGHT TO THE ATTN OF THE FLC WITHIN 10 MINS OF THE INCIDENT. NO ATC COMMENTS WERE MADE ABOUT ALT BUST.

  153.  
  154. Accession Number: 365320
    Synopsis: FLC OF AN MLG OVERSHOT DSCNT XING RESTR DUE TO MISSET AUTOPLT MODE CTL.
    Narrative: DURING DSCNT WE WERE GIVEN AN ADDITIONAL RESTR TO CROSS HITOP INTXN AT AND MAINTAIN 17000 FT. THIS WAS ENTERED IN LEGS PAGE. I DID NOT, I BELIEVE, RESET MCP ALT TO 17000 FT SINCE I WANTED TO LEVEL AT FL210 TILL WE NEEDED TO GO DOWN TO 17000 FT. WE WERE DSNDING IN VNAV ALL THE TIME WITH THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL WAYPOINT RESTRS IN FMC: 1) WHETO AT 12000 FT, AND 2) PSP AT 7000 FT. AS DSCNT CONTINUED, WE ADDED SPD RESTRS TO WHETO AND PSP TO GET SLOWED FOR THE FINAL DSCNT DURING THE EXPECTED VISUAL APCH. AS WE CONTINUED, I CAN'T SAY WHY, BUT I FELT SOMETHING WAS AMISS BUT DID NOT KNOW WHAT AT FIRST AND I STATED THIS TO THE CAPT. THEN I REALIZED WE WERE NEARING HITOP (DON'T RECALL HOW CLOSE WE WERE) AND WERE STILL AT FL210. IT (HITOP) WAS STILL DEFINITELY AHEAD OF US ON MAP DISPLAY. I IMMEDIATELY STATED WE MIGHT NOT MAKE HITOP AT 17000 FT TO THE CAPT, EXTENDED THE SPD BRAKES, WENT TO IDLE THRUST AND MANUALLY DSNDED THE AIRPLANE AS FAST AS POSSIBLE WITHOUT UPSETTING THE PAX. ATC THEN ASKED IF WE'D MAKE HITOP AT 17000 FT, CAPT SAID YES, I BELIEVE. I DON'T RECALL THE ALT AT HITOP BUT WE LEVELED AT 17000 FT PROBABLY 1-2 MI BEYOND. WE WERE, I PRESUME, CLOSE ENOUGH, BUT THE SIT COULD HAVE BEEN WORSE. IN THE END, I THINK OUR DOWNSTREAM WAYPOINT CHANGES CAUSED US TO DROP OUT OF VNAV AND INTO ALT HOLD AT FL210. THIS WOULD EXPLAIN THE LACK OF A 'RESET MCP ALT' MESSAGE PRIOR TO HITOP. THE MORAL OF THE STORY IS TO RECHK AND MONITOR FLT MODE ANNUNCIATIONS AND NEVER ASSUME THAT IT WON'T CHANGE MODES ON YOU WHEN YOU MAKE ALT RESTR MODIFICATIONS. IN THE END, THIS IS SOMETHING I'M QUITE MAD AT MYSELF FOR, FOR NOT MONITORING THE AUTOFLT SYS MORE CLOSELY.

  155.  
  156. Accession Number: 365344
    Synopsis: FLC OF A B757 UNDERSHOT DSCNT ALT RESULTING IN NOT MEETING A XING RESTR. THE FLC'S INATTN TO THE ACFT AUTOPLT ACTION, OF WHICH THEY THOUGHT WAS PREPROGRAMMED TO DSND THE ACFT IN TIME TO MEET THE XING RESTR, CAUSED THE ACFT TO BE 2000 FT HIGH AT XING FIX.
    Narrative: WHILE 70 NM E OF DEWITT, WE WERE GIVEN A CLRNC TO CROSS DEWITT AT FL310. THE MCA ALT WAS SET TO FL310 AND THE RESTR ENTERED INTO THE FMC. 5 NM FROM THE PROGRAMMED TOP OF DSCNT, 'DSND NOW' WAS ACTIVATED. THE THROTTLES CAME BACK AND THE DSCNT BEGAN. AFTER BEGINNING THE DSCNT, I BRIEFED THE UPCOMING APCH. I EXPECTED THE ACFT TO AUTOMATICALLY FLY THE RESTR LIKE IT IS SUPPOSED TO DO. THE CTR ASKED IF WE HAD A XING RESTR. WE LOOKED UP FROM OUR BRIEFING AND SAW THAT WE HAD CROSSED DEWITT AND WERE STILL DSNDING THROUGH FL330 AT ABOUT 1000 FPM. WE CHKED AND WE WERE STILL IN VNAV BUT THE THROTTLES WERE NOT AT IDLE. WE QUICKLY IDLED THE THROTTLES AND EXPEDITED DSCNT. CTR HAD TFC AT FL330. CONFUSED AT WHY THE ACFT DID NOT MAKE ITS RESTR, WE SET UP A SIMILAR SIT BUT THIS TIME THE ACFT MET THE RESTR. WE DON'T KNOW WHY THE ACFT DIDN'T MEET THE FIRST RESTR BUT WE CAN ONLY GUESS WE DID SOMETHING WRONG. PERHAPS THE EARLY PICKUP (XA15 HOME TIME) CONTRIBUTED. I NORMALLY GO TO SLEEP AROUND XB00 AT HOME AND DIDN'T EVEN COME CLOSE TO A FULL NIGHT'S SLEEP PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT.

  157.  
  158. Accession Number: 366354
    Synopsis: A320 ACFT ON APCH AND APPARENTLY NOT PROPERLY SET UP FOR THE APCH WAS GIVEN A GAR BY THE APCH CTLR. THE GAR WAS INITIATED, BUT WITHOUT TOGA THRUST UNTIL THE CAPT RPTR TOLD THE FO TO USE TOGA. AT THAT TIME, UNKNOWN TO THE FLC, THE ACFT CHANGED MODES AND IGNORED THE PREVIOUS INPUTS SET INTO THE FMGC.
    Narrative: DUE TO DETERIORATING WX CONDITIONS AND ABNORMALLY HIGH WINDS AT ALT VERSUS ON THE GND, DTW APCH CTL DIRECTED A GAR: MAINTAIN 3000 FT, TURN L 220 DEGS AND SPD OF 170 KTS. I RECOMMENDED TO THE FO TO GO TO THE TOGA THEN BACK TO CLB TO RESEQUENCE THE FMGC FOR THE ADDITIONAL APCH. THE ACFT STARTED CLBING, DISREGARDING THE 3000 FT FCU ALT. I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT TO RETURN IT TO 3000 FT. THE FO SAID WATCH YOUR AIRSPD WHICH WAS RAPIDLY INCREASING. THE FMGC IS SUPPOSED TO HONOR THE APCH SPD (140 KTS) OR FCU SELECTED AIRSPD (170 KTS) WHICHEVER IS HIGHER. IT DISREGARDED BOTH. I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOTHRUST AND RETARDED THE THRUST LEVERS. APPARENTLY THE FMGC STUCK IN THE GAR PHASE EVEN THOUGH THE THRUST LEVERS WERE IN THE CLB DSCNT. IN RETROSPECT WHAT WAS UNSETTLING WAS HOW LONG IT TOOK TO RECOGNIZE THE PROB THAN DEAL WITH IT. IN KNOW OUR FMGC'S HAVE BEEN EXPERIENCING NUMEROUS PROBS WHICH HAVE GOTTEN WORSE OVER TIME. I DON'T KNOW IF THIS HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE ABOVE PROB.

  159.  
  160. Accession Number: 366430
    Synopsis: B737-300 CLBING TO 16000 FT. 'A' AUTOPLT INDICATED ALT ACQUIRE AT 15000 FT. GIVEN VECTOR HDG AND IN SETTING HDG NOTICED AUTOPLT DID NOT CAPTURE AND ACFT WAS NEARING 17000 FT. REGAINED 16000 FT AND CHANGED TO 'B' AUTOPLT. NO COMMENT FROM CTLR.
    Narrative: THE B737-300 HAS 2 AUTOPLT SYS -- THE 'A' SYS NORMALLY USED BY THE CAPT AND THE 'B' SYS USED BY THE FO. THE FLT ORIGINATED OUT OF SAC TO BUR WITH MY FO FLYING THE FIRST LEG. THE ACFT HAD NO WRITE-UPS AND THE FIRST FLT WAS NORMAL. THE SECOND LEG WAS FROM BUR TO PHX FLOWN BY MYSELF. ON CLBOUT, WE WERE ASSIGNED 16000 FT BY DEP. AS WE WERE CLBING THROUGH 15000 FT, THE 'A' AUTOPLT WENT INTO THE ALT ACQUIRE MODE AND APPEARED TO BE WORKING PROPERLY. WE WERE GIVEN A HDG AND RADIAL TO INTERCEPT AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME. AFTER SETTING IN THE RADIAL AND HDG, I NOTICED THAT WE WERE STILL CLBING AND APCHING 17000 FT. OBVIOUSLY THE AUTOMATIC LEVELOFF FUNCTION OF THE 'A' AUTOPLT HAD FAILED. I STARTED A QUICK DSCNT BACK TO 16000 FT. THAT WAS CORRECTLY SET INTO THE ALT WINDOW. THE AUTOPLT AGAIN WENT INTO THE ALT ACQUIRE MODE BUT DID NOT CAPTURE THE ALT OR LEVELOFF, WHICH I HAD TO DO MANUALLY. NOTHING WAS SAID BY DEP ABOUT OUR ALTDEV AND WE WERE CLRED OVER TO ZLA. WHEN WE CHKED IN WITH CTR HE QUESTIONED OUR ASSIGNED ALT, WHICH WE STATED WAS 16000 FT. WE WERE THEN CLRED TO FL180 AND I SWITCHED TO THE 'B' AUTOPLT SYS, WHICH LEVELED OFF AND FUNCTIONED NORMALLY FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT. IN PHX WE HAD MAINT FIX THE 'A' AUTOPLT AND IT CHKED OUT OK TO OUR NEXT FLT TO STL. HAVING FLOWN THE 300 SERIES FOR OVER 10 YRS, THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME I'VE HAD A FAILURE OF THE AUTO LEVEL SYS. THE SYS IS SO RELIABLE AND WE DEPEND AND TRUST IT SO MUCH THAT WHEN IT FAILS IT CAN REALLY CATCH YOU OFF GUARD. I FEEL THAT IF THE AUTOPLT GOES INTO THE ALT ACQUIRE MODE BUT FAILS TO LEVEL OFF AT THE CORRECT ALT, A MORE POSITIVE WARNING THAN JUST A HORN SHOULD BE GIVEN, IE, A VERBAL 'ALT, ALT!' WOULD BE A FAR BETTER SYS.

  161.  
  162. Accession Number: 366709
    Synopsis: SUPER MD80 WAS REQUESTED TO TEST THE AUTOLAND SYS. TOUCHDOWN NORMAL BUT ON ROLLOUT AUTOPLT CALLED FOR FULL L AILERON. DISCONNECTED AUTOPLT AND REGAINED CTL. MAINT INSPECTION REVEALED L WING TAIL LIGHT LENS BROKEN AND 3 INCH METAL SCRAPE.
    Narrative: PER FLT PLAN REQUEST AUTOLAND LNDG MADE AT EWR. ATIS GAVE CEILING 40 OVCST -- 10 PLUS MI VISIBILITY AND I THINK WINDS 340/10 -- LNDG RWY 4R. APCH WAS BRIEFED AND AUTOPLT ON ONE. AUTOPLT CAPTURED LOC AND GS NORMALLY. ALL CALLOUTS WERE NORMAL AND AT AROUND 1400 FT CAPT INDICATED HE HAD THE RWY IN SIGHT AND HAD CTL OF THE ACFT. AUTOPLT CONTINUED TO FUNCTION NORMALLY AND CALLOUTS WERE NORMAL THROUGH TOUCHDOWN. TOUCHDOWN FELT SMOOTH BUT ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AUTOPLT RAPIDLY ROLLED FULL L AILERON. CAPT IMMEDIATELY DISCONNECTED AUTOPLT AND APPLIED CORRECTION. ON POSTFLT THE L WING TAIL LIGHT LENS WAS FOUND TO BE BROKEN AND THERE WAS A SMALL -- LESS THAN 3 INCHES -- SCRAPE IN THE AFT CORNER OF THE L WINGTIP.

  163.  
  164. Accession Number: 367190
    Synopsis: MD80 SUPER 80 DSNDED 300 FT BELOW ASSIGNED ALT WHEN AUTOPLT FAILED TO CAPTURE ALT. AUTOTHROTTLES WERE INOP.
    Narrative: UPON DSNDING FROM FL350 TO FL240 THE FO TURNED OFF THE AUTOTHROTTLES. AUTOPLT TRIED TO LEVEL OFF BUT IT APPEARED THAT IT WAS GOING TO GO BELOW FL240. AUTOPLT WAS TURNED OFF, AND ACFT WAS HAND FLOWN TO LEVELOFF. I BELIEVE THIS WAS DUE TO TURNING OFF AUTOTHROTTLE DURING LEVELOFF. THE AUTOPLT COULD NOT LEVEL SMOOTHLY OR AT ASSIGNED ALT WITHOUT AUTOTHROTTLE ON.

  165.  
  166. Accession Number: 367191
    Synopsis: MD80 SUPER 80 WHILE DEVIATING AROUND WX DSNDED A FEW HUNDRED FT BELOW ASSIGNED ALT WHEN AUTOPLT FAILED TO MAINTAIN ALT.
    Narrative: DEVIATING AROUND TSTMS IN AREA. WX RADAR DID NOT SHOW ANY WX. BUT, GOT INTO SOME TURB. ACFT AIRSPD BEGAN TO SLOW. ACFT BEGAN TO DSND OFF ALT. TURNED OFF AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHROTTLES AND HAND FLEW ACFT. WE HAD DSNDED A FEW HUNDRED FT OFF OF OUR ASSIGNED ALT DUE TO TURB WE ENCOUNTERED.

  167.  
  168. Accession Number: 368408
    Synopsis: AN ACR MLG CLBING TO 10000 FT SAW A MIL MLT AT 12:30 O'CLOCK POS AND AT SAME ALT AT APPROX ONE HALF MI. THE MLG SLOWED HIS SPD AND PASSED CLR OF THE TFC AND ATC DSNDED THE MLG TO 9000 FT. MLG FLC THEN NOTICED THAT THE TCASII HAD FAILED AND RESET THE CIRCUIT BREAKER AND IT WORKED AFTER THAT. TCASII NON OPERATIONAL.
    Narrative: OUR ORIGINAL CLRNC WAS TO MAINTAIN 10000 FT. AT TKOF THE CLRNC WAS CHANGED TO 9000 FT. WE HAD REQUESTED AN IMMEDIATE TURN SO THAT WE WOULD BE S OF SOME SMALL BUILDUPS AFTER COMPLETING THE TURN. WE WERE GIVEN A TURN 'HDG 080 DEGS, MAINTAIN 10000 FT,' WHICH WAS A VECTOR TO HEAD TOWARDS THE COS 107 DEG RADIAL, 44 DME FIX. I WAS LEVELING AT 9000 FT WHEN MY FO TOOK THE CALL. HE DIALED IN THE HDG AND ALT ON THE MCP, JUST AS I WAS LEVELING AT 9000 FT. I PROCEEDED TO CLB TO 10000 FT, HAND FLYING. A COMPANY CHK AIRMAN CALLED TFC AHEAD. I LOOKED UP. I WAS AT 9800 FT LEVELING OFF FOR 10000 FT. THERE WAS A MIL HVY AT 12:30 O'CLOCK POS AND 10000 FT. I PULLED THE PWR BACK TO SLOW, BUT TOOK NO EVASIVE ACTION AS WE WOULD PASS BEHIND THE ACFT. ATC ASKED US TO DSND TO 9000 FT. I EASED THE NOSE OVER AND DSNDED TO 9000 FT. ESTIMATED DISTANCE BTWN ACFT 1/2 MI. WE DISCOVERED OUR TCASII HAD FAILED, RECYCLED THE CIRCUIT BREAKER AND IT CAME ON.

  169.  
  170. Accession Number: 368760
    Synopsis: FLC OF A B737 WERE NOT ON THE STAR ARR ROUTING DUE TO AN ACFT NAVIGATIONAL POS COMPUTING ERROR RESULTING IN ATC INTERVENTION TO BRING RPTR BACK TO ASSIGNED ROUTING TRACK.
    Narrative: GIVEN CLRNC TO DSND ON THE ARR INTO OAK. STARTED DSCNT AND NOTICED TCASII TFC WITHIN 8 NM AND 200 FT VERT. CTR THEN ASKED IF WE WERE ON THE ARR. OUR NAV EQUIP CONFIRMED WE WERE (OR WITHIN 2 NM MAX ERROR PASSING OVER VOR DUE TO SLANT RANGE PROBS). WE RECEIVED A TCASII TA AND TURNED AWAY FROM TFC. I LATER TALKED WITH CTR AND THEY SAID WE WERE ABOUT 7 MI L OF COURSE. OUR EQUIP NEVER INDICATED THAT MUCH ERROR. ENRTE TO OAK EVERYTHING APPEARED OKAY.

  171.  
  172. Accession Number: 368929
    Synopsis: A DHC-8 OVERSHOOTS ASSIGNED ALT DURING CLB AS PF ASSUMES THE AUTOPLT AND LEVELING FEATURES WILL AUTOMATICALLY LEVEL THE ACFT AT THE PROPER ALT. NO LEVELING FEATURE WAS ENGAGED, THOUGH, AND THE ACFT FLEW ABOVE ASSIGNED ALT.
    Narrative: AFTER LEVEL OFF I ENGAGED AUTOPLT ON LAST LEG OF A 13 HR DUTY DAY WITH A SHORT OVERNIGHT. I ASKED THE FO WHAT HE HAD FOR TOTAL BLOCK SO FAR TODAY. HIS NUMBERS DID NOT AGREE WITH MINE. I THEN STARTED TO CHK MY NUMBERS AND THEN LOOKED BACK AT THE ADI WHICH SHOWED A L CLBING TURN. I IMMEDIATELY RESUMED CTL OF THE ACFT AND LEVELED OFF AND THEN DSNDED BACK TO 9000 FT. CTR NEVER ASKED ABOUT THE SLIGHT CLB ABOUT 500 FT HIGH. THE AUTOPLT EITHER DIDN'T ENGAGE OR DISCONNECTED. FATIGUE WAS THE PRIMARY CAUSE OF THIS ALT BUST. CTR DIDN'T QUESTION OUR ALT AND I ASSUME IT WENT UNNOTICED. THERE WERE NO OTHER ACFT IN THE AREA. NO TCASII TARGET. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 369020: HE RELEASED CTLS THINKING AUTOPLT WAS ON AND WE CLBED THROUGH OUR ASSIGNED ALT OF 9000 FT. I WAS FILLING OUT LOGBOOK AND NOT WATCHING. CAPT WAS FILLING OUT PERSONAL CREW LOG FOR TIMES OFF GATE. AS WE PASSED 9700 FT HE REALIZED AUTOPLT WAS NOT ENGAGED. WE RETURNED TO 9000 FT. CLT ATC NEVER ASKED ABOUT OUR ALT.

  173.  
  174. Accession Number: 368980
    Synopsis: ARTCC RADAR CTLR CLBED AN ACR B767 TO 15000 FT AND TURNED HIM TO A HDG TO PASS BELOW A MIL EA6 AT 16000 FT. TA WAS GIVEN TO THE EA6 AND HE HAD THE B767 IN SIGHT. THE B767 RECEIVED A TCASII RA TO CLB AS THE ACFT APCHED EACH OTHER AND THE CTLR SEES THAT THE ACFT HAVE PASSED AND THEN CLBS THE B767. CTLR RPTR SAYS THE TCASII RA INSTRUCTIONS WERE INVALID.
    Narrative: ACR X DEPARTED SEA FOR COPENHAGEN, DENMARK, AND CHKED ON FREQ CLBING TO 15000 FT. I RESTATED THE CLRNC TO 15000 FT. 1 MIN LATER, THE MIL Y (EA6) CHKED ON FREQ ENRTE TO WHIDBEY NAS LEVEL AT 16000 FT. I TURNED ACR X R TO HDG 020 DEGS TO CROSS BENEATH THE EA6. THEN I TURNED THE EA6 L TO HDG 250 DEGS AND CALLED THE B767 TFC AT 12 O'CLOCK, 2 MI, LEVEL AT 15000 FT. AFTER THE EA6 RESPONDS, ACR X STATES HE HAD A TCASII RA TO CLB. I ADVISE ACR X OF THE EA6 PASSING ON THE R AT 16000 FT. HE ANSWERS TFC IN SIGHT. TFC IS NO LONGER A FACTOR AND ACR X GETS CLB AND CONTINUES ON COURSE. THE TCASII RA TO CLB DOES NOT MAKE SENSE SINCE THE TFC HAD BEEN LEVEL LONG BEFORE THE TFC WAS CLOSE TO EACH OTHER. AN RA TO CLB SEEMS TO BE ABOUT THE ONLY THING THAT SHOULD NOT BE DONE.

  175.  
  176. Accession Number: 369679
    Synopsis: B747 ACFT DEPARTING ON SID AT MAX WT HAD TO TURN TIGHTLY TO FOLLOW SID. TIGHT TURN, HVY ACFT AND SPD RESTR RESULTED IN APCH TO A STALL (STICK SHAKER).
    Narrative: DEPARTED RWY 36L, BEIJING, CHINA. ASSIGNED SID 'D04.' PROC CALLS FOR MAKING A L 360 DEG TURN BEGINNING AND ENDING AT 'LG' TO A HARD ALT OF 1200M. 840000+ LB TKOF. FMC PROGRAMMED FOR THE SID AND DEPICTED THE 360 DEG CIRCLE AT 'LG.' UPON REACHING 'LG,' IT AND THE CIRCLE DISAPPEARED AS WE PASSED IT. I INITIATED THE L TURN VIA HEADING SELECT, BUT ONLY SLEWED BUG PART WAY AROUND TO ASSURE L TURN. SOMEWHERE IN TURN, DEP ADVISED 'CANCEL RESTRS' OR PERHAPS 'CANCEL ALT RESTRS.' CAPT (PF) BEGAN ACCELERATING AND CALLING FOR RETRACTING FLAPS FROM 20 DEGS. SOMEWHERE IN THERE I GOT BUSY WITH THE RETRACTION AND NAV AND DIDN'T CONTINUE TO MOVE THE HEADING BUG THE FINAL 90%. CALL WAS MADE FOR 'FLAPS UP.' WE WERE TURNING (I BELIEVE) BUT STARTING TO GET CONTRARY THE FLT DIRECTOR DUE TO HEADING BUG IMPROPERLY SET. CHKED AIRSPD (INDICATED), WAS SUFFICIENT, SELECTED FLAPS UP. ADVISED CAPT OF NEED FOR TIGHTER TURN TO GET TO 'LG.' WAS COGNIZANT OF BEING TIGHT ON IAS FOR THE INCREASE IN RATE OF TURN. HAD VERY BRIEF BUFFET (SECOND OR TWO) AND ONSET OF STICK SHAKER, I CALLED 'STALL' AND AIDED IN INITIATING RECOVERY. OVERSHOOT OCCURRED DURING ALL THIS. CORRECTING BACK TO SID TRACK AND 'DEP' CLRED US DIRECT TO A SUBSEQUENT FIX. REST OF OUR 'SHIFT' NORMAL (DOUBLE CREWED). NOTE: FIRST TIME FLYING OUT OF PEK FOR BOTH PLTS. CAPT IS IN 'FIRST 100 HRS' ON B747-400. NOT A GREAT COMBINATION FOR A FAR 121.445 SPECIAL ARPT. CONFUSION BEGAN WHEN 'LG' AND ITS 'CIRCLE' DISAPPEARED WHEN PASSED. DIDN'T EXPECT THIS SINCE IT WAS A SELECTED SID (DEP/ARR). THERE IS A 260 KT SPD LIMIT IN THE 'CIRCLE.' INCREASING WORKLOAD/CONFUSION (INCLUDING 'CANCEL RESTRS') GOT US OFF OUR ORIGINAL PLAN. SHOULD HAVE COMPLETED THE 360 DEGS BEFORE CLEAN UP. WILL SUBMIT RPT TO COMPANY RECOMMENDING TO PUT AN ADVISORY NOTE IN COMMERCIAL CHART INFO PAGE REGARDING 'DISAPPEARING CIRCLE' AND NEED TO MAINTAIN SOME DEG OF FLAPS UNTIL COMPLETING THE 360 DEGS AND RE-PASSING 'LG' (FOR SPD LIMIT) REGARDLESS OF DEP INPUTS.

  177.  
  178. Accession Number: 369920
    Synopsis: MD80 SUPER 80 OVERSHOT ASSIGNED ALT OF FL280 WHEN AUTOPLT FAILED TO CAPTURE. CTR ALTIMETER ALSO READ 300 FT LOW, NO FACTOR.
    Narrative: CLBING TO FL280, #2 AUTOPLT FAILED TO CAPTURE ALT. FO CLICKED AUTOPLT OFF AND RETURNED TO FL280. ATC NOTIFIED AND INFORMED OF 300 FT DEV BTWN PLT'S ALTIMETER AND CTR. ATC CONFIRMED PLT'S ALTIMETER TO BE CORRECT. CTR ALTIMETER READ 300 FT LOW.

  179.  
  180. Accession Number: 370232
    Synopsis: F100 ACFT WITH DSCNT CLRNC, FLC ENTERED DATA INTO FMS AND WHEN PROFILE WAS SELECTED IN THE MCP, THE ACFT IMMEDIATELY WENT INTO A CLB. FLC DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND RETURNED TO PROFILE USING THE #2 FMS.
    Narrative: FLT FROM RDU TO DCA. AFTER CLRNC TO CROSS RIC AT FL220, ACFT WAS LEVEL AT FL220 WITH AUTOPLT #1 SELECTED ON. RECEIVED CLRNC TO CROSS OJAAY (IRONS 3 ARR, DCA) AT 10000 FT, 250 KTS. THIS WAS ENTERED IN THE FMC AND IN THE AUTOPLT MCP. 'PROFILE' WAS SELECTED ON THE MCP. THE ACFT ENTERED AN UNCOMMANDED CLB, THE AUTOPLT WAS DISENGAGED AND A HAND-FLOWN DSCNT WAS INITIATED. ALTDEV WAS +500 FT (FL225). AFTER THE DSCNT WAS UNDER CTL, THE #1 FMS SHOWED APPROX 1200 FT BELOW THE PROFILE AND THE #2 FMS SHOWED 800 FT ABOVE PROFILE. #2 FMS WAS DETERMINED TO BE CORRECT AND THE #2 AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED. REMAINDER OF FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL. THE FMS WAS WRITTEN UP UPON ARR AT DCA. AN AIR SAFETY RPT WAS FILED WITH OUR COMPANY, AND AN ALT AWARENESS PROGRAM INCIDENT DATA FORM WAS ALSO FILED.

  181.  
  182. Accession Number: 370970
    Synopsis: AN ACR MD80 FLC DECIDES TO USE THE AIRSPD HOLD MODE TO DSND 1000 FT AND IS SURPRISED WHEN THE ACFT INITIALLY CLBS INSTEAD AND THEN STARTS A TOO STEEP DSCNT AND GOES BELOW THE ASSIGNED ALT.
    Narrative: LEVEL AT FL290, CLRED TO DSND TO FL280. CAPT USED IAS LEVEL AT FL290 WITH CAPT FLYING. CLRED DSND TO FL280. USED IAS INITIALLY AND ACFT PITCHED UP THEN DOWN AFTER A FEW SECONDS. RATE OF DSCNT WAS EXCESSIVE FOR 1000 FT DSCNT. CAPT TURNED AUTOPLT OFF AND STOPPED DSCNT AT ABOUT FL275-FL276 AND RETURNED ACFT TO FL280. NO COMMENT FROM CTR OR CONFLICTS KNOWN. IN RETROSPECT VERT SPD IS BETTER WHEN ONLY DSNDING 1000 FT.

  183.  
  184. Accession Number: 371010
    Synopsis: AN ACR B737 FLC ATTEMPTS TO INTERCEPT AN ILS WITH THE WRONG COURSE SET IN THE COURSE DEV INDICATOR AND ARE TEMPORARILY CONFUSED WHEN THE ACFT MAKES AN UNEXPECTED TURN. THE ALERT APCH CTLR AND THE CAPT RECOGNIZE THAT SOMETHING IS AMISS AND START A CORRECTION PROCESS.
    Narrative: WE WERE BEING VECTORED TO THE ILS RWY 28R AT SFO. WE WERE GIVEN A HDG OF 300 DEGS TO INTERCEPT THE LOC AND TOLD TO MAINTAIN 4000 FT TO DUMBA. WE WERE CLRED FOR THE ILS TO RWY 28R AT SFO. AS THE LOC CAME ALIVE THE AUTOPLT CAPTURED IT AND BEGAN A R TURN INSTEAD OF A L TO CAPTURE THE LOC. I TOLD THE COPLT TO TURN L ONTO THE LOC. HE TRIED TO MAKE THE AUTOFLT SYS MAKE THE CORRECTION. I THEN TOLD THE FO TO 'TURN L AND GET ON THE LOC, NOW!' AS WE WERE TURNING BACK ONTO THE LOC, APCH CTL CALLED US AND TOLD US HE SHOWED US GOING N OF THE LOC, TO TURN L TO 250 DEGS TO INTERCEPT THE LOC AND TO GO OVER TO TWR FREQ. I LOOKED OVER AT THE FO'S COURSE INDICATOR ON THE MCP AND SAW IT SAID 346 DEGS INSTEAD OF 282 DEGS. I CALLED IT TO HIS ATTN AND THE REST OF THE APCH PROCEEDED NORMALLY. I HONESTLY DON'T KNOW WHEN THE COURSE INDICATOR WAS SET ON 346 DEGS. I SHOULD HAVE CHKED IT DURING THE APCH DSCNT CHKLIST. I DON'T KNOW IF I MISSED IT THERE OR IF THE FO TURNED IT INSTEAD OF THE HDG INDICATOR WHILE BEING VECTORED FOR THE APCH. WHAT I DO KNOW IS THAT IN THE FUTURE I WILL DOUBLECHK BOTH THE FREQ AND THE COURSE SELECTOR WHEN WE ARE ON A HDG TO INTERCEPT THE LOC.

  185.  
  186. Accession Number: 371056
    Synopsis: FLC OF MLG HAS NMAC WITH SINGLE ENG SMA ON APCH. POSSIBLE TCASII FAILURE.
    Narrative: NO TCASII WARNING OR CONFLICT SHOWN. ATC NOT AWARE AND DID NOT PAINT TFC EVEN AFTER ADVISED. TFC SMALL SINGLE ENG CESSNA. TCASII SYS TEST NORMAL.

  187.  
  188. Accession Number: 371142
    Synopsis: MLG FLC IN DSCNT HAS AUTOPLT TRIM PROB AND IS UNABLE TO MAINTAIN ALT. WHEN DISCONNECTING AUTOPLT THEY DSND ABOUT 250 FT.
    Narrative: WHILE IN DSCNT TO 16000 FT MSL ON AUTOPLT, LEVELING AT 16000 FT MSL AND SLOWING TO 250 KIAS IN AIRSPD, AUTOPLT WAS UNABLE TO TRIM AND MAINTAIN 16000 FT MSL. AS A RESULT, THE FO DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT (WHICH GAVE A BUMP DUE TO OUT-OF-TRIM) AND DSNDED ABOUT 250 FT BELOW 16000 FT MSL IN AN EFFORT TO MAINTAIN PAX COMFORT. WE CORRECTED BACK TO 16000 FT MSL IMMEDIATELY, AND HAD NO FURTHER PROBS.

  189.  
  190. Accession Number: 371170
    Synopsis: ARR DC10 DSNDS BELOW ASSIGNED ALT WHEN ALT AUTO CAPTURE FEATURE OF THE AUTOPLT FAILS TO LEVEL THE ACFT AT 10000 FT. FLC WAS DISTR WITH AN AMENDED CLRNC AND A RWY CHANGE, RETRIEVAL OF OTHER APCH PLATES.
    Narrative: ACFT LEVELED AT 10000 FT WITH AUTOPLT ENGAGED. WHILE SLOWING TO 250 KTS WAS GIVEN A HDG CHANGE AND ALSO A RWY CHANGE FROM RWY 1 TO RWY 19. AS ACFT WAS IN TURN, ACFT DSNDED TO 9500 FT WITHOUT AN ALT WARNING FROM THE ALT WARNING SYS. DISENGAGED AUTOPLT AND CLBED BACK TO 10000 FT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 370799: AFTER FINDING THE NEW APCH PLATE ALL 3 CREW MEMBERS NOTICED SIMULTANEOUSLY THAT OUR ALT WAS 9600 FT. THE AUTOPLT ALT CAPTURE HAD FAILED TO ARM. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: MOMENTARY DISTR OF A RWY CHANGE GIVEN LESS THAN 1000 FT FROM LEVELOFF ALT. CREW FATIGUE DUE TO INBOUND LEG FROM EUROPE. XA00 RPT TIME FOR THIS FLT. THIS WAS DAY 3 OF A 9 DAY PATTERN TO EUROPE WHICH INCLUDED 6 OCEAN XINGS.

  191.  
  192. Accession Number: 371990
    Synopsis: AN ACR MD80 FLC GETS OFF TRACK DURING A STAR PROC AND THE APCH CTLR CORRECTS THEM. MAINT WAS ADVISED THAT THE NAV SYS HAD MALFUNCTIONED.
    Narrative: I WAS PF THE CEDAR CREEK ARR TO DFW, OUTBOUND ON THE CEDAR CREEK 307 DEG RADIAL USING THE AUTOPLT ON VOR TRACK. REGIONAL CTLR INSTRUCTED US TO TURN 20 DEGS L TO REJOIN THE ARR. THE CAPT RESPONDED WE WERE TRACKING RIGHT DOWN THE CTR OF THE RADIAL. APCH SAID WE WERE WAY OFF TRACK FROM EVERYONE ELSE AND TURN 20 DEGS L. I TURNED AND THEN THE CAPT TUNED UP THE DFW VOR AND INBOUND RADIAL. WE SAW A 2 DOT AZIMUTH DISCREPANCY BTWN NAV #1 AND NAV #2 WHILE TUNED TO DFW AND CQY AND THE APPROPRIATE RADIALS. THERE WAS NO TIME TO TROUBLESHOOT FURTHER AS THE APCH CTLR VECTORED AND DSNDED US FOR LNDG AT DFW. AFTER LNDG THE CAPT WROTE UP THE NAVIGATIONAL DISCREPANCY AND DEBRIEFED MAINT.

  193.  
  194. Accession Number: 372010
    Synopsis: AN ACR B737 FLC DSNDING ON A STAR GETS A TCASII RA TO CLB WHEN AN ACR MD80 CLBS THROUGH 7500 FT AS THE B737 DSNDS TO 7800 FT. THE CLB RA CHANGES TO INCREASE CLB AS THE MD80 CONTINUES ITS CLB. THE ACFT PASS VERY CLOSE TO EACH OTHER.
    Narrative: CLRED TO DSND TO 7000 FT AT KAYOH INTXN FOR AN EASTSIDE ARR TO THE SNA ARPT. PASSING APPROX 8500 FT, CTR RPTED TFC AT 2 O'CLOCK, 8 NM CLBING THROUGH 7500 FT. WE RPTED NO CONTACT. AT 7800 FT TCASII ISSUED AN RA TO 'CLB.' THE CLB RA CONTINUED UNTIL APPROX 9000 FT WHEN 'INCREASE CLB' WAS ANNUNCIATED. WE INCREASED CLB AND ABOUT 10200 FT AN MD80 PASSED SLIGHTLY BENEATH OUR FLT PATH FROM ABOUT A 2 O'CLOCK POS. IMMEDIATELY AFTER PASSING TFC, WE WERE GIVEN A FREQ CHANGE TO APCH CTL AND CLRED TO DSND VIA THE 'EASTSIDE ARR.' DUE TO THE RA, WE WERE CONSIDERABLY ABOVE ALT FOR THE ARR. WE COMPLIED WITH THE ARR CONSTRICTIONS AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE FOR A NORMAL APCH TO RWY 19R AT SNA. NEITHER PLT CAN ASCERTAIN WHY TCASII WOULD COMMAND A 'CLB' AND AN INCREASE CLB IN THIS SIT. FROM WHAT WE KNOW, IT APPEARS THAT A NORMAL OR 'INCREASE DSCNT' WOULD HAVE PROVIDED CLRNC. IT APPEARS TO US AS THOUGH WE CLBED INTO A CONFLICT. NO OTHER TFC WAS RPTED OR SIGHTED IN THE VICINITY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR SAID THAT HE HAD NEVER HAD A TCASII SYS TELL HIM TO INCREASE CLB BEFORE. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER OFF IF HE HAD CONTINUED HIS DSCNT, BUT NEITHER HE NOR THE TCASII KNEW THAT THE MD80 WAS GOING TO CONTINUE ITS CLB AND, IN FACT, INCREASE ITS CLB RATE. WHEN HE SAW THE MD80 CLBING TOWARD HIM WHILE HE WAS EVADING, USING A MAX PERFORMANCE CLB, HE WAS AFRAID TO TURN BECAUSE ANY ROLL WOULD HAVE LOST SOME OF HIS AVAILABLE LIFT AND HE FELT THAT THERE WAS NONE TO SPARE. HE SAID THAT HE COULD SEE EVERYTHING ABOUT THE MD80 AS IT PASSED, INCLUDING THE RIVETS. HE SAID THAT HE CALLED THE NUMBER THAT THE CTLR GAVE HIM FOR THE CTR. HE TOLD THE SUPVR THAT HE WAS THE CAPT OF THE B737-300 THAT HAD THE NMAC NEAR KAYOH. THE SUPVR, APPARENTLY, ADMITTED THAT THE CTLR ERRED AND WOULD RECEIVE FURTHER TRAINING ALONG WITH SEVERAL OTHER PERSONNEL. THE SUPVR SAID THAT THE ERROR WAS NOT DUE TO EQUIP PROBS, ACCORDING TO THE RPTR.

  195.  
  196. Accession Number: 372128
    Synopsis: THE FLC OF AN ACR B757 EXPERIENCED A MAP SHIFT DURING AN APCH TO LGA. THE ATCT LCL CTLR DIRECTED THE FLC TO GAR AND THEY SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED A RAW DATA APCH LATER. THE EFIS MAP DISPLAY WAS 2 PT 5 NM OFF TO THE W AFTER THE FLT WAS IN THE GATE. THE RPTR ADMITTED THAT THEY WERE NOT MONITORING THE RAW DATA DURING THEIR INITIAL APCH.
    Narrative: CLRED THE LGA VOR/DME-G RWY 22 TURNED ON 4 MI OUTSIDE FAF. NOTICED A SLIGHT MOVEMENT ON HSI MAP, WHICH WE HAD ENTERED THE VOR APCH IN EARLIER. FLYING THE LNAV COURSE ON THE HSI, NO ASSOCIATED MESSAGES FROM EICAS OR FMS, NO FLAGS ON ANY INSTS. WHEN WE FINALLY SAW RWY 22 WE WERE 2 MI N AND APCH CTL DIRECTED A MISSED APCH TO 3000 FT AND VECTORED FOR ANOTHER APCH VOR DME-G TO RWY 22, WHICH WAS UNEVENTFUL. AFTER LNDG, THE HSI MAP HAD DRIFTED 2.5 MI AWAY FROM THE ACTUAL RWY. THIS WAS A VERY INSIDIOUS EVENT DURING THE BUSY TIME OF APCH AT THE FAF. SOME NOTIFICATION OF OUR PRIMARY NAV BEING BOLDLY DISPLAYED WHEN IT IS OUT OF TOLERANCE, WOULD BE HELPFUL IN PREVENTING THIS PROB IN THE FUTURE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 372125: IN THE BASE TURN FROM NORMAL DSCNT, AND SUDDEN 2 1/2 MI MAP SHIFT OCCURRED IN FMS, WITH NO ASSOCIATED MESSAGES/FLAGS. COMPUTER/AUTOPLT FLEW APPROX 2 MI L OF RWY, AND LGA TWR DIRECTED MISSED APCH, HDOF TO TRACON. WE RE-FLEW SAME APCH ON RAW DATA. AFTER LNDG, MAP WAS SHIFTED 2 1/2 MI W. THIS IS INSIDIOUS, PARTICULARLY WHEN IT OCCURS DURING A BUSY PERIOD, AS TRANSITIONING TO FINAL. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN #372128 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR SAID THAT HE WAS FLYING A B757-200 EQUIPPED WITH HONEYWELL FMCS WHEN THE MAP SHIFT OCCURRED. HE SAID THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST MAP SHIFT THAT HE HAS EXPERIENCED IN THE SEVERAL YRS THAT HE HAS FLOWN THE ACFT. HE DID HAVE THE RAW DATA TUNED, BUT NOT DISPLAYED AND HE ADMITTED THAT THE FO AS THE PNF SHOULD HAVE HAD THE ILS DISPLAYED ON HIS HSI IN ACCORDANCE WITH COMPANY PROC. AFTER LNDG THE EFIS MAP WAS IN ERROR BY 2 1/2 NM TO THE W. HE ENTERED THE PROB IN THE LOGBOOK AND FURTHER DISCUSSED IT WITH MAINT TECHNICIANS. THEY COULD NOT PINPOINT THE CAUSE OF THE ERROR SO MAINT PERSONNEL CHANGED THE FMCS AND SOME RELATED EQUIP. THE RPTR TALKED TO HIS CHIEF PLT ABOUT THE PROB ALSO. HE HAS NOT BEEN TOLD OF THE CAUSE AS YET. HE HAS DECIDED TO CAREFULLY BACK UP HIS APCH DISPLAYS WITH RAW DATA IN THE FUTURE, HE SAID. HE SAID THAT THIS EPISODE WAS DEEPLY DISTURBING TO HIM AND HIS FO.

  197.  
  198. Accession Number: 372190
    Synopsis: FO OF AN LTT OVERSHOT CLB ALT AFTER DEP DUE TO FLYING TASKS RESULTING IN RECOGNIZING THE ERROR AND CORRECTING BACK AT THE SAME TIME THE CTLR INTERVENED TO INQUIRE OF THEIR ALT.
    Narrative: ASSIGNED ALT OF 4000 FT. AUTOPLT ENGAGED AT 2500 FT MSL WITH HDG, ALT SELECT, AND INDICATED AIRSPD ON FLT DIRECTOR. CAPT LEFT DEP FREQ TO TALK TO COMPANY TO RPT TIMES. ATC CALLED WITH A TURN TO 010 DEGS AND SWITCH TO 125.8 FOR ANOTHER DEP FREQ. WHILE RESPONDING TO THE CALL, MAKING A FREQ CHANGE AND MAKING THE TURN, MY ATTN WAS DIVERTED FROM THE ALT. THE AUTOPLT FAILED TO CAPTURE THE ALT AND CONSEQUENTLY PASSED THROUGH THE ASSIGNED ALT BY 500 FT. CAPT MADE THE ALT CALL AND WE STARTED THE CORRECTION WHEN ATC CALLED FOR US TO CORRECT THE ALT. WITH LOW TIME IN TYPE, TASK PRIORITY IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT. ALWAYS FLY THE AIRPLANE FIRST, ONE TASK AT A TIME, AND PRIORITIZE. LESSON LEARNED!

  199.  
  200. Accession Number: 372270
    Synopsis: FLC OF A BEECH, BE02, MODEL 1900 AIRLINER, OVERSHOT ALT ON DSCNT DUE TO ALT ALERTER PROB. THE FLC WAS CORRECTING BACK AS ATC INTERVENED TO REMIND THEM OF THEIR ASSIGNED ALT.
    Narrative: AFTER DEPARTING PALM BEACH INTL ARPT, THE ALT ALERTER BEGAN SOUNDING SPORADICALLY IN ADDITION TO THE NORMAL 1000 FT TO GO ALERT. THIS HAPPENED CONTINUOUSLY THROUGHOUT THE FLT DURING CLB, ENRTE PHASE AND DSCNT. AS WE APCHED JAX I MADE THE '1000 FT TO GO' CALLOUT AS WE DSNDED THROUGH 8000 FT FOR OUR ASSIGNED ALT OF 7000 FT. I ALSO GAVE COM #1 TO MY FO WHO WAS THE PF AS I WENT TO COM #2 TO GET THE NEW ATIS. AS I CAME BACK TO COM #1, I NOTICED MY FO HAD SLOWED HIS RATE OF DSCNT AS HE APCHED 7000 FT SO I GAVE HIM THE CURRENT ATIS WHILE THE ALT ALERTER CONTINUED ITS ERRATIC CHIMING. ALSO, ABOUT THIS TIME, I WAS POINTING OUT JAX IN THE DISTANCE AS MY FO DID NOT YET SEE THE ARPT. I THEN REALIZED HE HAD DSNDED THROUGH 6800 FT AND NOTIFIED HIM OF THIS. HE STARTED HIS CLB BACK TO OUR ASSIGNED ALT AT 6700 FT. ATC AT THAT POINT REITERATED OUR ASSIGNED ALT AND POINTED OUT TFC AT OUR 10 O'CLOCK POS AND 1000 FT BELOW US WHICH WE CONFIRMED WE ALREADY HAD ON TCASII AND VISUALLY. NEEDLESS TO SAY THE ALT ALERTER WAS WRITTEN UP AS INOP AS SOON AS WE LANDED. OUR DSCNT 300 FT BELOW OUR ASSIGNED ALT WAS BASICALLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE FACT THAT AFTER 1 HR 10 MINS OF LISTENING TO THE ALT ALERTER CHIME INCESSANTLY, WE BECAME DISENGAGED FROM ITS USEFULNESS AS A WARNING TOOL. IN THE FUTURE, IF THIS HAPPENS WITH THE ALT ALERTER, I WILL DEFINITELY WAIT UNTIL LEVEL AT THE ASSIGNED ALT BEFORE GETTING ATIS, POINTING OUT ARPTS, ETC.

  201.  
  202. Accession Number: 372430
    Synopsis: A B737 EXCEEDS THE REQUIRED 250 KTS BELOW 10000 FT WHILE ON A SID DEP PROC FROM EWR. A TEMPORARY MISUSE AND MALFUNCTION OF THE AUTOTHROTTLE SYS WITH AN IMPROPER CALL FROM THE FO. PIC WAS PNF AND NEW TO EQUIP.
    Narrative: ON THE EWR 6 DEP, RWY 4R/L, IT CALLS FOR HDG 060 DEGS UNTIL 4 DME AND THEN A L TURN TO 290 DEGS, LEVELOFF AT 2500 FT. ON THE B757 THE PF CALLS FOR CLB THRUST AT 1000 FT AGL. FO WAS FLYING, CALLED FOR CLB THRUST WHICH WAS SELECTED AT 1000 FT AGL. DUE TO THE RAPID RATE OF CLB OF A RELATIVELY LIGHT B757, THE FLT DIRECTOR HAD ALREADY CAPTURED ALT. THE AUTOTHROTTLES THEN SET THEMSELVES TO MAINTAIN SPD (THE SPD AT ALT CAPTURE WHICH WAS ABOUT 135 KTS). AS THE FO LEVELED AT 2500 FT, I INCREASED THE SPD BUG TO 250 KTS WHICH SHOULD HAVE SET THE THROTTLES TO MAINTAIN 250 KTS AT 2500 FT, BUT THE THROTTLES INCREASED PWR SO AS WE LEVELED, THE SPD SHOT UP TO 300+ KTS. AT THE SAME TIME, I WAS SWITCHING TO DEP CTL FROM TWR. DEP GAVE US A TURN TO 260 DEGS (AS WE WERE NOW SCOOTING FURTHER FROM THE TRACK OF THE 290 DEG HDG). (WE WERE ALREADY IN THE TURN.) I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOTHROTTLES, PULLED THE PWR BACK (WE HAD ALSO BEEN GIVEN A CLB TO 8000 FT) AND TOLD THE FO TO CLB AND BANK FURTHER TO INCREASE RATE OF TURN AND DECREASE SPD. THERE WAS NO RPTED CONFLICT FROM ATC. THE AUTOTHROTTLE PROB WAS APPARENTLY AN ANOMALY AS A CYCLE OF THE AUTOTHROTTLE SWITCH (TWICE ACTUALLY) RESET AND TOOK CARE OF THE PROB.

  203.  
  204. Accession Number: 372475
    Synopsis: A DC10-10 IN CRUISE, SHUT DOWN #1 ENG AND DIVERTED DUE TO THE AUTOTHROTTLE SYS DRIVING THE ENGS OVER MAX LIMITS FOR N1 AND EGT.
    Narrative: IN CRUISE FLT AT FL350, THE AUTOTHROTTLES DROVE THE ENGS OVER MAX LIMITS FOR N1 AND EGT. AS THE MOVEMENT WAS VERY SLOW, IT WASN'T NOTICED UNTIL THE EGT OVERTEMP LIGHTS CAME ON ON ENG #1 AND #2. THE THRUST LEVERS WERE IMMEDIATELY REDUCED TO NORMAL LEVELS. #1 ENG WAS SHUT DOWN AS A PRECAUTION AS PER THE COMPANY OPS MANUAL. ACFT WAS LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. WE LANDED IN MSP. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THE ACFT WAS A DC10-10 AND ALL 3 ENG THROTTLES MOVED FORWARD BUT ONLY #1 AND #2 WERE OVERBOOSTED. HE SAID ONLY ENG #1 WAS REPLACED. HE RELATED THE AUTOTHROTTLE SYS WAS DEFERRED AND IS NOT AWARE OF THE CORRECTIVE ACTION.

  205.  
  206. Accession Number: 372629
    Synopsis: AN MD SUPER 80 AT FL290 WITH AUTOPLT ON ALT HOLD DEVIATED FROM ASSIGNED ALT AND WHEN CORRECTIONS MADE THE AUTOPLT COMMANDED A 1000 FPM DSCNT. DSNDED 400 FT BEFORE CORRECTION BACK TO FL290 WAS MADE.
    Narrative: ALT ALERT WENT OFF AT 300 FT HIGH, SELECTED VERT SPD TO CORRECT. THEN HIT ALT HOLD, AT WHICH TIME THE AUTOPLT WENT INTO A 1000 FT RATE DSCNT. DISCONNECTED AUTOPLT AT 400 FT BELOW FL290 AND IMMEDIATELY CORRECTED BACK TO FL290. RECONNECTED AUTOPLT WITH NO FURTHER PROBS.

  207.  
  208. Accession Number: 373211
    Synopsis: B737-500 FLC FAILS TO MAKE AN ALT XING. ADVISED ZSE CTLR AND RECEIVED SOME VERBAL ADMONITION. FLT SWITCHED TO SEA APCH, CTLR GAVE A NEW ALT ASSIGNMENT. RPTRS CITE A LATE START OF DSCNT BY THE FMS.
    Narrative: THE AUTOPLT DID NOT START THE DSCNT TO CROSS TAWBN INTXN AT 16000 FT ON TIME OR AS PROGRAMMED. ATC INSTRUCTED US TO CROSS JAWBN AT 16000 FT. I DID NOT XCHK THE DSCNT COMPUTER IN MY HEAD TO INSURE ITS CALCULATIONS WERE CORRECT. ABOUT 15 MI FROM JAWBN, WE REALIZED THAT WE WERE NOT GOING TO MAKE JAWBN AT 16000 FT, AND TOLD ATC OF THIS SO SHE COULD VECTOR US OR HOLD US AS NECESSARY. SHE JUST SAID SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT OF 'DON'T TELL US YOU CAN MAKE THE ALT THEN FIND OUT YOU CAN'T -- CONTACT SEA APCH ON XXX.XX.' APCH THEN GAVE US A NEW ALT TO DSND TO. NOTHING MORE WAS SAID. AS I SEE IT, THE MAIN PROB WAS I RELIED TOO MUCH ON THE ONBOARD COMPUTER WITHOUT WORKING THROUGH THE CALCULATIONS IN MY HEAD. ALSO THE COMMENT AND TONE OF THE AIR TFC CTLR WAS NOT NECESSARY SINCE WE GAVE HER 15 MI NOTICE TO OUR SIT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 373210: AUTOPLT, THROUGH PMS, WAS SET FOR THIS ALT. DURING BRIEFING WE NOTICED THAT THE ACFT HAD STARTED DSCNT LATE AND WE WOULD NOT MAKE THE XING RESTR. ONCE AGAIN THIS SHOWS THAT PLT VIGILANCE OVER ALL ASPECTS OF ACFT SHOULD BE MAINTAINED AND THAT RELIANCE ON AUTOMATION CAN GET YOU IN TROUBLE IF YOU'RE NOT BACKING IT UP USING YOUR OWN EXPERIENCE.

  209.  
  210. Accession Number: 373273
    Synopsis: A320 CREW GET A TCASII TA BUT NO RESOLUTION. DEFINE THE POS OF THE INTRUDER AND START A DSCNT AND A TURN. ATC ASSIGNS NEW HDG, CTLR SAYING THE TFC JUST POPPED UP.
    Narrative: CLRED TO 15000 FT. ASSIGNED HDG 360 DEGS (VECTOR AROUND WX). TCASII TA AT ABOUT 12800 FT IN THE CLB. SELECTED TCASII RANGE TO 40 (NO DISPLAY ABOVE THAT) AND IMMEDIATELY SAW TFC NEARLY RIGHT ON TOP OF US, 1000 FT ABOVE AND DSNDING. OUR CLB RATE MUST HAVE BEEN IN EXCESS OF 2000 FPM. FO TURNED OFF AUTOPLT, LEVELED, THEN BEGAN A DSNDING L TURN. I ADVISED ATC. ATC ASSIGNED IMMEDIATE HDG OF 260 DEGS AND SAID VFR TFC JUST POPPED UP AT 13500 FT. WHEN CLR, THE CLB WAS RESUMED AND OPS NORMAL. NOTES: NO TCASII RA WAS GIVEN. AT CLOSEST POINT, TCASII SHOWED TFC +400 FT RIGHT ON TOP OF US. VISUAL CONTACT WAS NEVER ESTABLISHED.

  211.  
  212. Accession Number: 373570
    Synopsis: MLG ACFT ON STAR ARR FAILED TO COMMENCE DSCNT TO MAKE XING RESTR DUE TO INADVERTENT DISENGAGE OF VNAV.
    Narrative: ON A FLT FROM SFO TO LAS, APPROX 50 NM W OF BTY, HEADED DIRECT BTY FOR THE FUZZY 4 ARR. I STEPPED BACK TO THE CABIN FOR PERSONAL NEEDS AND UPON RETURNING I NOTICED THE FO HAD SET FL180 IN THE ALT ALERTER AND HAD TAKEN A COURSE OF DIRECT FUZZY. I WAS TOLD BY THE FO THAT ATC HAD ASSIGNED US DIRECT FUZZY, CROSS FUZZY AT FL180. IN THE MEANTIME, I WAS BUSY WITH PAPERWORK WHEN ASKED US ABOUT OUR ALT. I LOOKED AT THE ELECTRONIC ATTITUDE DIRECTOR INDICATOR AND OBSERVED THAT WE WERE ABOUT 15 NM W OF FUZZY AND STILL LEVEL AT FL270. ATC THEN ASSIGNED A 360 DEG TURN SO THAT WE COULD DSND TO CROSS FUZZY AT FL180. WE COMPLIED WITHOUT ANY FURTHER INCIDENT. DURING MY ABSENCE FROM THE FLT DECK THE VNAV HAD DISENGAGED WHILE THE FO WAS MANEUVERING THE AIRPLANE AND UPON MY RETURN I NEVER NOTICED I WAS RELYING ON THE VNAV TO INITIATE THE DSCNT, WHICH NEVER HAPPENED. THE LESSON HERE, DON'T DEPEND ON THE AUTOFLT SYS TO FLY THE AIRPLANE, BECAUSE, AS IN THIS CASE, IT MAY HAVE DISENGAGED WITHOUT YOU KNOWING.

  213.  
  214. Accession Number: 373610
    Synopsis: WDB ACFT IN DSCNT, ANNUNCIATORS INDICATED NORMAL OPS FOR ALT CAPTURE, BUT DSCNT RATE INCREASED AND BEFORE RPTR CAPT COULD CATCH IT, THE ACFT DSNDED 500 FT BELOW ASSIGNED.
    Narrative: FLT INBOUND TO CVG. WE WERE INBOUND TO CAP VOR AT FL330 WHEN ATC ISSUED A SE HDG FOR TFC. WE WERE THEN CLRED TO A NE HDG TO INTERCEPT THE 087 DEG RADIAL, CAP VOR, CLRED FOR THE MICAN 3 ARR, TO CROSS LEWEY INTXN AT FL240. I PROGRAMMED THE DSCNT ON THE FMS AND INITIATED THE DSCNT. THE DSCNT APPEARED NORMAL. AS THE ACFT APCHED THE ASSIGNED ALT OF FL240, ALL ANNUNCIATIONS INDICATED A NORMAL ALT CAPTURE. DURING THE FINAL SEVERAL HUNDRED FT, THE RATE OF DSCNT INCREASED TO 3000-3500 FPM WITH STILL A NORMAL ALT CAPTURE ANNUNCIATED. AS WE PASSED FL240 IT THEN BECAME OBVIOUS THE ACFT WAS NOT GOING TO LEVEL OFF. I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT APPROX 100 FT BELOW FL240 AND BEGAN TO INITIATE A RECOVERY. WITH THE EXCESSIVE NOSE DOWN TRIM AND RATE OF DSCNT, IT TOOK 500 FT TO REVERSE THE DSCNT. WE RETURNED TO FL240.

  215.  
  216. Accession Number: 373771
    Synopsis: A B757-200 ON AUTOLAND APCH EXPERIENCED AN AUTOPLT DISCONNECT AT 50 FT AGL JUST AFTER FLARE CAPTURE RESULTING IN A FIRM LNDG.
    Narrative: ROUTINE IOE, FO FLYING, VFR, AUTOLAND FOR LAS RWY 25L AT APPROX 1300 FT AGL, TWR STATED, ACR XYZ, LAND ON RWY 25R. FO DISCONNECTED AUTOPLT AND LINED UP ON RWY 25R. CAPT SELECTED RWY 25R ON CDU, SELECTED ILS FREQ, CYCLED FLT DIRECTOR SWITCHES, SELECTED AUTOPLT, SELECTED APCH. AT 1000 FT LOC AND GS CAPTURED. ACFT ON GS AND LOC. NO LAND 3 ANNUNCIATED. APCH WAS STABLE. AT APPROX 100 FT ACFT WAS LINED UP SLIGHTLY L OF CTRLINE, BUT ACCEPTABLE. CAPT CALLED OUT 70 FT, 60 FT. RADAR ALT ANNOUNCED 50 FT. FLARE CAPTURE. ACFT STARTED TO FLARE. AUTOPLT DISCONNECTED WITH AURAL WARNING. ACFT BOUNCED AND STARTED TO HEAD L. CAPT TOOK ACFT AND MADE NORMAL LNDG. CAPT HAD ACFT INSPECTED BY MAINT. FIRST LNDG WAS FIRM, BUT NOT HARD. FO FLEW NICE AUTOLAND ON NEXT LEG TO LAX. FO FLEW NICE MANUAL LNDG AT ATL. SUSPECT A GUST HIT ACFT BELOW 50 FT.

  217.  
  218. Accession Number: 374065
    Synopsis: AN F10 FLYING IN ZDC AIRSPACE HAS AN UNCOMMANDED DIVE AFTER ALT CAPTURE AND LOSES 500 FT. ACFT IS EASILY FLOWN BACK TO 15000 FT CRUISE ALT.
    Narrative: XA45Z, FREQ UNKNOWN, ALT 15000 FT. ATC FACILITY: DULLES APCH. LOCATION: TRIXY INTXN. ON THE BUCKO 4 ARR TO DCA, JUST OUTSIDE TRIXY INTXN, AFTER CAPTURING 15000 FT, AUTOPLT WENT INTO AN UNCOMMANDED DIVE. BOTH AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHROTTLES WERE DISCONNECTED AND DIVE WAS ARRESTED BY 14500 FT. ACFT WAS HAND FLOWN BACK TO 15000 FT AND MANUALLY FLOWN FOR REMAINDER OF FLT. NO COM WAS EXCHANGED WITH DULLES APCH REGARDING DEV OR OTHER ACFT CONFLICT.

  219.  
  220. Accession Number: 375020
    Synopsis: AN ACR MLG FLC CLBED ABOVE THEIR CLRED ALT. THE FLC SUSPECTS A MALFUNCTION IN THE AUTOFLT GUIDANCE SYS, BUT COULD NOT VERIFY THIS. THE SYS OPERATED PERFECTLY FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT.
    Narrative: ATC CLRNC 'CLB TO 6000 FT MSL, L TURN 220 DEGS TO INTERCEPT COL 350 DEG RADIAL.' AS PNF, I DIVERTED ATTN TO FMC TO SET UP COURSE INTERCEPT FOR PF. HE WAS FLYING MANUALLY. I HAD SET 6000 FT IN ALT WINDOW AND THEN BEGAN TO SET UP COURSE INTERCEPT. FOR SOME UNKNOWN REASON, I HAD TO REPEAT THE SETUP AND WHILE ATTEMPTING SECOND TIME, PF QUERIED '6000 FT?' I LOOKED UP AND CONFIRMED '6000 FT' AND NOTICED WE WERE LEVELING AT 7000 FT MSL. PF BEGAN IMMEDIATE CORRECTION TO 6000 FT AND STATED THAT THE COMMAND BARS INDICATED CLB UNTIL HE FINALLY QUERIED '6000 FT?' AS WE APCHED 7000 FT MSL. WE HAVE NO EXPLANATION WHY COMMAND BARS COMMANDED CLB. HE ALSO STATED, AUTOTHROTTLES DID NOT RETARD. HIS CORRECTION BACK TO 6000 FT WAS IMMEDIATE. UPON REACHING 6000 FT, DEP CLRED US TO HIGHER (I THINK 12000 FT) AND WE BEGAN CLB. PASSING 6400 FT ATC REQUESTED OUR ALT AND WE RESPONDED 6400 FT CLBING TO 12000 FT. ATC SAID NOTHING FURTHER, NOR DID WE. MISTAKES: 1) PNF DIVERTED ATTN TO FMC TOO LONG AT ONE TIME. 2) PF DIDN'T MONITOR ALTIMETER AS WELL AS COMMAND BARS. IF ALT WARNING AND AUTOTHROTTLES MALFUNCTIONED, IT NEVER HAPPENED AGAIN FOR ENTIRE FLT (NO EXPLANATION). WE WONDER IF SAME WOULD HAVE OCCURRED WITH AUTOPLT FLYING.

  221.  
  222. Accession Number: 375025
    Synopsis: A SAAB 340 HAS SEVERAL FALSE TCASII RA DURING ARR AND DEP INTO CRQ, CA. RPTR ASSOCIATES THIS WITH MIL OPS AT SEA. WHEN THE SHIPS ARE AT SEA, THE TCASII RA ARE PLENTIFUL AND ARE FALSE.
    Narrative: 7/CC INBOUND, FALSE RESOLUTION ALERT IN VMC. 7/CD IMC DEP. AT 1200 FT MSL 'DSND' RA 2 TARGETS (+2000 FT) 1 O'CLOCK LESS THAN 3 MI. INITIATED DSCNT, TARGETS DISAPPEARED. RESUMED CLB, WENT VMC AT 1500-1600 FT MSL, SAME 2 TARGETS, 200 FT ABOVE WITHIN 3 MI APPEARED ON TCASII WITH 'DSND' RA AGAIN. AFTER CONFIRMING WITH ATC THAT THERE WAS NO TFC IN OUR VICINITY WE CONTINUED OUR CLB WITH NO FURTHER RA'S. THE MIL IS CONDUCTING OPS OFF THE COAST THERE. EVERY TIME THEY DO WE GET THESE FALSE RA'S. IN VMC IT'S A NUISANCE, BUT IMC, IT'S A SAFETY FACTOR, A BIG ONE. IF IT'S THEIR EQUIP, IT NEEDS WORK. IF IT'S SOME E3 PLAYING GAMES, WELL, EITHER WAY, BIG PROB -- NEEDS FIXING. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR CLARIFIED THE RPT BY STATING THE FOLLOWING. WHENEVER A MIL SHIP IS OFF SHORE, HER ACFT RECEIVES FALSE TCASII RA SIGNALS. THE TCASII RA APPEARS FOR ABOUT 30 SECONDS, THEN DISAPPEARS. THE RA DOES NOT COINCIDE EXACTLY WITH THE SHIP, BUT WILL BE ABOUT 1-2 MI FROM THE SHIP. IF A HELI OR FORMATION OF HELIS ARE SEEN FLYING FROM SHORE TO SHIP, THEY WILL ALSO GENERATE A TCASII SIGNAL IN THE VICINITY OF THE HELI. THE FALSE RA SIGNALS NEVER COINCIDE WITH THE OBJECT, JUST APPEAR CLOSE BY, AND LAST NO LONGER THAN 30 SECONDS. WHEN THESE FALSE SIGNALS APPEAR IN VMC THE RPTR DOESN'T MIND BECAUSE THEY CAN USUALLY BE VERIFIED TO NOT EXIST BY THE FLC VISUAL OBSERVATION AND TRACON. WHEN IT'S IMC, THEN THEY HAVE TO FOLLOW THE COMMANDS FOR MAX SAFETY. RPTR STATES OTHER FLC MEMBERS HAVE ALSO EXPERIENCED THE SAME TYPE OF PHENOMENA. IT ONLY HAPPENS WHEN SHIPS ARE PARTICIPATING IN MIL MANEUVERS.

  223.  
  224. Accession Number: 375110
    Synopsis: A B757 FLYING IN ZJX AIRSPACE, LOSES THE NAV GND TRACK FROM THE FMC AND BEGINS TO WANDER OFF THE FLT PLAN COURSE.
    Narrative: FMC LOADED AND VERIFIED RTE BY BOTH CAPT AND FO. AFTER PASSING CHS, FMC APPARENTLY DELETED J79, UNCOMMANDED, AND ACFT PROCEEDED DIRECT TOWARD OMN, WHICH WOULD PENETRATE A WARNING AREA. AFTER PASSING CHS (WITHIN 10 MI), CTR CTLR NOTICED ACFT RTE DEV AND VECTORED FLT BACK ONTO J79. CAPT AND FO AT A LOSS TO EXPLAIN WHY FMC DROPPED J79 (FROM CHS TO OMN) FROM DATABASE.

  225.  
  226. Accession Number: 375980
    Synopsis: AN F100 FLYING INTO MSP, MN, OVERSHOT THE ILS. ILS IS IN THE PROCESS OF BEING RESET AND POSITIVE IDENT OF THE ILS COULD NOT BE MADE.
    Narrative: I WAS PF AT 2700 FT AND 8-10 NM SE OF MSP CLRED FOR ILS RWY 29L APCH. LAND WAS SELECTED ON FLT MODE PANEL AND I ACQUIRED A VISUAL ON AN AUTOLAND SYS OF A RWY BUT ALLOWED THE AUTOPLT TO FLY AND CAPTURE LOC SINCE WE WERE IN RAIN AND TRYING TO VERIFY THE CORRECT RWY VISUALLY. AUTOPLT DID NOT CAPTURE LOC AND WE WENT THROUGH LOC INTO AREA N OF FINAL APCH PATH. HAND FLEW BACK TO RWY 29L FINAL VISUALLY. PNF DID NOT GET IDENT ON RWY 29L LOC AFTER NUMEROUS ATTEMPTS AND WE RPTED NO IDENT. TWR SAID THEY HAD JUST RESET THE RWY 29L LOC AND WE WERE THEN GETTING GOOD RAW DATA. NO OTHER TFC CONFLICTS OBSERVED DURING OVERSHOOT.

  227.  
  228. Accession Number: 376660
    Synopsis: S80 FLC FAILS TO NOTE THAT THEIR FMC IS NOT GOING TO MAKE THE ALT XING RESTR PAST RMG DURING A NIGHT OP. FLC WAS BUSY, CAPT ON PA AND FO WORKING ON THE MEL FOR A LNDG LIGHT THAT HAD NOT RETRACTED AND HAS A CONCERN REGARDING ADDITIONAL FUEL BURN. CTLR CALLS FLT.
    Narrative: FREQ 132.05, FL330. ATC FACILITY: ATL. LOCATION: RMG. ZTL GAVE US A DSCNT TO CROSS ERLIN AT 13000 FT, 250 KTS. WE STARTED DOWN FROM FL290, ALT SET IN WINDOW AND IN FMC. XING ALT AND SPD SET IN FMC. CAPT FLYING. I, FO, WAS PNF AND WAS WORKING ON THE FMR CODES FOR A LNDG LIGHT THAT WOULD NOT RETRACT. I ASKED THE CAPT FOR MEL TO SEE ABOUT RESTRS AND EXTRA FUEL BECAUSE WE HAD USED 800 LBS MORE. JUST AFTER LOOKING AT MEL, ATC ASKED IF WE WERE GOING TO MAKE THE RESTR. WE HAD 9 MI TO GO AND 9000 FT. WE TOLD THEM WE COULD NOT MAKE THE XING AND REQUESTED A TURN. A SERIES OF 120 DEG TURNS LATER WE WERE BACK ON THE ARR AT THE PROPER SPD. I HAVE NO IDEA WHY THE FMC DID NOT MEET THE ALT RESTR. WE SHOULD HAVE MADE THE ALT RESTR BY A NUMBER OF MI. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 376659: IN PROFILE MODE AND INSERTED RESTR IN FMS AND BEGAN AN IMMEDIATE DSCNT. CHANGED RATE OF DSCNT TO 1500 FPM AND LEVEL BUG SHOWED LEVELOFF SHORT OF ROME. ADJUSTED RATE TO 1200 FPM AND LEVELOFF BUG MOVED BTWN ROME AND ERLIN. PF TURNED ATTN TO ARR PA AND 9 MI SHORT OF ERLIN, CTR ASKED IF WE WOULD MAKE THE XING. COMPLETED A 360 DEG TURN AND REJOINED THE ARR. I FAILED TO MANUALLY COMPUTE ALT VERSUS DISTANCE AND RELIED ON THE FMS TO CORRECTLY PLACE THE LEVELOFF BUG AND IN PROFILE TO TAKE OVER THE DSCNT IF PARAMETERS WERE EXCEEDED.

  229.  
  230. Accession Number: 376720
    Synopsis: EMB120 FLC OVERSHOT THEIR ALT DURING DSCNT. CREW WAS BUSY AND FAILED TO PAY ATTN TO THEIR DSCNT PROFILE. ACFT WAS BEING OPERATED WITHOUT THEIR TCASII SYS. OTHER ACFT NOTED THEIR PRESENCE, APPARENTLY WITH THEIR TCASII.
    Narrative: THE WX AT TLH REGIONAL ARPT WAS IFR WITH A 500 FT OVCST AND THE TOPS WERE ABOUT 2000 FT. THE WX ON TOP WAS VMC WITH GOOD VISIBILITY. AT APPROX AX25 WE WERE LEVEL AT 9000 FT AND CLRED DOWN TO 7000 FT AND WERE ALSO ASSIGNED A HDG. THE CAPT, WHO WAS THE PF, STARTED THE DSCNT AND ASKED FOR THE IN-RANGE CHKLIST AND THE INST APCH CHKLIST. I, THE FO AND PNF, PERFORMED THE IN-RANGE CHKLIST. I THEN BEGAN THE INST APCH CHKLIST BY FIRST BRIEFING THE ILS TO RWY 27 AND THEN I BEGAN PERFORMING THE OTHER CHKS INCLUDED, WHEN I HAD A QUESTION CONCERNING THE CHKING OF THE RADAR ALTIMETERS. THE CAPT EXPLAINED TO ME THE ANSWER TO MY QUESTION AND AT THE SAME TIME WE BOTH LOOKED UP AND REALIZED WE WERE AT 6500 FT AND DSNDING. THE CAPT IMMEDIATELY ARRESTED THE SINK RATE AND BEGAN A CLB AT 6450 FT. AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME THE ACFT OFF OUR R WING AND SLIGHTLY AHEAD QUERIED THE CTLR ABOUT OUR ALT. THE CTLR THEN GAVE US OUR ORIGINAL ALT OF 7000 FT AGAIN AND GAVE US A HDG OF 10 DEGS TO THE L. THE REST OF THE FLT AND APCH WAS UNEVENTFUL. AT THE TIME THE CTLR GAVE US 10 DEG TURN TO THE L WE WERE AT 6700 FT AND CLBING. SOME OF WHAT I BELIEVE TO BE THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS ARE: 1) FOR SOME REASON THE ALT ALARM DID NOT GO OFF. 2) I AS THE FO HAD A QUESTION ABOUT AN ITEM ON THE CHKLIST THAT I SHOULD HAVE KNOWN. 3) THE CAPT (PF) AND MYSELF (PNF) WERE PREOCCUPIED AND NOT FLYING AND MONITORING THE AIRPLANE PROPERLY. 4) THE TCASII WAS INOP. 5) I BELIEVE THAT ALSO, ON A SMALL SCALE, WE WERE A LITTLE TIRED, WE WERE IN THE LAST 20 MINS OF A 12 HR DUTY DAY, ON THE LAST DAY OF A 4- DAY SCHEDULE.

  231.  
  232. Accession Number: 376921
    Synopsis: MD80S ACFT BEING VECTORED FOR RWY 1 AND CLRNC FOR DSCNT TO 3000 FT. APCH CTLR TELLS FLC TO LEVEL AT 5000 FT BECAUSE THEY WERE CHANGING RWYS. AUTOPLT FAILED TO CAPTURE ALT AND ACFT DSNDED 200 FT BELOW BEFORE CAPT RPTR DISCONNECTED AUTOPLT AND REGAINED THE ALT.
    Narrative: DSNDING INTO MSY WE WERE BEING VECTORED FOR RWY 1 AND GIVEN DSCNT TO 3000 FT. APCH SAID THEY WERE CHANGING RWYS AND NOW TO STOP AT 5000 FT AND WE WERE GOING TO RWY 10. APCH GAVE THIS CLRNC. PASSING ABOUT 5500 FT THE AUTOPLT DID NOT CAPTURE AT 5000 FT AND AUTOPLT WAS DISCONNECTED. DURING THE DISCONNECT, WE BOTTOMED OUT AT 4800 FT BEFORE WE COULD RETURN TO 5000 FT. APCH AND LNDG WERE NORMAL.

  233.  
  234. Accession Number: 377050
    Synopsis: AN ACR ON AN ILS RWY 22R APCH CLAIMS THAT THE LOC INDICATOR DID NOT AGREE WITH THE LNAV TRACK. THE LNAV INDICATED THAT THE ACFT WAS R OF COURSE WHILE THE LOC SHOWED THE ACFT L OF COURSE. THE FLC SUBSEQUENTLY ACQUIRED THE ARPT VISUALLY AND LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER PROBS. THE TWR CTLR STATED THAT THE RWY 4L LOC WAS STILL ON.
    Narrative: DURING FINAL APCH TO RWY 22R AFTER DELAY VECTORED ONTO THE ILS, LOC INDICATOR DID NOT AGREE WITH LNAV TRACK. LNAV SHOWED US R OF COURSE WITH LOC SHOWING US L. WAS ABLE TO ACQUIRE ARPT VISUALLY AND LAND. TWR SAID THAT THE RWY 4L LOC WAS ALSO STILL ENGAGED WHICH MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE PROB.

  235.  
  236. Accession Number: 377190
    Synopsis: AN ACR B757 FLC HAS AN ELECTRICAL MALFUNCTION AS THEY WERE LEVELING FROM A DSCNT AND THEY OVERSHOT THEIR ALT BY 175 FT BEFORE MANUALLY RECOVERING.
    Narrative: FLT CLRED FROM FL350 TO FL310 JUST PRIOR TO JLI VOR. JUST PRIOR TO LEVELING OFF AT FL310, BOTH XPONDERS FAILED AND (BOTH XPONDER DATA BUSES) 'INTERMITTENTLY.' AND, LEVELING OFF FROM A 3500 FPM DSCNT AT FL310 (CAPT FLYING) THE AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHROTTLES DISCONNECTED CAUSING AN ALT BUST OF APPROX 175 FT PRIOR TO REVERTING TO MANUAL CTL. WE ADVISED CTR OF THESE ELECTRONIC FAILURES AND THEY WERE HELPFUL. WHEN FLT WAS HANDED OFF TO THE NEXT SECTOR, THE CTLR ASKED 'SOULS' AND 'FUEL' AS IF WE HAD AN EMER. WE ADVISED NO EMER, BUT NO XPONDERS AND AUTOPLT UNRELIABILITY. FLT LANDED UNEVENTFULLY.

  237.  
  238. Accession Number: 377247
    Synopsis: THE ACR FLC OF A B737 INCREASES THEIR AIRSPD AND CHANGES THE ASSIGNED ALT TO A LOWER ONE IN COMPLIANCE WITH A CTLR'S CLRNC. THE ACFT STARTED A SLOW CLB AS IT ACCELERATED, EVEN THOUGH THE 'ALT HOLD' MODE WAS, APPARENTLY, STILL ENGAGED.
    Narrative: LEVEL CRUISE FLT, ASKED BY ATC TO ACCELERATE TO 300 KTS AND GIVEN PLT'S DISCRETION TO FL280. ACFT WAS ENGAGED IN VNAV AND LNAV MODE WITH FL280 SET IN THE ALT SELECTOR AND 300 KTS IN THE SPD SELECTOR. AS THE ACFT WAS ACCELERATING FROM .74 MACH TO 300 KTS IT STARTED A 600 FPM CLB, BUT WAS NOT NOTICED, SINCE THE ALT ALERT DID NOT SOUND UNTIL FL359 HAD BEEN REACHED. ACFT WAS RETURNED IMMEDIATELY TO FL350 AND SOON THEREAFTER DSNDED TO FL280. WHEN ANY CHANGE IS MADE IN SPD OR ALT BE ESPECIALLY ALERT THAT VNAV DOES NOT DISENGAGE. ALTHOUGH IN THIS OCCURRENCE MAINT WAS NOTIFIED BECAUSE IT DID REMAIN ENGAGED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 377680: IN CRUISE AT FL350 AUTOFLT, BOTH VNAV AND LNAV, ENGAGED, GIVEN PLT'S DISCRETION TO FL240. 24000 FT SET IN MODE SELECTOR PANEL ALT WINDOW, MANY MI PRIOR TO TOP OF DSCNT. ACFT WAS IN STEADY STATE CRUISE AT FL350 WITH 'ALT HOLD' DISPLAYED.

  239.  
  240. Accession Number: 377720
    Synopsis: ACR B757 ACFT IN CRUISE AND ON AUTOPLT. ACFT DSNDED 250 FT SETTING OFF ALT ALERT. RPTR FO DISCONNECTED AUTOPLT AND RETURNED TO ASSIGNED ALT.
    Narrative: WHILE AT CRUISE WITH CTR AUTOPLT ENGAGED, THE ALT ALERT SOUNDED AS WE DSNDED ABOUT 250 FT BELOW FL350. FO, PF, DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND HAND FLEW BACK TO ALT, THEN ENGAGED R AUTOPLT.

  241.  
  242. Accession Number: 377764
    Synopsis: RPTR STATES THAT WHEN DC10, B747 TYPE FREIGHTERS ROLL TO THE END OF RWY 4R AND TURN SIDEWAYS EXITING THE RWY, THE LOC IS DEFLECTED TO THE L FOR A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME. RPTR HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN ON AN AUTOPLT COUPLED APCH AND GOT A HARD L TURN TO CHASE THE LOC.
    Narrative: I WAS EXPECTING THIS TO HAPPEN LAST NIGHT SINCE I'VE EXPERIENCED THIS VERY THING BEFORE ON THIS RWY. FOLLOWING A DC10 ON RWY 4R AT ORD, WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO ROLL TO THE END. WHEN THE PRECEDING WDB ACFT ROLLS TO THE END OF RWY 4R AND TURNS SIDEWAYS EXITING THE RWY, IT DEFLECTS THE LOC TO THE L ABOUT 1/2 DOT FOR A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME. LAST NIGHT IT WAS A DC10, I'VE EXPERIENCED THE SAME THING FOLLOWING A B747. MAYBE IT HAS TO DO WITH THE FACT THAT THESE ACFT WERE FREIGHTERS AND THEIR FUSELAGES WERE FULL OF FREIGHT WHICH MIGHT BLOCK THE LOC BEAM MORE THAN A PAX ACFT WOULD. WE SHOULD GET THIS ILS FLT TESTED WITH A WDB ACFT BLOCKING THE LOC AS IF IT WAS TURNING OFF AT THE END. I'M SURE THE RESULT WILL BE THAT THE LOC IS DEFLECTED SIGNIFICANTLY TO THE L. LAST NIGHT I WAS HAND- FLYING WITH THE RWY IN SIGHT SO I JUST WATCHED THE LOC SWING TO THE L AND THEN COME BACK. IN THE PREVIOUS INCIDENT THE AUTOPLT WAS COUPLED IN VMC AND I GOT A HARD L TURN TO CHASE THE LOC -- NOT FUN.

  243.  
  244. Accession Number: 378000
    Synopsis: ACR LGT PERFORMS AN AUTO ALT EXCURSION WHILE ON AUTOPLT AND PERFORMANCE MGMNT SYS ENGAGED. FLC RECOVERS IN SHORT ORDER AND SYMPTOM FAILS TO APPEAR FOR REST OF FLT.
    Narrative: THE FO LEVELED OFF THE ACFT AT 17000 FT MSL WITH AUTOPLT AND PMS ENGAGED. SHORTLY AFTER, THE ACFT BEGAN AN UNCOMMANDED DSCNT. THE FO DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND ARRESTED THE ALT AT 16600 FT MSL, THEN RETURNED TO OUR ASSIGNED 17000 FT MSL. I FEEL A RECURRENCE WILL BE PREVENTED BY MAINTAINING A MORE VIGILANT WATCH ON THE GAUGES AND BY INVESTING LESS TRUST IN THE AUTOMATION. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 377918: NO EXPLANATION COULD BE FOUND FOR THE UNCOMMANDED DSCNT, THE SYS PERFORMED NORMALLY FOR REMAINDER OF FLT.

  245.  
  246. Accession Number: 378040
    Synopsis: AN ACR B757 FLC FORGOT TO SELECT THE PROPER RTE IN THEIR FMS DURING A LATE, STEEP DSCNT AND BY THE TIME THEY REMEMBERED, THEY WERE OFF COURSE AND THIS LED TO OTHER PROBS. THEY FINALLY SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED THEIR APCH MANUALLY.
    Narrative: FLYING GLASR 3 ARR MLP TRANSITION. ACTIVE RTE WAS RTE 1 WITH THE GLASR 3 ARR MLP TRANSITION TO ILS RWY 16R TO SEATAC. RTE 2 HAD THE GLASR 3 ARR MLP TRANSITION WITH JAKSN FMS TRANSITION TO RWY 16R TO SEATAC. WE REQUESTED JAKSN FMS TRANSITION WITH ZSE ON 135.52. WE WERE TOLD TO STAND BY. WE WERE GIVEN A DSCNT CLRNC TO CROSS JAKSN AT 12000 FT CLRED JAKSN FMS TRANSITION. THE DSCNT TO 12000 FT WAS GIVEN LATE AND THE FMS SHOWED WE WOULD BE 4000 FT HIGH. I SPD INTERVENED AND INCREASED THE SPD TO 325 KIAS WITH SPD BRAKES DEPLOYED IN ORDER TO MAKE THE 12000 FT AND 250 KIAS XING RESTR AT JAKSN. I WAS CONCENTRATING ON THE DSCNT AND I FAILED TO REQUEST FO TO ACTIVATE RTE 2. AT THE JAKSN INTXN THE ACFT TURNED TO HDG OF 200 DEGS, THE SAME HDG FOR THE JAKSN FMS TRANSITION AND THE GLASR 3 ARR. I WAS CHKING THE APCH CHART FOR THE JAKSN FMS TRANSITION AND IT WAS AT THAT POINT I REALIZED I HAD NOT TOLD FO TO ACTIVATE RTE 2. I TOLD FO TO ACTIVATE RTE 2 AND THE ROUTING SHOWED THE ACFT TO BE SLIGHTLY L OF COURSE. I SELECTED HDG MODE AND TRIED TO CAPTURE THE COURSE. AT THAT POINT I THEN REQUESTED TO MAINTAIN PRESENT HDG TO INTERCEPT THE LOC WHICH WAS APPROVED BY APCH CTL. I ARMED THE LOC AND THE AUTOPLT FAILED TO INTERCEPT SO I DISCONNECTED AUTOPLT AND MANUALLY FLEW. APCH CTL CALLED AS WE HAD GONE THROUGH LOC AND GAVE US A HDG TO INTERCEPT RWY 16R LOC. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO NOT ACTIVATING RTE 2. 1) 2 1/2 HR GND DELAY FOR TSTMS IN DTW (FATIGUE). 2) LATE DSCNT CLRNC. 3) 90 DEG INTERCEPT AT 250 KTS.

  247.  
  248. Accession Number: 378070
    Synopsis: AN ACR FLC ON AN L1011 STARTS THEIR DSCNT EARLY AT CIVET WHEN THEY REF THEIR FMS ONLY, WITHOUT USING AVAILABLE VOR AND DME RAW DATA. FLC STATES THAT THEY FOLLOWED COMPANY PROC AND THEY THEN COMPLAIN ABOUT AGING ACFT.
    Narrative: AFTER REACHING CIVET ON THE FMS AND FRM (FROM) CIVET WAS DISPLAYED, WE BEGAN OUR DSCNT TO CROSS THE NEXT FIX, BREMR, AT 12000 FT. AFTER CIVET WE ALSO SWITCHED FROM FMS NAV TO VOR/DME NAV UTILIZING THE LAX ILS/DME TO RWY 25L, PER PLT'S APCH CHKLIST WHICH DICTATES THAT RADIO/NAV SWITCHES BE PLACED IN THE RADIO POS. AS THE LAX ILS/DME FREQ WAS BEING TUNED AND IDENTED, ATC INFORMED US THAT THEIR RADAR SHOWED THAT WE WERE NOT YET AT CIVET AND HAD BEGUN OUR DSCNT PRIOR TO CIVET. AFTER CONFIRMING OUR POS WITH ATC, WE DETERMINED THAT THE FMS WAS IN ERROR AT CIVET BY APPROX 4 MI. WE CONFIRMED THAT THE LATITUDE AND LONGITUDE IN THE DATABASE WERE CORRECT FOR CIVET AND WE MADE A MAINT LOGBOOK ENTRY TO THIS EFFECT AFTER ARRIVING LAX FOR MAINT TROUBLESHOOTING OF THIS FMS PROB. ALSO, ALL 3 CREW MEMBERS VERIFIED THAT WE HAD INDEED PASSED CIVET ON THE FMS DISPLAY AND WERE NOW ENRTE TO BREMR. WE RECEIVED NO TCASII ALERTS AND WERE IN VMC. THE BAL OF THE ARR, APCH, AND LNDG ON RWY 25L WERE NORMAL. THE PROB: AS THE L1011 AGES, MORE PROBS LIKE THIS WILL APPEAR AND SPECIAL ATTN MUST BE GIVEN TO NOT ONLY THE NAV SYS BUT TO ALL THE MAINT CONCERNS OF AN OLDER ACFT.

  249.  
  250. Accession Number: 378281
    Synopsis: ARTCC INFORMED FLC OF A B757 THAT THEY WERE OFF COURSE WHILE ENRTE ON A DIRECT COURSE USING LNAV AUTOPLT NAV. ATC ISSUED A NEW DIRECT COURSE FROM THAT LOCATION.
    Narrative: ATC FACILITY: HOUSTON. LOCATION: BTWN NEPTA AND LEV. WHILE FLYING BTWN NEPTA AND LEV ON A COURSE DIRECT TO ELP, CTR ADVISED US THAT WE WERE N OF COURSE. WE WERE ON AUTOPLT, LNAV ENGAGED, AND ON THE DIRECT MAGENTA COURSE TO ELP. CTR THEN ADVISED US TO PROCEED DIRECT TO SSO. NO CONFLICT WITH OTHER TFC WAS NOTED.

  251.  
  252. Accession Number: 378410
    Synopsis: AN MD80S RECEIVES A FALSE TCASII RA ON DEP FROM DFW, TX. FLC FOLLOWS TCASII COMMANDS, BUT NEVER SEES ANY TFC NOR DOES ANY TFC APPEAR TO DFW TWR.
    Narrative: ON DEP AT APPROX 1000 FT, TCASII RA RECEIVED. WE WERE TO REDUCE CLB THEN IMMEDIATELY DSND. WE RESPONDED TO THE COMMANDS, DSNDING TO APPROX 800 FT BEFORE CLR OF CONFLICT. WE SAW NO TFC AND THE TWR HAD NOTHING ON THE RADAR. WHAT WAS DISCONCERTING WAS THAT WE HAD NO WARNING ON THIS TARGET AND WERE REQUIRED TO TAKE EVASIVE ACTION DURING CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT FOR WHAT SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN A FALSE RETURN.

  253.  
  254. Accession Number: 378505
    Synopsis: S80 PIC RPT ON POTENTIAL CONFLICT WITH UNKNOWN TFC ON DEP BUR. TCASII RA CALLED FOR DSCNT AS ACFT Y WAS 500 FT ABOVE. CTLR HAD ISSUED A TURN FOR THAT TFC. SINCE RPTR WAS ALREADY IN THE CLB AND A TURN, HE ELECTED TO IGNORE THE RA COMMAND AND CONTINUED HIS CLB. ACFT PASSED 1000 FT BEHIND ACR X AT SAME ALT. RPTR SAYS, 'TCASII SOFTWARE SHOULD BE FIXED.'
    Narrative: ON CLBOUT FROM BUR AT ABOUT 7000 FT FOR 13000 FT, WE WERE GIVEN A R TURN BY TRACON TO AVOID OPPOSITE DIRECTION UNKNOWN TFC AHEAD. WHILE IN THE TURN WE GOT A TFC ALERT ON HIM. THE DISPLAY SHOWED TFC 12 O'CLOCK, 5 MI, ABOUT 500 FT ABOVE AND LEVEL. WE SEARCHED FOR THE TARGET WITHOUT SUCCESS WHILE I INCREASED OUR CLB RATE AND TURN RATE, ROLLING OUT A FEW DEGS R OF OUR ASSIGNED HDG FOR GOOD MEASURE. JUST THEN, WE GOT A TCASII RA 'REDUCE CLB' FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY BY 'DSND.' FROM THE CHANGE IN THE RELATIVE BEARING OF THE TARGET ON THE TCASII DISPLAY AND THE SENSE THAT WITH OUR CLB RATE WE COULD GET SAFELY ABOVE HIM IN THE REMAINING DISTANCE, AND THE FACT THAT TRACON SEEMED HAPPY WITH OUR LATERAL SEPARATION, I JUDGED THAT THE SAFEST THING TO DO WAS KEEP CLBING AT OUR BEST RATE. WE QUICKLY PASSED THROUGH THE TARGET'S ALT AND WERE 200 FT OR 300 FT ABOVE HIM WHEN HE PASSED ABOUT 1 MI ABEAM ON THE L. AT THIS POINT THE TCASII RA CHANGED TO 'DSND XING DSND' THEN 'CLR OF CONFLICT.' THE LAST RA SEEMED PARTICULARLY MINDLESS AS WE WERE ALREADY ABOVE THE TARGET AND CLBING RAPIDLY. I THINK OUR TCASII MAY HAVE BEEN ATTEMPTING TO COORDINATE MANEUVERS WITH A NON EXISTENT TCASII ABOARD THE INTRUDER AND I FOILED ITS PLANS BY COUNTERMANDING ITS INITIAL INSTRUCTION, BUT THAT'S NO EXCUSE. THE TCASII SOFTWARE SHOULD BE FIXED.

  255.  
  256. Accession Number: 378580
    Synopsis: MD88 FLC FAILS TO MAKE A XING RESTR EVEN THOUGH THEY WERE MONITORING THEIR DSCNT PROFILE AS SET UP BY THE FMS. TOO LATE THEY REALIZED THAT THEY WERE TOO HIGH TO MAKE IT. CTLR THEN ASKED FOR AN EXPEDITED DSCNT.
    Narrative: ENRTE FROM ATL TO DAY, ATC CLRNC WAS TO DSND OUT OF CRUISE (FL350) TO FL330 WITH PLT'S DISCRETION TO CROSS 20 NM S OF FLM VORTAC AT FL180. THE FMS COMPUTER WAS PROGRAMMED AND VNAV SELECTED. INITIALLY, FMS SHOWED US WELL BELOW GLIDE PATH AND FO MANUALLY VERIFIED THAT WE WERE. FO CONTINUED THROUGH FL330 AND WE WERE WELL BELOW GLIDE PATH AND MANUALLY DERIVED GLIDE PATH. FURTHER INTO DSCNT, THE FO AND I GOT DISTR WITH ATIS AND IN-RANGE RPT TO COMPANY. FO KEPT EYE ON VNAV GLIDE PATH WHICH STILL INDICATED WE WERE LOW FOR XING RESTR. ONCE AGAIN, FO MANUALLY CHKED DSCNT PROGRESS AND HE/WE REALIZED WE WERE ACTUALLY WAY HIGHER -- ALMOST 6000 FT ABOVE FL180 WITH ONLY 10.5 NM TO GET DOWN! FO DID HIS BEST TO SMOOTHLY GET ACFT DOWN BUT WE ACTUALLY CROSSED THE FIX ABOUT 1000 FT HIGH. NO TFC CONFLICTS WERE NOTED (ATC DID ASK US TO EXPEDITE OUR DSCNT JUST AFTER ERROR WAS NOTED). SUBSEQUENT EXAMINATION REVEALED THE FMS HAD BEEN PROGRAMMED CORRECTLY, BUT HAD MALFUNCTIONED ON GLIDE PATH COMPUTATIONS. MORAL TO STORY: PLTS MUST NEVER TOTALLY RELY ON AUTOMATION.

  257.  
  258. Accession Number: 378583
    Synopsis: POTENTIAL CONFLICT BTWN A B767 ON A VECTORED APCH AND AN MD11 IN A TURN, SAME ALT. QUICK REACTIONARY CLRNC GIVEN BY APCH CTLR TO B767 WITH TURN AND FURTHER DSCNT TO 5000 FT. TCASII RA GIVES CLB WHICH B767 FLC IGNORES. BOTH ACFT IN A TURN WITH B767 PIC HAVING A VISUAL ON THE MD11.
    Narrative: WHILE BEING RADAR VECTORED FOR AN ILS TO ATL RWY 27L AND DSNDING TO 5000 FT, WE WERE TOLD TO LEVEL OFF AT 6000 FT AND TURN TO '270 DEGS (L TURN), INTERCEPT RWY 27L LOC.' IN THE L TURN AROUND 330 DEGS ACFT HDG, WE WERE ISSUED A R TURN 270 DEGS, DSND TO 5000 FT, EXPEDITE, TURN L 270 DEGS -- ALL IN SHORT ORDER. DURING THESE CTLR ISSUED CLRNCS WE RECEIVED A 'CLB RA.' AS I WAS IN A R TURN BACK THROUGH ABOUT 030 DEGS AND IN A DSCNT TO 5000 FT, I COULD NOT SEE TO THE L OF THE ACFT. THE CAPT IMMEDIATELY PICKED THE CONFLICTING ACFT UP VISUALLY AND INFORMED ATC WE COULD NOT TURN L AND THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE THE TURN R TO 270 DEGS. THE CAPT ALSO CONCLUDED IT TO BE SAFEST TO CONTINUE THE DSCNT TO 5000 FT AS PREVIOUSLY CLRED INSTEAD OF FOLLOWING THE RA CLB. WE REMAINED S OF THE RWY 27L LOC AT ALL TIMES. THE CONFLICTING MD11 WAS NOT ON OUR FREQ. THERE WAS SEVERE WX IN THE AREA BUT NOT AT THE ARPT. WE HEARD ONE ACFT (IDENT UNKNOWN) DECLARE MINIMUM FUEL JUST MOMENTS BEFORE THE INCIDENT. UNEVENTFUL APCH AND LNDG. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 378582: DSNDING TO 5000 FT, WE WERE TOLD TO LEVEL OFF AT 6000 FT, HDG ABOUT 330 DEGS. ATC EXCITEDLY TOLD US TO TURN E. I THEN SAW AN MD11 IN A SHARP BANK TO THE W, AT OUR ALT. TCASII ADVISED US TO TURN L (INTO THE MD11). I HAD THE MD11 IN SIGHT UNTIL WE HEADED OPPOSITE DIRECTIONS.

  259.  
  260. Accession Number: 378600
    Synopsis: NEW RTE CLRNC RECEIVED FROM ZJX. AS BOTH PLTS ARE DISTR WITH OMEGA INPUT THE AUTOPLT DISCONNECTS. FLC MADE AWARE OF ALTDEV WHEN ALT ALERT GOES OFF. NOTHING SAID BY ATC AS CREW GETS BACK TO ASSIGNED ALT.
    Narrative: FO FLYING. WE WERE GIVEN NEW CLRNC. BOTH OF US WERE WORKING ON THE OMEGA TO PUT IN NEW FIX. ALL OF A SUDDEN, ALT ALERT GOES OFF. WE HAD DSNDED TO FL235 BEFORE WE CORRECTED BACK TO FL240. ATC NEVER MENTIONED OUR DEV. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 378509: AUTOPLT DISENGAGED FOR UNKNOWN REASON.

  261.  
  262. Accession Number: 379290
    Synopsis: FLC OF A FOKKER 100, FK10, FAILED TO MAKE STAR XING ALT DUE MISPROGRAMMING THE FMC AND NOT SUFFICIENTLY MONITORING RATE OF DSCNT AND ALT IN ORDER TO TAKE OVER ACFT MANUALLY IN TIME TO ASSURE MEETING CLRNC.
    Narrative: ENRTE TO SLC ON THE SPANE 2 ARR, WE WERE CLRED TO DSND AND CROSS THE SPANE INTXN AT FL190. THE PNF DIALED IN FL190 AND A PROPERLY PROGRAMMED PROFILE DSCNT WAS INITIATED WITH THE AUTOPLT ENGAGED. APPROX 8 MI FROM SPANE, IT WAS CONCLUDED THAT THE FMC COMPUTED DSCNT RATE WAS NOT GOING TO BE SUFFICIENT TO REACH SPANE BY FL190. THE PF RESPONDED BY DROPPING DOWN A LEVEL IN AUTOMATION. WHILE LEAVING THE AUTOPLT ON, LEVEL CHANGE WAS SELECTED ON THE FMP AND THE SPD BRAKE WAS EXTENDED. WHEN THE ACFT CROSSED SPANE, THE ACFT WAS IN ALT CAPTURE MODE APPROX 200-300 FT ABOVE ASSIGNED ALT.

  263.  
  264. Accession Number: 379502
    Synopsis: NAV ERROR. FO ON A B727-200 RPTS ON THE INACCURACY OF THE OMEGA SYS IN USE THAT DAY FROM BOS TO ARUBA. BY THE TIME THEY ARRIVED AT ZMA CTL AREA THEY WERE SOME 85 MI W OF PLANNED COURSE. FO CITES THE CAPT AS BEING PARTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR NOT INSURING A LAND DEP POINT FOR AN ACCURACY CHK OF THE OMEGA.
    Narrative: TO BEGIN WITH, THE FLT PLAN RTE NEEDS TO BE STATED. I FEEL THE INITIAL FAILURE TO FLY THE FLT PLAN RTE MAY HAVE LED TO THE EVENT. DEP POINT: BOS. ARR POINT: ARUBA. FLT PLAN/CLRNC: LOGAN 1 LUCOS SEY 067 SEY DIRECT HTO DIRECT RANCO DIRECT KUPEC A554 LAMER DIRECT SEKAR DIRECT PTA UW7 BEROX A567 TNCA. THE ACFT LONG RANGE NAV SYS IS OMEGA. A STANDARD PRACTICE WHEN USING OMEGA IS TO POSITIVELY FIX THE POS BY OVERFLYING A VOR OR NDB PRIOR TO GOING ON AN OCEANIC RTE. THIS IS WHERE I BELIEVE THE PROB INITIALLY OCCURRED. UPON REACHING LUCOS INTXN ON THE LOGAN 1 DEP FROM BOS, ZBW CLRED THE FLT DIRECT TO RANCO INTXN. THE CAPT OF THE FLT ACCEPTED THIS CLRNC. I QUESTIONED WHETHER WE SHOULD ACCEPT THIS BECAUSE WE NEEDED TO GO OVER A GATE AND POSITIVELY FIX OUR POS WITH THE OMEGA. WHAT FOLLOWED WAS A RATHER INTENSE DISCUSSION OVER WHAT WAS THE CORRECT AND PROPER PROC WHEN FLYING WITH OMEGA. THE CAPT'S ARGUMENT WAS THAT HIS MAP AND PLOTTER SHOWED THAT THE OMEGA COURSE AND DISTANCE WERE INDEED CORRECT. I COULD NOT ARGUE WITH THIS EXCEPT TO SAY THAT WITHOUT A POSITIVE FIX ON THE OMEGA, THE SYS TENDED TO WANDER. AFTER WE BEGAN TO GO DIRECT RANCO, I COUPLED THE AUTOPLT TO THE OMEGA. UPON REACHING RANCO, WE TRIED TO TRIANGULATE THE POS WITH BEARINGS FROM HTO AND SIE VORS. THESE BEARINGS SHOWED THE ACFT TO BE A LITTLE W AND S OF COURSE, COMPARED TO THE OMEGA. WE CORRECTED FOR THESE INDICATIONS AND THEN PROCEEDED TO FLY DIRECT KUPEC-A554 ETC. IT MUST BE STATED HERE THAT AFTER RANCO, THE FLT LOSES RADAR CONTACT AND MUST MAKE POS RPTS. THE OMEGA AND AUTOPLT APPEARED TO BE OPERATING PROPERLY. EACH POS CAME WITHIN 2-3 MINS OF WHAT THE COMPUTER FLT PLAN SHOWED. WE GAVE OUR POS RPTS ACCORDING TO THE INFO OFF THE OMEGA AND XCHKED WITH THE FLT PLAN. APCHING LAMER INTXN ON A554, THE FLT WAS SUPPOSED TO CONTACT ZMA. AFTER INITIAL CONTACT, ZMA ASKED FOR AN IDENT. THEY PROCEEDED TO TELL US WE WERE 5 MI SE OF LETON INTXN. LETON IS APPROX 90 MI W OF LAMER. AT THIS POINT WE RPTED AN OMEGA VLF NAV FAILURE. WE WERE ABLE TO CONTINUE THE FLT VIA VOR NAV TO THE DEST. IN SUMMARY: I FEEL THE PROB AROSE BY NOT TAKING A POSITIVE FIX. BY NOT BEING IN RADAR CONTACT, THE FLT WAS NOT ABLE TO BE CORRECTED FOR COURSE ERROR. I BELIEVE THE OMEGA SYS IS TOO INACCURATE AND SHOULD NOT BE USED FOR LONG RANGE NAV. I BELIEVE THE CAPT'S LACK OF KNOWLEDGE ON THE OMEGA SYS ENHANCED A BAD JUDGEMENT ON HIS PART, IE, PROCEED DIRECT RANCO WITHOUT A POSITIVE FIX. I ALSO FEEL HIS INABILITY TO LISTEN TO THE CREW AND THEREFORE EXERCISE CRM CONTRIBUTED TO THIS EVENT.

  265.  
  266. Accession Number: 379540
    Synopsis: B737-300 CAPT ELECTS TO DIVERT TO LAS WHEN HIS FUEL CALCULATIONS INDICATE LESS THAN SATISFACTORY RESERVE FUEL AT LAX. THE COMPUTER FLT PLAN IN CMH INDICATED A TOTAL RESERVE OF 6500 LBS LNDG LAX. AN UNEXPLAINED ERROR OR LOSS OF 3500 LBS OF FUEL.
    Narrative: ENRTE FROM CMH TO LAX. PREFLT, THE FMC WAS LOADED WITH ALL THE APPROPRIATE DATA FROM THE FLT RELEASE, INCLUDING RTE, WINDS ALOFT FOR EACH NAVAID, AND ARR INFO FOR LAX. THE FUEL LOAD WAS 28700 LBS WITH A BURN OF 21900 LBS. I MENTALLY ESTIMATED 20000 LBS TO XCHK THE RELEASE FUEL. I HAD 4000 LBS RESERVE AND 2500 LBS EXTRA FUEL. ENRTE ABEAM MKC, AFTER CHKING TIME/FUEL AND ENTERING DOWNLINE WAYPOINTS, A MESSAGE ON THE FMC SAID WE WOULD LAND IN LAX WITH LESS THAN OUR RESERVE OF 4000 LBS. I VERIFIED ALL FLT AND RTE DATA. WENT TO LONG RANGE CRUISE AND LOWERED OUR FLT INDEX. THE FUEL STILL SHOWED AN ARR FUEL OF 3000 LBS IN LAX. I CONTACTED DISPATCHER AND INFORMED HIM OF OUR ARR FUEL IN LAX. WE AGREED TO TAKE ANOTHER FIX ABEAM COS. THE FMC STILL INDICATED 3000 LBS ARR FUEL IN LAX. I TOLD THE DISPATCHER I WAS UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THIS ARR FUEL AND WOULD DIVERT TO LAS FOR FUEL. HE AGREED. WE REFUELED IN LAS AND CONTINUED TO LAX WITHOUT ANY FURTHER DELAY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM 380273: CREW CALLED 10 MINS PRIOR TO DEP AND ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION OF FLT RELEASE SHOWING A TAILWIND COMPONENT OF 59 KTS. I WENT THROUGH THE RELEASE WITH THE CAPT AND SINCE I PLANNED EXTRA FUEL OF 3900 LBS WE BOTH FELT COMFORTABLE TO INITIATE THE FLT. AFTER CONVERSING WITH A FELLOW DISPATCHER, THE SAME SCENARIO OCCURRED WITH A CMH-LAX FLT THAT LANDED SHORT IN LAS. AFTER RE-EXECUTING THE FLT PLAN 2 AND 3 TIMES IN THE SYS, I USED THE BACKUP, CADIS FLT PLANNING SYS, WHICH SHOWED A DRAMATIC CHANGE IN BURN. I SENT THE FLC A NEW CADIS RELEASE SO THAT THE FLT WOULD BE OPERATING WITH ACCURATE WINDS AND BURN. THE COMPANY CONTINUES TO OPERATE THIS SYS KNOWING THIS INFO IS INCORRECT AND STILL OPERATES THE LONG HAUL PORTION OF THE SYS WITH THE RISK OF STOPPING SHORT FOR FUEL. DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE FLT PLANNING SYS IS CALCULATING INACCURATE BURNS THE DISPATCHER IS AT RISK OF VIOLATION AND RISKING THE SAFETY OF FLT.

  267.  
  268. Accession Number: 379580
    Synopsis: ATC INTERVENED TO ADVISE FLC OF AN LTT TURBOPROP THAT THEIR HDG WAS 40 DEGS OFF WHAT IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN. ATC PROVIDED VECTORS TO ON COURSE. FLC COULD NOT OBSERVE ANYTHING WRONG WITH THEIR HDG WHICH WAS BEING DIRECTED BY THE AUTOPLT FLT DIRECTOR.
    Narrative: WE WERE ENRTE FROM IAD-BDL. WE WERE CLRED BY ZBW TO GO TO CALVERTON VOR, THEN ON TO MADISON VOR. ATC THEN SAID CROSS 10 MI S OF MADISON VOR AT 12000 FT. THE CALVERTON- MADISON RTE WAS SET IN THE GPS AND THE ACFT WAS ON AUTOPLT. THE GPS SEEMED TO BE WORKING CORRECTLY WHEN ATC CALLED AND ASKED US OUR CURRENT HDG. IT WAS 360 DEGS. ACCORDING TO ATC THIS WAS APPROX 40 DEGS OFF. ACCORDING TO OUR EQUIP WE WERE GOING DIRECT TO MADISON VOR. ATC GAVE US A NEW HDG TO MADISON VOR AND WE INFORMED THEM OUR RTE LOOKED CORRECT. THE GPS SEEMED TO BE WORKING CORRECTLY AND I COULD NOT FIND ANY PROBS WITH OUR EQUIP.

  269.  
  270. Accession Number: 379620
    Synopsis: FLC OF MD80 RESETS THE FMS TO CHANGE FROM 20 MI TO 10 MI LEGS IN HOLDING PATTERN. THOUGH THEY FOLLOW CORRECT PROCS THE FMS DOES NOT CHANGE TO 10 MI LEGS.
    Narrative: A CLASSIC AUTOMATION BITES YOU STORY. HOLDING AT MIGET INTXN ON J146, CLRED FOR 20 MI LEGS. CTLR TOLD US TO CHANGE LEG LENGTH TO 10 MI. I WENT TO HOLD PAGE ON FMS AND ENTERED 10 MI LEG LENGTH. IT ACCEPTED THE ENTRY AND THE EXECUTE KEY ILLUMINATED. I PUSHED THE EXECUTE KEY. I THEN CHANGED TO A LONGER RANGE DISPLAY ON THE NAV DISPLAY TO ENTER AN EXPECTED RTE FOLLOWING HOLDING. WE WERE VERY BUSY DECIDING HOW LONG WE COULD HOLD AND TALKING TO THE DISPATCHER TO SELECT AN ALTERNATE FOR POSSIBLE REFUELING. WHAT HAPPENED WAS THAT ALTHOUGH THE FMS ACCEPTED THE 10 MI LEG INPUT, IT DID NOT ACTUALLY FLY 10 MI LEGS BUT CONTINUED TO FLY 20 MI LEGS. I HAD ETG VOR TUNED TO DOUBLECHK THE FMS. MIGET INTXN IS 33 MI W ON J146. BY THE TIME WE FINISHED TALKING TO THE DISPATCHER AND I NOTICED THE DME, IT SAID 55, NOT 43, WHICH WOULD REPRESENT THE END OF THE OUTBOUND LEG OF A 10 MI LEG HOLDING PATTERN. I TURNED INBOUND IMMEDIATELY. NO OTHER ACFT WERE ON TCASII AND THE CTLR NEVER SAID ANYTHING TO US. HOWEVER, THE MISTAKE WAS MINE FOR NOT MONITORING THE FMS.

  271.  
  272. Accession Number: 379860
    Synopsis: AN ACR LTT FLC OVERSHOT THEIR ASSIGNED ALT WHILE LOOKING FOR TFC. THE FLC RETURNED TO THEIR PROPER ALT WITH NO CONFLICT.
    Narrative: WE HAD BEEN CLRED DIRECT TO ROBINSVILLE VOR AFTER DEPARTING JFK UP TO 14000 FT. PASSING 13000 FT, WE WERE GIVEN A TA FROM N90. I ENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND SELECTED 14000 FT IN THE ALT SELECT WINDOW AND BEGAN SEARCHING FOR THE TFC WHICH MY FO WAS ALREADY LOOKING FOR AT THE TIME. WHEN I LOOKED BACK DOWN THE ACFT WAS PASSING THROUGH 14250 FT. INSTEAD OF DOING A HARD NOSE OVER I SMOOTHLY, BUT FIRMLY, STOPPED THE CLB AT 14330 FT AND IMMEDIATELY RETURNED TO 14000 FT. THERE WAS NO COMMENT FROM DEP CONCERNING OUR DEV AND WERE SOON HANDED OFF TO ZNY WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. SIMPLY PUT, I MADE A MISTAKE. BOTH HEADS WERE OUT THE WINDOW DURING OTHER THAN LEVEL FLT. I HAVE SINCE ADOPTED A POLICY THAT THE PNF WILL LOOK FOR TFC WHILE THE PF DOES JUST THAT -- FLY! I LEARNED A LESSON -- HOPEFULLY WITHOUT LOSS.

  273.  
  274. Accession Number: 379870
    Synopsis: AN ACR FLC IN AN MLG GOT OFF COURSE WHEN THEY FOLLOWED AN FMC COURSE THAT WAS IMPROPERLY DEPICTED ON THEIR SCREEN. THE CAPT ATTEMPTED TO REPROGRAM THE FMC INSTEAD OF USING THE AVAILABLE VOR INFO.
    Narrative: SHORTLY AFTER TKOF FROM BUR, WE WERE TOLD TO INTERCEPT A RADIAL THAT WAS ON THE SID (218 DEG RADIAL PMD). I, AS THE PF, SAW ON THE SID THAT THE RADIAL WAS SHOWN ON OUR RTE, SO I TURNED TOWARD THE LINE SHOWN ON THE EFIS SCREEN. IT TURNS OUT THAT THE FMC FOR SOME REASON LOADED THE SID INCORRECTLY, EVEN THOUGH IT WAS ENTERED CORRECTLY SO THE LINE SHOWN WAS THE WRONG RADIAL. DURING THIS TIME, THE CAPT WAS TRYING TO FIX THE BOX INSTEAD OF TUNING THE VOR. IN ANY CASE, THE CTLR NOTED OUR HDG WAS 40 DEGS FROM OUR INTERCEPT HDG GIVEN TO US BY HIM. WE TURNED APPROX 5- 8 MI BEFORE THE ASSIGNED RADIAL. HE TOLD US TO TURN BACK AND WE DID. TO PREVENT THIS FROM HAPPENING AGAIN, I WILL VERIFY THE RTE ON THE LEGS PAGE IN ADDITION TO THE RTE PAGE IN THE FMC. ALSO, I THINK TYPING IN THE BOX BELOW 10000 FT IS NEVER A GOOD IDEA.

  275.  
  276. Accession Number: 380317
    Synopsis: B757 FLC TALE OF AN ALT OVERSHOOT THAT WAS PROMOTED BY A FAILURE OF THEIR AUTOTHROTTLE SYS AND OTHER DISTRS. NEITHER PLT LIKES THE NOISE ABATEMENT PROC AT SNA.
    Narrative: THE NOISE ABATEMENT TKOF FROM SNA IS DEMANDING WHEN EVERYTHING GOES RIGHT. WHEN SOMETHING MINOR GOES WRONG, THINGS GET BUSY REAL QUICK. AFTER TKOF WITH THE FMC AND AUTOTHROTTLES PROGRAMMED CORRECTLY, THE PWR DID NOT REDUCE WHEN VNAV WAS SELECTED AT 800 FT. THE CAPT FLEW THE PROFILE WHILE I ATTEMPTED TO GET THE PWR REDUCED. WE WERE HANDED OFF TO SOCAL DEP. THEY GAVE US A WESTERLY HDG AND A CLB TO 10000 FT. I WAS STILL WORKING WITH THE THRUST MGMNT COMPUTER AND THE MCP AS WE APCHED 10000 FT. WHEN I LOOKED UP, WE WERE AT 10300 FT AND CLBING. THE CAPT IMMEDIATELY DSNDED TO 10000 FT AS I CHKED ON ANOTHER FREQ. NO MENTION WAS MADE BY ATC AND WE WERE CLRED TO 16000 FT. OUR MAX ALTDEV WAS 500 FT. SNA IS BY FAR THE MOST DIFFICULT DEP IN OUR SYS. NOT BECAUSE THE PROC IS THAT DIFFICULT, BUT BECAUSE IT IS COMPLETELY DIFFERENT FROM ANYTHING ELSE IN OUR SYS. IT IS A MAJOR DEP FROM NORMAL SOPS THAT CAUSES DISTRS NOT ONLY IN THE DEP AREA BUT WELL BEYOND. THE NTSB AND FAA SHOULD RE-EVALUATE THE SAFETY OF THIS PROC DICTATED TO MANY AIRLINES BY ONE CITY IN THE COUNTRY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 380202: THE ACFT WAS VERY LIGHT CLBING AT 5000 FPM AND TO A CLRED ALT OF 10000 FT. PASSING ABOUT 9000 FT WE WERE SWITCHED TO ZLA. AT THE SAME TIME WE ENCOUNTERED UNEXPECTED MODERATE CLR AIR TURB. FO WAS IN THE PROCESS OF SWITCHING FREQS AND DID NOT NOTICE CAPT'S FAILURE TO LEVEL AT 10000 FT. WHEN ZLA ANSWERED OUR CHK-IN THEY IMMEDIATELY CLRED US TO A HIGHER ALT. THE CREW ALLOWED THEMSELVES TO BECOME OVERLY OCCUPIED WITH THE ANTICIPATED PROB OF NOISE EXCEEDANCE AND FAILED TO ADEQUATELY FOCUS ON THE CONTINUING CLBOUT. THE HIGH RATE OF CLB, AUTOTHROTTLE PROB, FREQ CHANGE, MODERATE TURB, ALL WITHIN THE FIRST 2 MINS OF FLT, RESULTED IN A VERY HIGH WORKLOAD SIT. THE WORKLOAD COULD HAVE BEEN MODERATED IF THE AUTOPLT HAD BEEN ENGAGED, BUT IT WAS NOT. THE SNA NOISE SIT IS AN EXAMPLE OF HOW PRIORITIES CAN BE MISPLACED WHEN THERE IS ANY GLITCH IN THE PLANNED DEP, SUCH AS OUR AUTOTHROTTLE PROB.

  277.  
  278. Accession Number: 380530
    Synopsis: WDB ACFT IN CRUISE ON OCEANIC RTE WAS OFF COURSE DUE TO EITHER A FAULTY IRS OR DATABASE ERRORS. WAYPOINTS WERE IN ERROR AND RPTR CAPT CLAIMS THAT CORRECT ENTRIES HAD BEEN MADE BEFORE FLT.
    Narrative: ENRTE FROM LONDON HEATHROW (LHR) TO NEW YORK (JFK) WE WERE CLRED DIRECT TO MERLY INTXN. ABOUT 50 MI NE OF MERLY WE WERE CLRED TO N52W15 DIRECT. WE ENTERED THIS WAYPOINT FROM THE DIRECT INTERCEPT PAGE OF THE FMC, BOTH PLTS VERIFIED AND THEN EXECUTED THE PAGE. WE PROCEEDED TO 15W AND ABOUT 3/4 OF THE WAY THERE THE ACTIVE WAYPOINT BEGAN TO APPEAR AS N52W104 ON THE FMC AND THE HSI. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, ATC (SHANNON) CONTACTED US ON VHF AND TOLD US TO FLY A HDG OF 180 DEGS. ORIGINALLY, WE THOUGHT THE TURN WAS FOR TFC (WE WERE STILL IN RADAR CONTACT). I QUESTIONED THE CTLR AND ASKED HIM HOW LONG WE WOULD BE ON THAT HDG. HE TOLD US THAT HE SHOWED US 16 MI N OF COURSE. WE LOOKED AT THE FMC AND SAW THE ACTIVE WAYPOINT AS N52W104. IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN N52W15. NEITHER MYSELF NOR THE FO HAD ENTERED THAT WAYPOINT AT ANY TIME. THE FMC RTE WAS LOADED BY ACARS DATA LINK IN LHR. ALL COMPANY SOP'S WERE FOLLOWED AND THE RTE VERIFIED BY BOTH PLTS. THE ONLY THING THAT WAS NOT ACCOMPLISHED WAS A LINE SELECT AND COORDINATE VERIFICATION OF THE ABBREVIATED OCEANIC WAYPOINTS WHICH IS NOT REQUIRED UNDER OUR SOP'S. ONCE WE CORRECTED BACK TO COURSE WE REVERIFIED THE WAYPOINTS IN THE FMC'S. WE DISCOVERED THAT THE NEXT CHKPOINT LOADED (N52W020) WAS ALSO WRONG. WHEN WE LINE SELECTED IT DOWN THE COORDINATES WERE WRONG SHOWING AS N5217.8W020. ADDITIONALLY ANOTHER WAYPOINT WAS ON THE LEGS PAGE THAT WE DID NOT ENTER. WE DELETED THIS PHANTOM WAYPOINT AND RE-ENTERED THE COORDINATES OF THE SUBSEQUENT OCEANIC WAYPOINTS SPECIFIED IN NAT TRACK E, OUR CLRED RTE. AFTER THE EVENT WE SUSPECTED BAD DATA ON THE FMC DOWNLINK OF THE RTE. DISPATCH WAS NOTIFIED. AT NO TIME WAS THERE A LOSS OF TFC SEPARATION, AND BECAUSE WE WERE STILL IN RADAR CONTACT WHEN WE WENT OFF COURSE, NO OCEANIC GROSS NAV ERROR OCCURRED. LATER IN THE FLT WE GOT A R IRS FAULT ERROR. THE IRS WAS OPERATED IN ATTITUDE ONLY AND NAV WAS NORMAL. THE R IRS WAS ALSO SUSPECTED AS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR.

  279.  
  280. Accession Number: 380542
    Synopsis: B767-200 ACFT ON STAR ARR HAD COM PROBS CONTACTING APCH CTLR AND WHEN FINALLY ESTABLISHING COM THE FLC WAS INFORMED THEY WERE OFF COURSE. AFTER CHKING NAV ACCURACY THEY FOUND ALL 3 INERTIAL REF UNITS OUT OF TOLERANCE (60 MI OFF). ATC VECTORED ACFT FOR APCH AND LNDG.
    Narrative: PROCEEDING DIRECT CARTR WHILE DSNDING ON THE ARR TO SLC IN B767-200, FO FLYING WITH AUTOPLT ON, LNAV AND VNAV ENGAGED. JUST FELT FMS WAS NOT GIVING US CORRECT POS FROM CARTR. XCHKED ON FIX PAGE AND MANUAL VOR -- OGD RADIAL. ALL CHKED OK ON MAP. WHEN CALLED APCH TO VERIFY, NO ANSWER. MADE 3 CALLS, STILL NO ANSWER. FINALLY SWITCHED TO TWR AND INSTRUCTED TO RETURN TO FREQ WE WERE ORIGINALLY ON. APCH ANSWERED WE HAD PASSED CARTR BY 20 MI (W). INFORMED APCH FMS HAD BECOME INACCURATE -- CHANGE TYPE ACFT -- NEEDED VECTORS. ON FINAL TO RWY 16R, I EXTENDED RWY ON FMS AND AT TOUCHDOWN WE SHOWED 62 MI FROM RWY. DISCOVERED ALL 3 INERTIAL REF UNITS OVER 1 DEG E OF CORRECT POS. XCHKED GATE POS AT BOSTON (OUR STARTING POINT) -- ITS LATITUDE/LONGITUDE WAS CORRECT. I ALSO CHKED ACFT POS ON MAP AS WE TURNED TO ACTIVE RWY -- SHOWED US ON RWY 22R (BOS). THIS TURNED OUT FINE BECAUSE WE VISUALLY FELT UNCOMFORTABLE. (BY LOOKING AT THE VARIOUS VALLEYS WE THOUGHT CARTR WAS IN.) IF IMC, WOULD HAVE DRIVEN EXTRA 25 MI TO CARTR FAT, DUMB, AND BLIND. STILL DON'T UNDERSTAND WHAT HAPPENED TO APCH CTL ON THE RADIO. MUST HAVE BEEN IN BLIND SPOT? WE TRUST THE MAGIC SO MUCH -- WE HAD NO CLUES. ONE PLT COULD HAVE BEEN IN MANUAL TO VERIFY XING RADIALS FROM OGDEN BUT WHO THOUGHT ALL 3 INERTIAL REF UNITS COULD GET LOST ON LONGITUDE ONLY, LATITUDE WAS CORRECT. NO FMC MESSAGE. IT'S AN EYE OPENER!

  281.  
  282. Accession Number: 380820
    Synopsis: AN ACR B737 FLC CLB ABOVE THEIR ASSIGNED ALT WHILE ENTERING DATA INTO THE FMS FOR A DSCNT AND AN INCREASED AIRSPD.
    Narrative: UPON RECEIVING DSCNT CLRNC WITH PLT DISCRETION WE ALSO RECEIVED A RESTR TO MAINTAIN 320 KTS OR MORE INTO LAX. I WAS REPROGRAMMING THE FMS TO COMPLY WITH THIS CLRNC WHILE IN VNAV. THE ACFT ACCELERATED TO 320 KTS AND BEGAN A SHALLOW CLB. I WAS HEAD DOWN SO I AM NOT SURE EXACTLY WHAT THE CAPT WAS DOING WITH THE MCP, BUT WHEN I LOOKED UP WE WERE 200 FT OFF ALT. CAPT DISENGAGED AUTOPLT AND MAX DEV WAS APPROX 300 FT.

  283.  
  284. Accession Number: 380850
    Synopsis: B737 FLC FAILS TO MAKE AN ALT XING RESTR. THE CAPT WAS FLYING VIA THE FMS AND THE FO WAS PUTTING HIS CHART REVISIONS IN HIS HANDBOOK. BOTH WERE IN CONVERSATION. NEITHER WAS MONITORING THE PROGRESS OF THE FLT IN THE DSCNT PROC.
    Narrative: WE WERE FLYING FROM LAX TO SMF AT 35000 FT ON THE WRAPS 5 ARR TO SMF. WE HAD BEEN GIVEN A XING RESTR AT TURLO INTXN OF FL240. THE CAPT WAS FLYING THE LEG. WE WERE CONVERSING WHILE I WAS REVISING MY MANUALS. CTR ASKED US IF WE WERE GOING TO MAKE THE TURLO RESTR. WE HAD ABOUT 2 MINS TO DSND 11000 FT AT THAT POINT. I ASKED CTR FOR RELIEF ON THE RESTR DUE TO STARTING DOWN TOO LATE. OAKLAND SAID TO 'DO THE BEST WE COULD' ON THE DSCNT. WE REACHED FL240 ABOUT 7 MI PAST TURLO INTXN. WE WERE THEN GIVEN THE TELEPHONE NUMBER TO ZOA. THE CAPT CALLED WHEN WE REACHED SMF. CTR SAID THAT NO CONFLICTS OCCURRED BECAUSE OF THE LATE DSCNT. THE CAPT WAS VERY SENIOR AND I WASN'T PAYING ENOUGH ATTN TO HIS DSCNT PLANNING. WE HAD THE XING RESTR IN THE FMC WITH THE DSCNT PAGE SELECTED BUT WE WERE NOT LOOKING AT IT.

  285.  
  286. Accession Number: 381881
    Synopsis: ARTCC RADAR CTLR RPTS THAT 2 ACR ACFT RECEIVED FALSE TCASII RA'S WHILE FLYING 75-100 NM W OF GRB VOR. THE FIRST ACFT, A B757 AT FL290, CLBED IN RESPONSE TO THE RA AND WAS ADVISED HIS ONLY TFC WAS A B747 AT FL330 WHICH WAS 4000 FT ABOVE HIM. SHORTLY AFTER THIS INCIDENT, A DC9 AT FL310, RECEIVED A CLB RA AS HE PASSED BENEATH THE B747.
    Narrative: ACFT #1 ON SHINE 1 DEP OUT OF MSP AT FL290. ACFT #2 FLYING J89 SEBOUND AT FL330. ACFT #1 ADVISES HE HAS RECEIVED A TCASII RA TO CLB, TFC 500 FT BELOW. I INFORM ACFT #1 THAT TFC IS AT FL330 AND TO MAINTAIN FL290. ACFT #1 STATES THAT HE IS DSNDING BACK TO FL290. THE HIGHEST ATC OBSERVED ALT REACHED BY ACFT #1 IS FL307. APPROX 3 MINS LATER, ACFT #3 (A DC9) AT FL310 PASSES BENEATH ACFT #2. THE PLT ADVISES HE HAS RECEIVED A TCASII RA TO CLB, TFC 500 FT BELOW. SINCE ACFT #3 WAS ON THE SAME FREQ AS ACFT #1 AND WAS ALSO ISSUED TFC FOR ACFT #2, THE PLT DISREGARDED THE TCASII RA AND REMAINED AT FL310. ACFT #3 THEN RPTED ACFT #2 IN SIGHT AT FL330. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 381987: TCASII GAVE RA CLB DUE TO AN ACFT AT 10 O'CLOCK, 500 FT BELOW AND CLBING. ATC STATED THAT NO TFC WAS THERE. WE WERE AT FL290. ONLY TFC NEAR US WAS AT FL330 AT OUR 12 O'CLOCK POS IN LEVEL FLT. COMPANY FLT BEHIND US ALSO RECEIVED TFC ALERT FOR SAME SIT WITHOUT AN RA.

  287.  
  288. Accession Number: 382191
    Synopsis: A320 ACFT HAD MULTIPLE FLT MGMNT GUIDANCE COMPUTERS (FMGC) FREEZE AT LIFTOFF. CAPT MESSAGE READ 'PLEASE WAIT' AND FO READ 'TIME OUT.' RPTR CAPT SAYS THEY RESET THE COMPUTERS WITH NO AVAIL. APPARENTLY THEY EVENTUALLY REGAINED THE FMGC'S. CALLBACK ATTEMPTED 3 TIMES.
    Narrative: ON LIFTOFF, BOTH MCDU'S HAD A FREEZE IN POS. FO'S SHOWED 'TIMED OUT,' CAPT'S SHOWED 'PLEASE WAIT.' WENT TO STANDBY NAV AND FOLLOWED COM. RESET COMPUTERS BUT NO HELP. THIS COULD HAVE BEEN VERY HAZARDOUS IF ON AN EXTENDED OVERWATER FLT. I FEEL WE SHOULD HAVE GPS BACKUP.

  289.  
  290. Accession Number: 382690
    Synopsis: FLC OF CPR LR25 HAS FAILURE OF ALT ALERTER AND CLBS ABOVE ASSIGNED ALT. THIS RESULTS IN LTSS. CTLR VECTORS BOTH ACFT FOR SEPARATION.
    Narrative: THE PF, FILED AS PIC, CALLED ZLA AS REQUESTED. BETTER CRM ON OUR PART WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THE DEV. I TOOK CTL OF ACFT, CLICKED OFF AUTOPLT AFTER WARNING HIM OF HIS ALT. I SHOULD HAVE TAKEN CTL AT FL283 INSTEAD OF FL285. WE DID SEE ABC ACR AT FIRST ATC RPT. AS CAPTS, WE SOMETIMES TRY NOT TO HURT A COPLT'S FEELINGS. A LESSON LEARNED. GOOD/BETTER CRM COULD HAVE PREVENTED THE DEV. I CERTAINLY OWE AN APOLOGY TO ZLA AND ABC ACR AND THANK THEM FOR THEIR PROFESSIONALISM. NOTE: THE COPLT ALSO TOOK YOKE AND INITIATED CORRECTIVE ACTION ABOUT SAME TIME I DID. WE TALKED LATER AND DISCUSSED HOW WE COULD HAVE DONE BETTER. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 382279: THE ALT ALERTER WAS NEVER HEARD OR SEEN THROUGHOUT THIS DEV. AFTER ROTATING BOTH THE ALTIMETER AND ALERTER KNOBS, BOTH ALTIMETER AND THE ALT ALERTER BEGAN TO FUNCTION AGAIN NORMALLY. WE WERE ASKED TO CALL ZLA UPON OUR ARR AT SFO TO EXPLAIN THE SIT AND WE COMPLIED IMMEDIATELY UPON LNDG. THE FAILED EQUIP WAS TRACED TO AN ALTIMETER, REQUIRING ADJUSTMENTS TO ALLOW FOR CORRECT ALT AND ALT WARNING SYS FUNCTIONS.

  291.  
  292. Accession Number: 382700
    Synopsis: FLC OF MLG DSNDING ADJUSTED THE VERT SPD RATE WHICH TOOK THE AUTOPLT OUT OF CAPTURE MODE. DSNDED 350 FT BELOW ASSIGNED ALT.
    Narrative: WE WERE DSNDING TO ASSIGNED ALT OF 11000 FT. ZJX GAVE A FREQ CHANGE FOR COLUMBIA APCH PASSING 12000 FT. ACFT WAS IN AN IAS IDLE DSCNT. JUST AS THE AUTOPLT CAPTURED 11000 FT AND SWITCHED TO VERT SPD FOR THE LEVELOFF, THE CAPT ADJUSTED THE VERT SPD RATE WHICH UNKNOWINGLY TOOK THE AUTOPLT OUT OF CAPTURE MODE. THE ACFT CONTINUED TO DSND THROUGH THE ASSIGNED ALT OF 11000 FT. IT REACHED 10650 FT BEFORE THE DSCNT COULD BE STOPPED AND THE ACFT RETURNED TO 11000 FT. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS INCLUDED THE FREQ CHANGE JUST PRIOR TO LEVEL OFF AND THE CAPT'S POSSIBLE UNFAMILIARITY WITH THE ACFT (4-6 MONTHS IN TYPE). THE CAPT INITIALLY TRIED TO ARREST THE DSCNT THROUGH THE AUTOPLT CTLS VERSUS DISCONNECTING THE AUTOPLT AND TAKING MANUAL CTL WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN MORE EFFECTIVE. AS FO AND THE PNF, I ASSISTED WITH ACFT CTL ONLY WHEN IT WAS APPARENT THE CAPT WAS HAVING TROUBLE STOPPING THE DSCNT. NO COMMENTS WERE MADE BY THE CTLRS DURING THIS EVENT.

  293.  
  294. Accession Number: 383225
    Synopsis: NMAC BTWN A B757 ON FINAL TO PARALLEL RWYS AND AN MD11 CONVERGING FROM THE R REAR. WHEN THE RPTING CREW OBSERVED THE MD11, IT WAS IN A R TURN AWAY FROM THEIR ACFT. TCASII ISSUED A TA ONLY.
    Narrative: WE GOT A TCASII TA AT 300 FT VERT SEPARATION RAPIDLY CLOSING TO 0. ANGLE OF APCH WAS FROM APPROX 4 O'CLOCK POS. VISUAL CONTACT WAS MADE THROUGH THE R AFT COCKPIT WINDOW WITH AN MD11 IN A R TURN. CLOSEST LATERAL SEPARATION WAS ABOUT 500 FT. NO EVASIVE ACTION WAS REQUIRED. TWO THINGS CONCERN ME. NO RA WAS ISSUED AND CTL OF RWYS 35C AND 35L TFC IS UNDER 2 LCL CTLRS, DIMINISHING ABILITY TO RAPIDLY COMMUNICATE WITH PLTS ON CLOSE SIMULTANEOUS PARALLEL APCHS. THANKS FOR YOUR REVIEW OF THIS RPT.

  295.  
  296. Accession Number: 384172
    Synopsis: AN ACR DC10 FLC HAD THE #2 AUTOPLT DISCONNECT AS THEY WERE APCHING LEVELOFF AT FL370. SHORTLY AFTER LEVELOFF, THE ACFT EXPERIENCED SEVERAL EPISODES OF VIBRATION ACCOMPANIED BY THE UPPER YAW DAMPER INOP LIGHTS ILLUMINATING. MAINT PERSONNEL COULD NOT DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF THE VIBRATIONS.
    Narrative: FLT WAS ENRTE TO AMSTERDAM FROM NEW YORK AND HAD JUST CHKED IN WITH SCOTTISH CTL AT FL350. CLRNC WAS GIVEN TO CLB TO FL370. APPROX 200 FT BELOW LEVELOFF, THE #2 AUTOPLT TRIPPED OFF. COPLT WAS PF AND HE LEVELED OFF MANUALLY AT FL370 AND ATTEMPTED TO RE-ENGAGE THE #2 AUTOPLT. IT TRIPPED OFF AGAIN AND THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY STRONG ACFT VIBRATIONS AND PITCH OSCILLATIONS. THE VIBRATIONS STOPPED AFTER ABOUT 10 SECONDS, BUT WERE FOLLOWED BY TWO MORE EPISODES OF SIMILAR STRONG VIBRATIONS. THERE WAS SOME GAIN AND LOSS OF ALT AND SCOTTISH CTL WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS. AFTER THINGS SETTLED DOWN, THE #1 AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED AND OPS WERE NORMAL TO AMS. THE ONLY SYS MALFUNCTIONS NOTED WERE UPPER YAW INOP LIGHTS ILLUMINATING. SWITCHES WERE RECYCLED AND LIGHTS REMAINED OUT. CAUSE OF VIBRATIONS IS UNKNOWN. NO INJURIES OF ANY KIND WERE RPTED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR IS A DC10-30 CAPT AND HE SAID THAT MAINT WAS UNABLE TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF THE VIBRATIONS. THE MAINT PERSONNEL RAN SOME TESTS, HE SAID, AND CONCLUDED THEIR EXERCISE BY PUTTING THE #2 AUTOPLT ON THE MEL. THE CAPT SAID THAT HE HAS CHKED WITH THE MAINT DEPT SEVERAL TIMES. THEY HAVE NOT HAD FURTHER PROBS WITH THE ACFT. THE #2 AUTOPLT WAS REPLACED. THE ALT ONLY VARIED ABOUT 200 FT UP AND DOWN DURING THE VIBRATION EPISODES. HE SAID THAT THE CREW WAS VERY CONCERNED AS NONE OF THEM HAD EVER EXPERIENCED ANYTHING LIKE THIS BEFORE.

  297.  
  298. Accession Number: 384361
    Synopsis: B737-500 ACFT DSNDING ON STAR AND FMC SET FOR ILS INTERCEPT TO RWY 5R (MMMX), APPARENT MAP SHIFT FROM VOR OR LOC RESULTED IN ACFT TURNING INBOUND ON THE ILS N OF ACTUAL ON COURSE. FLCS MUST MANUALLY CORRECT FOR THE APCH.
    Narrative: ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS FLYING THE SMO ARR TO THE ILS RWY 5R AT MEXICO CITY (MMMX) OVER THE PAST 1-2 MONTHS, THE FLT GUIDANCE/AUTOPLT IS CAPTURING THE LOC APPROX 6 MI FROM THE RWY END AND TURNING TO/OR COMMANDING A COURSE OF ABOUT 052 DEGS (RWY COURSE) HDG EVEN THOUGH THE ACTUAL ACFT POS IS APPROX 1/4 MI N (AND PARALLELING) THE FINAL APCH COURSE. IT USUALLY FOLLOWS THIS PATH FOR APPROX 1 MI OR MORE AND SOMETIMES STARTS ON ITS OWN TO CORRECT BY TURNING TO INTERCEPT THE PROPER INBOUND COURSE. (IT MIGHT HAVE CORRECTED MORE OFTEN HAD I NOT INTERVENED.) IN ALL CASES IT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ON THE PROPER FINAL APCH COURSE UNTIL AFTER PASSING THE LOM (MW). IN ADDITION, RARELY DOES THE LOM (MW) POINT PROPERLY AFTER STATION PASSAGE. I AM CONSTANTLY AMAZED THAT THERE HAS NOT BEEN A MAJOR PROB WITH THIS FACILITY TO DATE. NUMEROUS OTHER PLTS HAVE SEEN THIS PHENOMENON AS WELL.

  299.  
  300. Accession Number: 384614
    Synopsis: AN ACR WDB FLC FINDS THAT UPON ARMING THE APCH MODE, AFTER RECEIVING CLRNC APPROX 15 NM OF THE ARPT, THE ACFT TURNED TO A COURSE THAT PARALLELED THE APCH COURSE WITHOUT INTERCEPTING IT. THE FLC WAITED AND THEN ARMED THE APCH MODE WITHIN 1 MI OF THE ILS AND THE ACFT THEN PERFORMED NORMALLY.
    Narrative: ON HDG 025 DEGS AND 4000 FT W OF ILS RWY 35R AT MXP ALT AND HEADING ASSIGNED BY ATC TO INTERCEPT ILS FOR CAT IIIB APCH. ARMED APCH MODE AND AUTOPLTS APPROX 3-5 MI W OF LOC COURSE AND ACFT EXECUTED IMMEDIATE L TURN PARALLELING APCH. REENGAGED HEADING SELECT AND RETURNED TO INTERCEPT HEADING. VERIFIED AND POSITIVELY IDENTED THAT WE HAD ENTERED PROPER COURSE, APCH AND FREQ. ALL CHKED OK. REARMED APCH MODE AND AUTOPLTS AND MANEUVER OCCURRED AGAIN AND ACFT STARTED DOWN (LOST 300 FT). DISCONNECTED AUTOPLT SELECTED HEADING SELECT AND MANUALLY RETURNED TO ALT AND INTERCEPT HEADING. WAITED TILL LESS THAN A MI FROM LOC COURSE AND REARMED APCH MODE AND AUTOPLTS. ACFT THEN EXECUTED NORMAL CAT IIIB AUTOLAND APCH. WE WERE LESS THAN 15 MI RADIUS FROM ARPT DURING ENTIRE INCIDENT. MAP/LOC/GS INDICATORS NEVER CORROBORATED WE WERE ON APCH IN FIRST 2 INSTANCES. RELATED INCIDENT TO OUTBOUND CAPT AND HE STATED HE'D HAD A SIMILAR EXPERIENCE, BUT NO OTHERS HAVE BEEN RPTED BEFORE OR SINCE. ALSO HEADING BUG SLEWED TO INBOUND COURSE AS IF LOC CAPTURE HAD OCCURRED, EVEN THOUGH LOC/GS NEEDLES WERE OFF SCALE. HAD NO INDICATIONS OF ACFT SYS MALFUNCTION, NOTIFIED MXP STATION MGR, WHO CONTACTED ITALIAN AVIATION AUTHS AND THEY ASSURED US ILS WOULD BE CHKED.

  301.  
  302. Accession Number: 384678
    Synopsis: AN ACR DC10 FLC DSNDED BELOW THEIR ASSIGNED ALT WHEN THE ALT CAPTURE MODE OF THE AUTOPLT MALFUNCTIONED.
    Narrative: ACFT CLRED TO DSND TO 11000 FT. AUTOPLT #1 WAS ENGAGED. ALT DID NOT CAPTURE. PF BEGAN CORRECTIVE MEASURE AT 10800 FT, BUT DSCNT CONTINUED TO 10500 FT BEFORE CLBING BACK TO ASSIGNED 11000 FT. FLT PROCEEDED TO MSP ARPT UNEVENTFULLY. THIS SIT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED BY CLOSER MONITORING OF THE FLT INSTS.

  303.  
  304. Accession Number: 384745
    Synopsis: B777 OVERSHOT ITS ALT WHEN THE DATA BASE DOES NOT SWITCH OVER TO ITS UNITED STATES DOMESTIC SENSING OF TRANSITION LEVEL OF 18000 FT. THE DATA BASE WAS 'STUCK' AT THE 6000 FT TRANSITION LEVEL AS UTILIZED IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE ACFT'S DEP POINT. ACFT LEVELED OFF SOME 600 FT BELOW ASSIGNED ALT. PIC HAD THIS OCCUR BEFORE, RECOGNIZED THE PROB AND RESET THE VNAV CLB DATA BASE TO 18000 FT.
    Narrative: CLRED TO DSND FROM FL200 TO 17000 FT MSL. SET 17000 FT IN MODE CTL PANEL. AS ACFT DSNDED THROUGH 18000 FT I TRIED TO SET ALTIMETER TO 29.52 MB. ALT INDICATOR WENT YELLOW TO ALERT US TO AN ALTIMETER PROB. ACFT LEVELED OFF AT 17000 FT INDICATED. ALTIMETER INDICATION STILL YELLOW, SELECTED VNAV CLB PAGE ON CDU AND DISCOVERED DATA BASE HAD NOT AUTOMATICALLY SWITCHED FROM TRANSITION ALT OF 6000 FT FOR LONDON TO 18000 FT FOR UNITED STATES AIRSPACE. ENTERED '18000 FT,' ALTIMETER WENT TO NORMAL INDICATION AND INDICATED WE WERE AT ABOUT 16400 FT. IMMEDIATELY STARTED CLB BACK TO 17000 FT, ZNY REQUESTED OUR INDICATED ALT, WE REPLIED WE WERE HAVING AN ALTIMETER PROB WITH OUR AUTOMATION AND WERE CLBING TO 17000 FT. I HAVE PREVIOUSLY EXPERIENCED THIS PROB IN THE B777, BUT IT HAS NEVER BEFORE INTERFERED WITH ALTIMETRY, THE DATA BASE SHOULD NOT MAINTAIN 6000 FT TRANSITION ALT IN THE UNITED STATES, PERIOD. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR'S INCIDENT OCCURRED ON THE ONE AND ONLY B777 IN THE FLEET THAT HAS EXHIBITED THIS CHARACTERISTIC. DURING DSCNT THE CLB PAGE STICKS AND STAYS IN CLB INSTEAD OF SHIFTING TO THE DSCNT MODE PAGE. THE FLT HAD BEEN AT FL200 AND WAS RECLRED TO 17000 FT. THE ALTIMETER DISPLAY GAVE A YELLOW WARNING OF 'ALT NOT SET CORRECTLY' INDICATION WHEN GOING THROUGH FL180. THE ALTIMETER WOULDN'T RESET. THE PIC WENT INTO THE CLB PAGE AND RESET THAT PAGE TO 18000 FT. HE THEN GOT A NORMAL INDICATION ON HIS ALTIMETERS. HE HAD DSNDED TO 16500 FT BEFORE ATC ASKED HIM ABOUT HIS PROB. THIS HAS OCCURRED NUMEROUS TIMES AND ENTERED INTO THE LOGBOOK EACH AND EVERY TIME. HE DOESN'T NOW WHAT HIS COMPANY IS DOING ABOUT IT.

  305.  
  306. Accession Number: 385090
    Synopsis: A B757 TURNS EXCESSIVELY DURING ILS INTERCEPT IN N90 AIRSPACE. FLC RESETS AUTOFLT SYS AND EVERYTHING BEGINS TO WORK PROPERLY.
    Narrative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

  307.  
  308. Accession Number: 385162
    Synopsis: ATR72 FLC IS ON VISUAL APCH TO RWY 5 WITH TFC TURNING BASE TO FINAL FOR RWY 23 WHEN THEY RECEIVE A GPWS ALERT. BECAUSE THEY CAN SEE THEY ARE ON GS AND NO TERRAIN PROB, THEY DECIDE TO CONTINUE APCH RATHER THAN GO MISSED DUE TO OPPOSITE DIRECTION TFC.
    Narrative: WE WERE CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 5 INTO TRI-CITIES AT 12 MI SW. A GULFSTREAM WAS ON A CTLED DOWNWIND FOR A VISUAL TO RWY 23. BOTH OF US WERE ON TWR FREQ. WE WERE LINED UP ON THE LOC FOR RWY 23 USING THE VASI FOR RWY 5 FOR VERT GUIDANCE. AT APPROX 0.8 TO 1.0 MI FROM THE ARPT THE VASI SHOWED US SLIGHTLY ABOVE THE GS. THE RADAR ALTIMETER SHOWED US APPROX 700 FT. AT THIS TIME WE HAD FULL LNDG CONFIGN. ALSO, AT THIS POINT WE RECEIVED THE GPWS 'TERRAIN, TERRAIN' 'PULL UP, PULL UP.' THE GULFSTREAM WAS APPROX 3 MI OUT ON BASE TO FINAL FOR RWY 23. INSTEAD OF GOING AROUND AND RISKING A POTENTIAL MIDAIR CONFLICT WE RESOLVED UPON OBVIOUS INST AND VISUAL CUES WE SHOULD CONTINUE A NORMAL APCH AND LNDG. WE LANDED WITHIN THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE NORMALLY WITHOUT ANY ABRUPT CORRECTIVE ACTION. WE INFORMED THE TWR OF THE ALERT. THE COORDINATED DECISIONS BTWN THE PIC AND MYSELF WERE MADE FOR SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS EVEN THOUGH THE COMPANY PROC IS TO OBEY ALL GPWS AT NIGHT, NO MATTER IF ERRONEOUS OR VISUAL CUES COULD PERMIT OTHERWISE. I BELIEVE PROCEDURALLY AUTH SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE FLC IN VMC CONDITIONS (INCLUDING NIGHT) TO PREVENT OBVIOUS ERRONEOUS GPWS ALERTS TO BE DISREGARDED, ESPECIALLY IF SAFETY OF FLT IS A SERIOUS CONSIDERATION.

  309.  
  310. Accession Number: 385230
    Synopsis: MD80S ACFT ON ILS APCH BEHIND AN MD11, FLC SUSPECTS LOC FLUCTUATION MAY HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY THE PRECEDING ACFT.
    Narrative: FOLLOWING AN MD11 APPROX 5 MI AHEAD ON FINAL TO RWY 9R AT ORD EXPERIENCED SOME LOC DEV. DEV WAS WITHIN LOC LIMITS AS FAR AS BEING LEGALLY ESTABLISHED ON FINAL, HOWEVER, WITH THE AUTOPLT ENGAGED THE AUTOPLT WAS CHASING THE LOC. SUSPECT OCCURRENCE MIGHT HAVE A CORRELATION TO FOLLOWING WDB ACFT ON APCH.

  311.  
  312. Accession Number: 385280
    Synopsis: MLG ACFT IN DSCNT, PF, FO DIDN'T SEE AUTOPLT FAILING TO CAPTURE LEVEL AT ASSIGNED ALT. CAPT RPTR PROMPTED FO OF ALTDEV AND ACFT WAS FLOWN BACK TO ASSIGNED.
    Narrative: ON DSCNT TO 11000 FT, ENRTE TO HUNTSVILLE, AL, THE AUTOPLT DID NOT CAPTURE THE ALT. PASSING 12000 FT, WE CALLED OUT 12000 FT FOR 11000 FT. APCHING 11000 FT, I NOTICED THE ACFT WAS NOT REDUCING DSCNT TO CAPTURE THE ALT. AT 11000 FT, I TOLD THE FO, WHO WAS FLYING, THAT THE ALT WAS NOT CAPTURING. HE DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND LEVELED THE AIRPLANE MANUALLY TO 11000 FT. THE ALT BOTTOMED OUT AT 10750 FT FOR A FEW SECONDS AND WAS BROUGHT BACK TO 11000 FT VERY QUICKLY. PRIOR TO AND AFTER THIS, THE AUTOPLT CAPTURED THE ALTS NORMALLY. ATC DID NOT SAY ANYTHING, SO I GUESS THEY DID NOT NOTICE.

  313.  
  314. Accession Number: 385322
    Synopsis: AN A320 ACFT ON VECTORS FOR ILS APCH. FLC HAS DIFFICULTY GETTING ACFT OUT OF 'MANAGED' MODE AND ACFT TURNS OPPOSITE DIRECTION FROM HDG DESIRED. FLC WAS ABLE TO CORRECT THE PROB. LOW TIME CAPT MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO LACK OF UNDERSTANDING MANAGED VERSUS MANUAL MODES.
    Narrative: WE WERE BEING VECTORED WITH THE AUTOPLT ENGAGED FOR AN ILS APCH TO RWY 21R AT DTW. ON BASE LEG, TURNING R TO FINAL, WE WERE GIVEN HDG 120 DEGS AND WHILE TURNING TO THAT HDG, GIVEN HDG 160 DEGS TO INTERCEPT THE LOC. I SELECTED HDG 160 DEGS AND PUSHED THE 'LOC' PUSH BUTTON TO ARM THE FMGC FOR THE INTERCEPT. THE FLT DIRECTOR THEN IMMEDIATELY COMMANDED A L TURN AND THE AUTOPLT FOLLOWED IT. AFTER A SLIGHT 'REACTION TIME' DELAY WHILE I WENT THROUGH THE GLASS COCKPIT TROUBLESHOOTING SEQUENCE (WHAT'S IT DONE? WHY'S IT DOING THAT? HOW DO I MAKE IT STOP?), I PULLED THE HDG KNOB AND TURNED IT TO THE R, WHICH SHOULD HAVE CAUSED THE GUIDANCE SYS TO EXIT WHATEVER MODE IT HAD GONE INTO AND TURN TO THE SELECTED HDG. THIS DID NOT WORK, HOWEVER, AND THE ACFT CONTINUED IN THE L TURN. I THEN DISENGAGED THE AUTOPLT, DISREGARDED THE FLT DIRECTOR AND TURNED THE ACFT BACK TO THE R. THIS ALL TOOK PLACE IN JUST A FEW SECONDS, BUT IT WAS ENOUGH TO CAUSE AN OVERSHOOT ON WHAT WAS ALREADY A TIGHT INTERCEPT. ALSO, BECAUSE OF THE COMPRESSED SEQUENCE OF EVENTS, I DID NOT OBSERVE THE ANNUNCIATIONS ON THE FMA PANEL AND DON'T KNOW WHAT MODE THE FLT GUIDANCE SYS WENT INTO THAT CAUSED THE L TURN. WHEN WE GOT THINGS SORTED OUT WITH THE CTLR AND WERE ON AN INTERCEPT HDG FROM THE OTHER SIDE OF THE LOC, THE FLT DIRECTOR CONTINUED TO COMMAND A L TURN, IN SPITE OF REPEATED ATTEMPTS BY THE FO TO SELECT A HDG TO THE R. THE SELECTED HDG SHOWED IN THE WINDOW BUT THE 'MANAGED NAV' DOT WOULD NOT GO OUT. WE ARMED FOR THE APCH BY PUSHING THE 'APPR' PUSH BUTTON AND THE FLT DIRECTOR THEN SUCCESSFULLY CAPTURED THE LOC AND SEEMED TO RETURN TO NORMAL OP. AFTER LNDG WE WROTE UP THE FLT GUIDANCE SYS, BUT AS I WRITE THIS, I AM AT A LOSS TO EXPLAIN WHAT HAPPENED. THE L TURN SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN COMMANDED, AND THE MANAGED NAV MODE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISENGAGED BY SELECTING A HDG TO THE R. THE HDG SELECTED WAS ONLY ABOUT 40 DEGS OR 50 DEGS R OF THE PRESENT HDG, SO IT WAS NOT A CASE OF SELECTING A HDG CHANGE OF OVER 180 DEGS AND HAVING THE ACFT TURN THE SHORTEST DIRECTION. WITH ONLY 100 HRS IN THE ACFT, I DO NOT CONSIDER MYSELF AN AUTH, SO I AM GOING TO BRING THIS SIT UP TO THE 'EXPERTS.'

  315.  
  316. Accession Number: 385762
    Synopsis: AN ACR B757 FLC HAD TO SWITCH TO THE ALTERNATE PITOT STATIC SOURCE TO RECOVER THE CAPT'S INSTS, BUT THEY WERE UNABLE TO INHIBIT THE GPWS WARNING SYS SO IT SOUNDED THE 'DON'T SINK' WARNING DURING THEIR APCH AT DEST.
    Narrative: WE HAD OBTAINED A 10000 FT RWY (4R) AT BOSTON FOR DEP, WHICH GAVE US MORE TIME TO REACT AT V1 '141 KTS' WHEN CAPT'S PITOT-STATIC INSTS FAILED. FO PERFORMED THE TKOF IN HIS USUAL OUTSTANDING PROFESSIONAL MANNER AS A SOLO UNTIL CAPT'S FLT INSTS COULD BE RECOVERED BY USE OF THE ALTERNATE AIR DATA SOURCE. ON LNDG AT LAX THE AURAL WARNING 'DON'T SINK' WAS PRESENT FROM 2000 FT AGL DOWN TO 200 FT AGL, WHILE ACFT WAS IN PROPER LNDG CONFIGN AND ON GS. BECAUSE THE WARNING WAS SO LOUD, OUR COMS WERE DANGEROUSLY COMPROMISED AND WE WERE UNABLE TO STOP THE GPWS WARNING IN SPITE OF HITTING ALL THE GPWS INHIBIT BUTTONS. WHY NO INFO ABOUT HOW TO SILENCE ERRONEOUS GPWS WARNINGS?

  317.  
  318. Accession Number: 386275
    Synopsis: FLC OF S80 HAS TCASII RA TO DSND WHEN CLOSE IN ON FINAL OF VISUAL APCH. THEY HAVE TFC IN SIGHT AND DO NOT RESPOND TO THE TCASII RA.
    Narrative: ATC FACILITY: DFW TWR. LOCATION: 110.3/ON LOC AND GS BEAM FOR RWY 17C DFW 2-3 DME. DURING SIMULTANEOUS VISUAL APCHS TO RWY 17L/17C AT DFW WE WERE VECTORED ABOVE AND BEHIND TFC TO RWY 17L TO INTERCEPT FINAL FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 17C. WE WERE ABLE TO OBSERVE THE OTHER ACFT AND VERIFY ITS TCASII SYMBOL THROUGHOUT THIS EVENT. ESTABLISHED ON FINAL WITH VISIBILITY UNRESTR WE COULD MONITOR OUR RELATIVE POS TO THE OTHER ACFT. THE COMMENT WAS MADE THAT THE OTHER ACFT APPEARED CLOSER THAN IT SHOULD BE. ITS SYMBOL ON THE TCASII DISPLAY WAS TOO CLOSE TO OURS TO JUDGE DISTANCE. IT MAINTAINED A POS 200-300 FT ABOVE US AT 2-3 MI WITHOUT A 'TFC' CALL, WE GOT A 'DSND' COMMAND FROM TCASII WITH A VSI RED/GREEN COMMAND OF 1500- 2000 FPM. AFTER A HASTY SURVEY OF OUR CIRCUMSTANCES AND CONTINUED CLOSE MONITORING OF OUR BOOGEY AT 9 O'CLOCK POS WE INSURED OUR OWN SEPARATION AND CONTINUED THE APCH TO A LNDG. EVEN THOUGH IDEAL CIRCUMSTANCES FOR PARALLEL APCHS EXISTED, A TCASII COMMAND OCCURRED THAT I FEEL WAS GROSSLY INAPPROPRIATE AND DANGEROUS. WE HAD BEEN VISUALLY MONITORING THE CONFLICTING TFC SINCE DOWNWIND. HAD WE BEEN IMC, WE WOULD HAVE BEEN PRESENTED WITH AN UNRESOLVABLE RA.

  319.  
  320. Accession Number: 386386
    Synopsis: OJT INSTRUCTOR INTERVENED WHEN TRAINEE CTLR ACTIONS WERE BELIEVED INSUFFICIENT WHEN DISCONTINUING VERT SEPARATION BTWN A B737 AND A XING DA20. THE B737 AND DA20 INDIVIDUALLY REACTED TO TCASII RA'S. INSTRUCTOR ASSERTS TCASII RA'S HINDERED CTLR ACTIONS, MAKING SIT CLOSER THAN IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN.
    Narrative: ON FRI, NOV/XX/97 AT XX10, A SIT DEVELOPED AND A LOSS OF STANDARD SEPARATION (5 MI HORIZ, 2000 FT VERT ABOVE FL290) OCCURRED BTWN ACR X AND CPR Y ABOUT 20 MI NW OF THE MIP VOR. I AM A RADAR INSTRUCTOR AND AT THE TIME OF OCCURRENCE I WAS GIVING TRAINING TO A DEVELOPMENTAL. CPR Y WAS SWBOUND ON J49 ABOUT 30 MI NE OF PSB VOR AT FL310. ACR X WAS 20 MI W OF THE MIP VOR FLYING THE MIP 1 ARR INTO LGA AT FL330. THE DEVELOPMENTAL ISSUED ACR X A L TURN TO 360 DEGS, A SPD OF 250 KTS, AND A DSCNT CLRNC TO FL220. ACR X READ THIS CLRNC BACK CORRECTLY. AS THE INSTRUCTOR, I INITIATED AN EXPEDITE DSCNT CLRNC THROUGH FL290 TO ACR X WHEN BOTH ACFT WERE APPROX 8-9 MI APART CONVERGING. ACR X ACKNOWLEDGED THIS CLRNC. AT THE TIME THE EXPEDITE CLRNC WAS ISSUED, ACR X DATA BLOCK SHOWED AN ALT MODE C OF FL312. (REMEMBER, THE INFO DISPLAYED IS 6- 12 SECONDS OLD, ALSO ACR X DSCNT RATE PRIOR TO THE EXPEDITE CLRNC WAS APPROX 1500 FPM.) IF I HAD DONE NOTHING AND BOTH CPR Y AND ACR X HAD NOT REACTED TO THEIR INDIVIDUAL RESOLUTIONS, THEY WOULD HAVE CROSSED WITH AT LEAST 1000-1500 FT SEPARATION. KNOWING OF TCASII SENSITIVITY AND PROX OF BOTH ACFT, I INITIATED A TA TO CPR Y FIRST, THEN A TA TO ACR X. ACR X ACKNOWLEDGED WITH REACTING TO A TCASII RESOLUTION AND WAS CLBING. CPR Y RESPONDED ALSO BY REACTING TO AN RA. I FEEL ACR X WAS ALREADY REACTING TO TCASII PRIOR TO EXPEDITE CLRNC THROUGH FL290 BUT STILL ACKNOWLEDGED THE EXPEDITE CLRNC. I ALSO FEEL THAT EVEN THOUGH STANDARD SEPARATION MAY HAVE BEEN STRAINED, TCASII HINDERED THIS SIT AND MADE IT A LOT CLOSER THAN IT SHOULD HAVE. IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT ACR X FILED A NEAR MISS RPT.

  321.  
  322. Accession Number: 386390
    Synopsis: MD11 ON A COUPLED APCH HAS TRACKING PROB WHEN NOSEWHEEL TOUCHES RWY ON LNDG. AUTOPLT IS DISCONNECTED AND NORMAL PROCS RETURN.
    Narrative: A COUPLED APCH TO AN AUTOLAND WAS FLOWN TO RWY 18L AT CVG. THE APCH WAS CONDUCTED USING 50 DEGS OF LNDG FLAPS AND AUTOBRAKES SET TO MINIMUM. THE TOUCHDOWN WAS NORMAL AT 140 KTS IN THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE AND ON CTRLINE. MAIN GEAR TOUCHDOWN AND AUTOSPOILER DEPLOYMENT WAS NORMAL. UPON NOSEWHEEL TOUCHDOWN, THE ACFT IMMEDIATELY BEGAN TRACKING L AND ATTEMPTED TO EXIT THE L SIDE OF THE RWY. DISCONNECTING THE AUTOPLT AND APPLYING R RUDDER AND NOSEWHEEL STEERING RETURNED THE ACFT TO THE RWY CTRLINE WHERE NORMAL BRAKING AND THRUST REVERSE ALLOWED A NORMAL ROLLOUT AND TURNOFF. THERE DID NOT APPEAR TO BE ANY INTERFERENCE TO THE LOC SIGNAL UP UNTIL THE TIME OF NOSEWHEEL TOUCHDOWN

  323.  
  324. Accession Number: 386532
    Synopsis: RPTED LOSS OF SEPARATION BTWN RPTR'S MD11 DSNDING TO 6000 FT AND ANOTHER ACR AT 6000 FT.
    Narrative: HOLDING INBOUND TO TOKYO'S NARITA ARPT AT ARIES INTXN AT 8000 FT. INBOUND COURSE IS 258 DEGS L TURNS, 7 MI LEG. AFTER TURNING INBOUND WE WERE GIVEN A CLRNC TO CONTINUE OUR TURN TO HDG 160 DEGS AND DSND TO 6000 FT. A FLT BELOW US HAD A PREVIOUS CLRNC TO DEPART ARIES ON A HDG OF 160 DEGS AND WAS AT 6000 FT. AS WE ROLLED OUT ON THE 160 DEG HDG AND DSNDED BELOW 6500 FT, WE RECEIVED A TCASII TA ALERT AND REALIZED THAT THE OTHER FLT WAS NOW CLOSELY IN TRAIL AND TRACKING PARALLEL TO US. WE LEVELED OFF AT 6200 FT WITH A -200 INDICATED ON THE TA ALERT. THE OTHER FLT WAS LESS THAN 1 MI TO OUR 4-5 O'CLOCK POS. ATC WAS ADVISED AND THE OTHER FLT WAS DIRECTED TO TURN R TO A HDG W OF OUR TRACK. THE COPLT COULD SEE IT OVER HIS SHOULDER AND THE FLC ACKNOWLEDGED SEEING US. APPARENTLY ATC MISJUDGED THE RESULT OF THE 2 DIFFERENT CLRNCS GIVEN EACH FLT. MY CONCERN IS WHY WE NEVER GOT A TCASII RA ALERT EVEN THOUGH WE WERE WITHIN 200 FT ALT AND LESS THAN 1 MI PROX TO THE OTHER ACFT. OUR TCASII HAD TESTED OK AND WE WERE GETTING ALT INFO FROM THE OTHER ACFT.

  325.  
  326. Accession Number: 386936
    Synopsis: AN ACR B737 FLC HAS SEVERAL PWR INTERRUPTIONS WHILE ON GND PWR. THEY DO MANAGE TO ALIGN THE INERTIAL REF SYS AND DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE PWR PROBS AFFECTED THESE SYS. HOWEVER, ONCE AIRBORNE, THE FLC EXPERIENCES A SERIES OF FAILURES OF IRS DRIVEN SYS AND HAVE TO RETURN.
    Narrative: AT THE BOARDING GATE, THE GND PWR FLUCTUATED SEVERAL TIMES WHILE THE APU WAS STARTING AND THE IRS'S WERE ALIGNED. I TURNED OFF THE GND PWR AND ALLOWED THE APU TO FINISH STARTING, WHICH I PLACED ON THE ACFT BUSSES. WE CHKED THE ALIGNMENT AND HAD NO PROBS WITH ANY PERCEIVABLE SYS MALFUNCTIONS. IN POS ON THE RWY, ON THE TKOF STATUS PAGE IT SAID: POS ENT. THIS PROMPT LED US TO CHK THE 'POS REF' PAGE, WHICH SHOWED LAST AND CURRENT POS. THESE DIGITS AFTER A CLOSE CHK BY THE FO AND I AGREED. THIS TELLS ME THAT THE IRS'S ARE ALIGNED. AFTER TKOF ON A HDG OF S FROM RWY 8, THE FO'S ADI FAILED, AND MINE DID NOT. AFTER TURNING FURTHER SW WE DID NOT HAVE EITHER ADI OR HDG INFO. WE WERE IMC AT THIS POINT AND DECIDED TO CLB TO OUR ASSIGNED ALT OF 15000 FT. I SELECTED ATT ON THE IRS'S WHICH RESTORED OUR ADI'S. THE FO HAD BEEN USING THE STANDBY ADI. INSTEAD OF TYPING IN THE HDG ON THE FMC OR IRS'S I ASKED FOR A NO GYRO VECTOR TO VMC CONDITIONS WHICH WE FOLLOWED WITH THE HELP OF ABQ TWR TO A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 8 AT ABQ. I NOTICED THROUGHOUT THIS THAT OUR NAV RADIOS WERE INOP. I HAD TUNED ZUNI VOR ON BOTH SIDES AND DID NOT GET A WARNING RED FLAG ON OUR RMI'S. THE NEEDLES WERE PARKED AT THE 9 O'CLOCK POS. THIS SAME SCENARIO WITH THE RMI'S WHEN ABQ WAS TUNED OCCURRED. WE LANDED WITH NO FURTHER FAILURES OR PROBS. I TAXIED TO THE GATE STILL NOTING THE RMI'S WHICH WERE STILL TUNED TO ABQ AND STILL INDICATING 'FAILED.' AT THE GATE I DID A FULL ALIGNMENT AND ALL OF THESE SUBSEQUENT FAILURES DISAPPEARED. ALL SYS OPERATING NORMALLY. WE OBTAINED A NEW RELEASE AND WX. FLEW TO PHX WITH NO FURTHER PROBS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 387297: THE PROB WAS RPTED TO MAINT IN PHX WHO FOUND THE SYS WORKING OK.

  327.  
  328. Accession Number: 387027
    Synopsis: A DC10-30 ACFT IN CRUISE WAS QUESTIONED BY FOREIGN CTLR IF THE FLC SAW CLOSE TFC 1000 FT BELOW THEM. NOT ONLY DID THE RPTR FLC NOT SEE ANY TFC, THEY ALSO DIDN'T SEE ANY ON TCASII. APPARENTLY A MIL P3 FLC RPTED A 200 FT NEAR MISS AND INFERRED RPTR ACFT WAS OFF ALT.
    Narrative: RECEIVED A SELCAL FROM SHANWICK ASKING IF WE HAD SEEN ANOTHER ACFT AT FL280. WE NEVER SAW ANOTHER ACFT NOR DID WE EVER HAVE A TCASII INDICATION OF ANOTHER ACFT. WE WERE LEVEL AT FL280 ALL THE WAY FROM FRANCE. THE AUTOPLT WAS FULLY FUNCTIONAL. A MIL P3 ESTIMATES WE PASSED 200 FT ABOVE HIS LEVEL OF FL270. EITHER HIS ALT WAS OFF OR HIS ESTIMATE WAS OFF BECAUSE WE HAD ANOTHER ACFT SHOWING ABOVE US AT 33 DEGS EVEN ON OUR TCASII.

  329.  
  330. Accession Number: 387160
    Synopsis: FLC OF B757 HAS PROB WITH FLT DIRECTOR REMAINING IN ALT HOLD MODE AFTER INTERMEDIATE LEVELOFF. PITCH BARS INDICATED A CLB. DURING TROUBLESHOOTING THE PROB THEY HAD AN ALT EXCURSION OF 400 FT.
    Narrative: ON CLBOUT FROM FLL THE FLT DIRECTOR STAYED IN AN 'ALT HOLD' MODE AFTER AN INTERMEDIATE LEVELOFF. HOWEVER, THE PITCH BARS GAVE A CLB INDICATION. AUTOTHROTTLES CLICKED OFF AND 'PWR MODE' WAS LOST. COULD NOT RESTORE FLT DIRECTOR OUT OF 'ALT HOLD' MODE BACK INTO 'VNAV.' WHILE WORKING ON PROB, EXCEEDED ALT OF 11000 FT BY 400 FT. TURNED EVERYTHING OFF AND FLEW RAW DATA TO 11000 FT. I WAS FINALLY ABLE TO RESTORE 'VNAV' AFTER 2 RESET ATTEMPTS. DID NOT GET AUTOTHROTTLES BACK UNTIL COMING OUT OF CLB MODE AT 25000 FT.

  331.  
  332. Accession Number: 387216
    Synopsis: AN ACR B737 FLC HAD THE L STALL WARNING VANE BROKEN OFF BY THE JETWAY OPERATOR. THIS WAS DISCOVERED DURING TAXI OUT AND THE FLC RETURNED FOR MAINT, BUT THE MAINT TECHNICIANS IMPROPERLY USED THE MEL TO KEEP THE ACFT IN SVC.
    Narrative: WHEN DOING RECALL DURING TAXI FLOW AND CHKLIST WE NOTED A L ALPHA VANE LIGHT ILLUMINATED AND ALSO AN INTERMITTENT STICK SHAKER ON THE CAPT'S SIDE. AFTER CHKING CIRCUIT BREAKERS, WE CALLED MAINT CTL FOR HELP. WE PULLED AND RESET SEVERAL CIRCUIT BREAKERS, BUT CONDITION REMAINED. WE THEN RETURNED TO THE GATE AND AFTER BLOCK-IN, I OPENED MY WINDOW TO DISCOVER OUR ALPHA VANE HAD BEEN BROKEN OFF BY THE JETWAY PRIOR TO OUR ORIGINAL DEP. I INFORMED OUR MAINT CTLR AND THE LINE MECHS OF THE PROB. THE LINE MECHS SAID THEY FIGURED WE COULD MEL THE L STALL WARNING SYS AND BE ON OUR WAY. I TALKED TO OUR MAINT CTLR AND WAS TOLD WE COULD INDEED MEL THE L STALL WARNING SYS AND THE GPWS (WINDSHEAR WARNING). THE MECH SIGNED OFF OUR LOGBOOK AND I ENTERED A DELAYED PLACARD INSTALLATION IN REF TO THE MEL FOR THE STALL WARNING AND GPWS. WE DEPARTED EWR FOR CMH AND DURING LEVELOFF THE AUTOTHROTTLES DIDN'T REDUCE THE PWR FROM THE CLB SETTING. WE CALLED TO INFORM THEM OF THE SIT, THEN DURING DSCNT FLOW WE GOT AN AUTOSLAT FAIL LIGHT. WHEN WE BLOCKED IN AT CMH A TECHNICIAN CAME ON BOARD AND INFORMED US THAT WE SHOULD ALSO HAVE HAD SEVERAL OTHER MELS FOR OUR GIVEN PROB. MEL AAAA ANGLE OF ATTACK SENSOR, MEL BBBB AUTOTHROTTLE, MEL CCCC SPD BUG COMMAND, MEL DDDD AUTOSLAT, AND MEL EEEE L ANGLE OF ATTACK HEAT IN ADDITION TO THE MELS ALREADY IN PLACE. WHILE DISCUSSING THE PROB WITH THE CMH TECHNICIAN HE INFORMED THE FO AND I THAT A SIMILAR INCIDENT HAPPENED A COUPLE OF WKS EARLIER. AN ACFT HAD EXPERIENCED THE LOSS OF AN ALPHA VANE ENRTE TO CMH AND MAINT CTL TRIED TO HAVE THEM MEL JUST THE STALL WARNING AND GPWS. THE CMH TECHNICIAN CONVINCED THEM THAT THEY NEEDED THE OTHER MELS ALSO. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT A PROB EXISTS IN MAINT CTL THAT HAS YET TO BE RECTIFIED. IN SUMMARY, THE PROB STARTED WITH A CARELESS JETWAY OPERATOR IN EWR AND WAS FURTHER COMPLICATED BY IMPROPER MEL APPLICATION. IN ADDITION THE PROPER MEL AAAA WAS EXTREMELY HARD TO FIND AS IT IS LOCATED UNDER THE AUTOFLT SECTION OF THE TABLE OF CONTENTS.

  333.  
  334. Accession Number: 387250
    Synopsis: FLC OF AN EMBRAER BRASILIA EMB120 (E120), OVERSHOT CLB ALT DUE TO THE AUTOPLT CAPTURE WAS NOT TURNED ON RESULTING IN ATC INTERVENTION TO BRING THEM BACK TO ASSIGNED ALT.
    Narrative: SET ALT ALERTER AT 20000 FT AS PER OUR CLRNC. ALT CAPTURE WAS DISENGAGED FOR UNKNOWN REASON. AUTOPLT DID NOT CAPTURE AND ATC ADVISED US AS WE CLBED THROUGH 20700 FT. NO FURTHER MENTION FROM CTR OF THE DEV.

  335.  
  336. Accession Number: 387393
    Synopsis: AN ACR MLG FLC HAS THEIR AUTOFLT SYS INTERCEPT A DIFFERENT APCH FROM THE ONE THAT THEY WERE ASSIGNED. THE FMS HAD DEFAULTED TO A STORED APCH AND THE FLC WERE NOT MONITORING THE RAW DATA.
    Narrative: EARLY IN FLT, INSTALLED GLASR 3 ARR PER FLT PLAN RTE AND CHKED FMS RTE AGAINST STAR BEFORE STARTING ARR. AFTER PASSING GLASR INTXN, INSTALLED THE RWY 16R INTO FMS, BRIEFED VISUAL APCH BACKING IT UP WITH ILS, AND COMPLETED CHKLIST FOR ARR. IN A TURN TO R, APCH ASKED IF WE WERE TURNING ON ARR (INFORMED YES). APCH AT THIS POINT GAVE US HDG AND STATED THERE HAS BEEN A PROB ON THIS ARR WITH FMS EQUIPPED ACFT. AFTER PARKED, EXAMINED SIT AND CONCLUDED THAT THE ACFT FMS AUTOMATICALLY INSERTS JACKSN FMS WITHOUT SELECTING IT. THE ACFT FMS SHOULD ALWAYS INSTALL APCHS OR NEVER INSTALL APCHS -- NOT SOMETIMES INSTALL THEM. TURN WAS MADE EARLY AND NOT CAUGHT BY PF BECAUSE OF SPD CHANGE REQUEST BY ATC AT JAKSN AND FMS ONLY SHOWS DISTANCE TO POINT, AND CHKED EARLIER INFLT AND CORRECT. TURN MADE APPROX 2 MI EARLY.

  337.  
  338. Accession Number: 387512
    Synopsis: FLC OF B757 HAS TCASII RA AND DSNDS ONLY TO FIND THEMSELVES HEAD ON WITH TFC AT ANOTHER ARPT. A CLB RA IS RECEIVED AND THEY CLB.
    Narrative: ON VECTORS TO LAX N COMPLEX (RWY 24) MY B757 WAS ON AUTOFLT, FLAPS 20 DEGS, SPD 160 KTS, 2500 FT MSL, JUST STARTING R BASE TURN WHEN TCASII GAVE SUDDEN RA TO 'DSND NOW.' AUTOFLT WAS DISCONNECTED IMMEDIATELY AND DSCNT BEGUN WITH GUIDANCE FROM VSI. ONCE CLR OF CONFLICT (ALT LOSS 400 FT) WE RECEIVED AN IMMEDIATE CLB RESOLUTION DUE TO NOW BEING HEAD-ON WITH TFC ON APCH TO ANOTHER LAX AREA ARPT. (WE BELIEVE THE OTHER ACFT WAS INBOUND TO SMO ARPT.) MANUAL THRUST WAS APPLIED ALONG WITH A CLB TO CLR THIS CLB RESOLUTION. APCH WAS CONTINUED WITH A CLOSE-IN ILS RWY CHANGE TO A SUCCESSFUL LNDG AT LAX. BOTTOM LINE: A FALSE TCASII RESOLUTION PUT OUR ACFT INTO A REAL TFC CONFLICT AND RESOLUTION. THIS IS THE SECOND FALSE RESOLUTION I HAVE EXPERIENCED IN OUR B757 ACFT IN 8 MONTHS TIME.

  339.  
  340. Accession Number: 388239
    Synopsis: A DC10 LNDG AT LAX, CA, HAS ITS FLT INSTS INDICATE THE ACFT IS OFF COURSE ACCORDING TO TRACON RADAR.
    Narrative: WE DIVERTED TO LAX DUE TO A GPS NAV PROB WITH ASSOCIATED CADC INPUT ERROR. DURING THE REEDR ARR FOR A LNDG ON RWY 7R WE REALIZED BOTH CAPT'S AND FO'S LOC WERE INDICATING L OF COURSE. WE ASKED ATC ABOUT OUR POS, HE INDICATED THAT RADAR SHOWED US 2 MI N OF COURSE. BOTH LOC ON THE ACFT SHOWED US 1.5 MI S OR L OF COURSE. WE ARE NOT SURE IF OUR OTHER NAV PROBS WERE CAUSING THE IMPROPER INDICATION ON OUR HSI. WE ASKED FOR VECTORS FOR A LNDG ON RWY 7R AT LAX. THE LOC INDICATED PROPERLY WHEN FLYING THE APCH TO RWY 7R. PERHAPS THERE WAS A BACK COURSE PROB SINCE THE RWY 7R LOC WAS BEING USED. WE RECHKED OUR RADIO FREQ AND WE HAD THE PROPER HEADING AND INBOUNDS SET FOR THE REEDR STAR. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 388240: ON REEDR ARR ATC ADVISED WE WERE 2 MI L OF COURSE. OUR INSTS SHOWED THE OPPOSITE. WE REQUESTED AND RECEIVED VECTORS TO FINAL.

  341.  
  342. Accession Number: 388490
    Synopsis: INBOUND TO EWR ARPT, ACR FLC WAS UNABLE TO MAKE A TIMELY FMS INPUT FOR AN INTXN ALT XING RESTR ON A STAR, CAUSING THE FLC TO TAKE BACK MANUAL CTL OF ACFT. FLC ADVISED ATC THAT THEY WERE UNABLE TO MEET RESTR. THOUGH ATC EXPRESSED DISPLEASURE, FLT PROCEEDED ON COURSE TO DEST.
    Narrative: ENRTE FROM BUF TO EWR, ZBW CLRED US DIRECT TO CRANK INTXN TO INTERCEPT SHAFF 3 ARR, TO CROSS CRANK INTXN AT 7000 FT MSL. FMC WAS PROGRAMMED AND DSCNT BEGUN. AT 10500 FT MSL, THE ACFT HAD NOT BEGUN TO SLOW DOWN TO 250 KTS. WE TOOK OVER MANUALLY AND REALIZED THAT WE WOULD NOT MAKE CRANK INTXN AT 7000 FT MSL. I NOTIFIED ZBW, HE WAS VERY MAD. I ASKED FOR A VECTOR FOR DSCNT. NOTHING ELSE SAID.

  343.  
  344. Accession Number: 390379
    Synopsis: AN ACR DC10 FLC DSNDED BELOW THEIR ASSIGNED ALT WHEN THE AUTOPLT CHANGED MODES DURING THE ALT CAPTURE PHASE OF THE LEVELOFF.
    Narrative: ALTDEV LEVELING AT FL330. ALT WAS ARMED AT FL340. ACFT DSNDED THROUGH FL330 TO FL326. ALT WAS NOT ARMED AT FL328 WHERE WE FIRST NOTICED DEV. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 390380: ALTDEV LEVELING AT FL330. DSNDING FROM FL370 DUE MODERATE TURB. ENCOUNTERED CONTINUING, THOUGH DIMINISHED, TURB APCHING LEVELOFF AT FL330. AUTOPLT WENT TO CAPTURE MODE THEN, OR SOME REASON, REVERTED TO VERT SPD MODE BEFORE REACHING FL330. CAUGHT DEV PASSING FL328. CAPT (PF) DISCONNECTED AUTOPLT AND RECOVERED EXPEDITIOUSLY TO FL330. INFORMED ATC OF CONTINUED TURB PER THEIR INQUIRY. ATC SAID NOTHING ABOUT OUR MINIMUM ALT OF FL326.

  345.  
  346. Accession Number: 390438
    Synopsis: AS A B737 PASSED ABEAM THE BUR ILS RWY 8 FAF, THE PIC RECEIVED TWO TCASII TA'S, THEN A TCASII RA. THE PIC EXECUTED AN EVASIVE 20 DEG R TURN AND A 4000 FPM CLB. THE B737 CAME IN CLOSE PROX TO A C402 AT 4000 FT AND A BE99 AT 5000 FT. THE CTLR DID NOT OBSERVE RADAR TFC ASSOCIATED WITH THE TCASII TA RA. THE B737 PIC CALLED THE FAA 3 DAYS LATER AND STATES THE SUPVR TOLD HIM THE FAA HAD ADDITIONAL INCIDENTS INVOLVING FALSE TARGETS IN THE SAME AREA AND ALT, WITHIN MINS OF HIS TCASII RA.
    Narrative: ACFT X, A B737 ON APCH (ILS) TO BURBANK ARPT RECEIVED A TCASII RESOLUTION TO CLB WHEN ON A 5 MI FINAL. HE LATER INDICATED THAT HE RECEIVED AN ALERT ON TFC 500 FT BELOW HIM. THERE WAS NO TARGET ON THE RADAR. HE CLBED INTO ACFT AT 4000 FT, ACFT Y A C402. ACFT X CLBED FROM 3000 FT ON THE ILS. TARGETS MERGED AT 4000 FT AND 4100 FT. ACFT X CONTINUED CLB AND CAME WITHIN 500 FT/0 MI OF ANOTHER ACFT, ACFT Z A BE99 ON VECTORS. I ISSUED EVASIVE VECTORS AND CLBS TO BOTH ACFT. ALL ACFT WERE IFR IN THE CLOUDS. THE C402 LOST 1000 FT ALT DUE TO WAKE TURB FROM B737. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 390696: ON FINAL APCH TO BUR RWY 8 ILS, IMC AT 3000 FT MSL. JUST BEFORE (1/2 MI) THE OM, WE GOT A TCASII TA. TARGET WAS '-500 FT' AT 12 O'CLOCK POS, 1/2 MI. GOT A SECOND TA IN ABOUT 3-5 SECONDS AND THEN AN RA (CLB). TARGET SHOWED '-100 FT' AT 12 O'CLOCK POS, 1/4 MI. WE INITIATED AN AGGRESSIVE GAR. RA/VSI COMMANDED 3000-4000 FPM. WE TURNED R ABOUT 20 DEGS AND CLBED TO ABOUT 4500 FT MSL BEFORE LEVELING OFF. THIS PUT US IN CONFLICT WITH 4000 FT MSL TFC. SOCAL TURNED BOTH ACFT TO MINIMIZE CONFLICT. THERE WAS NO TA OR RA WITH THIS OTHER TFC. A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH SOCAL 3 DAYS LATER REVEALED THAT THERE WERE 3 ACRS INVOLVED WITH FALSE TARGETS AT THE SAME POS, SAME ALT WITHIN A FEW MINS OF OUR ACFT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 390843: AS WE APCHED GS INTERCEPT AND READY TO BEGIN OUR DSCNT WE RECEIVED A TA 500 FT BELOW US FROM THE TCASII. THE CAPT DELAYED HIS DSCNT ON GS SO AS NOT TO DSND INTO TFC OVERHEAD VAN NUYS/ILS FAF, HOWEVER, WE QUICKLY WENT FROM A TCASII TA TO AN RA. OUR TCASII VSI DICTATED A 3500-4000 FPM RATE OF CLB TO AVOID TFC AND A MIDAIR. WE LEVELED OFF AT 4500 FT INSTEAD OF 4000 FT (MISSED APCH ALT) BECAUSE OF THE EXCESSIVE RATE OF CLB COMMANDED BY THE TCASII.

  347.  
  348. Accession Number: 390900
    Synopsis: WDB ACFT IN CRUISE AND ON LNAV. ACFT WENT OFF TRACK WHEN LNAV REVERTED TO HEADING HOLD MODE. ATC INTERVENED ALERTING FLC TO COURSE DEV.
    Narrative: ACFT HAD BEEN TRACKING THE FMS FLT PLAN RTE IN LNAV FOR THE PAST HR. CTR CALLED AND ASKED OUR NEXT FIX ON RTE OF FLT. WE REPLIED DOPHN. CTR SAID WE WERE SLIGHTLY N OF TRACK. WE THEN NOTICED LNAV HAD DISENGAGED AND WE WERE APPARENTLY IN HEADING HOLD MODE. (HEADING MODE WAS NOT ANNUNCIATED.) WE IMMEDIATELY CORRECTED BACK TO TRACK. WE APPARENTLY WERE ONLY A FEW MI OFF TRACK. LNAV WAS RE- ENGAGED AND TRACKED NORMALLY THE REST OF FLT. WE HAVE NO IDEA WHAT CAUSED THE MOMENTARY LNAV DISENGAGEMENT.

  349.  
  350. Accession Number: 391024
    Synopsis: A B737-300 ENCOUNTERS SEVERE CLR AIR TURB IN ITS CLB TO FL270. THE AUTOPLT REVERTS TO CTL WHEEL STEERING AND THE ACFT OVERSHOT TO FL279 BEFORE ACFT CTL IS OBTAINED.
    Narrative: ON CLB OUT OF BWI, ON THE SWANN TWO DEP, WE ENCOUNTERED MODERATE TO SEVERE TURB AT APPROX 26500-27000 FT. OUR LEVELOFF ALT WAS FL270. THE AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED. INITIALLY THE AUTOPLT ATTEMPTED TO LEVEL AT FL270 BUT THE TURB THRUST US INTO A VERT CLB AND ROLLED THE ACFT FROM L TO R AND BACK. THE AUTOPLT DISCONNECTED AND REVERTED TO CTL WHEEL STEERING. OUR BANK ANGLE REACHED 30-40 DEGS EACH SIDE OF LEVEL. THE TURB LASTED APPROX 15 SECONDS. WE IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED ATC OF THE TURB AND DSNDED TO FL270. NO INJURIES WERE SUSTAINED IN THE CABIN. THE TURB WASN'T VIOLENT BUT JUST ROLLED THE ACFT FROM SIDE TO SIDE EVEN THOUGH WE HAD FULL AILERON DEFLECTION IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION. NO CONFLICT WAS NOTED WITH ATC TFC AND THE FLT PROCEEDED TO PVD WITHOUT FURTHER PROBS. NORMAL APCH AND LNDG AT PVD. THERE WAS NO INDICATION OF WX ON OUR RADAR AND NO RPTS OF TURB FROM ATC. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 391148: THE AUTOPLT WAS UNABLE TO MAINTAIN HEADING AND ALT AND REVERTED TO CTL WHEEL STEERING AT ABOUT 26500 FT. THE SUDDEN UPSURGE WAS TOO GREAT FOR THE AUTOPLT TO CAPTURE FL270. WE REGAINED CTL OF ACFT AT 27900 FT AND DSNDED BACK TO FL270.

  351.  
  352. Accession Number: 391090
    Synopsis: CAPT OF AN MD88 FAILED TO LEVEL OFF AT ASSIGNED ALT CAUSING HIM TO IMMEDIATELY RETURN TO ASSIGNED AND ATC TO INTERVENE AS HE WAS RETURNING.
    Narrative: MANUALLY LEVELED ACFT AT 10000 FT ENGAGED AUTOPLT AND ACFT STARTED TO CLB. AT 10100 FT DISCONNECTED AUTOPLT TO RETURN TO 10000 FT. ACFT ALT NEVER GOT TO MORE THAN 10150 FT, BUT GOT A CALL FROM DEP TO MAINTAIN 10000 FT THAT THEY SHOWED US CLBING THROUGH 10300 FT AND THAT CALL WAS RECEIVED AS WE WERE RE-LEVELING AT 10000 FT. LCL ALTIMETER FROM ATIS WAS 30.19. AUTOPLT WORKED NORMALLY FOR REMAINDER OF FLT AND WAS NOT WRITTEN UP.

  353.  
  354. Accession Number: 391160
    Synopsis: B737-300 AUTOPLT FAILS TO CAPTURE FL190. IT OVERSHOT ALT TO FL185. CAPT HAD TO HAND FLY IT UP TO FL190.
    Narrative: CLRED TO FL190. NOTICED AUTOPLT DID NOT CAPTURE ALT. TURNED OFF AUTOPLT AND MANUALLY CLBED BACK TO FL190. ACFT BOTTOMED OUT AT ABOUT FL185.

  355.  
  356. Accession Number: 391328
    Synopsis: CAPT OF A SUPER MD80 DSNDED BELOW ASSIGNED ALT DURING DSCNT DUE TO AN AUTOPLT ALT CAPTURE PROB. HE RETURNED ACFT TO ASSIGNED ALT AND THEN CAUGHT ERROR BEFORE THE ACFT PASSED LEVELOFF ALT DURING SUBSEQUENT DSCNTS.
    Narrative: FLYING ON #2 AUTOPLT, WAS GIVEN CLRNC TO DSND TO FL200 DURING APCH TO RSW. ALT WAS SET AND ARMED. APCHING LEVELOFF, AMBER ALT LIGHT ON FMA WENT OUT BUT AUTOPLT FAILED TO CAPTURE ALT. ACFT NOTED PASSING THROUGH FL200 VERT SPD WHEEL WAS ROLLED UP AND ALT HOLD SELECTED. ACFT STOPPED DSCNT 400 FT BELOW FL200. VERT SPD CLB AND FL200 RESELECTED. BEFORE REACHING FL200 CTR ISSUED CLRNC TO 13000 FT. SAME OCCURRENCE WITH AUTOPLT LEVELOFF AT 13000 FT AND SUBSEQUENT 11000 FT CLRNC. HOWEVER, CLOSER MONITORING PREVENTED ALTDEV. TWO OTHER AUTOPLT MALFUNCTIONS DURING FLT, RELATED TO TURNS. AUTOFLT WRITE- UP MADE AT FLT TERMINATION.

  357.  
  358. Accession Number: 391856
    Synopsis: WDB OVERSHOT ASSIGNED ALT ON DSCNT DUE TO NOT MONITORING AUTOPLT LEVELOFF AT THE PRESELECTED ALT.
    Narrative: LAST LEG ON 3 DAY TRIP. ON EXTENDED FLAP FOR RWY 19R DUE TO WX. AFTER NUMEROUS VECTORS OFF APCH AND BACK ON, WE WERE GIVEN DSCNT FROM 6000 FT TO 5000 FT. PNF (CAPT) SET 5000 FT IN WINDOW, AND BOTH PLTS POINTED AND CONFIRMED. ALT ARM LIGHT WAS ON. I NOTICED WE WERE A COUPLE HUNDRED FT TO LEVEL OFF AND TURNED TO RECHK MY ENGINEER PANEL. WHEN I TURNED BACK I NOTICED WE HAD DSNDED BELOW (PASSING 4900 FT) 5000 FT. AS I STARTED TO SAY SOMETHING THE CAPT CALLED OUT THE DEV. THE FO MADE A SMOOTH RECOVERY TO 5000 FT, BUT THE ACFT WENT DOWN TO APPROX 4600 FT. ATC DID NOT SAY ANYTHING DURING OR AFTER THE DEV. IN RETROSPECT I SHOULD HAVE MONITORED THE PLTS THROUGHOUT THE DSCNT AND LEVELOFF, INSTEAD OF TRUSTING THE AUTOPLT.

  359.  
  360. Accession Number: 391967
    Synopsis: CANADAIR REGIONAL JET ON CLB WITH DEFERRED INOP GENERATOR, FLC HAD APU RUNNING FOR GENERATOR REQUIRED BY MEL. RPTR CAPT INADVERTENTLY SHUT DOWN APU WHEN MEANING TO SHUT OFF CONTINUOUS IGNITION. JUST PRIOR TO THAT THE FMS FAILED AND DEFAULTED TO DEST SO IT WAS UNUSABLE. FLC EVENTUALLY WAS ABLE TO GET APU BACK ON THE LINE.
    Narrative: BUSY MORNING, PICKED UP AIRPLANE THAT HAD MULTIPLE DEFERRED ITEMS. WX WAS OVCST WITH SNOW. IT TOOK QUITE A WHILE TO SORT THROUGH ALL THE DEFERRED ITEMS AND THE ASSOCIATED LIMITATIONS, PROCS, ETC. THEN SOME MORE INVOLVED THAN NORMAL TKOF CALCULATIONS DUE TO WX MADE FOR A BUSY MORNING. 1 DEFERRED ITEM WAS THE #2 IDG (THIS RENDERED THE #2 ENG DRIVEN GENERATOR INOP). THIS MEL REQUIRED US TO LEAVE THE APU RUNNING AND ITS GENERATOR ONLINE. AFTER TKOF ON RWY 3, WE WERE ISSUED A R TURN BY DEP AND CLRED DIRECTLY TO DNV VOR (OUT OF NORMAL VOR RANGE), BUT ON OUR RNAV FLT PLAN. NO SOONER WERE THOSE WORDS OUT OF THE CTLR'S MOUTH WHEN OUR FMS BLINKED ONCE AND TOTALLY ERASED OUR FLT PLAN. IT DEFAULTED TO OUR DEST AND BECAME UNUSABLE. WE ASKED FOR A VECTOR TO DNV AND I PROCEEDED WITH CLB CHKLIST. I THEN MOVED TO THE CLB CHKLIST BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO DEAL WITH THE FMS. SINCE WE HAD TOPPED THE CLOUD LAYER AND SNOW SHORTLY AFTER TKOF, I ELECTED TO TURN OFF THE CONTINUOUS IGNITION, WHICH I HAD ON FOR TKOF. WHAT HAPPENED NEXT WAS STRANGE. I REACHED UP TO PUSH THE SWITCH FOR THE IGNITION, BUT INSTEAD PUSHED THE APU START/STOP BUTTON, SHUTTING DOWN THE APU. THE SWITCHES ARE CLOSE TO EACH OTHER AND AS I WAS PUSHING IT, I KNEW I HAD THE WRONG ONE BUT IT WAS TOO LATE. I DON'T KNOW IF IT WAS HABIT THAT CAUSED IT BECAUSE THAT WAS THE POINT WHERE THE PNF NORMALLY SHUTS DOWN THE APU AND I THINK MY HAND JUST WENT THAT WAY AUTOMATICALLY. ANYWAY, THAT BASICALLY JUST CUT OFF SOME MINOR ITEMS AND SOME GALLEY PWR (IT HAD US DOWN TO 1 GENERATOR DUE TO THE DEFERRED IDG). AFTER THINKING HOW STUPID THAT WAS, I GOT READY TO RESTART THE APU -- NO BIG PROB SO FAR, BUT GUESS WHAT? THE APU WOULD NOT RESTART. WE HAD A MESSAGE THERE WAS A FAULT WITH THE AIR INTAKE DOOR. WE CALLED OUR MAINT CTLR WHO PROMPTLY TOLD US HE COULD NOT HELP US WITH THE APU UNTIL WE REACHED OUR DEST. SO HERE WE WERE IN BEAUTIFULLY CLR SKIES ON 1 GENERATOR HEADING FOR AN IFR APCH. NOT REALLY SERIOUS AS WE STILL HAD AN AIR DRIVEN EMER GENERATOR IN CASE OUR LUCK CONTINUED AND GENERATOR #1 FAILED, BUT A LESS THAN IDEAL SIT NONETHELESS. LUCKILY, ENRTE WE WERE ABLE TO COAX THE APU TO START AND CONTINUED TO DEST WITHOUT FURTHER EVENT. LOOKING BACK ON ALL THIS, THE WORKLOAD GOT PRETTY HIGH AS ALL THIS HAPPENED IN A SHORT SPAN OF TIME. WHILE I WAS PRETTY HAPPY WITH THE WAY WE AS A CREW DEALT WITH IT, IT STILL WAS EMBARRASSING FOR ME IN REGARD TO MY BUTTON FAUX PAS. BUT, IT ALSO BROUGHT UP ONE OF MY PET PEEVES, AND THAT IS FLYING AIRPLANES WITH MULTIPLE DEFERRED ITEMS. THEORETICALLY, UNLESS A SPECIFIC MEL ITEM HAS A LIMITATION, THERE REALLY ISN'T ANY LIMIT TO THE NUMBER OF ITEMS YOU CAN HAVE AND IT DOES GET VERY CONFUSING IF YOU HAVE A NUMBER OF ITEMS (ESPECIALLY IF THEY HAVE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS THAT ARE NOT NORMAL AS IS OFTEN THE CASE). PRETTY SOON YOU ARE BASICALLY OPERATING A DIFFERENT AIRPLANE WITH DIFFERENT PROCS FROM THE ONES YOU TRAIN WITH. NOW SOME MIGHT MAKE THE ARGUMENT THAT A REAL PLT COULD DEAL WITH ALL THIS. I REALLY DON'T BUY THAT. BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY, AND WHAT I SAW THIS PARTICULAR MORNING, WAS THAT ALL BETS ARE OFF IF SOMETHING ELSE GOES WRONG. WITH NUMEROUS (OR EVEN ONE MAJOR) SYS(S) INOP, YOU'RE IN A LESS THAN IDEAL SIT ALREADY AND IF SOMETHING ELSE FAILS OR GOES WRONG, YOU COULD BE IN SERIOUS TROUBLE. I DON'T KNOW IF FAA SHOULD LIMIT THE NUMBER OF DEFERRED ITEMS THAT CAN BE CARRIED AT ONE TIME, BUT IT MIGHT BE WORTH INVESTIGATING. THAT IS WHY I SUBMIT THIS TO YOU FOR ENTRY INTO THE DATABASE. MAYBE SOME OTHER CREWS HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN WITH THIS. NOTE: THE PREAMBLE TO OUR MEL DOES SAY THAT INTERRELATIONSHIPS BTWN ITEMS AND CREW WORKLOAD SHOULD BE CONSIDERED BUT GIVES NO SPECIFIC GUIDANCE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: ACFT CONFIRMED AS REGIONAL JET CANADAIR. RPTR CAPT WASN'T SURE WHY THEY HAD DIFFICULTY RESTARTING THE APU, BUT SAYS THERE HAVE BEEN INSTANCES OF THE APU CTL COMPUTER MALFUNCTIONING. APPARENTLY THERE WAS NO RELATIONSHIP BTWN THE DEFERRED INOP GENERATOR AND THE FMS ERASING THE FLT PLAN AND DEFAULTING TO THE DEST. RPTR SAYS THAT NEITHER OF THE FLC HAD INPUT ANYTHING INTO THE FMS PRIOR TO THE FAILURE. RPTR COMMENTS THAT HIS COMPANY HAS JUST RECENTLY BEEN FLYING THE RJ'S AND HE WAS SURPRISED HOW MUCH MORE INPUTS ARE REQUIRED AS COMPARED TO THE SAAB 340 WHICH HE HAD PREVIOUSLY FLOWN AND BOTH HAVE GLASS COCKPITS. RPTR CAPT MAKES AN INTERESTING STATEMENT: 'IN GLASS COCKPIT AIRPLANES, EVERYTHING HAPPENS VERY FAST AND EFFICIENT, INCLUDING ERRONEOUS INPUTS.'

  361.  
  362. Accession Number: 392004
    Synopsis: CAPT OF A BRITISH JETSTREAM BA41 OVERSHOT ASSIGNED ALT ON CLB.
    Narrative: ON DEP CLB OUT OF STL ENRTE TO SUX, ISSUED CLB TO MAINTAIN 12000 FT. AT 1000 FT BELOW ASSIGNED ALT I ADVISED THE CAPT (PF) OF '1000 FT TO GO' AND RECEIVED CONFIRMATION REPLY FROM THE CAPT. AT 100 FT BELOW ALT I SIGNALED (SINGLE 'LITTLE FINGER') 100 FT TO GO AND THOUGHT I OBSERVED CONFIRMATION FROM THE CAPT. ANTICIPATING NORMAL AUTOPLT CAPTURE, I (PNF) BECAME BUSY WITH CHART ORGANIZATION. AT 12300 FT WE RECEIVED AN ALT ALERT HORN, OBSERVED THE DEV AND THE CAPT BEGAN THE ALT CORRECTION. AT APPROX 12200 FT ATC RPTED THE AREA ALTIMETER SETTING AND ADVISED US TO MAINTAIN 12000 FT. THE FLT THEN PROCEEDED UNEVENTFULLY. FACTORS AFFECTING THE DEV: THIS WAS THE LAST ROUND TRIP FLT OF A 4 DAY TRIP. WE WERE ALL WELL RESTED, HOWEVER, THE CAPT HAD BEEN PREPARING FOR A MAJOR AIRLINE INTERVIEW THE ENTIRE TRIP AND WAS EXPECTING THE INTERVIEW THE FOLLOWING DAY. I HAD OBSERVED SOME INCREASING PREOCCUPATION AND DISTR IN HIM ALL DAY. I FEEL THAT THIS WAS THE PRIMARY CAUSE OF THE DEV. ALSO, THIS WAS A CAPT THAT HAD TRANSITIONED TO THE ARPT RECENTLY FROM AN ACFT WITH ANALOG INSTRUMENTATION. WHETHER THERE WAS A CONFUSION ON HIS PART IN REGARD TO PROGRAMMING THE EFIS DISPLAYS OR CONFIRMING AUTOPLT ALT CAPTURE, I CANNOT POSITIVELY SAY. MY RELAXED VIGILANCE AFTER I HAD OBSERVED DISTR IN THE PF RESULTED IN THE BREAKDOWN IN 2-PLT XCHKING PROCS. HAD I NOT ASSUMED A 'NO BRAINER' ACTIVITY AND REMAINED ATTENTIVE I COULD HAVE INTERJECTED BEFORE THE HORN. PRIMARY LESSON -- PLT VIGILANCE.

  363.  
  364. Accession Number: 392290
    Synopsis: MLG ACFT ON APCH TO MINIMUM WX CONDITIONS FAILED TO CONTACT TWR FOR LNDG CLRNC. APCH CTLR FORGOT TO SWITCH THEM DUE TO HVY WORKLOAD WITH OTHER ACFT SEPARATION PROB.
    Narrative: DURING APCH TO ILS RWY 10 AT BWI WITH WX AT 1/2 MI, VISIBILITY 100 FT BROKEN, 200 FT OVCST, WHEN CLRED FOR APCH BY FINAL APCH CTLR FROM 2000 FT, AUTOPLT STARTED DOWN EARLY AND AUTOTHROTTLES OVERSPED BY 200 KTS. ABOUT THIS TIME APCH CTLR STARTED GIVING TURNS TO 2 ACFT BEHIND AND ABOVE US. ONE OF THE ACFT HAD TAKEN A WRONG TURN AND CAME CLOSE TO THE OTHER ONE. CTLR WAS TRYING TO FIND OUT WHAT WENT WRONG AND DID NOT SWITCH OUR FLT TO TWR. WE WERE TRYING TO STAY ON APCH AFTER AUTOPLT STARTED DOWN EARLY -- THUS, BREAKING OUT AT MINIMUMS AND OBSERVING THE ACFT AHEAD OF US CLR OF THE RWY. WE LANDED WITHOUT TALKING TO TWR.

  365.  
  366. Accession Number: 392939
    Synopsis: A320 ACFT ON VECTOR HEADING FOR INTERCEPT AND ALT RESTR, ACFT ARMED FOR APCH CAPTURES GS PRIOR TO LOC INTERCEPT AND COMMENCES DSCNT BELOW ASSIGNED. TCASII RA ALERTS FLC TO ANOTHER ACFT ON APCH TO PARALLEL RWY. RPTR CAPT SAYS HE MAY HAVE PULLED INSTEAD OF PUSHING THE FCU (FLT CTL UNIT).
    Narrative: WHILE ON A 240 DEG VECTOR TO FINAL APCH COURSE TO RWY 21L AT DTW, WE WERE CLRED TO 'MAINTAIN 5000 FT UNTIL ROBBI, CLRED FOR THE ILS RWY 21 APCH.' THE FCU APPR (APCH) PUSH BUTTON WAS PUSHED AND THE AUTOPLT WAS ARMED TO CAPTURE THE LOC COURSE AND THE GS. THE GS WAS CAPTURED BEFORE THE LOC COURSE AND DSCNT FROM 5000 FT WAS INITIATED BY THE AUTOPLT. WHILE I ATTEMPTED TO DETERMINE IF WE HAD PASSED 'ROBBI,' WE FLEW THROUGH THE LOC COURSE (THE AUTOFLT SYS DID NOT CAPTURE THE LOC FOR REASONS UNKNOWN). AS I USED THE HEADING CTL KNOB OF THE FCU TO TURN BACK TO THE LOC COURSE, A TA FOLLOWED BY AN RA WAS GENERATED BY THE TCASII SYS FOR AN ACFT BELOW US ON THE PARALLEL APCH (RWY 21R). WE LEVELED OFF AT APPROX 4600 FT MSL AND CONTINUED THE TURN BACK TO THE LOC COURSE AND INTERCEPTED THE FAC. WHEN ESTABLISHED ON THE LOC (WELL ABOVE THE GS) AND AFTER THE TCASII AURAL 'CLR OF CONFLICT' MESSAGE WAS RECEIVED, I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOFLT SYS AND FLEW THE ACFT DOWN TO THE GS AND CONTINUED THE APCH TO A LNDG IN VMC. THE INCIDENT WAS INITIATED BY A FAILURE OF THE AUTOPLT TO CAPTURE THE LOC COURSE. THIS MAY HAVE RESULTED FROM MY POSSIBLY PULLING THE FCU HEADING CTL KNOB AFTER THE APCH PUSH BUTTON HAD BEEN PUSHED AND THE LOC AND GS ARMED FOR AUTOPLT CAPTURE. THIS WAS EXACERBATED BY MY FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE THE FAILURE TO CAPTURE THE LOC SOONER. THAT WAS BECAUSE I BECAME PREOCCUPIED WITH IDENTING 'ROBBI' (OUR 5000 FT RESTR). THE ILS RWY 21L HAS NO DME AND ROBBI WAS NOT DISPLAYED ON OUR EFIS NAV DISPLAY (A 'VIA' HAD NOT BEEN SELECTED ON THE FMGC APCH MENU). 'ROBBI' IS IDENTED BY THE CRL VOR/DME WHICH WAS NOT MANUALLY TUNED, AND BOTH VOR RECEIVERS WERE AUTO TUNED TO DXO VOR/DME. THE A320 FMGC IS PROGRAMMED TO ALLOW THE AUTOFLT SYS TO CAPTURE THE GS SIGNAL PRIOR TO THE LOC SIGNAL WHICH CAN CAUSE A DSCNT TO BE INITIATED BEFORE THE ACFT IS ESTABLISHED ON THE FAC. ANOTHER MISTAKE MADE WAS MY FAILURE TO DISCONNECT THE AUTOPLT IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE TCASII RA. THIS RESULTED IN A SLOWER DIVERGENCE FROM THE RA TFC AND A SLOWER CORRECTION BACK ONTO THE GS, RESULTING IN A HIGH RATE OF DSCNT ONCE THE AUTOPLT WAS DISCONNECTED.

  367.  
  368. Accession Number: 393524
    Synopsis: L1011 ACFT CLBED TO FIND SMOOTH AIR AND AFTER LEVELOFF AUTOTHROTTLES MALFUNCTIONED. #2 THROTTLE WAS FORWARD AND #1 AND #3 WERE PULLED BACK RESULTING IN DETERIORATING AIRSPD. SPD WAS LOW ENOUGH THAT RPTR HAD TO DSND TO GET SPD BACK.
    Narrative: WE WERE REROUTED BY ATC DUE TO RPTS OF MODERATE TO SEVERE TURB ON OUR ORIGINAL RTE. FLT CTL HAD ADVISED US THIS MIGHT HAPPEN. WE ENCOUNTERED LIGHT TO MODERATE DURING OUR CLB TO FL370. FL390 WAS RPTED SMOOTH SO WE ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED CLRNC TO FL390. AT LEVELOFF THE AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHROTTLES CAPTURED NORMAL CRUISE. IT WAS SMOOTH. I TURNED OFF THE SEAT BELT LIGHT AND WENT TO USE THE RESTROOM. THE COPLT WAS ON OXYGEN AND EVERYTHING WAS NORMAL. AS I RETURNED TO THE COCKPIT A SHORT TIME LATER, I BEGAN TO FEEL SOME TURB. I QUICKLY GOT INTO MY SEAT AND AS I DID SO, I NOTICED THE AIRSPD WAS DOWN TO APPROX 205 KTS AND ENG #2 THROTTLE WAS FORWARD WHILE #1 AND #3 PULLED BACK. I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHROTTLES, PUSHED FORWARD ON THE CTL COLUMN AND PUSHED THROTTLES #1 AND #3 UP WHILE CALLING FOR MAX CLB. THE AIRPLANE WOULD NOT ACCELERATE AND HAD DIFFICULTY MAINTAINING ALT. I TOLD THE COPLT TO ASK FOR A LOWER ALT. HE WAS STILL WEARING HIS OXYGEN MASK SO I COULDNÃūT TELL WHETHER OR NOT HE WAS REQUESTING LOWER. HE PULLED THE MASK OFF AND SAID WE ARE CLRED A BLOCK ALT OF FL390 TO FL370. WE WERE FL388 AT THE TIME. I DUMPED THE NOSE SLIGHTLY AND LEVELED OFF AT FL370 AT NORMAL CRUISE SPD. ALTHOUGH WE NEVER GOT BELOW STALL SPD DURING THE INCIDENT, WE NEVERTHELESS DID ENCOUNTER SOME SLIGHT BUFFETING DUE TO THE HIGH ALT AND TURBULENT ENVIRONMENT. WE MADE A TURB RPT TO CTR AND WROTE UP THE AUTOTHROTTLES. THE WHOLE INCIDENT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF THE CAPT HAD BRIEFED AND WARNED THE CREW ABOUT THE 'NOTORIOUS' AUTOTHROTTLES ON THE L1011.

  369.  
  370. Accession Number: 393942
    Synopsis: CAPT OF A B757 DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND INCREASED THE RATE OF DSCNT IN RESPONSE TO A TCASII RA CAUSING A POTENTIAL COLLISION WITH THE OTHER ACFT BY DECREASING SEPARATION INSTEAD OF INCREASING IT. THE OTHER ACFT'S MODE C XPONDER WAS NOT RPTING THE SAME ALT AS THE PLT HAD GIVEN TO ATC.
    Narrative: 20 MI E OF TORCH ON EL NIDO ARR 12000 FT. RECEIVED VFR TA 1 O'CLOCK POS AT 11500 FT. SHORTLY THEREAFTER RECEIVED A TA WITH TARGET AT 200 FT ABOVE US, 1 O'CLOCK POS AND CLOSING. ZOA THEN CLRED US TO DSND TO 11000 FT. AS THE DSCNT WAS STARTED THE TA CHANGED TO AN RA WITH A DSND COMMAND. AUTOPLT WAS DISENGAGED AND DSND COMMAND FOLLOWED AT 1300 FPM RATE. PASSING 11700 FT WE FINALLY SPOTTED THE TFC AT 11500 FT AND CLOSING RAPIDLY AT WHICH TIME I INCREASED DSCNT RATE BEYOND COMMANDED RATE TO AVOID THE TFC. TFC PASSED BEHIND US WITH BTWN 1/4 TO 1/2 MI HORIZ SEPARATION. ZOA WAS ADVISED OF THE RA. THEY THEN ADVISED THE TFC TO CHK ALT, MODE C SHOWED 12200 FT. THIS WHOLE CHAIN OF EVENTS TOOK LESS THAN 45 SECONDS. WE WERE IN VISUAL CONDITIONS. IF WE WERE IMC OR DID NOT VISUALLY SPOT THE TFC, I THINK THAT THIS EVENT WOULD HAVE ENDED MUCH LESS FAVORABLY. I SUSPECT THIS EVENT WAS CAUSED BY THE ERRONEOUS MODE C OF THE VFR TFC THAT TOLD OUR TCASII IT WAS 200 FT ABOVE US WHEN IT WAS REALLY 500 FT BELOW US. THIS LED TO A DSND COMMAND WHEN WE NEEDED TO MAINTAIN ALT. THIS EVENT FURTHER REINFORCES THE SEE AND AVOID CONCEPT IN VISUAL CONDITIONS AND THE NEED TO AGGRESSIVELY MAINTAIN SITUATIONAL AWARENESS.

  371.  
  372. Accession Number: 394330
    Synopsis: FO OF A WDB FAILED TO FOLLOW THE LOC COURSE AFTER VECTOR FOR INTERCEPTION DUE TO THE AUTOPLT TURNING THE ACFT IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION WHICH RESULTED IN ATC INTERVENTION AND INSTRUCTIONS TO GAR. THE FO OVERSHOT MISSED APCH ALT AFTER ENGAGING THE GAR MODE AND HAD TO DSND BACK TO THE PRESCRIBED ALT.
    Narrative: AT THIS TIME OF THE FLT, WE WERE ON AN INTERCEPT HDG FOR THE ILS TO RWY 13L AT JFK. THE AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED IN 'HDG SELECT.' IMMEDIATELY AFTER APCH CLRNC 'LOC' WAS ENGAGED ON THE AUTOPLT. THE ANNUNCIATION ON THE ADI SHOWED LOC CAPTURE, HOWEVER, THE RAW DATA LOC WAS STILL INDICATING FULL SCALE DEFLECTION. SHORTLY AFTER, THE ACFT ROLLED L TO 35 DEGS OF BANK IN WHAT APPEARED TO BE AN ATTEMPT TO TRACK THE ILS OUTBOUND. AT THIS POINT WE WERE ON THE ILS AND GOING THROUGH ON AN EASTERLY HDG. I TURNED THE AUTOPLT OFF AND BEGAN A R TURN IN AN EFFORT TO TRACK THE ILS INBOUND. AT THIS POINT ATC ASKED WHAT WAS HAPPENING. WE RESPONDED AND HE SAID 'GAR.' OUR HDG WAS NOW 165 DEGS, MISSED APCH ALT WAS 3000 FT. WE WERE AT 2700 FT. I HIT THE GAR BUTTON WHICH GIVES GAR THRUST AND GIVES YOU A 2000 FPM RATE OF CLB. DUE TO THE WORKLOAD, TURB, HVY RAIN, COUPLED WITH CLEANING UP THE ACFT, WE CLBED TO 3400 FT. AGAIN ATC ASKED ABOUT OUR ALT AND WE RETURNED TO 3000 FT. I THINK THIS INCIDENT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF IN TRAINING THEY GO OVER SOME SHORT ALT CLBS IN A GAR MODE. AUTOPLT FUNCTION TEST SHOULD BE CONDUCTED WKLY AS OPPOSED TO MONTHLY.

  373.  
  374. Accession Number: 394384
    Synopsis: MLG ACFT ON STAR HAD R THROTTLE GO TO IDLE WHILE L ONE WAS AT 88% N1. THAT CAUSED THE ACFT TO TURN R. CAPT TURNED OFF AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHROTTLES AND TURNED BACK ON COURSE.
    Narrative: DSNDING ON MINKS ARR INTO LGA, APCHING MINKS INTXN, CAPT FLYING ACFT. FLT DIRECTOR V BARS INDICATING A L TURN AS ACFT LEVELS OFF. ACFT STARTS TURNING TO R, GOING THROUGH ABOUT 30 DEGS R BANK. CAPT DISENGAGES AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHROTTLES. ACFT TURNED L MANUALLY TO RETURN TO PROPER HDG. DURING TURN, NOTICE THAT L THRUST LEVER INDICATING 88% N1, R THRUST LEVER AT IDLE. SET SYMMETRICAL THRUST AND CONTINUE FOR LNDG AT LGA. AUTO THROTTLE WAS WRITTEN UP UPON ARR AT LGA.

  375.  
  376. Accession Number: 394740
    Synopsis: A B757 OVERSHOT ITS ASSIGNED ALT OF FL190 BY 400 FT. ACFT HAD BEEN ON AUTOPLT AND AT A HIGH RATE OF CLB.
    Narrative: CAPT WAS HAND FLYING. AFTER CONTACTING DEP WE WERE CLRED TO 10000 FT ON A N HDG. PASSING THROUGH 8300 FT MSL, ATC TOLD US TO LEVEL AT 8000 FT. CLB WAS STOPPED AND STARTING DSCNT TO 8000 FT WE WERE RECLRED TO 10000 FT WITH A 120 DEG TURN TOWARDS THE E, AWAY FROM ANOTHER ACFT AT 10000 FT. ZDC LATER CLRED US UP TO FL190. THE ALTIMETER SETTING WAS 29.52. DUE TO TFC, AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED. THE ACFT WAS LIGHT AND 'ALT CAPTURE' OCCURRED AT 17000 FT. AT 17300 FT ALTIMETER WAS RESET TO 29.92. REACHING FL190 ACFT LEVELED OFF. HOWEVER, IT CONTINUED UP TO FL193, AT WHICH TIME THE ALT ALERT SIGNALED US THAT A DEV HAD OCCURRED. ATC ALSO QUESTIONED US BECAUSE THEY SHOWED US AT FL194. IN FACT, BY THIS TIME, WE TOUCHED FL194. ACFT WAS MANUALLY FLOWN BACK TO FL190 WHICH WAS THE ALT SET ALL ALONG IN THE MODE SELECTOR PANEL. BECAUSE THE AIRPLANE HAD BEEN ON AUTOPLT AND WE WERE LOOKING OUTSIDE FOR TFC AND THE SUN WAS RISING IN OUR EYES, I FAILED TO NOTICE THE ALTDEV. WE CALLED OUR MAINT BASE, SUSPECTING THAT THE LARGE ALTIMETER DIFFERENCE WAS TOO LARGE FOR THE AIRPLANE SYS TO ACCOMMODATE IN JUST A FEW HUNDRED FT (GOING THROUGH 17000 FT TO FL190), PARTICULARLY AFTER ENGAGING IN THE ALT CAPTURE MODE. THEY THOUGHT SO, TOO. THIS IS SOMETHING TO REALLY PAY ATTN TO WHEN TRANSITION LEVELS AND LEVELOFFS NEAR THEM INVOLVE LARGE DIFFERENCES IN ALTIMETER CHANGES, ESPECIALLY WHEN NOT HAND FLYING, BUT RELYING ON AUTOMATED SYS. I DON'T THINK THERE WAS A CONFLICT WITH ANY OTHER ACFT.

  377.  
  378. Accession Number: 395103
    Synopsis: B737-400 ACFT ON COUPLED APCH, PF, FO DSNDS BELOW THE APCH PROFILE, BUT CORRECTS BACK WHEN RECOGNIZING THE 'PICTURE' DOESN'T LOOK RIGHT. COCKPIT CONFLICT CONTRIBUTES.
    Narrative: THE EVENT BEGAN WITH THE EXECUTION OF AN RNP APCH. WE SET UP THE APCH AS TRAINED AND FOLLOWED THE APPROPRIATE CHKLIST. 99% OF THE TIME I HAND FLY APCHS, SO AT 10000 FT ON THIS APCH, I UNCOUPLED THE AUTOPLT. AS SOON AS I DID THE CAPT GOT UPSET AND SAID, 'WHAT ARE YOU DOING? WE HAVE TO LEAVE IT COUPLED!' WHICH IS NOT TRUE. NOT WANTING TO CREATE ANY CONFLICT, I RE-ENGAGED THE AUTOPLT. THEN HE MADE A COMMENT LIKE, 'OH, GO AHEAD AND HAND FLY IT.' I CHOSE NOT TO. WE ENTERED VMC CONDITIONS PRIOR TO THE FAF, AT WHICH POINT I QUIT REFING MY APCH PLATE. INSTEAD I WAS LOOKING OUT AT THE ARPT THINKING ABOUT LNDG ON RWY 8. I SOON REALIZED THAT 'THE PICTURE' DIDN'T LOOK RIGHT AND THAT WE WERE MUCH LOWER THAN WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN. WE WERE APCHING 800 FT MSL INSTEAD OF BEING AT 1270 FT WHERE WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN. WITHOUT HESITATION, I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHROTTLES AND CLBED BACK UP TO 1000 FT MSL. AT THIS POINT WE WERE NEAR CGL NDB. ONCE PAST CGL I MADE THE TURN THROUGH 'THE CUT' TO LINE UP AND LAND ON RWY 8. I BELIEVE THAT THE PROB STEMMED FROM: 1) MY NEWNESS TO THE AIRPLANE. 2) BEING ON REVERSE AND VERY SELDOM FLYING (COMMON COMPLAINT WITH NEW B737-400 FO'S HERE AT ACR X). 3) SECOND TIME I'VE FLOWN THE APCH (FIRST TIME AS THE PF). 4) CAPT WAS VERY CTLING, NONSTANDARD (I'D BEEN INFORMED OF THIS THE DAY BEFORE BY A CHK AIRMAN AND ALSO TOLD BY THIS PERSON THAT 'A LOT OF FO'S DON'T LIKE TO FLY WITH THIS GUY') AND HE WAS ABRASIVE WHICH CAUSED ME TO MENTALLY DISTANCE MYSELF FROM THE COCKPIT. 5) CAPT 'PLAYED' BY HIS OWN RULES, WHICH MADE MATTERS VERY CONFUSING SINCE I WAS NEVER SURE WHAT HE WANTED AND HE COULDN'T RELATE WHAT HE WANTED. SINCE THE CAPT HAD BEEN AT ACR X FOR 14 YRS AND ACTED LIKE HE WAS VERY KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT FLYING IN SOUTHEAST ALASKA, I TENDED TO LET MYSELF BE LED LIKE A STUPID SHEEP OUT TO SLAUGHTER. I NEED TO NOT ALLOW MYSELF TO BE INTIMIDATED BY CAPTS LIKE THIS. ALTHOUGH I'M NEW AND RELATIVELY INEXPERIENCED IN THE AIRPLANE, I KNOW BETTER THAN TO STOP MONITORING THE COUPLED APCH, EVEN IN VMC.

  379.  
  380. Accession Number: 395382
    Synopsis: MD80S ACFT BEING VECTORED FOR APCH WITH ACFT MANEUVERING, RPTR CAPT THOUGHT THE AUTOPLT HAD CAPTURED AND WOULD HOLD ALT, BUT IT DIDN'T AND ACFT LOST 300 FT WHILE IN TURN.
    Narrative: CAPT, PF, FO, PNF, OBSERVED FMA SWITCH FROM IAS TO ALT CAPTURE. WE WERE THEN GIVEN A 30 DEG HDG CHANGE EXECUTED AT 25 DEG BANK. I LOOKED DOWN AT APCH CHART FOR ILS FREQ AND HEARD ALT WARNING. ALT WAS NOW 6700 FT. AUTOPLT DID NOT EXECUTE ALT HOLD. AUTOPLT WAS DISCONNECTED AND ACFT FLOWN BACK TO 7000 FT. NO CONFLICT WITH OTHER ACFT OBSERVED OR MENTIONED BY US OR ATC. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 395700: ON AUTOPLT THE CAPT SELECTED HEADING AND THE ACFT ROLLED INTO 30 DEGS OF BANK AS ALT CAPTURE WAS ANNUNCIATED ON THE FMA. AS COPLT PNF MY JOB IS TO BACK UP THE PF, BUT IN THIS CASE TO BACK UP ACTUAL ALT I HAVE TO GO XCOCKPIT DUE TO AFL ALTS ON THE FO'S ALTIMETER.

  381.  
  382. Accession Number: 395411
    Synopsis: B757 ACFT ON STAR AND DSCNT HAD MAP SHIFT WHICH RPTR CAPT ATTRIBUTES TO THE LAX DME. RPTR CLAIMS THAT HIS RAW DATA SHOWED ACCURATE DME, BUT THE FMS WAS 2 MI OFF.
    Narrative: DURING APCH RWY 25L LAX, FO NOTICED MAP SHIFT ON ARR OVER CIVET INTXN. ONLY 1 DME WAS UPDATING FMS, MY DME WAS ON RAW DATA. I CAN ONLY SURMISE THAT FO DME LOCKED ON A DME NEAR THE LAX AREA AND THAT THE SIGNAL WAS NOT ACCURATE. THE FMS DME WAS 2 MI DIFFERENT THAN THE RAW DATA ILS DME. SIGNIFICANT ERROR ONLY IN THE LAX AREA. I'VE NEVER NOTICED SUCH A LARGE SHIFT IN THE FEW MINS IT TOOK FOR THIS EVENT TO OCCUR.

  383.  
  384. Accession Number: 395658
    Synopsis: B757-200 ACFT IN CRUISE ENCOUNTERED SEVERE TURB RESULTING IN INJURIES TO CABIN ATTENDANTS AND PAX. EMER DECLARED AND FLT CONTINUED TO DEST DUE TO WX CONDITIONS AT CLOSER ARPTS.
    Narrative: SCHEDULED FROM LAX-TPA, B757. FULL PAX LOAD WITH 6 FLT ATTENDANTS ON BOARD. PRIOR TO DEP REVIEWED WX FOR TRIP WITH PARTICULAR REVIEW OF RTE THROUGH TX, LA, AND THE GULF FOR TSTM ACTIVITY AND TURB. MODERATE TURB FORECAST TO FL330. OUR PLANNED CRUISE WAS AT FL370. CAPT TALKED TO FLT CTL DISPATCH FOR UPDATED INFO. DISPATCH WAS ALSO CALLED WHILE OVER NM TO REVIEW WX AND DEVELOPMENTS. NO CHANGES FROM FORECAST. ACROSS TX, NOTED A COUPLE OF LARGE CELLS S OF OUR RTE VIA ACFT RADAR. NO DEVS WERE NECESSARY, 30-35 NM CLRNC ON RTE. BTWN LFK-HRV WITH SEAT BELT SIGN ON, WE RECEIVED A CALL FROM ZHU THAT AN ACFT IN OUR AREA HAD RPTED MODERATE-SEVERE TURB WITH AN ALT GAIN OF 1000 FT. AS THE FO, I ACKNOWLEDGED THE CALL AND IMMEDIATELY MADE A PA THAT EVERYONE WAS TO RECHK THE SECURITY OF THEIR SEAT BELTS, THE FLT ATTENDANTS WERE TO TERMINATE THEIR SVC AND TAKE THEIR SEATS IMMEDIATELY AS WE WERE ENTERING A DANGEROUS AREA. WITHIN ABOUT 1 MIN THE ACFT STARTED A CLB (EVEN THOUGH THE AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED IN ALT HOLD). AT 37200 FT THE CAPT DISENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND LEVELED THE ACFT AT 37400 FT. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY WE HIT SHARP SEVERE TURB FOR ABOUT 5 SECONDS. THEN IT WAS SMOOTH AGAIN AS IT HAD BEEN. WE RPTED THE ENCOUNTER TO ZHU. I CHKED WITH THE 'A' FLT ATTENDANT AND SHE SAID THERE APPEARED TO BE SOME PROBS IN THE AFT. WE WERE SWITCHED TO ZJX. I CALLED FLT CTL AND COORDINATED A PLAN. AS RPTS CAME TO THE COCKPIT OF INJURIES, WE STARTED LOOKING FOR THE NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT. PHYSICIANS ON BOARD REVIEWED THE INJURIES AND I RELAYED THE INFO TO THE DISPATCHER. MSY, BTR WERE RULED OUT DUE TO WX AND TURB. 1 FLT ATTENDANT WAS THROWN AGAINST THE CEILING AND A SVC CART FELL ON HER. THE PHYSICIAN RECOMMENDED NOT MOVING HER AND AVOIDING ANY KNOWN TURB. WITH THE INPUT FROM THE PHYSICIAN AND WX ALONG THE GULF COAST NOT FAVORABLE IT WAS JOINTLY DECIDED TO CONTINUE TO TPA, NOW ABOUT 40 MINS AHEAD. WE DECLARED A MEDICAL EMER WITH ZJX NEAR NEPTA INTXN. ZMA COORDINATED OUR ARR INTO TPA. WE LANDED ON RWY 18L AND ROLLED TO THE END TO AVOID A QUICK DECELERATION ON THE INJURED PAX. WE TAXIED TO THE GATE AND WERE MET BY MEDICAL/RESCUE PERSONNEL. THE FINAL RPT SHOWED 2 FLT ATTENDANTS AND 6 PAX WERE TREATED AT LCL HOSPITALS. THE FLT ATTENDANTS WERE RELEASED THAT EVENING WITH BRUISES AND BACK SPRAIN. I DO NOT KNOW HOW SERIOUS THE PAX INJURIES WERE, BUT THE FLT ATTENDANT WAS CONSIDERED THE WORST CASE AT THE ACFT. WE WROTE UP THE EVENT IN THE ACFT LOGBOOK AS AN 'ENCOUNTER WITH SEVERE AND UNUSUAL TURB.' ALL ACFT SYS OPERATED NORMALLY FOR THE DURATION OF THE FLT AND MAINT FOUND NO PROBS DURING THEIR POSTFLT INSPECTION. NO PANELS WERE DISLODGED IN THE ACFT AND ALL PAX WHO HAD THEIR SEAT BELTS ON WERE NOT INJURED. WE ELECTED TO PROCEED TO TPA DUE TO WX CONSIDERATIONS AND MEDICAL CAPABILITY. TURB IS HARD TO PREDICT AND PAX DO NOT FEEL COMPELLED TO OBEY THE LIT 'SEAT BELT SIGN.' THE INJURIES MOST LIKELY RESULTED FROM THE RAPID AND SUDDEN ON-SET OF THE TURB. IT HAD BEEN SMOOTH THE ENTIRE TRIP WITH THIS ONE EXCEPTION. AGAIN THIS IS A PITFALL. THE FLT WAS OPERATING NORMALLY ABOVE A CIRRUS CLOUD LAYER IN CLR SKIES. THE CLOUD DECK WAS 1000-2000 FT BELOW THE ACFT. THERE APPEARED TO BE WIDESPREAD CUMULO NIMBUS ACTIVITY WELL BELOW OUR FLT LEVEL, BUT NO RETURNS WERE ON THE WX RADAR.

  385.  
  386. Accession Number: 395870
    Synopsis: A CL65 CREW HAS SOME PROBS WITH THEIR FMS MAKING A DSNDING TURN OVER SPA, SC. THE PIC HAD TO REVERT TO HEADING MODE TO TURN BACK TO THE DESIRED RADIAL. ATC STEPS IN AND GIVES AN ALT RESTR AND A TURN.
    Narrative: WE WERE APCHING SPARTANBURG VOR FROM THE W AT FL310. GND SPD WAS +500 KTS AND WIND FROM NW AT +100 KTS. NAV WAS FMS IN NAV MODE. WE WERE GIVEN A XING RESTR ALSO THAT REQUIRED A RATE OF DSCNT OF +3000 FPM. TURN AND DSCNT WERE STARTED ABOUT THE SAME TIME. OUTBOUND COURSE WAS 035 DEGS (L TURN) WITH NW WINDS AT +100 KTS. SO I EXPECTED A LARGE HEADING CHANGE TO STAY ON TRACK. I WATCHED THE FMS GO THROUGH OUTBOUND COURSE AND TURN TO WHAT I THOUGHT WAS TOO MUCH CORRECTION. THE AIRPLANE WAS IN A 30 DEG BANK TO THE L. I WENT TO HEADING MODE AND SET HEADING TO REINTERCEPT OUTBOUND COURSE (ABOUT 85 DEGS). BY THIS TIME ATC SAID WE HAD A TFC CONFLICT AND MAINTAIN FL280. WE WERE ABOUT 27700 FT. I CANCELED THE AUTOPLT AND FLEW THE AIRPLANE TO FL280 AND BACK ON COURSE. I EXPECTED A LARGE CHANGE IN HEADING TO ACCOMMODATE WINDS AND COURSE CHANGE, AND HAD NO INDICATION OF A MALFUNCTION. THERE ALSO WAS VERY LITTLE TIME TO CHK AND VERIFY FMS INDICATIONS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 396189: ATC CALLED AND STOPPED OUR DSCNT AT FL280 AND GAVE US A 085 DEG HDG TO RETURN TO COURSE. WE WERE THEN CLRED TO TRAKS, ON THE FMS NAV MODE, WE WENT TO TRAKS BUT THE FMS DIDN'T MAKE THE TURN AT TRAKS. WE WENT TO HEADING MODE AND MADE THE CORRECTION. THE FMS WORKED PROPERLY THE REST OF THE DAY.

  387.  
  388. Accession Number: 396030
    Synopsis: B767 TRACK DEV ON STAR ARR INTO LAX. ACFT OPERATING ON FMS BUT WAS ONE HALF MI S OF INBOUND VOR COURSE. CTLR CALLED FLT.
    Narrative: 40 DME FROM LAX. WE WERE DSNDING VIA THE CIVET THREE ARR WHEN ATC ADVISED US THAT WE WERE 1/2 MI S OF COURSE. I WAS IN RAW DATA THE ENTIRE ARR BUT HAD NOT NOTICED UNTIL THE CTLR ADVISED US THAT WE WERE S OF COURSE. LNAV SHOWED US RIGHT ON COURSE. WE VISUALLY AND WITH RAW DATA CONFIRMED THAT WE WERE IN FACT OFF COURSE SLIGHTLY. TO MY KNOWLEDGE NO OTHER ACFT HAD TO DEVIATE AS A RESULT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 395890: WE NOTICED THE RAW DATA LOC WAS R OF OUR FMC COURSE. WE STARTED CORRECTING TO THE R WHEN ATC TOLD US WE WERE 1/2 MI L OF COURSE. WE CORRECTED COURSE AND FLEW DATA FOR THE REST OF THE ARR.

  389.  
  390. Accession Number: 396329
    Synopsis: A B767 CREW EXPERIENCES A MAP SHIFT WHILE ATTEMPTING TO ALIGN WITH THE RWY 25R ILS LOC. ACFT HAD BEEN ON THE APCH FOR RWY 24R AND HAD BEEN SHIFTED OVER TO THE S COMPLEX BY APCH CTLR.
    Narrative: THE REMARKS SECTION OF OUR FLT PLAN CONTAINED A WARNING TO WATCH FOR AN FMS MAP SHIFT INBOUND TO LAX. IT SAID SEVERAL ACFT HAD EXPERIENCED MAP SHIFTS DURING THE ARR. WE WERE CLRED DIRECT 'CIVET' INTXN AND WERE EXPECTING THE 'CIVET' ARR TO RWY 25L. THE FMS WAS PROGRAMMED FOR A 'CIVET' ARR AND ILS RWY 25L. ATC THEN CHANGED OUR CLRNC TO THE 'MITTS' ARR, DIRECT 'SNRKL' INTXN, CROSS 'SNRKL' AT OR ABOVE 12000 FT, CLRED ILS RWY 24R. WE RETUNED THE NAVAIDS AND REPROGRAMMED THE FMS FOR A 'MITTS' ARR TO RWY 24R. WE WERE ISSUED TFC TO OUR L SEVERAL TIMES BUT NEVER DID SEE THE TFC. ATC THEN OFFERED, AND WE ACCEPTED RWY 25R. I TUNED THE LOC AND WENT TO A RAW DATA DISPLAY ON MY HSI, WHILE THE CAPT LOOKED FOR THE RWY 25R APCH PLATE AND THEN SELECTED THE ILS RWY 25R IN THE FMS. WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO JOIN THE RWY 25R LOC, CROSS 'MUSIK' INTXN AT OR ABOVE 8000 FT, CLRED ILS RWY 25R. I DON'T RECALL SEEING OUR POS IN RELATION TO THE RAW DATA DISPLAY OF THE LOC BECAUSE I WAS DISTRACTED AT THIS POINT: THE ACFT MADE AN ABRUPT L TURN, AND THEN WE GOT A TCASII RA TO 'REDUCE DSCNT.' I BELIEVE THE ABRUPT L TURN WAS CAUSED BY A MAP SHIFT THAT BECAME APPARENT A BIT LATER. ANYWAY, WE RESPONDED TO THE TCASII WARNING. THEN I SAW THE ARPT VISUALLY AND REALIZED WE WERE WELL S OF THE LOC WHEN I EXPECTED TO BE N OF THE LOC. WE INITIATED A R TURN BACK TOWARD THE LOC IMMEDIATELY, AND INFORMED ATC THAT WE WERE CORRECTING. AT THIS POINT I COULD SEE THAT THE CAPT'S DISPLAY SHOWED US ABOUT 5 MI N OF THE LOC, WHEN IN REALITY WE WERE S OF THE LOC. THE ARR AND RWY CHANGES MADE DETECTING THE MAP SHIFT ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE UNTIL IT WAS TOO LATE. I THINK THE PNF SHOULD MONITOR RAW DATA AT ALL TIMES DURING ARRS TO LAX ARPT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 396417: MOMENTS PASSED AS WE SET UP FOR THAT CLRNC. ATC CONTINUED TO CALL WITH TFC, AIRSPD RESTRS, AND FREQ CHANGES, REQUIRING RESPONSES AND INTERRUPTIONS TO OUR FMS SET-UP. WE WERE GIVEN ANOTHER FREQ CHANGE. SOCAL APCH CTL IMMEDIATELY OFFERED US RWY 25R. ALTHOUGH ALMOST REFUSING THE OFFER, IT WAS ACCEPTED FOR THE SHORTER TAXI TIME TO THE GATE. (ALMOST REFUSED DUE TO MULTIPLE CLRNC CHANGES ALREADY AND DIFFICULTY, DUE TO TIME CONSTRAINTS AND UNFAMILIARITY, IN NEW SETUPS FOR EACH CHANGE AND MULTIPLE CALLS FROM ATC INHIBITING OUR CLRNC PROCESSING.) SOCAL APCH THEN CLRED US TO INTERCEPT THE RWY 25R LOC. LOOKING AT MY HSI MAP, I EXPECTED TO HAVE TO TURN L SLIGHTLY TO INTERCEPT THE LOC. THE AUTOPLT ALREADY WAS/HAD BEEN IN A LOW-BANK TURN TO THE L. THIS PUZZLED ME FOR A MOMENT. THE INTERCEPT ANGLE WAS ALREADY TOO GREAT SO I INTERCEDED AND REDUCED THE ANGLE. SOCAL APCH HAD CLRED US FOR THE APCH. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY OUT OF 8000 FT, WE HAD A TCASII ALERT, 'REDUCE DSCNT.' WHEN I LOOKED AT THE TCASII, THE ALERT SOUNDED ONE MORE TIME AS I SAW A TARGET PASS 500 FT, MORE OR LESS UNDER US, ALSO IN A DSCNT. AT THAT TIME A PLT JUMP SEAT RIDER BEHIND ME POINTED OUT BY VISUAL REF TO THE ARPT THAT WE WERE S OF BOTH RWY 25L AND RWY 25R LOCS AND GOING FURTHER S. I IMMEDIATELY WENT TO RAW DATA, MADE A CORRECTION BACK TO THE R TO INTERCEPT RWY 25R LOC AND FURTHER REDUCED OUR RATE OF DSCNT. AUTOPLT LOC WAS ALSO ARMED. WITHIN SECONDS, WE WERE ON THE LOC AND THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT PROGRESSED NORMALLY. NEEDLESS TO SAY, WE SPENT SOME TIME ANALYZING THIS. OUR FIRST REALIZATION WAS THAT WE'D EXPERIENCED A 'MAP SHIFT,' WITHOUT RECOGNIZING IT IMMEDIATELY. UPON REALIZING THAT WE WERE CHASING A PHANTOM LOC TO THE S (L), WE RECOGNIZED THE SHIFT. MINS LATER, AT THE GATE, MAINT CONFIRMED A SHIFT OF AT LEAST 2 1/2 MI. ON REFLECTION, WE MIGHT HAVE SAVED SOME OF THIS IRREGULAR OP HAD WE: 1) ARMED THE AUTOPLT FOR LOC INTERCEPTION IMMEDIATELY AFTER RECEIVING THE CLRNC AND DIALING IN THE LOC FREQ. 2) DOWNLOADED SOME OF THE AUTOMATION RIGHT AWAY AND GONE TO MANUAL AND RAW DATA MODE. 3) REFUSED THE OFFER OF RWY 25R SINCE WE WERE SET UP FOR RWY 24R. NORMALLY, WE DON'T INTERCEPT THE LOC TOO FAR OUT BECAUSE IT'S TOO UNSTABLE AND CAUSES THE ACFT TO WING WALK TOO MUCH. INSTEAD, WE USE THE FMS CALCULATED LOC, AND ARM THE LOC WHEN IN CLOSER. STANDARD PROC ALSO CALLS FOR 1 PLT TO BE ON RAW DATA FOR LOC INTERCEPT. THAT WAS DONE, BUT WE WERE PLAYING CATCH-UP WITH THE CLRNC AND FAILED TO CATCH THE RAW DATA DISCREPANCY RIGHT AWAY. ALL OF THIS HAPPENED IN A VERY SHORT TIME FRAME, COMPRESSED AND COMPLICATED BY AN UNUSUALLY HIGH NUMBER OF CALLS FROM ATC. ALTHOUGH RAW DATA WAS AVAILABLE TO CORRECT US, WE DID NOT SEE IT IN THE FEW SECONDS AVAILABLE BEFORE WE REALIZED IT ANYWAY. THE MAP SHIFT WAS A SERIOUS COMPLICATION. IT HAD ALREADY POINTED THE ACFT TOWARDS THE SW BEFORE WE SAW IT. WITHOUT ALL THE CLRNC CHANGES, THE MAP SHIFT MORE THAN LIKELY WOULD HAVE BEEN CAUGHT MUCH MORE QUICKLY, IF NOT IMMEDIATELY. WITH PAST KNOWN MAP SHIFTS, I WOULD RECOMMEND THAT 1 PLT MONITOR THE ENTIRE ARR AND APCH, AS WE DO IN MEXICO CITY. NEVER LET ATC FURTHER COMPLICATE OR RUSH YOUR ARR/APCH. AND DOWNLOAD TO THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF AUTOMATION IMMEDIATELY WHEN NECESSARY. WITH MY 11 YRS EXPERIENCE IN GLASS COCKPITS, I REALLY THOUGHT THAT I WAS MORE IMMUNE TO THIS KIND OF THING HAPPENING TO ME THAN MOST. LET ME TELL YOU. CIRCUMSTANCES CAN CONSPIRE TO TRAP ANY UNSUSPECTING VICTIM.

  391.  
  392. Accession Number: 396392
    Synopsis: A G3 OVERSHOT THEIR ASSIGNED ALT WHEN THE AIR DATA COMPUTER FAILS TO RECOGNIZE THE ALT CAPTURE ALT AND DOES NOT LEVEL THE ACFT AT THE ALT ALERTER SETTING OF FL350. AN OPPOSITE DIRECTION MD80 GETS A TCASII TA.
    Narrative: GULFSTREAM ACFT WAS PROCEEDING WBOUND DIRECT TO FLYBY INTXN JUST W OF LVS VOR AT FL430 WHEN ZAB CLRED THEM TO DSND TO FL350. THE FO RESET THE ALT ALERT TO 35000 FT AND THE CAPT STARTED THE DSCNT ON AUTOPLT USING VERT SPD MODE AND APPROX 1500-1800 FPM RATE OF DSCNT SET ON THE SPZ-800 FLT DIRECTOR/AUTOPLT CTL. AS THE ACFT PASSED THROUGH FL360 THE FO CALLED OUT 1000 FT TO GO AND THE CAPT SLOWED THE RATE OF DSCNT SLIGHTLY. THE DSCNT PROCEEDED NORMALLY UNTIL APCHING FL350. AT 35100 FT THE FO CALLED OUT THAT THE AUTOPLT WAS NOT CAPTURING THE SELECTED ALT. THE CAPT IMMEDIATELY SELECTED ALT SELECT ON THE FLT GUIDANCE CTL PANEL BUT THE ACFT CONTINUED THROUGH THE ALT. THE AUTOPLT WAS THEN DISCONNECTED BY THE CAPT AND A PULL-UP MANEUVER EXECUTED. THE ACFT STARTED TO LEVEL AND REVERSE DIRECTION AS THE ALTIMETER INDICATED ABOUT 34700 FT AND WAS LEVEL AT 35000 FT APPROX 10 SECONDS LATER. I BELIEVE THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS INCIDENT TO BE THE POSSIBLE MALFUNCTION OF THE FLT DIRECTOR/AUTOPLT ALT HOLD FUNCTION AND THE CREW'S FAILURE TO REALIZE THAT THE AUTOPLT WAS NOT DOING ITS JOB UNTIL TOO LATE. ANOTHER FACTOR WAS THE CAPT HAD JUST COMPLETED 21 DAY INITIAL TRAINING ON AN ACFT WITH A VERY DIFFERENT FLT GUIDANCE CTLR (FMZ-8400). SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: 1) A VISIT TO ZAB WAS MADE THE NEXT DAY BY THE PLT. 2) ALL ACFT SYS INCLUDING THE ADC'S, ALTIMETERS, FLT DIRECTOR COMPUTERS AND AUTOPLT WERE CHKED BY THE AVIONICS SHOP IN ALBUQUERQUE THE NEXT DAY. TWO DISCREPANCIES WERE FOUND: A) THE #1 XPONDER COULD NOT BE SUPPLIED DATA FROM THE #2 ADC, AND B) ON ONE ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE ALT, THE #2 FLT DIRECTOR FAILED. 3) CREW PROCS ARE BEING CHANGED SO THAT IN ADDITION TO THE NORMAL CALLOUT AT 1000 FT ABOVE OR BELOW THE ASSIGNED ALT OR RESTR THE COPLT WILL ALSO STATE 'RATE OF DSCNT 1000 FPM OR LESS AND FLT DIRECTOR ARMED.' 4) THE NEW PROC WILL BE SENT TO FLT SAFETY TO BE INCORPORATED INTO OUR FLC SEMI-ANNUAL TRAINING PROGRAM. 5) A CREW MEETING HAS BEEN SCHEDULED TO INFORM ALL PLTS OF THE NEW PROC AND TO EXPLAIN FURTHER THE LIMITATIONS OF THE AUTOPLT SYS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 396174: IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THIS AN MD80 AIRLINER AT FL330 RPTED TO ATC THEY WERE RECEIVING A TA ALERT ON TCASII. AT THAT TIME WE WERE QUESTIONED BY ATC AND TOLD TO CALL CTR ON THE GND. FROM THAT POINT ON A NORMAL DSCNT AND LNDG WERE MADE. WE HAVE TWO TYPES OF ACFT WITH TWO DIFFERENT FLT GUIDANCE COMPUTERS. ONE DOES NOT REQUIRE ACTIVATION OF ALT SELECT TO CAPTURE THE PRESELECTED ALT. AFTER FLYING THIS ONE TYPE FOR A NUMBER OF TRIPS AND THEN SWITCHING ACFT, IT DOES TAKE A CONTINUOUS EFFORT TO MAKE SURE ALT SELECT IS SELECTED. RECOMMENDATIONS: THE PNF SHOULD CALL '1000 FT TO GO, ALT SELECT.'

  393.  
  394. Accession Number: 396730
    Synopsis: FLC OF MD88 ON DSCNT WITH FMS PROPERLY PROGRAMMED HAS ALTDEV WHEN AUTOPLT FAILS TO CAPTURE ALT. THEY IMMEDIATELY CLB BACK TO ASSIGNED ALT.
    Narrative: IN A DSCNT TO 11000 FT MSL AUTOPLT ON, VERT NAV/FMS IN OP, VNAV CAPTURE DISPLAYED ON THE FMA APCHING 11000 FT. ALT HOLD DISPLAYED ON THE FMA AT 11000 FT HOWEVER ACFT CONTINUED DSCNT. I ENGAGED VERT SPD TO BRING ACFT BACK UP AT APPROX 10850 FT. ACFT WENT AS LOW AS 10700 FT BEFORE CLBING BACK UP TO 11000 FT MSL.

  395.  
  396. Accession Number: 397100
    Synopsis: MLG ACFT WITH XING ALT RESTR IN DSCNT WAS HIGH ON PROFILE AND WAS NOT CAPTURED BY FMC. FLC REQUESTED AND RECEIVED A 360 DEG TURN TO LOSE ALT IN ORDER TO MAKE RESTR.
    Narrative: WE WERE CLRED TO CROSS PLSNT INTXN (PXR 321 DEG RADIAL 35 DME) AT 12000 FT AND 280 KTS. THE ACFT WAS IN VNAV AND APPEARED TO BE GRADUALLY DSNDING TO 12000 FT WHILE INTERCEPTING THE DSCNT PROFILE. APPARENTLY IT MISSED THE PROFILE AND WE WERE WAY HIGH AND FAST. WE WERE ABLE TO GET A 360 DEG AND DSCNT TO THE FIX FROM ZAB PRIOR TO HDOF. HAD WE BEEN ABLE TO GET UNDER THE PROFILE AND NOT TRY TO INTERCEPT IT FROM ABOVE, THE FLT PATH WOULD HAVE BEEN CAPTURED MORE EASILY. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS INCLUDE MY GETTING THE ATIS AND TROUBLESHOOTING SOME MINOR UNRELATED ELECTRICAL MALFUNCTIONS. I COULD HAVE QUERIED THE CAPT AS TO WHAT EXACTLY HE WANTED THE AIRPLANE TO DO. AS IT WAS, IT INITIALLY APPEARED THAT WE WERE GOING TO MAKE THE RESTR WITHOUT A PROB.

  397.  
  398. Accession Number: 397578
    Synopsis: B757 ACFT IN CLB AT 34000 FT EXPERIENCED SEVERE PITCH OSCILLATIONS RESULTING IN EXCESSIVE G LOADS AND INJURIES. RPTR CAPT ATTRIBUTES THE UPSET TO FAULTY ELEVATOR INPUTS, POSSIBLY THE PCU (PWR CTL UNIT). NO INDICATIONS ON THE EICAS (ENG INDICATION AND CREW ALERTING SYS).
    Narrative: WHILE CLBING FROM FL310 TO FL350, WT OF ACFT APPROX 214000 LBS, ACFT STARTED TO DSND AT FL340. ACFT ON AUTOPLT AT TIME. RATE OF DSCNT INCREASED RAPIDLY. AUTOPLT TURNED OFF AND ACFT FLOWN MANUALLY. SPD OF ACFT AT THE TIME WAS MACH .790 PER ATC. SEVERE PITCH OSCILLATIONS SOON FOLLOWED IN DSCNT. ACFT AT TIMES UNCONTROLLABLE. SPD RANGED FROM 340 KTS TO 230 KTS. ACFT SHOOK VIOLENTLY WHILE PITCHING UP AND DOWN. AFTER BRIEFLY STABILIZING THE ACFT FOR A FEW MINS IN FL240 RANGE, OSCILLATIONS AND VIOLENT PITCHING UP AND DOWN RESUMED. ONLY PITCH AXIS WAS AFFECTED. ROLL AND LATERAL CTL NORMAL AT ALL TIMES THROUGHOUT FLT. DURING 20 MINS FROM ONSET TO TOUCHDOWN IN SRQ, AT LEAST 4 SETS OF SEVERE OSCILLATIONS AND TURB OCCURRED, EVEN AS LOW AS 11000 FT AND 270 KTS. SEVERE UP AND DOWN PITCHING LASTED SEVERAL MINS THROUGHOUT EACH EPISODE OF UNCONTROLLABLE FLT. FLT ATTENDANTS IN AFT GALLEY REMARKED THAT THE NOISE FROM ACFT SHAKING WAS DEAFENING. FOOD AND BEVERAGE CARTS SHOOK SO HARD THAT THEY CAME LOOSE FROM THEIR STATIONS. CHK AIRMAN DEADHEADING IN FIRST CLASS NOTED A SEVERE FLUTTER FELT THROUGHOUT DURATION. NO STALL WARNING, STICK SHAKER, OR OVERSPD ANNOUNCEMENTS OCCURRED. ENGS NORMAL IN ALL PWR RANGES. MAJORITY OF TIME FLT IN VMC CONDITIONS. ACFT SHOOK SO VIOLENTLY BOTH PLTS LOST HEADSETS AND CAPT'S SUNGLASSES CAME OFF. AT LOWER AIRSPD AND ON APCH ACFT FLEW NORMALLY. LNDG UNEVENTFUL. SUSPECT A POSSIBLE PROB WITH ACFT PITCH MODE FLT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR CAPT WAS VERY FRUSTRATED THAT NEITHER HIS COMPANY NOR BOEING ARE TAKING THE EVENT AS SERIOUSLY AS WARRANTED. THEY DO HAVE AN ONGOING INVESTIGATION AND BOEING IS SUPPOSED TO RELEASE THEIR CONCLUSIONS SHORTLY. INCLUDED IN BOEING'S INVESTIGATION IS A CLR AIR TURB/ACFT POS MODEL BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE THE UPSET WAS CAUSED BY TURB. THE CAPT, WHILE AGREEING THEY ENCOUNTERED SEVERE TURB, BELIEVES THE MAIN CAUSE WAS ELEVATOR MALFUNCTION. THE DFDR SHOWED A 5 UNIT SPLIT AT THE WORST OSCILLATION SHOWING THAT THE ELEVATORS WERE NOT IN SYNC. RPTR SUSPECTS THE ELEVATOR PCU (PWR CTL UNIT) WHICH, IF MALFUNCTIONING MAY BE DUE TO ONE OR MORE VALVES STUCK IN POS. A DEADHEADING CHK AIRMAN SAID THE ACFT WAS 'FLUTTERING' DURING THE UPSET. CAPT HAD CUTS ON HIS LEGS WHICH HE SUSPECTS WERE CAUSED BY TUCKING HIS LEGS BACK UNDER THE SEAT TRYING TO REMAIN IN HIS SEAT DURING THE OSCILLATIONS. AN EMER WAS DECLARED AND THE GND FIRE CREW MET THE AIRPLANE AFTER LNDG. 4 PAX WERE TAKEN TO THE HOSPITAL AND ALL THE FLT ATTENDANTS COMPLAINED OF INJURIES. AS FAR AS RPTR KNOWS NONE OF THE INJURIES WERE SERIOUS. 1 MALE PAX WAS SO TRAUMATIZED HE COULDN'T GET OUT OF HIS SEAT TO DEPLANE AT THE GATE. THE WX WAS VMC THROUGHOUT. WHEN THE FLC DSNDED TO A LOWER ALT AND SLOWED THE ACFT IT BECAME CONTROLLABLE AND OPERATED NORMALLY. RPTR SAYS THE SPD WAS A FACTOR WHICH, WITH UNCOMMANDED ELEVATOR MOVEMENT, WOULD MAKE SENSE -- THE FASTER THE SPD THE GREATER THE PITCH.

  399.  
  400. Accession Number: 397595
    Synopsis: B757 ACFT ON DSCNT AND APCH TO LAX HAD MAP SHIFT. ACFT WENT INTO 10 DEG BANK AT THE SHIFT, FLC DISCONNECTED AUTOPLT AND FLEW REMAINING APCH USING RAW DATA.
    Narrative: ON CIVET 3 NOTICED ACFT DRIFTING R OF LOC AT ARNES. AT SUZZI ACFT WENT INTO 10 DEG BANK AND SAW MAP SHIFT ON SCREEN. DISCONNECTED AUTOPLT AND TURNED L TO INTERCEPT TO LOC. WE WERE 1 DOT R AT SUZZI. BOTH VORS WERE TUNED TO MANUAL 113.6 AND 115.7 ILS TUNED TO 109.9. CLRED FOR APCH AT FUELR. FLEW REST OF APCH IN EXPANDED ILS WITH LARGE MAP SHIFT. THIS MAKES FOR A VERY CRAZY APCH. AFTER CORRECTING BACK, COMPLETION OF APCH WAS ON RAW DATA.

  401.  
  402. Accession Number: 397720
    Synopsis: FLC OF A BAE146 LANDED WITHOUT CONTACTING TWR FOR CLRNC. THEY NOTICED THEIR ERROR WHEN AFTER LNDG ATTEMPTING TO OBTAIN TAXI INSTRUCTIONS AND DISCOVERED THAT THEY WERE STILL ON APCH CTL FREQ.
    Narrative: CLRED FOR VISUAL APCH IN DES MOINES, FOR RWY 31R. AUTOPLT FLEW THROUGH FINAL APCH COURSE, EVEN THOUGH IT SHOWED IT HAD CAPTURED THE LOC. CAPT AND I WERE TRYING TO FIGURE OUT WHAT AND WHY THE AUTOPLT HAD DONE WHAT IT DID. AS APCH WAS CLRING US FOR THE VISUAL APCH WE WERE NOT SURE IF THEY HAD TOLD US TO CONTACT THE TWR OR NOT. EITHER WAY AFTER WE LANDED I REALIZED WE WERE STILL ON APCH FREQ. I IMMEDIATELY SWITCHED FREQ AND TWR SAID 'CLRED TO YOUR GATE WITH ME.' NO FURTHER MENTION WAS MADE AS TO WHY WE DID NOT REPLY WHEN HE CLRED US TO LAND OR IF HE DID CLR US TO LAND. WE ASSUMED HE DID CLR US TO LAND BECAUSE NOTHING MORE WAS SAID. ON APCH IN DSM WE WERE FOLLOWING A CPR JET THAT WAS 5-10 MI AHEAD AND WAS WELL CLR BY THE TIME WE LANDED. NO OTHER PLANES WERE WAITING FOR TKOF OR CONFLICTS IN THE AREA EXISTED. THE CAPT AND I WERE DISTRACTED BY THE AUTOPLT AND WHEN WE DECIDED TO FORGET ABOUT IT AND CONCENTRATE ON THE JOB AT HAND (CHKLISTS, SETTING AND CALLING SPDS) WE HAD FORGOTTEN TO SWITCH FREQS. I WAS PNF ON REDUCED REST OVERNIGHT PREVIOUSLY WITH APPROX 5 HRS SLEEP. FATIGUE MAY HAVE BEEN A FACTOR IN MY ALERTNESS. APCH DID NOT QUERY TO SEE IF WE WERE STILL ON FREQ.

  403.  
  404. Accession Number: 397840
    Synopsis: AN S80 FLC EXPERIENCES AN ALTDEV WHEN THEIR ALT HOLD ON THE AUTOPLT DOES NOT MAINTAIN THE CLBED TO ALT.
    Narrative: LOCATION: ORD 030 DEG RADIAL, 30 DME. FO HAND FLYING WITH PERFORMANCE ENGAGED, LEVELED OFF AT 13000 FT AND ENGAGED AUTOPLT. ACFT CONTINUED TO CLB TO 13300 FT. IMMEDIATELY RECOVERED TO 13000 FT. ORD DEP NOTED THE DEV AS WE WERE RETURNING TO 13000 FT. HE RPTED THERE WAS NO CONFLICT.

  405.  
  406. Accession Number: 397919
    Synopsis: AN ACR B757 FLC HAS THEIR ACFT TURN OFF COURSE DURING AN ILS APCH TO RWY 25L AT LAX. THE FLC RECOGNIZED THE DEV AND CORRECTED. LATER, THE FLC FOUND THAT THERE HAD BEEN A CHANGE IN THE APCH DIRECTION AND ALTHOUGH THE NEW ILS WAS OPERATING, APPARENTLY SO WAS THE OLD XMITTER.
    Narrative: IN CLOUDS WITH AUTOPLT ENGAGED AND TRACKING RWY 25L LOC IN LNAV. ALL IS WELL, BUT GAATE APCH FIX IS NOT IN FMS, SO FO SELECTS ILS MODE ON EHSI FOR ILS DME. ABOUT 2 NM LATER, ACFT BEGINS A R TURN AWAY FROM LOC (TOWARD OTHER RWYS AND ACFT). AS PF, I SWITCH TO HDG SELECT MODE OF AUTOPLT AND CORRECT BACK. WHILE ON COURSE, MAP SHOWS AN INCREASING TRACK DEV AWAY FROM COURSE. AT FAF (BASED ON DME), THE MAP/FMC SHOWS US DEVIATING 10 DEGS OFF COURSE AND STILL 3 MI TO GO. STOPPED ON GND ON TXWY M BTWN RWYS 25L&R, MAP/FMC SHOWS US 1.3 NM OUT ON FINAL, -3036 FT ON VNAV PATH, AND A GND SPD OF 20 KTS. AT GATE XX, LAST FMS POS IS 3 MINS OFF IN LONGITUDE FROM COMMERCIAL CHART COORDINATES. PER NORMAL OP, FMC FINALLY DROPPED OUT OF NAV MODE AWAITING NEW RTE. ALL OPS NORMAL ON RETURN FLT TO PHX. FOR SOME REASON, THIS ACFT FMS RADIO UPDATED AWAY FROM COURSE AT A CRITICAL POINT IN OUR FLT. THE ONLY 'ALERT' OF THIS MALFUNCTION WAS OUR SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR WAS FLYING A B757-200 WHEN IT TURNED OFF OF THE ILS COURSE. HE MADE AN ENTRY IN THE MAINT LOG CONCERNING AN FMS ERROR, BUT THE MAINT PERSONNEL WERE UNABLE TO DUPLICATE THE INCIDENT. HIS CHIEF PLT LATER INFORMED HIM, ACCORDING TO THE RPTR, THAT THE LAX CTLRS HAD ADMITTED THAT BOTH THE RWY 25L AND THE RWY 7R ILS XMITTERS WERE OPERATING AT THE SAME TIME AND THEREFORE THE FMS PROBABLY UPDATED BY USING THE DME AND LOC SIGNAL FROM THE NEAREST XMITTER, THAT OF RWY 7R. THE CAPT SAID THAT HIS COMPANY'S STANDARD PRACTICE IS TO HAVE BOTH PLTS SELECT MAP MODE FOR THE APCH. THIS PREVENTS THE FMS FROM UPDATING ITS POS. REQUIRING THE PNF TO TUNE THE ILS FREQ AND TRACK IT IN THE ILS MODE ALLOWS THE FMS TO USE AUTOMATIC TUNING TO VORS IN THE AREA WHILE TRACKING THE ILS'S RAW DATA. THE OTHER NAVAID'S DATA THEN CONTINUOUSLY UPDATES THE FMS'S POS. THE CHIEF PLT, ALLEGEDLY TOLD THE CAPT THAT THE COMPANY'S APCH POLICY WAS UNDER REVIEW.

  407.  
  408. Accession Number: 398020
    Synopsis: AN EMB-145 FLC OVERSHOT THEIR ALT WHEN THEY WERE UNAWARE THAT THE AUTOPLT HAD DISCONNECTED AND FAILED TO LEVEL THE ACFT AT 14000 FT. THE AUTOPLT DESIGN WAS CRITICIZED FOR NOT HAVING A WARNING SYS ALERT WHEN DISCONNECT OCCURS OVER 2500 FT AGL. BOTH PLTS WERE FILLING OUT CUSTOMS FORMS IN DSCNT.
    Narrative: WE WERE FLYING FROM HALIFAX, NOVA SCOTIA (YHZ), TO NEWARK (EWR) ON A STAR AND GIVEN A DSCNT CLRNC TO 14000 FT. I'M NOT SURE TODAY IF THIS WAS THE ALT ATC GAVE US, BUT IT WAS AN EVEN MIDDLE-TEEN ALT AND I WAS SURE OF THE ALT ON THE DAY OF THIS INCIDENT -- THAT WAS NOT THE ISSUE. WHILE DSNDING ROUTINELY, IT WAS THE FO'S LEG AND I WAS FILLING OUT OUR CREW DECLARATION CUSTOMS FORM. I NOTICED THAT MY FO WAS ALSO FILLING OUT HER CUSTOMS FORM, SO I WOULD OCCASIONALLY LOOK UP TO MONITOR OUR FLT SIT. THE AUTOPLT WAS ON AND DSNDING INITIALLY, BUT HAD SOMEHOW DISENGAGED WITHOUT US KNOWING WHY. THE AUTOPLT AURAL WARNING ANNOUNCING DISENGAGEMENT ONLY OCCURS BELOW 2500 FT AGL AND NOT AT ANY OTHER ALTS ABOVE THAT. I HAVE ALREADY EXPERIENCED SEVERAL UNANNOUNCED AND UNKNOWN DISENGAGEMENTS OF THE AUTOPLT DURING CLBS, CRUISE, AND DSCNTS AND CAUGHT THEM DURING NORMAL MONITORING OF THE AUTOPLT WHILE IT WAS FLYING. BECAUSE OUR DSCNT WAS SHALLOW AND BECAUSE WE WERE BOTH FILLING OUT OUR CUSTOMS FORMS, NO ONE NOTICED WE HAD DSNDED THROUGH OUR ASSIGNED ALT UNTIL WE WERE 500 FT BELOW IT. MY FO CORRECTED PROMPTLY AND NO TFC WAS ON TCASII. BEING A SATURDAY, IT WAS A LIGHT TFC DAY ON THE ATC FREQ. ZBW DIDN'T MENTION THE ALTDEV. I STILL DON'T KNOW WHY THE AUTOPLT DISENGAGED. I'M CONCERNED THAT THIS PRIMUS 1000 DOES NOT ANNOUNCE DISENGAGEMENT ABOVE 2500 FT. I HAVE TALKED TO SEVERAL CREW MEMBERS WHO HAVE EXPERIENCED SIMILAR UNEXPLAINED DISENGAGEMENTS. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL PAY CLOSER ATTN TO MONITORING THE AUTOPLT SO THAT A DEV DOES NOT OCCUR IN THE FUTURE AS A RESULT OF AN UNEXPLAINED AND UNANNOUNCED DISENGAGEMENT AND SUPERVISE MY FO'S MORE CLOSELY DURING AUTOFLT. A SIMPLE CHANGE IN THE PRIMUS 1000 SOFTWARE WOULD PROBABLY SOLVE THIS ANNOUNCEMENT PROB. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR INDICATED THAT HE HAS HAD ANOTHER DISCONNECT INCIDENT SINCE HIS INITIAL RPT ON THE EMB145 AUTOPLT PROB. THE COMPANY HAS BEEN INFORMED OF THE INADEQUATE WARNING SYS AND HE IS INTENDING TO INFORM HIS AIRLINE UNION SAFETY COMMITTEE. THE ONLY WARNING THAT THE CREW RECEIVES FROM AN AUTOPLT DISCONNECT INFLT ABOVE 2500 FT IS WHEN THE LITTLE LIGHT GOES OUT IN THE CORNER QUADRANT OF THE AUTOPLT 'PUSH TO ENGAGE' BUTTON. ONE MUST BE VERY ALERT TO THIS LIGHT BEING LIT AND IT IS DIFFICULT AT BEST TO NOTE ANY CHANGE IN THE STATUS OF THE AUTOPLT.

  409.  
  410. Accession Number: 398257
    Synopsis: FLC OF AN EMBRAER BRASILIA EMB120 OVERSHOT ALT ON DSCNT TO A CRUISE ALT 1000 FT LOWER DUE TO NOT NOTICING THAT THE AUTOPLT WAS NOT LEVELING OFF THE ACFT AND THE ALT ALERTER DID NOT GIVE NORMAL WARNING.
    Narrative: WE WERE IN CRUISE FLT AT FL210 AND GIVEN A CLRNC TO DSND TO FL200. WE BEGAN OUR DSCNT AT ABOUT 700 FPM WITH THE AUTOPLT ENGAGED. THE ALT ALERTER WAS SET FOR FL200, HOWEVER, THE AUTOPLT DID NOT LEVEL OFF AT FL200. ALSO, THE ALT ALERTER NEVER ALERTED US THAT THE AUTOPLT DID NOT CAPTURE ALT. RECOGNIZING THE PROB, WE DISENGAGED THE AUTOPLT TO LEVEL AT FL190. THE CTLR QUESTIONED US ABOUT OUR ALT. WE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT WE WERE ASSIGNED FL200. THE CTLR ADVISED US TO CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN FL190, AND HE IMPLIED THAT IT WAS 'NO PROB.'

  411.  
  412. Accession Number: 398620
    Synopsis: AN ACR B767 FLC EXPERIENCED A MAP SHIFT AND BEGAN TO USE MANUAL CTL OF THE ACFT WITH REF TO THE APCH RAW DATA INFO. HOWEVER, THEY DID NOT REALIZE THAT THE DESIGNATED ALTS AT THE XING POINTS DO NOT NECESSARILY COINCIDE WITH THE GS ALTS AT EACH POINT. THE FLT PATH WAS AS MUCH AS 200 FT LOW AT SOME OF THE XING POINTS.
    Narrative: ON APCH TO LAX FOR RWY 25L ILS, THERE WAS A MAP SHIFT WHICH MOVED THE TRACK LINE ABOUT 1 MI R OF COURSE. THIS HAPPENED AT APPROX 10000 FT PASSING ARNES INTXN, AND JUST BEFORE CHANGING FROM LNAV TO LOC MODE FOR NAV TRACKING. I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT WHEN THE ACFT STARTED TURNING TO THE DISPLACED TRACK LINE, ENGAGED LOC MODE AND ATTEMPTED TO USE THE FLT DIRECTOR TO INTERCEPT THE INBOUND ILS TRACK. THE FLT DIRECTOR DID NOT PROVIDE PROPER GUIDANCE AND SO I FLEW RAW DATA TO GET BACK ON CTRLINE. THIS OCCURRED IN THE VICINITY OF SEVERAL XING FIXES ON THE APCH, NAMELY SUZZI, GAATE, ETC. AS A RESULT OF DISTR, 1 OR MORE OF THOSE FIXES WERE CROSSED APPROX 200 FT BELOW THE PUBLISHED XING ALTS. THERE WAS NO KNOWN TFC CONFLICT. WHEN ESTABLISHED ON THE LOC, THE FLT DIRECTOR BEGAN TO PERFORM NORMALLY AND THE TRACK LINE SLOWLY MOVED BACK TO A POS CO-INCIDENT WITH THE LOC CTRLINE, BUT THE INDICATED TRACK ON BOTH HSI'S WAS OFF ABOUT 15 DEGS FROM ACTUAL TRACK. ON TOUCHDOWN, THE HSI TRACK SLEWED TO INBOUND COURSE. THE SYS MALFUNCTION WAS WRITTEN UP IN THE ACFT LOGBOOK AND COMPANY MGMNT WAS VERBALLY DEBRIEFED REGARDING THE TRACK SHIFT AND THE MAP SHIFT. THE REASON FOR THE MALFUNCTION IS NOT KNOWN AT THIS TIME. THE SIT WAS EXACERBATED BY THE COMPLEXITY OF THE APCH (LARGE NUMBER OF STEPDOWN FIXES AND NEED TO VERIFY DME DISTANCE OF EACH), ATC SPD RESTR AND COM WITH ATC WHICH WAS RELATIVE TO TFC ON THE RWY 24R VISUAL APCH. IT IS A HIGH WORKLOAD APCH BECAUSE OF THE COMPLEXITY. A LESSER NUMBER OF STEPDOWN FIXES OR ABILITY TO USE GS FURTHER FROM RWY COULD HELP IMPROVE THE APCH. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR SAID THAT HE HAD CALLED HIS COMPANY MAINT PERSONNEL TO DISCOVER THE CAUSE OF THE MAP SHIFT AND OTHER PROBS WITH THE FMC, BUT THEY HAD NOT RESPONDED YET. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD CALL ASRS WITH THE INFO WHEN IT WAS AVAILABLE.

  413.  
  414. Accession Number: 398621
    Synopsis: A B747-400 MAKING AN APCH INTO JFK LOSES THE L FMC WHICH FAILS ALL THE ILS INSTS. THE ACFT EXECUTES A MISSED APCH BECAUSE OF THE LOW WX AND JFK AND DIVERTS TO EWR.
    Narrative: ACR FLT XX APR/XA/98. DURING THE INITIAL APCH PHASE TO RWY 31R AT JFK AT 4000 FT, EXPERIENCED INTERMITTENT FAILURE OF BOTH FMC'S AND SUBSEQUENT INTERMITTENT VHF FAILURE (PARTIAL). AT THIS POINT, WE DISCONTINUED THE APCH, CLBED TO 8000 FT MSL AND HELD APPROX 20 MI NE, SE OF JFK TO RATIFY SIT. UPON HEARING FROM THE CABIN CHIEF PURSER ABOUT AN ODOR OF BURNING WIRES IN THE AFT CABIN, WE DISCONTINUED HOLDING AND PROCEEDED TO EWR FOR AN UNEVENTFUL APCH AND LNDG IN VISUAL CONDITIONS. THE FLC DETERMINED THAT ELECTRICAL EQUIP FAILURE WAS DUE IN PART TO A MALFUNCTION IN THE ELECTRICAL EQUIP COOLING SYS. I DO NOT RECALL THE CAPT DECLARING AN EMER, BUT ATC DID PROVIDE PRIORITY HANDLING FOR OUR APCH AND LNDG AT EWR. MY PRIMARY ROLE DURING THIS INCIDENT WAS IN MAINTAINING CONTACT WITH MAINT TO TRY AND FIND A CAUSE FOR THE ACFT'S PROBS. I ALSO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATING OUR DIVERSION FOR LNDG AT EWR INSTEAD OF JFK. THIS WAS DONE THROUGH COMPANY COMS. I ALSO KEPT THE PAX AWARE OF OUR SIT THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE EPISODE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT IT IS NOW KNOWN THAT THERE WAS A FAILURE OF THE L FMC. IT IS FELT THAT THE FAILURE WAS INTERMITTENT WHICH WOULD EXPLAIN WHY THE FLC NEVER RECEIVED AN EICAS WARNING. WHEN A FLT ATTENDANT RPTED THE SMELL OF HOT BURNING WIRES ANOTHER RELIEF FLT OFFICER WENT TO THE BACK TO INVESTIGATE, BUT HE COULD NOT DETECT ANY BURNING WIRE ODOR. THE COOLING FAN WAS ALSO OPERATING ON AN INTERMITTENT BASIS AS WAS DETERMINED LATER. WITH THE LOSS OF THE FMC, THEY COULD NOT KEEP THE ILS AVAILABLE FOR THE APCH. SINCE THE FLC COULD VISUALLY IDENT EWR THEY MADE A DECISION TO GO TO THAT VFR ARPT. FLC AND MAINT PERSONNEL DETERMINED TOGETHER THAT BECAUSE THE FMC WAS INTERMITTENT IT WOULD BE REPLACED. HOWEVER, AS THE ACFT WAS FERRIED BACK TO JFK BY ANOTHER FLC, THE FMC FAILED AGAIN. IT WAS FELT THAT A COOLING FAN THAT WAS FAILING SPORADICALLY PLAYED A PART IN THE FMC FAILING BECAUSE OF INADEQUATE COOLING. THAT WAS ANOTHER FAILURE THAT WAS NEVER DISPLAYED ON THE EICAS PANEL. THE ACFT TYPE WAS A B747- 400. THE ACFT MANUFACTURER AND ACR MAINT ARE WORKING ON WHY THE FAILURE WAS NEVER ANNUNCIATED ON THE EICAS SCREEN. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 398505: THE UPPER EICAS DISPLAYED 'AUTOTHROTTLE DISCONNECT' AND 'FMC MESSAGE.' THE L AND R CDU'S WERE BLINKING 'RESYNCHING' AND THE 'MAP FAIL' AND 'VTK' WARNINGS WERE ON THE NAV DISPLAYS. THE L 'ND' RESTORED ABOUT 30 SECONDS LATER AND I SAID 'I GOT THE MAP BACK.' ONE MIN OR SO LATER, IT FAILED AGAIN WITH THE 'RESYNCHING' MESSAGE ON THE CDU'S. JFK MAINT WAS CONTACTED AND WE WERE GIVEN SOME GUIDANCE THAT POSSIBLY WE HAD A MAJOR ELECTRICAL OVERLOAD AND THEY SUGGESTED TURNING 'OFF' THE UTILITY BUS SWITCHES TO LOWER THE ELECTRICAL LOAD. THIS WAS DONE AND IMMEDIATELY THE UPPER EICAS FILLED WITH MESSAGES ABOUT SYS THAT WERE NOW UNPWRED, AND THE 'AUTOTHROTTLE' AND 'FMS MESSAGES' WERE STILL AT THE TOP OF THE PAGE. WE CONTINUED IN THAT CONFIGN FOR A FEW MORE MINS UNTIL ONE OF THE EICAS MESSAGES CAME UP 'EQUIP COOLING.' THE PNF FO'S REMARKED 'FINALLY THERE'S SOMETHING I HAVE A PROC FOR.' THE L CDU WOULD ACCEPT NOTHING. I MOMENTARILY SELECTED THE 'NAV SELECTOR' TO 'CDU-L' TO TRY TO HARD TUNE THE L ILS AND THE CDU WENT BLANK. ABOUT 4 MI OUT ON FINAL, THE FO'S WERE ABLE TO GET THE ILS ON THE RADIO RAW DATA DISPLAYS AND THE ILS WAS USED FOR GUIDANCE. THE APPROX TIME FROM INITIAL PROB TO LNDG AT EWR WAS ABOUT 25 MINS. THE 'MASTER FMC' WAS NOT TRIED BECAUSE BOTH FMC'S APPEARED TO HAVE PROBS -- BUT NO EICAS MESSAGE EVER SAID 'FMC FAILURE.' THIS WAS ALL AT THE END OF A 12 HR FLT! FATIGUE CERTAINLY DIDN'T HELP! SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 399265: NAV INFO FROM FMC'S NIL TO UNRELIABLE.

  415.  
  416. Accession Number: 399607
    Synopsis: AUTOFLT SYSTEM ALT SET CHANGED FROM FL330 TO FL340 BY ITSELF. FO NOTICED DEVIATION AT FL334. EXCURSION CORRECTED BY FL337 USING MANUAL CTL.
    Narrative: CAPT JUST FINISHED AN ENGINE HEALTH CHECK (AUTOPLT IN BASIC ALT HOLD MODE) AND HAD REENGAGED THE AUTOMATED PMS ALT HOLD MODE AT FL330. SOON THEREAFTER, I NOTICED ACFT WAS CLBING THROUGH FL334 AND ALERTED THE CAPT. USING BASIC AUTOPLT, HE STOPPED THE CLB BY FL337 AND DSNDED PROMPTLY AFTER TOTALLY DISCONNECTING THE AUTOPLT. I ALSO NOTICED THAT THE DIGITAL ALT WINDOW READOUT READ FL340. AS THE PMS WAS IN THE CRUISE MODE, AN INADVERTENT CHANGING OF THE DIGITAL ALT LEVEL WOULD NOT NORMALLY CAUSE ANY CHANGE IN ALT, A CLB OR DSCNT MODE MUST FIRST BE ENGAGED. LIKEWISE, AN INADVERTENT ACTIVATION OF THE VERTICAL SPEED WHEEL (BASIC AUTOPLT) WOULD NOT CAUSE THE DIGITAL ALT WINDOW TO READ FL340. THEREFORE TWO SEPARATE INADVERTENT ACTS WOULD HAVE BEEN NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THIS EFFECT WITHOUT A MALFUNCTION OF THE PMS. THEREFORE IT IS MY BELIEF THAT A MOMENTARY PMS MALFUNCTION CAUSED THE DIGITAL DISCREPANCY AND RESULTED IN THE SHORT DURATION ALT DEV DESCRIBED.

  417.  
  418. Accession Number: 401142
    Synopsis: AN ACR B757 FLC EXPERIENCES A MAP SHIFT THAT WAS APPARENTLY CAUSED WHEN THE IRS SYS WERE NOT ALLOWED TO UPDATE THEMSELVES DUE TO FLC MISOP OF THE NAV RADIOS.
    Narrative: ON THE PDZ2 ARR IN THE VICINITY OF THE ARNES INTXN WE EXPERIENCED A MAP SHIFT ON THE FO'S FMC. CAPT WAS IN EXPANDED ILS AND THE FO WAS IN AUTO MODE. FO SWITCHED TO MANUAL MODE AND DEV TO ASSIGNED CLRNC OCCURRED. CALLED DISPATCH DESK IMMEDIATELY AFTER ARR AND TOLD DISPATCHER OF THE ABOVE. CAPT WAS TUNED TO LAX RWY 25L LOC. NO REF ON THE FO'S RECEIVER AT TIME OF SHIFT.

  419.  
  420. Accession Number: 401193
    Synopsis: FO OF A B737-400 ALLOWED THE ACFT TO ASCEND ABOVE ASSIGNED ALT WHEN SLOWING THE ACFT FOR DSCNT DUE MISPROGRAMMING THE FMC AUTO HOLD BEFORE IT WAS TIME FOR THEIR DSCNT.
    Narrative: ZSE WAS SLOWING US DOWN AND GIVING US VECTORS FOR SPACING INTO SEATTLE. APPROX 40 MI FROM TOP OF DSCNT, WE WERE CLRED, PLT'S DISCRETION, TO FL240, WHICH WE SET IN THE ALT ALERTER. THE FO WAS PF AND RESPONDED TO ATC AS I WAS OFF FREQ TO GET ATIS. A FLT ATTENDANT CAME UP AT THAT TIME TO TAKE AWAY OUR MEAL TRAYS AND REMIND US THAT A MEDICAL OXYGEN BOTTLE WAS NEEDED IN SEATTLE ON LNDG. WHEN I TURNED FORWARD, I NOTICED THAT WE WERE TURNING BACK TO BTG PER ATC INSTRUCTIONS, BUT THE AUTOPLT WAS IN CTL WHEEL STEERING PITCH MODE. A QUICK GLANCE AT THE ALT SHOWED THAT WE WERE CLBING AND PASSING FL316. (ASSIGNED ALT WAS FL310.) I GRABBED THE CTLS AND GENTLY PUSHED THE ELEVATOR OVER TO GET US BACK TO FL310. OUR ALTIMETER SHOWED WE GOT TO FL318 BEFORE WE STARTED BACK DOWN. NO ALT ALERTER WENT OFF BECAUSE WE HAD FL240 IN THE MCP. I AM NOT SURE HOW THE ACFT GOT INTO CTL WHEEL STEERING PITCH MODE, BUT THE LACK OF ANY BELLS, MY ATTN DIVERTED TO THE FLT ATTENDANT, BUSY ATC INSTRUCTIONS, AND THE FO NOT NOTICING WHAT MODE THE AIRPLANE HAD DOWNGRADED TO, CAUSED US TO BUST OUR ALT.

  421.  
  422. Accession Number: 402210
    Synopsis: MDT ACFT IN CRUISE WAS CLRED DIRECT AN INTXN. RPTR CAPT INSERTED IT INTO THE FMS, BUT IT DIDN'T CHANGE TO 'ACTIVE.' CTLR AGAIN CALLED TO GO DIRECT AND THE RPTR WAS ABLE TO INSERT IT CORRECTLY.
    Narrative: AFTER MULTIPLE VECTORS WE WERE CLRED DIRECT TARNE INTXN. I BROUGHT TARNE UP ON THE FMS, HOWEVER, IT FAILED TO CHANGE TO THE 'ACTIVE' COLOR. THE CTLR ONCE AGAIN GAVE US A HDG DIRECT TARNE. I RE-INITIALIZED TARNE ON THE FMS AND IT TOOK UP THE CORRECT COURSE.

  423.  
  424. Accession Number: 402440
    Synopsis: FLC OF A B737-400 FAILED TO CROSS ALT FIX AT ASSIGNED ALT RESULTING IN ATC INTERVENTION TO REMIND RPTR THAT THE FIX HAD BEEN OVERSHOT. ATC AMENDED CLRNC FOR OTHER ALT XING FIXES.
    Narrative: CRUISING AT FL240, ATC ISSUED 'CROSS 15 MI S OF DNY AT FL190.' I READ BACK CLRNC. FO (PF) ENTERED XING RESTR IN FMC. A FEW MINS AFTER THAT, FO MADE PA TO PAX. AS HE STARTED PA I WENT TO DSCNT PAGE ON FMC. I NOTICED WE STILL HAD 24 MI UNTIL TOP OF DSCNT. ALL I LOOKED AT WAS JUST THAT, AND NOT TOP OF DSCNT FOR 15 MI S OF DNY. TURNS OUT 24000 FT UNTIL TOP OF DSCNT WAS FOR NEXT WAYPOINT DOWN THE ROAD. JUST ABOUT THE TIME WE REALIZED THE PROB, ATC INQUIRED WHEN WE WOULD BEGIN OUR DSCNT. I REPLIED 'NOT FOR A LITTLE WHILE YET.' I WAS STILL THINKING WE HAD A FEW MORE MI YET. HOWEVER, AN INQUIRY FROM ATC ABOUT YOUR ALT USUALLY SENDS A JOLT OF ADRENALINE AND WE BOTH CHKED OUR DISTANCE FROM DNY. TO OUR SHOCK, WE WERE ABOUT 20 MI S, ALREADY PAST THE XING RESTR, AND STILL AT FL240. ATC THEN ISSUED THE FOLLOWING, 'JUST CROSS LHY AT 12000 FT.' NOTHING FURTHER WAS SAID ABOUT IT BTWN ATC AND US. AFTER REFLECTING ON THE INCIDENT, THE FO AND I THOUGHT THE ONLY POSSIBLE SCENARIO WAS THE FMC DUMPED THE DATA BECAUSE IT WAS ENTERED PROPERLY, VNAV WAS ENGAGED, AND IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE DATA WAS LOST BECAUSE IT COULDN'T 'MAKE' THE DSCNT. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THIS HAS EVER HAPPENED TO ME AND OTHER THAN THE FACT I SHOULD HAVE MONITORED BETTER, I HAVE NEVER SEEN AN FMS DO THAT. NOW I MONITOR BETTER AND CHK IT AGAIN BEFORE ALLOWING AND TRUSTING A COMPUTER TO DO IT.

  425.  
  426. Accession Number: 402690
    Synopsis: A DSNDING MD90 DSNDS BELOW THE ALT XING AS DESIGNATED FOR KAYOH INTXN WHEN THE FMS MALFUNCTIONS AND DISTRACTS THE CREW FROM THEIR DSCNT PROC.
    Narrative: WE WERE CLRED TO CROSS KAYOH AT 7000 FT AND PROCEED VIA EASTSIDE 3 ARR. THE CAPT WAS USING A VNAV DSCNT SETUP FOR THE EASTSIDE 3 FMS STAR AND VERIFIED BY BOTH PLTS. DURING OUR DSCNT TO 7000 FT THE CAPT NOTICED A MAP FAILURE AND ATTEMPTED TO UPDATE THE ACFT POS. I NOTICED OUR NAV DISPLAYS SHOWED THE RTE AS A DASHING BLUE LINE INSTEAD OF THE NORMAL PINK RTE LINE. THE AUTOPLT REMAINED ON IN THE 'HEADING HOLD' MODE AND VERT SPD. SINCE THE FMS WAS SET UP FOR THE STAR THE CAPT HAD RESET THE DIGITAL FLT GUIDANCE COMPUTER ALT TO 3300 FT FOR 'SNAKE INTXN.' I ATTEMPTED TO REGAIN OUR ARR SINCE WE WERE ON AN 'FMS STAR' WITH NO NAVAID BACKUPS. AFTER REACTIVATING THE RTE AND EXECUTING, THE NAV DISPLAY SHOWED A NORMAL DISPLAY. THE CAPT RE-ENGAGED NAV AND ATTEMPTED TO RE-ENGAGE VNAV. THE FMS DISPLAYED 'NO VERT NAV' AND 'NO PERFORMANCE DATA.' AS I WAS ENTERING THE PERFORMANCE DATA THE AUTOPLT AGAIN SWITCHED TO 'HEADING HOLD AND VERT SPD' MODE. AT THIS TIME ATC RADIOED ABOUT OUR ALT APPROX 5900 FT MSL. THE CAPT IMMEDIATELY DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND STARTED A CLB TO 7000 FT MSL. ATC ASKED IF WE WERE VMC, WHICH WE WERE, AND CLRED US TO PROCEED VISUALLY, MAINTAINING TERRAIN CLRNC AT 5000 FT OR ABOVE. THE REST OF THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL. TO PREVENT RECURRENCE I'LL NOTIFY ATC IMMEDIATELY WITH EQUIP FAILURES. ENSURE SOMEONE IS FLYING THE AIRPLANE WHILE THE OTHER PLT CORRECTS THE MALFUNCTION. PROVIDE A BETTER BACK UP FOR THE PF. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 402691: I THEN NOTICED THE AUTOPLT HAD AGAIN GONE TO 'HEADING HOLD' AND WAS STILL IN 'VERT SPD' DSCNT AND I WAS 1200 FT OR 1300 FT BELOW 7000 FT AND 2 OR 3 MI E OF KAYOH. I KICKED OFF THE AUTOPLT AND STARTED A CLB BACK UP TO 7000 FT WHEN SOCAL CALLED AND SAID WE WERE CLRED TO DSND AND THEN SAID WE WERE TOO LOW AND TO CLB BACK TO...THEN HE ASKED IF WE WERE VFR. TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE, I'LL SET THE ALT WINDOW FOR THE BOTTOM ALT AT EACH WAYPOINT ON THE STAR.

  427.  
  428. Accession Number: 403063
    Synopsis: A DC10 CLBING THROUGH FL310 HAS A SUDDEN 2 G PITCH UP EXERTED UPON IT. THE ACFT'S AUTOPLT WAS DISCONNECTED AND THE ACFT RETURNED TO LAX. 6-7 PAX AND FLT ATTENDANTS INJURED. A LOSS OF ACFT CTL.
    Narrative: ACFT PITCHED UP. CAPT DISCONNECTED AUTOPLT AND MANUALLY FLEW PLANE, SOME INJURIES. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT MAINT CTL HAD CALLED HIM. THEY STATED THAT THERE HAD BEEN AN AUTOPLT MALFUNCTION, THE DESCRIPTION OF SAME ESCAPED HIS TECHNICAL EXPERTISE SO HE COULD NOT PASS ON ANY OTHER PERTINENT INFO WITH REGARDS TO THE EQUIP PROB. HE DID STATE THAT THE SEAT BELT SIGN HAD BEEN ON, WITH THE FLT ATTENDANTS STANDING IN THE GALLEY, ATTENDING TO SOME PRE- SVC PAX DUTIES. THE INJURIES INCLUDED SOME BONE FRACTURES OF VARIOUS SORTS, INCLUDING FEMURS, AND SOME ANKLE AND BACK INJURIES. ALL THE FLT ATTENDANTS ARE RECOVERING IN AN EXPECTED FASHION. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 403065: IN ROUTINE CLB (500-700 FPM) ACFT PITCHED UP (APPROX 2 G'S) HARD. WX CLR AND SMOOTH. ALL INSTS (ENG AND FLT) NORMAL. 6-7 INJURIES IN AFT PORTION OF ACFT. RETURNED TO LAX AND FUEL DUMP COORDINATED WITH CTR. RETURN UNEVENTFUL. MEDICAL ASSISTANCE WAITING AT GATE. SEAT BELT SIGN WAS ON THE DURATION OF THIS FLT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 402925: SOME PAX AND FLT ATTENDANTS WERE INJURED. CAUSE UNKNOWN. FLT FROM LAX TO HNL.

  429.  
  430. Accession Number: 403196
    Synopsis: FLC OF AN MD88 EXPERIENCED ERRATIC OP OF NUMEROUS INSTS, INCLUDING THE AUTOPLT SYS, DURING CLB CAUSING QUESTIONABLE ALT READINGS INDICATED VIA XPONDER TO ATC. ATC APCH AND CTR WERE ADVISED OF DIFFICULTY. THE PROB SEEMED TO BE CORRECTED AFTER SWITCHING TO THE ALTERNATE STATIC SOURCE. CONTINUED TO DEST.
    Narrative: DURING CLB, ACFT INCURRED NUMEROUS INST FAILURES INCLUDING NAV, AIRSPD, AUTOPLT, ATTITUDE/TURN, AND ALTIMETER FAILURES. ATC ADVISED OF INABILITY TO RPT CORRECT ALT. POM ABNORMALS COMPLETED AND SYS PARTIALLY RESTORED. FLT CONTINUED USING ALTERNATE SPD AND ALT SYS, AND ATC ADVISED OF POSSIBLE INACCURACIES. FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL FROM THIS POINT, HOWEVER, SINCE ATC GETS ALT RPTING ELECTRONICALLY AND THAT WAS THE INOP SYS, WE FILED NASA RPTS TO EXPLAIN ANY QUESTIONS ATC/FAA MIGHT HAVE. IN MY OPINION, THE ALTERNATE SYS WERE OPERATING NORMALLY BUT ATC WAS PROBABLY GETTING BAD ALT READOUTS. AS A LINE CHK AIRMAN I HAD HOPED TO TEACH THE NEW HIRE FO SOMETHING USEFUL ON HIS IOE. THIS, HOWEVER, WAS MORE THAN EITHER OF US BARGAINED FOR. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 402753: ALTERNATE STATIC SOURCE WAS SELECTED BY CAPT AND PROB SEEMED TO CLR. ONCE PROB SEEMED TO CLR, DISCUSSED SIT. CAPT CALLED MAINT AND DISPATCH. FLT CONTINUED TO ATL FOR UNEVENTFUL LNDG. VMC CONDITIONS THROUGHOUT ENTIRE FLT.

  431.  
  432. Accession Number: 403504
    Synopsis: AN A320 LOSES ITS AUTOMATED SYS WHEN THE AUTOPLT, AUTOTHRUST, FLT DIRECTOR SYS AND THE AIR DATA INERTIAL REF SYS FAILS. FLT WAS FLOWN MANUALLY AND ATC ADVISED OF THE ACFT PROBS AND EXPECTED ALTDEVS.
    Narrative: I WAS THE CAPT OF FLT ON MAY/FRI/98, SCHEDULED ACR FLT FROM MEM TO SFO. THE FLT WAS AN AIRBUS 320 MODEL. AFTER 1 1/2 HRS INTO THE FLT THE AUTOPLT, AUTOTHRUST, AND FLT DIRECTORS DISENGAGED AND WOULD NOT RE-ENGAGE. MANUAL FLT REGIME WOULD BE THE NORM FOR THE NEXT 3 1/2 HRS. THE ECAM DISPLAYED THE LOSS OF THE AUTOMATION BUT DID NOT REVEAL WHAT CAUSED THE LOSS. LOOKING IN THE CFDS (CENTRALIZED FAULT DISPLAY SYS) PORTION OF THE COMPUTER, WE FOUND THAT A DISCREPANCY HAD OCCURRED BTWN THE #2 ADIRU (AIR DATA INERTIAL REF UNIT) AND THE OTHER TWO. AFTER TRYING TO INSTALL THE MAGNETIC HEADING IN THE #2 ADIRU, A TRY TO SYNC IT UP WAS FUTILE. AFTER LNDG, THE CAPT'S FMGC (FLT MGMNT GUIDANCE COMPUTER) SHOWED TIMED OUT, THE ECAM (ELECTRONIC CENTRALIZED ACFT MONITORING) DISPLAYED MULTIPLE FAILURES INCLUDING THE #2 ADIRU HEADING INPUT. ATC WAS ADVISED AS TO OUR LOSS OF AUTOMATION AND THE NEED FOR AIRSPACE IN OUR VICINITY TO BE CLR DUE TO THAT LOSS. ALTDEVS WERE LESS THAN 200 FT AND WE USED THAT TRACKING DEVICE ON THE NAV DISPLAY FOR NAV GUIDANCE.

  433.  
  434. Accession Number: 403730
    Synopsis: FLC OF A B757 USED VECTORS AND VORTAC DIRECT NAV AFTER NOTICING FAULTY INDICATIONS AND ACTIONS OF THE ACFT'S FMS DURING DEP CLB FROM A FOREIGN ARPT. THE CAUSE WAS SUSPECTED TO HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY PAX USE OF AN ELECTRONIC COMPUTER GAME.
    Narrative: ON TKOF OUT OF BGI, WE WERE ALERTED TO A GPWS TOO LOW TERRAIN ALERT AND THEN A MAJOR FMS MAP SHIFT WAS NOTED. ON TURNING TO THE N AND RE-EVALUATING THE SHIFT, IT WAS NOTED TO BE ABOUT 30 MI OFFSET, TOO. WE HAD THE #1 FLT ATTENDANT CHK THE CABIN AND FOUND A YOUNG PAX PLAYING A GAME BOY. WE CONTINUED THE FLT UNDER ALTERNATIVE NAV METHODS, IE, VECTORS AND NAVAIDS TO NAVAIDS SINCE WE COULD NOT TRUST THE FMS. ALL OTHER OPS NORMAL.

  435.  
  436. Accession Number: 403819
    Synopsis: A CLBING L1011-500 EXPERIENCES AN ALT UNDERSHOOT WHEN THE FMC DOES NOT CAPTURE THE CLB TO ALT. ACFT SLOWLY DSNDED UNTIL ATC CTLR CORRECTED SIT.
    Narrative: I WAS OUT OF THE COCKPIT (IN THE LAVATORY) WHEN I FELT A SHARP PULL UP. UPON RETURNING, SAW CAPT ADDING FULL PWR TO CLB BACK TO CRUISE ALT. HE SAID ACFT WAS IN LAST 400 FT OF CLB, AUTOPLT ON IN LNAV MODE WHEN VERT SPD COMMAND DROPPED OUT (AS NORMALLY DOES DURING LAST 300 FT OF ALT CAPTURE). CTR HAD CLRED HIM DIRECT TO FIX, WHICH HE ENTERED INTO FMS. HOWEVER, PRIOR EXPERIENCE HAS TAUGHT ME, THIS OVERLOADS THIS OLD TYPE OF FMS WHILE IT COMPUTES NEW COURSE. THE BLACK MAGIC WAS IN THE PROCESS OF RETARDING THE AUTOTHROTTLES PRIOR TO CAPTURE AND THE PITCH MODE WAS IN NEUTRAL. THE ACFT STARTED A SLOW DSCNT WHEN CTR ASKED FOR OUR ALT. THERE IS NO WARNING OTHER THAN THE 'C' CHIME ON THE ALT ALERTER, HOWEVER THOSE PARAMETERS WERE SHORT-CUT BECAUSE WE HADN'T BEEN WITHIN 250 FT OF LEVELOFF. THE NEXT CHIME IS AT 750 FT OFF SELECTED ALT.

  437.  
  438. Accession Number: 403840
    Synopsis: FLC OF A SAAB SF340B (SF34L), DSNDED IN RESPONSE TO A TCASII RA. A FALSE TCASII WARNING IS BELIEVED POSSIBLE BY THE CREW SINCE ATC SHOWED NO TFC IN THEIR VICINITY NOR DID THE CREW SIGHT TFC.
    Narrative: DTW-FNT. ABOUT 18 MI SE OF FNT WE RESPONDED TO AN RA TO DSND. WE DID NOT VISUALLY SEE ANY ACFT SO WE COMPLIED. WE NEVER DID RECEIVE A TA. I BELIEVE THE RA WAS FALSE. THERE DID TURN OUT TO BE TFC 1500 FT BELOW US BUT THE TCASII COMMANDED US TO DSND. THERE WAS NEVER ANY CONFLICTS WITH ANY ACFT PER A REPLY FROM DTW APCH.

  439.  
  440. Accession Number: 403852
    Synopsis: A B737-700 CREW OVERSHOT THEIR ASSIGNED ALT, BELIEVING THAT THEIR AUTOPLT IS COUPLED. IT WASN'T, MAINT HAD DISENGAGED BOTH AUTOPLTS PRIOR TO THE FLT.
    Narrative: FIRST FLT IN A NEW MODEL B737 ACFT. THE NEW MODEL B737- 700 HAS A GLASS COCKPIT WITH MANY SYS DIFFERENCES COMPARED TO THE B737-200, B737-300, OR B737-500 ACFT WE USUALLY FLY. THIS WAS MY FIRST FLT AND THE CAPT'S SECOND FLT IN THE B737-700. WE HAD RECEIVED THE ACFT FROM MAINT AND DID NOT REALIZE THEY HAD USED THE 'GANG BAR' TO DISENGAGE BOTH AUTOPLT SYS. AS WE WERE CLBING OUT, THE CAPT (PF) SELECTED THE 'A' AUTOPLT. THE ACFT WAS TRIMMED AND STABLE. AS WE APCHED OUR ASSIGNED ALT I NOTICED THE ACFT RATE OF CLB WAS NOT DECREASING. I ASKED THE CAPT IF THE ACFT WAS GOING TO LEVEL OFF. HE IMMEDIATELY TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AND LEVELED AS BEST HE COULD, BUT DUE TO OUR HIGH RATE OF CLB, WE LEVELED APPROX 300 FT HIGH. WE CORRECTED TO ALT ASAP.

  441.  
  442. Accession Number: 403917
    Synopsis: ALT EXCURSION DURING HIGH ALT CRUISE BY FLC OF AN MD11.
    Narrative: I WAS ACTING AS PNF WHILE RECEIVING MY IOE ON THE MD11. THE CHK CAPT WAS FLYING IN THE R SEAT AND WAS THE PF. AFTER DEPARTING CVG FOR EUROPE, WE WERE AT CRUISE ALT OF 33000 FT MSL NEAR SYRACUSE, NY. THE WX WAS DETERIORATING RAPIDLY WITH MULTIPLE TSTMS, EXTREME TURB, STRONG WINDS, AND ACCORDING TO THE CTR, TORNADIC ACTIVITY. IT WAS NECESSARY TO MAKE MANY LATERAL DEVS TO AVOID THE WX, AND WE WERE BOTH CONCENTRATING ON THE WX RADAR WHILE BEING GIVEN SEVERAL CHANGES TO OUR CLRNC BY ZNY. I WAS VERY BUSY TALKING ON THE RADIO AND ATTEMPTING TO CHK OUR RTE ON THE CHARTS AND MAPS. CTR CALLED AND ASKED OUR ALT, AT WHICH POINT WE BOTH REALIZED THAT THE AIRPLANE (WHICH WAS ON AUTOPLT AT ALL TIMES) WAS LEVEL AT 32000 FT. THE PF IMMEDIATELY CLBED BACK TO 33000 FT. THERE WAS NEVER AN ALT WARNING FROM THE AUTOPLT OR ALTIMETER SYS, AND NEITHER OF US CAN EXPLAIN HOW THE ALT CHANGED. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT IN ALL THE CONFUSION TAKING PLACE, THAT THE PF TURNED THE ALT CTL KNOB INSTEAD OF THE HEADING KNOB TO ATTEMPT A WX DEV. THE 2 KNOBS ARE NEXT TO EACH OTHER AND ARE ALMOST IDENTICAL ON THIS AIRPLANE. THE CTLR SAID THAT THERE WAS NO CONFLICT AND 'NO PROB.'

  443.  
  444. Accession Number: 404370
    Synopsis: FLC OF A B757 OVERSHOT ASSIGNED DEP ALT SOON AFTER TKOF ON A SID DEP DUE TO CLRNC CHANGE AND THE AUTOTHROTTLES STILL ON TKOF SETTING AND NOT REDUCED TO CLB PWR. THEREFORE, IT TOOK MORE TIME TO LEVEL OFF ACFT.
    Narrative: WHILE CLEANING UP, ACCELERATING, AND CLBING, FULL PWR. DEP GAVE A TURN FROM 060 DEGS TO 280 DEGS. WENT FROM TAILWIND TO 40 KT HEADWIND INTO THE SUN. THROTTLES WERE IDLE (AUTOTHROTTLE DISCONNECT) TO LEVEL OFF AT 2500 FT. ACFT CONTINUED UP TO 2800 FT BEFORE DSNDING MOMENTUM TOOK OVER. SOLUTION: TOO LOW LEVELOFF ALT, CHANGING FREQS, ACFT CONFIGN, TURNING, TURB, WINDSHEAR, ETC. DUE TO EARLY CAPTURE OF ALT DUE TO HIGH RATE OF CLB, AUTOTHROTTLES WENT TO THROTTLE HOLD (TKOF PWR) BECAUSE CLB THRUST WASN'T SELECTED YET. NECESSITATING AUTOTHROTTLE DISCONNECT, PULLED TO IDLE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 404600: THIS WAS CAUSED BY MOMENTARY WORKLOAD SATURATION DUE TO ATC CLRNC CHANGE AND A PECULIAR FUNCTION OF THE AFDS DURING A LOW ALT LEVELOFF AT A HIGH RATE OF CLB. SOLUTION -- ALLOW SID TO BE FLOWN AS DEPICTED, OR AT LEAST, EDUCATE ATC CTLRS TO GIVE TIME FOR THE ACFT TO BE PROPERLY CONFIGURED BEFORE MAKING CHANGES TO THE CLRNC.

  445.  
  446. Accession Number: 404750
    Synopsis: FLC OF B737-300 HAVE NAV PROBS INFLT WHEN BOTH IRS AND FMC DO NOT UPDATE INFO. THEY REVERT TO RAW DATA AND LATER THE PROB CLRS ITSELF. A GPS IS FOUND TO BE IN USE IN THE CABIN.
    Narrative: ACFT EQUIPPED WITH IRS AND FMC. I ARRIVED AT ACFT AND COMPLETED PREFLT INCLUDING A FULL ALIGNMENT OF IRS. ONCE AIRBORNE, CONFIRMED IRS/FMC NAV FUNCTIONS WERE WORKING NORMALLY BY USING FIX PAGE AND RAW DATA. APPROX 10-15 MINS INTO THE CLB, BOTH CAPT AND MYSELF NOTED THE FMC WAS NOT AUTO UPDATING ITSELF. ABOUT THIS TIME WE RECEIVED A 'VERIFY POS' MESSAGE FROM THE FMC. WE REVERTED TO RAW DATA FOR NAV AND I CHKED THE IRS AND FMC POS PAGE. BOTH THE L AND R IRS CLAIMED THE ACTUAL POS WAS 3.8 AND 3.4 NM (RESPECTIVELY), 90 DEGS TO OUR L. WE WERE GOING TO COMPLETE A POS SHIFT EXERCISE WHEN WE NOTED WE HAD AUTO UPDATING FUNCTIONS BACK AND THE FMC POS WAS CORRECTING ITSELF. LATER IN THE FLT, A FLT ATTENDANT CALLED AND ASKED OUR GND SPD. I TOLD HER IT WAS 389 KTS. SHE STATED SHE HAD LOST A BET BECAUSE A PAX GUESSED 388 KTS. I ASKED HER TO ASK THE PAX IF HE HAD A GPS. THE PAX SAID YES. I ASKED HER TO TELL THE PAX TO TURN IT OFF AND KEEP IT TURNED OFF. THE FLT CONTINUED UNEVENTFULLY. AT DEPLANING, I FOUND OUT THE PAX WAS EMPLOYED BY ANOTHER AIRLINE. FLT IN QUESTION WAS TO PHX IN A B737-300.

  447.  
  448. Accession Number: 405990
    Synopsis: A DSNDING FK100 FLC DOES NOT CROSS THEIR ASSIGNED POINT AT THE REQUESTED ALT. THEIR FMS WAS OFF ON ITS PROFILE. CREW REALIZED THIS TOO LATE.
    Narrative: WE RECEIVED CLRNC TO CROSS HOLEY INTXN AT 11000 FT. THIS WAS ENTERED INTO THE FMC AND XCHKED WITH THE EFIS DISPLAY WHICH SHOWED BOTH ALT AND DSCNT POINT. ABOUT 9 MI FROM HOLEY WITH THE ACFT ON AUTOPLT AND IN A DSCNT WE REALIZED THE ACFT, ALTHOUGH DSNDING, WAS NOT FOLLOWING ITS COMPUTED PROFILE. THE ACFT WAS THEN HAND FLOWN DOWN TO THE ALT RESTR, USING LEVEL CHANGE, MANUAL IDLE THRUST AND SPD BRAKES. ATC WAS ADVISED THAT WE WOULD BE LATE ON THE XING RESTR AND WE REACHED 11000 FT ABOUT 5 MI TO THE N OF HOLEY. WE COULD HAVE AVOIDED THIS BY MORE CLOSELY MONITORING THE ACFT DURING ITS DSCNT IN ORDER TO PICK UP ITS PROFILE DEV SOONER, ALLOWING US TO STEP IN SOONER. THERE WERE NO KNOWN CONFLICTS.

  449.  
  450. Accession Number: 406470
    Synopsis: SF340 CREW OVERSHOT ASSIGNED ALT CLBING IN DTW AIRSPACE.
    Narrative: THE FO WAS THE PF. THE WX WAS SEVERE TSTMS. WE WERE TRYING TO FIND A WAY AROUND THEM DIFFERENT THAN PREVIOUSLY CHOSEN. THE AUTOPLT WAS ON AND 5000 FT WAS SELECTED. AT 5600 FT WE BOTH NOTICED THE ALT DID NOT CAPTURE. THE FO IMMEDIATELY STARTED BACK TO 5000 FT. THE ATC CTLR ADVISED WE WERE ASSIGNED 5000 FT. WE INFORMED HIM WE WERE CORRECTING. HE SAID, 'NO PROB' AND GAVE US THE ALTIMETER SETTING. NO OTHER ACFT WERE INVOLVED.

  451.  
  452. Accession Number: 406966
    Synopsis: A B737-400 ON APCH TO CLT BACK COURSE APCH RWY 23 EXPERIENCES AN UNCOMMANDED TURN TO THE L. ACFT WAS IN DSCNT AND DURING RECOVERY MANEUVER THE FLT ENCROACHED UPON AIRSPACE DELEGATED TO AN ACR DH8. BOTH THE APCH CTLR AND TCASII ALERTS THE CREW TO THE CONFLICT.
    Narrative: DURING APCH AT CLT ARR FROM MAJIC STAR ON A VECTOR OF 210 DEGS FOR THE LOC BACK COURSE RWY 23 CLT. AT APPROX 16.5 DME (CLT VOR) DSNDING FROM 6000 FT TO 4000 FT, ARPT AND RWY ENVIRONMENT IN SIGHT. MODE CTL PANEL SET UP FOR AUTOPLT WAS SET UP IN HEADING HOLD AND LEVEL CHANGE. CAPT WAS FLYING ACFT, CLRED APCH ON HDG 210 DEGS. AS FO, I WAS OUTSIDE VISUALLY CLRING FOR TFC AND MAINTAINING VISUAL CONTACT WITH ARPT. ALSO XCHKING RADAR INSIDE FOR WX WHICH WAS ON MISSED APCH PATH. I FELT THE ACFT GO INTO AN UNEXPECTED L TURN. I VISUALLY CONFIRMED CAPT WAS IN CTL AND ATTEMPTING TO DISCONNECT AUTOPLT. AS DIRECTED BY CAPT I STARTED TO REQUEST ATC FOR CORRECTIVE VECTOR. ATC CAME THROUGH FIRST, DIRECTED AN IMMEDIATE CLB TO 5000 FT. CAPT WAS FINALLY ABLE TO DISCONNECT AUTOPLT AND BEGAN AN IMMEDIATE CLB THEN RECEIVED A TCASII RESOLUTION ALERT. CAPT WENT TO FIREWALL PWR 30 DEG PITCH CLB TO 5000 FT. CLR OF CONFLICT, A SUBSEQUENT ROUTINE APCH AND LNDG WAS MADE AT CLT. APPROPRIATE LOGBOOK ENTRIES MADE UPON ARR AT GATE.

  453.  
  454. Accession Number: 407244
    Synopsis: A DC10 JUST W OF LAX, BOUND OF HNL, DIVERTS TO LAX WHEN THEIR GPS UNITS DISPLAY A NAV PROB MESSAGE.
    Narrative: DURING FLT, BOTH GPS UNITS GAVE AN ALERT MESSAGE OF 'UNABLE RNP' FOLLOWED BY A 'DR' MESSAGE. AFTER CONSULTING THE OPS MANUAL, WE BEGAN TO CLOSELY MONITOR BOTH GPS UNITS AND XCHK OUR POS WITH AVAILABLE NAVAIDS ENRTE. WE NOTICED A SLOW DIVERGENCE AND NAV PERFORMANCE ERROR DEVELOPING ON BOTH UNITS. BTWN LAX AND DINTY AND CONFERRING WITH ZLA, IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT OUR NAV UNITS WERE UNACCEPTABLE FOR OCEANIC FLT. THE NAV UNITS HAD A PREVIOUS ERROR HISTORY IN THE ERROR LOG OF MULTIPLE MULTIFUNCTION CTL DISPLAY UNIT FAILURES. WE ATTEMPTED TO RESET EACH UNIT USING THE PREVIOUS WRITE-UPS AND THE OPS MANUAL AS REF. NEITHER GPS UNIT RESPONDED PROPERLY. THE DECISION TO DUMP FUEL AND LAND AT LAX WAS MADE AND COORDINATED WITH ATC, DISPATCH AND TECHNICAL SVCS. LAX MAINT REPLACED BOTH NPU UNITS AND RELOADED THE SOFTWARE. THE FLT FROM LAX TO HNL WAS UNEVENTFUL AND THE PERFORMANCE OF BOTH GPS UNITS WAS NORMAL.

  455.  
  456. Accession Number: 407370
    Synopsis: AN F100 ACFT FLYING INTO GDL, FO, SETS UP THE INSTS FOR AN APCH WITH THE ILS. THE ILS CAPTURES AND INTERCEPTS A FALSE LOC. ARPT IS 30 DEGS OFF TO THE SIDE.
    Narrative: ATC FACILITY: GDL APCH CTL. LOCATION: GDL/070 DEG RADIAL/10 NM. WHILE BEING RADAR VECTORED TO THE ILS RWY 28, GDL, THE F100 AFS CAPTURED A FALSE LOC AND GS. ACFT HDG WAS 190 DEGS AT 9500 FT MSL WITH THE AUTOPLT ENGAGED AND LAND ARMED, WE WERE CLRED TO INTERCEPT THE LOC AND CLRED THE ILS RWY 28 APCH. THE AUTOPLT CAPTURED A FALSE LOC AND GS APPROX 5 NM N OF THE ACTUAL ILS COURSE. BOTH LOC AND GS CAPTURE ANNUNCIATED ON THE PFD AND THE ACFT BEGAN A R TURN. XCHK OF RAW DATA (LOC AND VOR) AND THE ND MAP (HAD BUILT THE ILS MANUALLY SINCE IT IS NOT IN THE DATABASE) CONFIRMED ACFT N OF THE LOC CTRLINE. DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND INITIATED A TURN BACK TO HDG 190 DEGS. GDL APCH CTL CONFIRMED OUR POS, GAVE US HDG 180 DEGS AND 7500 FT MSL AND RECONFIRMED APCH CLRNC. COMPLETED THE APCH MANUALLY IN VMC. (AFTER REARMING LAND, NORMAL LOC AND GS CAPTURE OCCURRED.) CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR HAD USED OTHER MEANS OF NAV TO FLY INTO GDL BESIDES THE ILS. THE WX WAS CLR. THE FLC TUNED IN THE ILS, BUT USED A VOR RADIAL AS REF, AND ALSO MANUALLY BUILT AN APCH INTO THE FMC. AS THE ACFT WAS ON A 190 DEG HDG, IT TURNED TO AN ILS HEADING FOR THE LOC INTERCEPT. THE ILS COMMAND SHOWED LOC CAPTURE. FLC RECOGNIZED EARLY THAT THE ACFT HAD TURNED TO AN ILS HEADING AND CAPTURE, BUT THE LOC WAS 30 DEGS OFF FROM THE ARPT. FLC TURNED OFF ALL AUTOPLT FUNCTIONS AND FLT INST COMMANDS AND RESET THE FLT INSTS AFTER TAKING UP A WESTERLY HEADING. THEN, EVERYTHING WORKED PERFECTLY. RPTR FEELS IT WAS JUST AN ANOMALY THAT CAN HAPPEN. THIS IS THE ONLY TIME IT HAS HAPPENED TO HIM AND HAS NOT HEARD OF ANY OTHER INCIDENTS OF THIS TYPE.

  457.  
  458. Accession Number: 407534
    Synopsis: A CRJ65 DEVIATES FOR WX AND INCURS A NAV DEV IN ZDC AIRSPACE.
    Narrative: THE FLT DEPARTED THE GATE WITH ALL NORMAL PREFLT OPS COMPLETED. A GND STOP AT PHL REQUIRED US TO SHUT DOWN OUR ENGS AND WAIT 2 HRS ON THE TXWY. THE FMS WAS CHKED SEVERAL TIMES AND CONCURRED WITH THE FLT PLAN AND CLRNC. ON DEPARTING WE WERE REQUIRED TO DEVIATE SEVERAL TIMES DUE TO SEVERE WX. ATC QUESTIONED US SAYING 'WHERE ARE YOU?' AND STATED THAT WE WERE NOT CLRED DIRECT TO FKN. SO WE CHKED THE FMS ONLY TO FIND THE CCV (CAPE CHARLES) HAD DROPPED OUT AND ONLY FKN WAS REMAINING AS THE NEXT POINT. CCV WAS REPROGRAMMED AND WE WERE ABEAM THE FIX (15 MI TO THE W). ACCORDING TO THE MECHS, WHEN DEVIATING IF YOU GET CLOSE TO OR ABEAM A FIX IT WILL DROP OUT. EVIDENTLY THAT IS WHAT HAPPENED. NEITHER OF US REMEMBER IT DROPPING OUT. WE CONTINUED ON WITH THE REST OF OUR FLT PLAN AND NOTHING ELSE WAS EVER SAID BY ATC. THE FOLLOWING DAY THE FMS WAS PROGRAMMED AND FOUND TO BE GIVING ERRONEOUS ROUTES OF FLT. THE MECHS REPROGRAMMED THE DATA ONCE WE RETURNED TO RDU. WE FLEW THREE MORE FLTS AND IT SEEMED TO BE FUNCTIONING PROPERLY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR TALKS ABOUT HOW THE WAYPOINT DROPPED OUT OF THE FLT PLAN RTE AND THE NEXT WAYPOINT IN THE FLT PLAN BECAME THE ACTIVE WAYPOINT. RPTR WAS NOT CERTAIN IF THE FMS WAS SUPPOSED TO WORK THIS WAY, HOWEVER, SOME MECHS ON THE SUBSEQUENT FLTS INDICATED THAT IS THE WAY THE FMS WORKS. RPTR FELT THAT ANY NAV DEV SHOULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN CARE OF WITH A PROPERLY WORKING FMS. HE FELT THE FMS SYS WAS NOT WORKING PROPERLY, THUS, A NAV DEV HAPPENED.

  459.  
  460. Accession Number: 407580
    Synopsis: ARTCC CTLR ASSIGNS NEW CLRNC WHEN OBSERVING A B757 FLC CROSS ASSIGNED COURSE. FLC WAS IN LNAV EQUIP MODE. FLC DID NOT OBSERVE DEV FROM ASSIGNED RTE.
    Narrative: I WAS THE PLT FLYING THE ACFT. THE ACFT WAS ON AUTOPLT WITH THE LNAV ENGAGED WHEN WE WERE CLRED TO BRIGS INTXN. I WATCHED THE ACFT MAKE THE TURN TO MAYZE INTXN TO JOIN J6O. AFTER PASSING ASHEN INTXN, ZOB CALLED TO ASK IF WE WERE ON A HEADING. NEITHER THE CAPT OR I COULD REMEMBER IF WE HAD BEEN GIVEN A HEADING, BUT THE ACFT WAS IN HDG MODE AND 6.5 MI R OF COURSE. WE SHOULD HAVE MADE A 20 DEG L TURN TO JOIN THE AIRWAY AT MAYZE INTXN. I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MONITORING THE ACFT CLOSELY, BUT RELAXED ONCE WE HAD REACHED CRUISE ALT AND ESTABLISHED ON COURSE. I STILL DO NOT KNOW HOW WE ENDED UP IN HEADING MODE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 406785: UNKNOWN HOW AUTOPLT GOT OFF OF LNAV TRACKING. CORRECTED BACK ON COURSE.

  461.  
  462. Accession Number: 407712
    Synopsis: A B737-400 ON APCH TO CLT, NC, HAS A 30 DEG BANK COMMANDED BY THE AUTOFLT SYS. FLC HAS DIFFICULTY DISCONNECTING THE AUTOPLT BUT WHEN IT IS DISCONNECTED, THEY ENCOUNTER A TCASII RA.
    Narrative: APCHING CLT TERMINAL AREA OFF OF THE MAJIC ARR WE WERE GIVEN A VECTOR OF 210 DEGS TO INTERCEPT THE LOC BACK COURSE RWY 23 APCH. WE WERE 16.5 MI FROM THE CLT VORTAC AND LEVELING AT 4000 FT MSL. THE RWY AND ARPT ENVIRONMENT WERE IN SIGHT AT THIS TIME AND COURSE WAS SLOWLY INTERCEPTING WHEN THE ACFT BANKED SUDDENLY TO THE L IN A 30 DEG BANK OPPOSITE OF INTENDED PATH. MODE CTL PANEL WAS SET UP ON LEVEL CHANGE FOR DSCNT AND HEADING FOR ROLL AT THE TIME. ACFT AUTOPLT FAILED TO DISCONNECT ON THE YOKE UNTIL 6-10 ATTEMPTS WERE MADE. ATC ORDERED AN IMMEDIATE CLB TO 5000 FT MSL, WHICH WAS THEN FOLLOWED BY A TCASII ALERT. I CLBED IMMEDIATELY AT THAT TIME TO AVOID THE CONFLICT. I APPLIED FIREWALL PWR AND A 30 DEG PITCH ATTITUDE. SUBSEQUENTLY, A ROUTINE APCH AND LNDG WAS MADE. AN APPROPRIATE LOGBOOK ENTRY WAS MADE UPON ARR AT THE GATE.

  463.  
  464. Accession Number: 407782
    Synopsis: A B737-300 FLC GETS AN OFF COURSE CORRECTION FROM PHX DEP CTLR WHEN THEY UNKNOWINGLY EXPERIENCE A MAP SHIFT. RPT CITES AN EQUIP COOLING FAN MALFUNCTION AS A CAUSATIVE FACTOR.
    Narrative: BUCKEYE 2 DEP FROM PHOENIX, RWY 26L. WE CONTACTED PHX DEP CTL AND WERE CLRED TO 15000 FT. AS THE PNF, I BECAME PREOCCUPIED IN THE COCKPIT (HEADS DOWN). I LAST SAW 9 DME FROM THE PHX VOR AND NOTICED THE PF TURNING TOWARDS THE BXK VOR. I CAUTIONED HIM THAT HE WAS TURNING EARLY AND THAT HE SHOULD TURN BACK TO THE L ON THE PROPER HDG OF 240 DEGS UNTIL THE 13 DME FIX. DURING THIS CONVERSATION BTWN OURSELVES, DEP CTL CLRED OUR FLT DIRECT TO THE BXK VOR. WE BOTH MISSED THIS INSTRUCTION. THE PF CORRECTED (AS I COMMANDED) AND AT THE PROPER FIX (13 DME) TURNED THE ACFT TO A HDG OF 280 DEGS. I MANUALLY CHANGED THE NAVIGATIONAL RADIOS TO THE BXK VOR FOR OUR INTERCEPT OF THE 077 DEG RADIAL. BOTH MAP DISPLAYS INDICATED THAT WE WERE N OF THE BXK 077 DEG RADIAL. I INSTRUCTED THE PF TO TURN L TO 240 DEGS TO RE-INTERCEPT THE PROPER RADIAL. THIS PUT OUR ACFT ON A DIRECT HEADING TO THE BXK VOR (AS DISPLAYED ON OUR EFIS DISPLAYS). DEP CTL ASKED WHAT OUR HEADING WAS AND I INFORMED HIM 240 DEGS. I FAILED TO MENTION TO HIM THAT THIS HEADING WAS GETTING US DIRECT TO BXK VOR AS DISPLAYED. THE DEP CTLR INFORMED US THAT WE WERE 9 MI S OF BXK VOR AND WE NEEDED TO TURN R TO RE- INTERCEPT THE AIRWAY (J212) W OF BXK VOR. ENRTE TO OUR DEST WE VERIFIED OUR POS WITH CTR AND MANUALLY OVER VARIOUS NAVAIDS. THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES NOTED. UPON LNDG AT SNA I CALLED PHX TRACON AND TALKED TO THE SUPVR ON DUTY. HE EXPLAINED TO ME WHAT THEY INDICATED ON RADAR AND VERIFIED THAT THE NAV FACILITIES WERE OPERATING NORMALLY. I EXPLAINED WHAT WE OBSERVED IN THE COCKPIT AND VERIFIED TO HIM THAT WE HAD THE PROPER NAV FREQS TUNED IN AND THAT I SUSPECTED IRS DRIFT AND SYMBOL GENERATION FAILURE. THE WORKING CTLR KEPT OUR ACFT AND INBOUND TFC ON THE ARLIN ARR SEPARATED THROUGHOUT THIS EVENT. MY ACFT MAINTAINED LAST ASSIGNED ALT OF 15000 FT AND THE INBOUND TFC HAD THEIR ALT AMENDED TO MAINTAIN 16000 FT. NO TFC CONFLICTS OCCURRED. I CONTACTED OUR MAINT SUPVR IN SNA AND EXPLAINED TO HIM OUR EXPERIENCE. I GAVE HIM DATA ON OUR RTE IN REGARDS TO LATITUDE AND LONGITUDES AND THE DIFFERENCES BTWN THE L AND R IRS'S. I ALSO BACKED THIS UP WITH DATA FROM THE POS DIFFERENCE DISPLAY (LOCATED ON THE LOWER R SIDE OF OUR MAP DISPLAY) FROM OVER A RANDOM POS ENRTE AND THE ARR GATE POS. I WAS CONTACTED BY OUR MAINT CTLR THAT NIGHT FOR ANY ADDITIONAL INFO. THE FOLLOWING MORNING, I MET THE OUTBOUND CREW AND GAVE THEM A BRIEFING ON MY EXPERIENCE. THE CAPT HAD EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD EXPERIENCED THIS ONCE BEFORE ON A B757. THIS OUTBOUND CREW DID IN FACT FLY THIS ACFT AND I WAS INFORMED THEY DID NOT HAVE ANY PROBS. ON JUL/SAT/98, THIS ACFT HAD A DISCREPANCY WRITE UP IN REGARDS TO THE EQUIP SUPPLY FAN FLICKERING AND CAUSING THE DISPLAYS TO FADE OUT. MAINT CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS THAT THEY COULD NOT DUPLICATE AND THE ACFT WAS RETURNED TO SVC. THAT EVENING OF JUL/SAT/98, I WAS ON THE JUMP SEAT OF THIS SAME ACFT ENRTE TO LAX. DURING CLBOUT THE SUPPLY FAN WAS FLICKERING AND CAUSING BOTH EFIS DISPLAY UNITS TO FADE OUT. THE CREW CHANGED THE FAN SWITCH TO THE AUX FAN WITH NO CHANGE. IT WASN'T UNTIL THE ACFT GOT TO CRUISE ALT OF 31000 FT DID THE SYS COOL OFF ENOUGH TO EXTINGUISH THE LIGHT. MAINT CTL AND DISPATCH WAS CONTACTED ENRTE AND THE FLT WAS GIVEN CLRNC TO CONTINUE TO LAX. UPON ARR IN LAX, CONTRACT MAINT WAS TO MEET THE ACFT FOR INSPECTION. AT THIS PRINTING, I AM NOT AWARE OF THE FINDINGS.

  465.  
  466. Accession Number: 407880
    Synopsis: A CL65RJ ON APCH TO CVG FLIES THROUGH THE LOC COURSE WHEN THE AUTO-CAPTURE MODE OF THE AUTOPLT DEFAULTS TO THE HEADING MODE.
    Narrative: AFTER BEING CLR FOR ILS RWY 18R AT CVG AND ARMING THE APCH MODE ON AUTOPLT, APPARENTLY THE MODE CTL DEACTIVATED AND DEFAULTED TO HEADING MODE. DID NOT NOTICE UNTIL FLYING THROUGH THE LOC. AUTOPLT WAS DISCONNECTED AND WE TURNED BACK TO THE RWY 18R LOC. NO CONFLICT WITH TFC WAS NOTED.

  467.  
  468. Accession Number: 407902
    Synopsis: ACR BE02 FLC AWARE OF CLBING BE90 TFC, BUT NO VISUAL CONTACT. BE90 HAS BE02 IN SIGHT AND COMMENCES VFR CLB. BE02 TCASII RA CLB MANEUVER INITIATED WHEN BE90 IS ALREADY ABOVE THE BE02. BE02 CLBS THROUGH BE90 ALT, AND RECEIVES A TCASII RA DSCNT COMMAND, BUT IS ARRESTED BY PIC. ATC TRIED TO STOP CLB ACTION, BUT BE02 PIC ADVISES THEY WILL FOLLOW RA COMMAND.
    Narrative: FROM OUR POS LISTED ABOVE, WE NOTICED, BUT WERE UNABLE TO VISUALLY ACQUIRE, AN ACFT ON OUR TCASII SCOPE AT 2 O'CLOCK POS AND 10 MI. THIS ACFT WAS IN A SLOW CLB FROM 300 FT BELOW OUR ALT. APCH CALLED THIS ACFT AND GAVE HIM TFC 'A BEECHCRAFT 1900 AT 10 O'CLOCK POS AND 10 MI AT 11000 FT.' THE ACFT SAID HE HAD US IN SIGHT AND WAS TOLD TO MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION WITH US. APCH THEN CALLED US WITH TFC. HOWEVER, JUST AS HE SPOKE WE RECEIVED A TCASII RA 2500 FPM CLB, WHICH WE OBEYED BECAUSE THE TFC WAS NOT IN SIGHT. THE TFC WAS ALREADY 200 FT ABOVE US SO THIS RA TOOK US THROUGH THEIR ALT. APCH WANTED US TO DSND TO 7000 FT, BUT WE TOLD HIM WE WERE IN A TCASII CLB. NOW, SAFELY ABOVE THE TFC, THE TCASII COMMANDED A 2500 FPM DSCNT. WE IGNORED THIS RA BECAUSE WE SAW THE ACFT PASS BENEATH US. THIS SECOND RA ALSO WANTED US TO PASS THROUGH THE ALT OF THE TFC. WHEN WE FIRST TOLD THE CTLR WE WERE IN A TCASII CLB, HE ASKED WHY WE HAD TO CLB IF THE OTHER ACFT HAD US IN SIGHT. I EXPLAINED THAT WE DIDN'T HAVE HIM IN SIGHT. I BELIEVE THE CTLR'S CONFUSION ABOUT WHEN WE MUST ACT ON AN RA, CONTRIBUTED TO ALLOWING THE OTHER ACFT CLOSE ENOUGH TO CAUSE AN RA. I ALSO BELIEVE THE OTHER ACFT, NOT HAVING TCASII, DOESN'T UNDERSTAND HOW MUCH ROOM TO GIVE A TCASII EQUIPPED ACFT SO AS NOT TO GIVE THEM AN RA. POINTING OUT TFC TO IFR ACFT BEFORE VFR ACFT MAY ALSO HELP TO AVOID THIS SIT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 408048: APCH NEVER CALLED OUT VFR KING AIR TFC OUT TO US. I, AS COPLT (PF) IMMEDIATELY RESPONDED TO TCASII YELLOW INTRUDER TFC, TFC COMMAND. THE CAPT ASKED IF I SAW TFC. I RESPONDED YES, SAW ACFT PASS BELOW OUR R OUTBOARD WINGTIP APPROX 100 FT BELOW AND 25 FT HORIZLY DIAGONALLY TOWARDS OUR 8 O'CLOCK REAR POS.

  469.  
  470. Accession Number: 408150
    Synopsis: FLC OF A B737-300 CLBED ABOVE ASSIGNED ALT DUE TO THE AUTOPLT ALT HOLD MODE DISCONNECTING DUE TO HIGHER THAN CRUISE PWR SETTING.
    Narrative: WE WERE AT FL280 WITH DISCRETION TO FL240 AND AT AN ASSIGNED SPD OF 280 KTS. ZHU CHANGED OUR SPD TO 300 KTS. I INCREASED OUR AIRSPD TO 300 KTS BY MEANS OF THE MODE CTL PANEL. DURING ALL OF THE SPD CHANGES, THE CAPT AND MYSELF WERE HAVING A DISCUSSION ON CONVERTING CENTIGRADE TEMP TO FAHRENHEIT TEMP. AFTER A WHILE THE CTLR ASKED ABOUT OUR ALT. THE ACFT HAD BEGUN A SLOW CLB FROM FL280 TO FL290. THE CAPT AND MYSELF HAD A LONG DISCUSSION ON THIS INCIDENT. WE THINK THAT WHEN I INCREASED THE AIRSPD THE ENGS ACCELERATED THE ACFT TO THE POINT THAT THE AUTOPLT COULD NOT KEEP UP WITH THE ACCELERATION. THE PITCH MODE OF THE AUTOPLT DISCONNECTED AND IT BEGAN A SLOW CLB. SINCE WE WERE IN A CRUISE PORTION OF FLT WE MISSED THE ACFT WAS IN A CLB. IN ADDITION TO CLB AND DSCNT LEVELOFFS, I WILL WATCH SPD CHANGES TO MAKE SURE WE DON'T GO THROUGH ON ALT.

  471.  
  472. Accession Number: 408440
    Synopsis: B737 CREW HAD FLT GUIDANCE CHANGE FROM ALT HOLD TO CTL WHEEL STEERING PITCH. THIS RESULTED IN A 1000 FT ALT EXCURSION.
    Narrative: WE WERE AT FL280. ATC HAD GIVEN US 'PLT'S DISCRETION TO FL240.' IT WAS THE FO'S LEG TO FLY. ATC DIRECTED US TO MAINTAIN 300 KIAS. AT THAT MOMENT WE WERE CRUISING AT 280 KIAS. I VISUALLY CONFIRMED THAT THE FO HAD DIALED 300 KIAS INTO THE MCP AIRSPD WINDOW. APPROX 1 MIN LATER, ATC SAID TO US, 'CALL SIGN, SAY YOUR ALT.' SINCE WE HAD BEEN GIVEN A FREQ CHANGE BTWN THE TIME WE WERE GIVEN PLT'S DISCRETION TO FL240 AND NOW, I THOUGHT MAYBE THERE HAD BEEN A FAILURE TO COM BTWN THE LAST SECTOR CTLR AND THIS ONE. I GLANCED AT THE FMC TO CONFIRM WE WERE NOT YET AT OUR TOP OF DSCNT POINT AND REPLIED, 'CALL SIGN WAS GIVEN PLT'S DISCRETION TO FL240.' THEN ATC REPLIED, 'CALL SIGN, SAY YOUR ALT.' WELL, I WAS SURE WE WERE STILL AT FL280 (BECAUSE THAT HAD BEEN OUR CRUISING ALT, AND WE HAD NOT YET STARTED OUR DSCNT), BUT A QUICK GLANCE AT MY INSTS TOLD ME I WAS DEAD WRONG, AND WE HAD A PROB. WITH NO WARNING WHATSOEVER, AND FOR NO APPARENT REASON, THE ACFT HAD BEGUN A VERY SLOW CLB, AND WAS NOW NEARING FL290. AT THE SAME INSTANT I SAW OUR ALTDEV, I ALSO SAW THAT THE PITCH MODE OF THE AUTOPLT HAD REVERTED FROM 'ALT HOLD' TO 'CTL WHEEL STEERING PITCH.' FOR THOSE NOT COMPLETELY FAMILIAR WITH THE B737-500 AUTOPLT, CTL WHEEL STEERING PITCH IS AN AUTOPLT MODE DESIGNED TO MAINTAIN A CONSTANT PITCH ATTITUDE. THE ACFT WAS AT THE MOMENT OF REVERSION TO CTL WHEEL STEERING PITCH. WELL, THAT PART OF THE SYS WORKED AS ADVERTISED. BUT REMEMBER, WE HAD ACCELERATED FROM 280 KIAS TO 300 KIAS. AND (LESSON FROM BASIC AIRMANSHIP 101) A CONSTANT PITCH AT AN INCREASING AIRSPD RESULTS IN -- THAT'S RIGHT -- A CLB. I IMMEDIATELY TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AND BEGAN A DSCNT, NOT JUST BACK DOWN TO FL280, BUT CONTINUING DOWN TO FL240. SIMULTANEOUSLY I KEYED THE MIKE AND TOLD CTR, 'CALL SIGN IS AT FL290, DSNDING NOW TO FL240. OUR AUTOPLT APPEARS TO HAVE MALFUNCTIONED.' CTR REPLIED, 'ROGER, COPY YOU DSNDING TO FL240.' WE HAD NO TCASII ALERT OF ANY KIND, AND WHEN I ASKED THE CTLR IF I NEEDED TO CALL HIM WHEN WE GOT ON THE GND, HE REPLIED 'NO, DON'T WORRY ABOUT IT.' IN MY 12 1/2 YRS AND 11000 HRS ON B737-300/500 ACFT, I HAVE NEVER SEEN THIS HAPPEN. I HAVE SEEN THE AUTOPLT ON THE B737-300/500 REVERT TO CTL WHEEL STEERING PITCH FOR ONLY 3 REASONS: 1) MANUALLY DESELECTING ALL OTHER PITCH MODES. (THIS DID NOT HAPPEN.) 2) TURB SO BAD THE AUTOPLT CANNOT MAINTAIN ALT. (WE WERE IN PERFECTLY SMOOTH RIDE CONDITIONS.) 3) A FORCE BEING APPLIED TO THE FLT CTLS SIGNIFICANT ENOUGH TO CAUSE THE SELECTED AUTOPLT PITCH MODE TO DISENGAGE. THIS IS THE ONLY POSSIBILITY I CAN THINK OF. WHAT MAY HAVE HAPPENED IS THAT THE NOSE-UP PITCH FORCES RESULTING FROM THE PWR ADVANCING TO ACCELERATE FROM 280 KIAS TO 300 KIAS WERE SIGNIFICANT ENOUGH TO CAUSE THE AUTOPLT TO REVERT FROM 'ALT HOLD' TO 'CTL WHEEL STEERING PITCH.' NORMALLY WE WOULD GET A WARNING HORN IF THE ACFT DEVIATED FROM THE SELECTED CRUISE ALT BY MORE THAN 150 FT. BUT IN THIS CASE, BECAUSE WE HAD DIALED FL240 INTO THE ALT WINDOW ON THE MCP TO COMPLY WITH OUR CLRNC, WHEN THE ACFT DEPARTED FL280, EVEN THOUGH IT WAS CLBING INSTEAD OF DSNDING, WE GOT NO WARNING HORN AND NO ALT ALERT LIGHT. ALSO, BECAUSE THE AUTOPLT HAD NOT COMPLETELY DISENGAGED, WE GOT NO 'AUTOPLT DISENGAGED' WARNING TONE OR LIGHT. WHAT APPARENTLY HAPPENED WAS THE CTL WHEEL STEERING PITCH APPEARED ON THE EFIS DISPLAY. I HAD MY HEAD DOWN AT THE MOMENT THIS OCCURRED AND WAS NOT LOOKING AT THE INST PANEL. THE FO, WITH NO REASON TO EXPECT ANY ANOMALY, DID NOT NOTICE THE CTL WHEEL STEERING PITCH DISPLAY APPEAR. AND THE CLB WAS SO SLOW THAT NEITHER THE FO NOR I HAD ANY 'SEAT-OF-THE-PANTS' INDICATION WE HAD DEPARTED ALT. RECOMMENDATIONS: HUMAN FACTORS: 1) INCREASED VIGILANCE. 2) GET THE WORD OUT HOW THIS CAN HAPPEN. MECHANICAL: CONDUCT INSPECTIONS TO DETERMINE IF THE 'PENDULUM EFFECT' RESULTING FROM LARGE PWR CHANGES IN B737'S IS SIGNIFICANT ENOUGH TO CAUSE AUTOPLT REVERSION TO CTL WHEEL STEERING PITCH IN A STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF ACFT.

  473.  
  474. Accession Number: 409085
    Synopsis: A CANADAIR CL65 ON DSCNT AT 11000 FT HAD THE DME JUMP FROM 20 MI TO 10 MI RESULTING IN MISSING AN INTXN 2 MI LATE. CREW SUSPECTS CABIN PAX ELECTRONICS AND NOT THE AUTOPLT AS RPTED.
    Narrative: FMS DME JUMPED FROM 20 MI TO 10 MI IN A MATTER OF SECONDS. WE RESPONDED BY INCREASING OUR DSCNT RATE TO APPROX 4000 FPM. CROSSED SARGO 2 MI LATE. CLRNC WAS TO CROSS SARGO AT 11000 FT, WE CROSSED AT 12000 FT. ADDITIONALLY, THE FMS LED THE AUTOPLT 2 MI S OF COURSE (APCHING SARGO) BEFORE THE CREW RETURNED TO THE PROPER COURSE. NO ATC QUERIES WERE RECEIVED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE ACFT WAS A CANADAIR CL65 AND THE DME PERFORMED NORMALLY AFTER THE 20 MI TO 10 MI JUMP AND NO WRITE-UP WAS NECESSARY. THE RPTR SUSPECTS THE ANOMALY IN THE DME WAS CAUSED BY PAX PERSONAL ELECTRONIC UNITS.

  475.  
  476. Accession Number: 409112
    Synopsis: A B737-300 FLC CRUISING THROUGH ZMP AIRSPACE TESTS THE FUEL GAUGES AND TAKES THE AUTOFLT SYS OUT OF VNAV. THE ACFT HAS AN ALT EXCURSION OF 400 FT.
    Narrative: B737-300 IN CRUISE AT FL350, AUTOPLT ENGAGED IN VNAV. I TESTED THE FUEL GAUGES, AND FOR SOME REASON THE VNAV DISCONNECTED AND THE AUTOPLT DID NOT DEFAULT TO ALT HOLD, BUT RATHER STARTED A SLOW DSCNT. WE DID NOT PICK UP THE DSCNT UNTIL THE ALT ALERT HORN SOUNDED AT 300 FT BELOW FL350. I TOOK CORRECTIVE ACTION BY DISENGAGING THE AUTOPLT AND RETURNING TO FL350. THE ACFT DSNDED TO ABOUT 400 FT BELOW OUR ASSIGNED ALT OF FL350. TESTING THE FUEL GAUGES RESULTED IN VNAV DISENGAGEMENT. HOWEVER ON EACH SUBSEQUENT TEST THE AUTOPLT DEFAULTED TO ALT HOLD AND DID NOT CHANGE ALT.

  477.  
  478. Accession Number: 409279
    Synopsis: B767 CRUISING AT FL350. CAPT FAILED TO INITIATE DSCNT WHEN CLRED TO LOWER ALT DUE TO UNMONITORED VNAV MALFUNCTION.
    Narrative: 30 NM W OF MOL, WHILE AT FL350, ZDC CLRED US TO DSND TO FL330. WE RESET THE ALT WINDOW TO FL330 AND SELECTED FL330 AS CRUISE ALT IN CDU. WE HAD BEEN OPERATING IN VNAV BUT FOR SOME UNKNOWN REASON THE ACFT THEN REVERTED TO ALT HOLD. I, AS THE PF, FAILED TO CHK THE ADI FOR THE APPROPRIATE DSCNT INDICATIONS AND WENT ABOUT REVIEWING THE ARR PROCS FOR JFK. A MIN OR 2 LATER, CTR CALLED AND ASKED IF WE HAD RECEIVED THE DSCNT TO FL330. I THEN INITIATED THE DSCNT USING FLT LEVEL CHANGE. THE FLT CONTINUED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. LESSON LEARNED: CHK WHAT IS ACTUALLY ON YOUR PLATE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 409280: WE RESET THE ALT WINDOW BUT FAILED TO NOTICE THAT WE HAD NOT ENGAGED THE AUTOPLT TO START THE DSCNT.

  479.  
  480. Accession Number: 409350
    Synopsis: FK10 CREW EXCEEDED 250 KTS BELOW 10000 FT.
    Narrative: I SET 250 KTS ON FMC BUT NOTICED 290 KTS AT 9500 FT. I LEVELED OFF AND SLOWED TO 250 KTS AND CONTINUED. I MUST WATCH FMC MORE CLOSELY.

  481.  
  482. Accession Number: 409414
    Synopsis: LGT CREW MAY HAVE LANDED WITHOUT GETTING TWR CLRNC.
    Narrative: ACR FLT XXX PIT-ABE, ON BASE TURNING FINAL TO RWY 24 VISUAL APCH, COMPONENT FAILURE ACCOMPANIED WITH LOSS OF AUTOTHROTTLES PLUS NUMEROUS WARNING FLAGS AND AURAL WARNINGS, DISTR CREW ON THE FINAL APCH. THE FLT MAY HAVE LANDED WITHOUT TWR CLRNC. THE FLT WAS CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH, NOT SURE IF HANDED OFF TO TWR. UPON LNDG, CALLED TWR BY PHONE. THEY SAID NO PROB AT ALL, NO TFC. THE AUTOTHROTTLE SYSTEM FAILURE OCCURRED AT A CRITICAL TIME ON THE APCH INTERRUPTING THE CREW'S NORMAL PROCS. THIS DISTR PREVENTED THE FLC FROM DOUBLECHKING WITH THE TWR AND HDOF. THERE WAS NO TFC CONFLICT AND SAFETY WAS NOT COMPROMISED. CTLR INTERACTION WITH OTHER CTLRS COULD POSSIBLY PREVENT THIS OCCURRENCE IN THE FUTURE BY XCHKING (APCH CTLR AND ALSO TWR CTLR) WITH EACH OTHER TO VERIFY IF A HDOF HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED OR NOT, AND CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR WHEN THE HDOF HAS FAILED.

  483.  
  484. Accession Number: 409722
    Synopsis: THE CREW ON A B757 LNDG RWY 12 AT MIA IS INSTRUCTED TO LAND AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 9R. APPROX 2-3 MI OUT, THE B757 CREW ADVISES THE TWR THAT THEY ARE UNABLE TO LAND AND HOLD SHORT.
    Narrative: WE WERE CLRED FOR THE ILS RWY 12 AT MIA ARPT. APCH CTLR REQUESTED WE KEEP OUR SPD UP AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. WHEN WE WERE AT THE FINAL APCH FIX, WE WERE SWITCHED TO TWR FREQ. THE TWR CTLR CLRED US TO LAND ON RWY 12, HOLD SHORT OF RWY 9R. WE WERE AT A FASTER SPD THAN NORMAL, TO FACILITATE APCH'S REQUEST. BY THIS TIME WE WERE INSIDE THE FAF, TRYING TO SLOW AND CONFIGURE THE AIRPLANE FOR LNDG. THE CAPT ASKED TWR HOW MUCH RWY WOULD BE AVAILABLE WITH LAHSO AND GOT NO REPLY. HE STARTED TO LOOK AT THE COMPANY SPECIAL PAGES TO FIND A LAHSO RWY AVAILABLE DISTANCE, BUT HAD A HARD TIME SINCE IT WAS DARK AND HE WEARS GLASSES. I FELT UNCOMFORTABLE GETTING A LAHSO CLRNC SO LATE, WHILE WE WERE VERY BUSY. ALSO, OUR UNION HAS ISSUED MANY SAFETY BULLETINS RECOMMENDING PLTS NOT ACCEPT LAHSO CLRNCS UNTIL MANY ISSUES ARE RESOLVED. I TOLD THE CAPT I DIDN'T WANT TO LAND AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 9R. HE TOLD TWR 'UNABLE TO LAND AND HOLD SHORT.' TWR REPLIED, CANCEL LNDG CLRNC RWY 12, CLRED TO LAND RWY 9L. WE WERE ABOUT 2-3 MI OUT, AND I COULDN'T SEE RWY 9L. WE DIDN'T HAVE ANY NAVAIDS OR FMS DISPLAY SET FOR RWY 9L, AND I WASN'T SURE WHERE RWY 9L WAS IN RELATION TO RWY 12. I ASKED THE CAPT TO DIAL IN THE RWY 9L LOC FREQ, BUT HE WAS BUSY AND DIDN'T HEAR. DURING ALL THIS CONFUSION, SOMEHOW THE AUTOTHROTTLES WERE DISCONNECTED AND I DIDN'T REALIZE IT, GETTING 10 KIAS SLOW. WE WERE BOTH LOOKING OUTSIDE FOR THE 9L RWY AND PICKED UP THE VASI FOR A NORMAL LNDG. TWR PUT US IN A DANGEROUS SIT. LAHSO IS A BAD IDEA. NEXT TIME I'LL GO AROUND.

  485.  
  486. Accession Number: 409730
    Synopsis: ACR MD88 FLC EXPERIENCED AN AC ELECTRICAL BUS FAILURE ON DEP, DRIFTING OFF COURSE UNTIL SYS FAILURE COULD BE OVERCOME. FLT RETURNED TO LAND WITHOUT FURTHER DIFFICULTY.
    Narrative: DURING CLB, LOST L AC ELECTRICAL BUS BAR, THUS AUTOPLT, AUTOTHROTTLES AND COURSE GUIDANCE DISAPPEARED. TOOK A WHILE TO FIND ANOTHER WAY TO MONITOR COURSE. DURING THIS TIME, THE SID COURSE HAD CHANGED AND AS A RESULT, WE WERE OFF COURSE, PROBABLY A COUPLE OF MI. THERE WAS NO LOSS OF SEPARATION. IT JUST TOOK A WHILE AFTER LOSING FMS AND MAP TO FIGURE OUT HOW TO USE CDI WITHOUT COURSE SELECT WINDOW WORKING. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 410003: ZFW QUERIED US STATING HE SHOWED US ABOUT 4 MI N OF COURSE. AN APPARENT EQUIP PROB WITH OUR ACFT FMS. DEAD RECKONING MESSAGES STARTED TO APPEAR. MAP DISPLAYS WERE SHIFTED NOTICEABLY TO THE L. FMS VOR AND DME UPDATING FUNCTIONS WERE NOT OPERATING PROPERLY. UPDATED POS OVER KNOWN POINT AND ALL MALFUNCTIONS RETURNED TO NORMAL.

  487.  
  488. Accession Number: 409993
    Synopsis: THE FLC OF A B747-400 HAS PROBS TRYING TO BAL THE FUEL AS THEY FLY IN RCTP FOREIGN AIRSPACE.
    Narrative: DURING FLT #YY NRT-HKG ON JUL/XX/98, WE HAD A MAJOR FUEL IMBALANCE SIT WHICH IF NOT DETECTED, COULD HAVE RESULTED IN THE FLAMEOUT OF ENGS #1 AND #4. THERE WAS PLENTY OF ACCESSIBLE FUEL IN TANKS #2 AND #3 WHICH WOULD HAVE ALLOWED A RESTART AND POSITIVE FUEL FLOW FOR CONTINUED FLT. THE CAPT AND FO HAD DIFFERENT FUEL PUMP CONFIGNS IN MIND AT ENG START, BOTH OF WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN ACCEPTABLE. HOWEVER ONLY HALF OF EACH CONFIGN WAS ESTABLISHED. 3 OUT OF 4 EICAS MESSAGE ADVISORIES WERE NEVER RECEIVED. HUMAN FACTORS AND DISTRACTIONS ALSO WERE INVOLVED RESULTING IN THE IMBALANCE. AT ENG START, I PUSHED THE APPLICABLE FUEL PUMPS ON FOR TANK TO ENG CONFIGN. AS THE FUEL LOAD WAS 121000 LBS, EITHER THE TANK TO ENG OR THE FUEL-OVERRIDE #2 AND #3 PUMPS ALONG WITH #1 AND #4 XFEEDS OPEN, ARE ACCEPTABLE CONFIGNS. MY CAPT WAS THINKING OF THE OVERRIDE/XFEED CONFIGN AND I WAS USING TANK TO ENG. THUS WE ENCOUNTERED HALF THE SET UP OF EACH. THE CHKLIST HAS A CHALLENGE OF 'XFEEDS #1 AND #4' OF WHICH THERE ARE TWO POSSIBLE RESPONSES. MY CAPT RESPONDED 'OPEN' WHICH WAS TRUE AND I SHOULD HAVE STOPPED AND ASKED: WHY? RATHER, BECAUSE THIS RESPONSE IS ACCEPTABLE, I CONTINUED ON. WE SHOULD HAVE RECEIVED 3 EICAS ADVISORY MESSAGES WARNING OF THIS NON STANDARD CONFIGN, BUT NEVER DID AND PUSHING THE RECALL BUTTON DISPLAYED NO APPLICABLE MESSAGES AS WELL (1) FUEL TANK/ENG, 2) XFEED CONFIGN, 3) XFEED FUEL IMBALANCE #1 AND #4). THE 4TH ADVISORY DID DISPLAY HALFWAY THROUGH THE FLT (LOW FUEL QUANTITY). AT THAT TIME WE PLACED THE OVERRIDE PUMPS #2 AND #3 ON, WHICH FED FUEL INTO ENGS #1 AND #4. THE REST OF THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL WITH A NORMAL LNDG IN HKG. I NOTED THE FUEL QUANTITY TOTALS ON THE FLT PLAN EVERY WAYPOINT WHICH SHOWED A CONSISTENT 2500 LBS UNDER BURN. THE LOGBOOK ARR FUEL WAS LOGGED AND A MECH BRIEFED. HUMAN FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE IMBALANCE WERE: 1) CAPT AND FO THINKING OF DIFFERENT FUEL CONFIGN SCENARIOS BEFORE ENG START UP, 2) DISTRACTIONS OF A COMPLEX SID FROM NRT ALONG WITH EXTENSIVE BRIEFING FOR APCH AND LNDG INTO THE NEW HONG KONG ARPT, 3) THE CHKLIST WAS FOLLOWED BUT DID NOT ADDRESS THIS SCENARIO, 4) THIS WAS MY FIRST TIME IN THE COCKPIT FOR TKOF IN 7 MONTHS. MECHANICAL FACTORS WERE: 1) NOT RECEIVING 3 EICAS ADVISORY MESSAGES, 2) MAIN PUMPS #1 AND #4 HAVING A HIGHER OUTPUT PRESSURE THAN #2 AND #3 MAIN PUMPS RESULTING IN FUEL DEPLETION (TANKS #1 AND #4) IF #1 AND #4 XFEEDS OPEN, 3) XFEED CONFIGN EICAS MESSAGE DISPLAYED AFTER COMPLETE ENG SHUTDOWN IN HKG. OTHER ITEMS TO NOTE ARE 1) THE L FMC WAS RELOADED WITH DATA DUE TO PREVIOUS FAILURE JUST BEFORE OUR FLT, 2) WE HAVE A TEMPORARY PROC OF TURNING ON THE ENG BLEED VALVES JUST BEFORE START, 3) THE FUEL LOAD OF 121000 LBS ALLOWED FOR EITHER FUEL CONFIGN SET UP, 4) LATE FLAP RETRACTION DUE TO NOISE ABATEMENT REQUIREMENTS IN NRT, 5) COCKPIT OPERATING MANUAL DOES NOT SOLVE THIS PARTICULAR 'LOW FUEL QUANTITY' SIT IN TANKS #1 AND #4. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT THE FUEL LEVEL WAS EVEN AT 120000 LBS TOTAL. THE EICAS MESSAGE INDICATED THE FUEL TANKS OF EACH WING TANK SHOULD BE TO EACH RESPECTIVE ENG. THEY GOT A FUEL IMBALANCE LIGHT AND NOTED THAT TANKS #1 AND #4 DIFFER BY 6000 LBS. ONE TANK GOT LOW ENOUGH TO SHOW FUEL QUANTITY. THEY CARRIED EXTRA FUEL, BUT THEY DID NOT CHK THE FUEL PANEL TO ASSURE HOW FUEL WAS BEING USED. WHEN IT WAS DECIDED TO REBALANCE THE FUEL, NO ONE PERSON WAS IN CHARGE. EACH PLT DECIDED WHICH TECHNIQUE THEY WOULD USE AND EACH PLT WAS DOING SOMETHING DIFFERENT THAN THE OTHER. THE L FMC WAS INOP WHICH DISTRACTED THE FLC. SOMEHOW, THE FUEL BEGAN TO COME WITHIN BAL RANGE IN TIME FOR NORMAL UNEVENTFUL LNDG AT DEST.

  489.  
  490. Accession Number: 410070
    Synopsis: FLC OF A B757 OVERSHOT ASSIGNED ALT DURING A STAR ARR DUE TO THE ACFT'S OVERSPD WARNING DISTR AND IMMEDIATELY STARTED RETURN WHEN ATC CLRED THEM TO A LOWER ALT. THE FO WAS MANUALLY FLYING ACFT DUE TO THE ALT BUG OF THE MODE CTL PANEL BECOMING INOP.
    Narrative: DURING OUR INITIAL DSCNT INTO MSP WE WERE CLRED TO DSND FROM AN INTERMEDIATE ALT TO FL240. DURING THIS INTERMEDIATE PERIOD OUR ALT CTL BUG ON THE MODE CTL PANEL (MCP) FAILED TO OPERATE AT ABOUT FL246 AND STUCK IN THIS POS FOR THE REST OF THE FLT. THE FO WAS FLYING THE ACFT AND I (THE CAPT) INSTRUCTED HIM TO FLY THE ACFT MANUALLY, SINCE ALL LEVELOFF LOGIC WAS BASED ON THE MCP ALT WINDOW. WE WERE KEPT HIGH ON THE ARR BECAUSE OF TFC AND THEN WERE CLRED TO CROSS GOLLF INTXN AT 11000 FT. THE FO DSNDED MANUALLY, DEPLOYING THE SPD BRAKES AND INCREASING AIRSPD TO 340 KTS IN ORDER TO MAKE THE RESTR. I THEN STARTED TO TROUBLESHOOT THE PROB WITH HOPES OF RESTORING THE MCP AND RETURNING TO AUTOMATIC FLT WHILE THE FO CONTINUED TO FLY THE ACFT. AS WE APCHED 11000 FT, THE OVERSPD WARNING SOUNDED ON THE ACFT AND DISTRACTED US JUST LONG ENOUGH TO DIP BELOW THE 11000 FT RESTR. WE LEVELED AT 10400 FT AND STARTED AN IMMEDIATE CLB BACK TO 11000 FT. AS WE STARTED OUR CLB BACK TO 11000 FT WE WERE ALMOST IMMEDIATELY GIVEN THE CLRNC TO DSND TO 10000 FT. WE DSNDED TO 10000 FT AND FLEW THE REST OF THE FLT MANUALLY WITH A NORMAL LNDG AT MSP. THE ALT BUST WAS THE RESULT OF 4 FACTORS WORKING IN CONCERT: 1) MECHANICAL FAILURE OF THE MCP ALT BUG. 2) THE SUDDEN REQUIREMENT TO FLY THE ACFT MANUALLY (VERY RARE SIT ON THE B757) WITH NO FLT GUIDANCE. 3) THE AGGRESSIVE DSCNT RATE REQUIRED TO MAKE THE STAR ALT REQUIREMENT. 4) THE LAST MIN DISTR OF THE ACFT OVERSPD WARNING WHILE APCHING LEVELOFF ALT.

  491.  
  492. Accession Number: 410594
    Synopsis: A FO RPT ON AN INFLT ENG SHUTDOWN AND THE CONFUSION EXHIBITED BY THE FLT ATTENDANTS WHEN GIVEN A 'CABIN ADVISORY' BY THE FLC.
    Narrative: WE HAD AN ENG FAILURE IN A B737-300 ON A FLT FROM SAN TO SFO. AT FIRST WE THOUGHT IT WAS AN AUTOTHROTTLE PROB. ON CLBOUT FROM SAN PASSING THROUGH ABOUT FL240, THE #1 THROTTLE STARTED HUNTING -- ABOUT +/-8% N1 OR SO. WE TURNED OFF THE AUTOTHROTTLES AND LEFT THEM OFF FOR THE REST OF THE CLB. AT CRUISE AT FL350, WE TURNED THEM BACK ON TO SEE WHAT WOULD HAPPEN. AT THIS TIME (AND FOR MOST OF THE CRUISE PORTION OF THE FLT) THEY BOTH HUNTED ABOUT +/-1% N1 -- NOT TOO BAD, BUT STILL NOTICEABLE AND NOT NORMAL. WE WANTED TO LEAVE THEM ENGAGED TO SEE WHAT WOULD HAPPEN AT THE TOP OF DSCNT. AT TOP OF DSCNT, THE THROTTLES CAME BACK TO IDLE LIKE NORMAL. SOMETIME AROUND FL260, THE AIRSPD BEGAN TO DECAY (280 WAS PROGRAMMED) AS THE AIRPLANE PITCHED TO STAY ON THE VNAV PATH. THIS IS NOT UNCOMMON IF YOU ENCOUNTER A HEADWIND COMPONENT GREATER THAN PROGRAMMED ON DSCNT. AT AROUND 265 KTS, THE AUTOTHROTTLES ADVANCED LIKE NORMAL TO RE-ESTABLISH PROGRAMMED DSCNT SPD. HERE'S THE CATCH -- BOTH THROTTLES ADVANCED, BUT ONLY THE R ENG RESPONDED. ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY THE 'LOW IDLE' LIGHT CAME ON AND WE NOTICED THE N1, N2, AND FUEL FLOW FOR THE L ENG DECAY RAPIDLY. AN INTERESTING SIDE NOTE -- SINCE THE B737 ONLY HAS A 2-AXIS AUTOPLT, THE YOKE TURNED ABOUT 2 UNITS TO THE R TO COUNTERACT THE ASYMMETRICAL THRUST. THIS SIT WOULD HAVE BEEN A LOT HARDER TO NOTICE IN AN AIRBUS PRODUCT WITH A SIDESTICK CTLR THAT DOESN'T MOVE. THERE WAS NOW ABSOLUTELY ZERO RESPONSE FROM THE L THROTTLE. THIS IS WHEN THINGS STARTED HAPPENING QUICKLY. THE L GENERATOR KICKED OFF AS WE WERE STARTING THE APU, THE FLT ATTENDANTS CALLED ABOUT THE LOSS OF GALLEY PWR AND SOME LIGHTING, WE WERE PULLING OUT THE BOOKS, CALLING DISPATCH, AND WE GOT A FREQ CHANGE TO BAY APCH ALL AT THE SAME TIME. WE CHKED IN WITH BAY, DECLARED AN EMER, REPWRED THE L SIDE OF THE ELECTRICAL SYS, AND ASKED THE FIRST FLT ATTENDANT TO COME UP. WE TOLD THE FIRST FLT ATTENDANT THAT WE HAD JUST LOST THE #1 ENG, THAT WE EXPECTED A NORMAL LNDG IN ABOUT 10 MINS, THAT WE DID NOT WANT HER TO PREPARE THE CABIN FOR AN EVAC, BUT THAT THIS WAS A 'CABIN ADVISORY.' SHE SAID OK AND LEFT THE COCKPIT. (A 'CABIN ADVISORY' MEANS GET OUT YOUR MANUALS AND REVIEW THE EVAC PROCS, BUT DO NOT PREPARE THE CABIN UNLESS THE SIT DETERIORATES AND YOU ARE INSTRUCTED TO DO SO.) SINCE WE COULD HAVE GLIDED ALL THE WAY TO THE ARPT WITH NO ENGS, SINCE WE HAD EXPERIENCED EARLIER PROBS WITH THE NOW-DEAD L ENG, AND SINCE WE WERE SHORT ON TIME, WE OPTED NOT TO TRY FOR A RESTART AND INSTEAD TO JUST SECURE THE ENG. AS WE WERE FINISHING THE CHKLISTS AND STARTING TO CONFIGURE FOR LNDG (ABOUT 6000 FT AT THIS TIME), THE FIRST FLT ATTENDANT KNOCKED ON THE DOOR. SHE ENTERED THE COCKPIT LOOKING LIKE A DEER IN THE HEADLIGHTS. SHE SAID THAT NEITHER SHE, NOR THE OTHER WORKING FLT ATTENDANTS, NOR THE JUMP SEATING FLT ATTENDANT HAD EVER HEARD OF A 'CABIN ADVISORY' AND COULDN'T FIND IT IN THEIR MANUALS. SHE THEN ASKED AGAIN IF WE WANTED HER TO PREPARE THE CABIN FOR AN EVAC. QUITE BUSY AND FRANKLY NOT BELIEVING OUR EARS, WE HAD TO EXPLAIN TO HER WHAT A 'CABIN ADVISORY' WAS AT THIS CRITICAL POINT IN THE FLT. NEEDLESS TO SAY, WE LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. WE STILL HAD 1 MORE LEG TO GO FOR THE DAY, BUT THE FIRST FLT ATTENDANT WAS SO SHAKEN THAT SHE COULDN'T CONTINUE THE TRIP, AND SHE HAD TO BE REPLACED. BY THE WAY, WE WERE MET BY AN INFLT SUPVR WHEN WE WALKED OFF THE AIRPLANE. CURIOUS, WE ASKED THE SUPVR IF SHE WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE TERM 'CABIN ADVISORY.' SHE HAD ALSO NEVER HEARD OF IT AND MADE THE COMMENT, 'MAYBE I'LL ASK ABOUT IT WHEN I GO TO RECURRENT IN A FEW WKS.' THERE IS OBVIOUSLY A SERIOUS TRAINING ISSUE HERE. EITHER THE FLT ATTENDANTS ARE NOT PAYING ATTN IN RECURRENT TRAINING, OR SOME OF OUR COMPANY'S EMER PROCS ARE NOT GETTING ENOUGH COVERAGE. I ALSO BELIEVE THERE IS AN ISSUE WITH THE HIRING OF OUR FLT ATTENDANTS. MY COMPANY IS MUCH MORE INTERESTED IN HIRING FLT ATTENDANTS WHO CAN SPEAK A FOREIGN LANGUAGE THAN THE BEST FLT ATTENDANTS FOR THE JOB. IN FACT, ONE CANNOT EVEN GET A FLT ATTENDANT INTERVIEW WITHOUT FOREIGN LANGUAGE SKILLS. THERE WERE NO LANGUAGE PROBS ON THIS FLT, BUT I HAVE TO WONDER IF WE ARE HIRING THE BEST PEOPLE FOR THE JOB. BY THE WAY, MAINT TRIED STARTING THE ENG AT THE GATE AND GOT A HUNG START. THEY ENDED UP REPLACING THE MAIN ENG CTL AND THE PLANE WAS FLYING AGAIN THE NEXT DAY.

  493.  
  494. Accession Number: 410608
    Synopsis: FLC OF A HAWKER 700 EXPERIENCES SEVERE WAKE TURB 8 MI IN TRAIL OF A B757 ON STEPDOWN DSCNT VECTOR.
    Narrative: WHILE BEING VECTORED FOR AN APCH TO MSP WE EXPERIENCED WHAT I BELIEVE WAS SEVERE WAKE TURB. WE WERE ON AN ASSIGNED HDG AT 11000 FT AND ASSIGNED SPD OF 250 KTS. IT STARTED WITH MAYBE 5 SECONDS OF STEADY BUT VERY LIGHT TURB. I COMMENTED ON THE STRANGE FEEL TO THE PNF. AS I SAID THAT, THE AIRPLANE ROLLED INTO A 90 DEG BANK TO THE R INSTANTLY. I DISENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND RECOVERED BY HAND FLYING THE AIRPLANE. BY THE TIME THE WINGS WERE LEVEL WE HAD LOST 700 FT OF ALT. THE PNF CALLED APCH CTL TO TELL HIM WHAT HAD HAPPENED. THE CTLR SAID THAT WE WERE 8 MI IN TRAIL OF A B757. I CALLED BOTH THE TWR AND TRACON AFTER LNDG AND TALKED FURTHER WITH THEM. GIVEN THE SPD OF THE B757 AND OUR AIRPLANE (250 KTS) THE CTLRS WERE SURPRISED THAT THE WAKE TURB WAS SO SEVERE. THEY STATED THAT USUALLY THAT SEVERE OF TURB IS ASSOCIATED WITH SLOWER SPDS AND THE ASSOCIATED DRAG FROM FLAPS, ETC. THERE WAS 1 PAX ON BOARD. THERE WERE NO INJURIES TO CREW OR PAX. OUR PAX WAS SCARED BUT OTHERWISE UNHARMED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATES THAT HIS REVIEW WITH ATC BROUGHT ADDED QUESTIONS SINCE THE B757 WAS CLEAN AND AT 250 KTS. BOTH ACFT WERE ON RADAR VECTORS AND ON THE EXACT SAME FLT PATH AND SPDS. THE IN TRAIL SEPARATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN AMPLE TO AVOID SUCH A WAKE TURB ENCOUNTER. RPTR WAS SURPRISED WHEN AUTOPLT WAS DISENGAGED THAT THERE WAS NO CTL INPUT ALREADY ACTIVE. INQUIRING OF THE MANUFACTURER THEY LEARNED THAT IN EXTREME CTL CHANGES THE AUTOPLT GOES INTO A COAST MODE UNTIL IT CAN DETERMINE IF THE EXTREME IS A FALSE INPUT OR NOT. THE AUTOPLT THEN RESPONDS WITH CORRECT INPUT. RPTR SAYS YOU LEARN SOMETHING NEW ALL THE TIME. IN HIS 23 YRS OF FLYING HE HAS NEVER EXPERIENCED ANYTHING AS SEVERE AS THIS. THE ACFT WAS A HAWKER 700.

  495.  
  496. Accession Number: 410758
    Synopsis: ACR MD82 FLC FO INADVERTENTLY DISARMS AUTOPLT IN DSCNT WHILE INPUTTING SPD DATA INTO THE DIGITAL FLT GUIDANCE PANEL. DSCNT THROUGH ASSIGNED ALT WAS OBSERVED BY THE FLC WHEN BELOW 11000 FT. ATC NOTIFICATION WAS MADE AND THE ACFT RETURNED TO ASSIGNED ALT. PIC ALLEGES THAT MANIPULATING THE DIGITAL FLT GUIDANCE SYS IN THE MD82 IS A BIG HURDLE TO OVERCOME IN THE ACFT.
    Narrative: WAS TOLD TO MAINTAIN 11000 FT, BUT DSNDED TO 10500 FT. AUTOPLT DID NOT CAPTURE ALT. DO NOT DEPEND ON AUTOPLT TO DO THE JOB. YOU MUST SCAN AT ALL TIMES. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 410900: COPLT WAS FLYING WITH #2 AUTOPLT ENGAGED DSNDING TO 11000 FT WITH THAT ALT ARMED FOR CAPTURE BY AUTOPLT. IN DIAGNOSIS OF WHAT CAUSED THE ALT INCURSION, COPLT HAD MADE A DIGITAL FLT GUIDANCE PANEL SELECTION TO REDUCE AIRSPD, HOWEVER THE FLT GUIDANCE AND AUTOPLT HAD ALREADY CAPTURED THE ARMED ALT OF 11000 FT AND WAS BEGINNING TO LEVEL OFF. THE SELECTION MADE BY THE COPLT 'DISARMED' THE ALT CAPTURE AND REVERSED THE DIGITAL FLT GUIDANCE TO A VERT SPD MODE DSCNT AND ACFT CONTINUED TO DSND BELOW 11000 FT. HAD I SEEN IT, I COULD HAVE CANCELED HIS SELECTION, RE-ARMED THE ALT AND PREVENTED INCURSION. UNDERSTANDING AND MANIPULATING THE DIGITAL FLT GUIDANCE SYS IS PROBABLY THE BIGGEST HURDLE TO OVERCOME IN THIS ACFT.

  497.  
  498. Accession Number: 411330
    Synopsis: B737 CREW DID NOT MAKE A CTLR ISSUED XING RESTR.
    Narrative: ON DSCNT ON THE VCN STAR, CTR GAVE US A XING RESTR. AT THE SAME TIME, THE FLT ATTENDANT RANG US. FO WAS FLYING. I ANSWERED THE RADIO, THEN ANSWERED FLT ATTENDANT. FO PROGRAMMED THE FMC. SOMEHOW SIE VOR DROPPED FROM FMC. FO SAID HE DIDN'T DO IT. I WAS TALKING ON INTERPHONE TO A FLT ATTENDANT AND THUS DISTR BY OTHER DUTIES. CTR SAID THERE WASN'T A CONFLICT, BUT WE DID GO OFF THE STAR.

  499.  
  500. Accession Number: 411760
    Synopsis: A CLBING MD80 OVERSHOT ITS ASSIGNED ALT OF FL280 BY 1200 FT WHEN THE ALT ALERTER WINDOW WAS SET TO FL290 VERSUS FL280.
    Narrative: I WAS PNF ON AUG/TUE/98, WHICH WAS IN PROCESS OF LEVELING OFF AT FL290 1000 FT ABOVE FL280 ASSIGNED. CTLING AGENCY ZAU RECLRED FLT TO FL280 WHILE CLBING TO FL230 ON MKE-STL LEG. THE CAUSE OF THE OVERSHOOT, I BELIEVE, WAS A COCKPIT PREOCCUPATION WITH THE CAPT'S PROB TRIMMING THE ACFT PLUS A POSSIBLE MOVEMENT OF THE ALT WINDOW DIGIT FROM 28000 FT TO 29000 FT AFTER THE ALT WAS SET. TO MY KNOWLEDGE I SET AND ARMED 28000 FT AND POINTED TO THE WINDOW TO DOUBLE CHK AND THEN TO THE YELLOW 'ALT' READOUT ON THE MD80 FLT MGMNT ANNUNCIATOR WINDOW. DURING THE CLB THE CAPT ASKED ME SEVERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ACFT TRIM AND IN MY RESPONSE I MENTIONED THAT I USUALLY JUST TRIM WITH AILERON AND WORRY ABOUT RUDDER TRIM ADJUSTMENTS AFTER LEVELOFF. HE CONTINUED TO EXPLORE THE TRIM PROB UNTIL I FELT THE ACFT LURCH FORWARD IN PITCH AND I SAW 29200 FT ON MY ALTIMETER. IF 29000 FT WAS MISSING IN WINDOW IT SHOULD'VE LEVELED OFF AT 29000 FT SO I BELIEVE SOMEHOW ALT SETTING SLIPPED 1 DIGIT AND DISARMED THE ALT WITHOUT PF OR PNF (ME) SEEING IT. RECOMMEND: 1) CHK WITH MANUFACTURER TO SEE IF ALT WINDOW CAN 'AUTONOMOUSLY' SLIP 1 DIGIT AND DISARM AFTER IT HAS BEEN SET AND ARMED? 2) PLTS BE ENCOURAGED NOT TO DISCUSS ANY NON ESSENTIAL SUBJECTS WHILE ALTIMETER IS MOVING, ESPECIALLY DURING THE INITIAL CLBOUT WHEN ACTIVITY SLOWS DOWN.

  501.  
  502. Accession Number: 411791
    Synopsis: A B737, LOST 800 FT IN THE HOLDING PATTERN AT FL410 WHEN THE CAPT SELECTED LNAV FOR THE TURN BACK INBOUND TO THE VOR. THE AUTOPLT HAD DISENGAGED DURING THE ENSUING 30 DEG BANK.
    Narrative: AFTER PASSING GLOVR AND WHILE ON THE OUTBOUND HOLDING LEG, THE LNAV WAS ENGAGED AND ACFT TURNED INTO A 30 DEG ANGLE OF BANK TO GET ON THE INBOUND LEG. SUDDENLY, THE AUTOPLT DISENGAGED, THE NOSE DROPPED AND ACFT LOST 800 FT IN SECONDS. I DISENGAGED THE AUTOTHROTTLE CLBED UP TO 41000 FT AND RESUMED HOLDING.

  503.  
  504. Accession Number: 411990
    Synopsis: B737 ACFT WITH AUTOMATED FLT GUIDANCE SYS DEVIATED 200 FT ABOVE CLRED ALT BEFORE CAPT CORRECTED IT.
    Narrative: FO WAS THE PF. ACFT AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED ENTIRE LEG FROM MSP TO MDW. DURING THE TIME OF OCCURRENCE, HOWEVER, I'M NOT SURE IF FMS WAS ENGAGED OR ALT HOLD. WE WERE CLRED FOR THE ILS RWY 4R APCH TO MDW (IN VMC CONDITIONS) AND INSTRUCTED TO 'MAINTAIN 4000 FT UNTIL CADON, CLRED FOR ILS RWY 4R APCH, CONTACT TWR FAF INBOUND.' APPROX 2-3 MI FROM CADON, FO CALLED FOR FLAPS 5 DEGS. UPON REACHING BACK FROM THE FLAP HANDLE, I NOTICED THE ACFT CLBING THROUGH 4200 FT. I SIMULTANEOUSLY TOLD THE FO TO CHK HIS ALT, DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND RETURNED TO 4000 FT MSL. AT NO TIME WAS ANOTHER ACFT OBSERVED IN THE AREA NOR AN ALERT GIVEN (OR WARNING) BY TCASII OR ATC.

  505.  
  506. Accession Number: 412229
    Synopsis: A B757-200 IN CRUISE AT FL370 DIVERTED DUE TO NUMEROUS AIR DATA COMPUTER SERVED SYS FAILURES.
    Narrative: AFTER CLBING OUT OF FL330 TO FL370 THE ALT ALERT DID NOT FUNCTION PROPERLY, THEN FOLLOWED WITH THE L AUTOPLT MOVING THE YOKE FORWARD AND AFT 2-3 INCHES 4 TIMES IN LESS THAN 2 SECONDS, FOLLOWED BY THE CABIN ALT INSTS SPINNING LIKE A PROP IN BOTH AUTO 1 AND 2 MODES, FOLLOWED BY THE NO LAND 3 STATUS, FOLLOWED BY THE AUTOTHROTTLES DISCONNECT AND EICAS MESSAGE SEVERAL TIMES, FOLLOWED BY THE R AUTOPLT TRIPPING OFF. THIS WAS ALL OVER A 15 MIN PERIOD. A PATCH WITH DISPATCH AND MAINT WAS MADE AND AFTER 30 MINS, A DECISION WAS MADE TO WHICH ARPT TO DIVERT TO FOR MAINT. WE DSNDED TO FL240 DUE TO THE CABIN ALT PROB, NOT KNOWING WHERE IT WAS DUE TO SPINNING DIALS. WE LANDED SAFELY IN SFO AND PLACED ALL ITEMS IN THE LOG. SFO WAS PICKED FROM DISPATCH AND MAINT FOR MAINT REASONS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE ACFT WAS A B757-200 AND WAS DELAYED FOR 2 HRS AWAITING AN AIR DATA COMPUTER SHIPPED INTO THE DEP STATION TO CORRECT A PREVIOUS LOG WRITE-UP. THE RPTR SAID THE MECH REPLACED THE AIR DATA COMPUTER AND ACCOMPLISHED A BITE TEST OF THE COMPUTER AND SIGNED OFF THE RPT. THE RPTR STATED THE MECH DID NOT PERFORM A STATIC LEAK CHK WHICH THE RPTR THOUGHT WAS NECESSARY. THE RPTR STATED THE ACFT HAD THE CTR AUTOPLT DEFERRED AS INOP BUT NOT PLACARDED AND THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS WERE NOT PULLED AND LOCKED OUT. THE RPTR SAID ON CLBING FROM FL330 IT WAS NOTED THE ALT ALERT SYS WAS NOT WORKING AND ON LEVELOFF AT FL370 THINGS BEGAN TO HAPPEN LIKE THE YOKE MOVING FORE AND AFT, CABIN PRESSURE AND ALTIMETER FLAGS IN VIEW, CABIN PRESSURE INDICATORS PEGGED AND THE CABIN ALT DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE INDICATOR SPINNING LIKE A PROP AND THE AUTOTHROTTLE DISCONNECTED. THE RPTR SAID A DSCNT WAS MADE TO FL240 DUE TO CONCERN ABOUT THE PRESSURIZATION BUT AT NO TIME DID THE ACFT LOSE PRESSURIZATION. AFTER THE ACFT WAS LANDED AND MAINT MADE A QUICK CHK OF THE L AIR DATA COMPUTER, IT INDICATED 12 FAULTS BUT NO OTHER DETAILS WERE RECEIVED FROM MAINT.

  507.  
  508. Accession Number: 412710
    Synopsis: A DSNDING MD80 OVERSHOT ITS ASSIGNED ALT BY 400 FT WHILE ON AUTOPLT, ALT CAPTURE MODE.
    Narrative: CLRED TO CROSS RIDGY AT FL240 ON RBV 1. FL240 SET AND ARMED FOR ALT CAPTURE. WITH HIGH DSCNT RATE, ACFT WENT THROUGH FL240 BY 300-400 FT AND DID NOT CAPTURE ALT. AUTOPLT ON. IMMEDIATELY MANUALLY LEVELED AT FL240. CTR SAID NOTHING.

  509.  
  510. Accession Number: 413180
    Synopsis: ACR ACFT APCHS OTHER TFC DEVIATING WX IN LAS ZLA AIRSPACE.
    Narrative: WE WERE LEVEL AT 16000 FT MSL, DEVIATING AROUND BUILDUPS. ALL OF A SUDDEN WE SAW A TWIN (BEECH STARSHIP) PASS R TO L IN FRONT OF US -- CLOSE -- AND HE APPEARED TO BE CO- ALT. WE IMMEDIATELY LOOKED AT THE TCASII DISPLAY, AND IT INDICATED 14000 FT, 2000 FT BELOW US! THAT'S NOT WHAT IT LOOKED LIKE. WE ASKED CTR TO VERBALLY CONFIRM WITH THE OTHER PLT THAT HE WAS AT 14000 FT, WHICH HE DID. WE THEN LOOKED AT OUR OWN ALTIMETERS, ETC, AND COULD NOT DETERMINE ANY REASON FOR THE DISCREPANCY. BOTH OF US ARE CONVINCED WE WERE VERY CLOSE TO BEING CO-ALT. WE COULD SEE THE TYPE AND COLOR OF THE OTHER ACFT.

  511.  
  512. Accession Number: 413415
    Synopsis: AN MD11 IN CRUISE AT FL370 WITH AUTOPLT IN ALT HOLD MODE BEGAN A SMOOTH GENTLE CLB TO FL378 WITH NO ALT ALERT WARNING. ALT SELECT STILL INDICATED FL370.
    Narrative: AT FL370 WHILE IN CLR, DAYLIGHT, SMOOTH CONDITIONS, THE ACFT BEGAN A SMOOTH CLB. THE CAPT NOTICED IT FIRST, CALLED IT TO MY ATTN (I WAS LOOKING AT ANOTHER MD11 BELOW US). I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND RETURNED TO FL370. WE HAD BEEN AT FL370 FOR ABOUT 6 HRS (FLT WAS LAX-NRT) AND THE ONLY FMS INPUT WAS FOR A DSCNT TO CROSS A FIX INBOUND TO NRT. THE ONLY GLARESHIELD (AUTOFLT) INPUT WAS A HDG CHANGE. THE CAPT SAW FL370 STILL IN ALT WINDOW DURING THIS EXCURSION. WE WERE DSNDING BACK TO FL370 WHEN TOKYO ASKED IF WE WERE AVOIDING WX. WE SAID NO, WE WERE RETURNING TO FL370. NO CONFLICT AROSE AND NOTHING FURTHER WAS SAID. REMAINDER OF FLT UNEVENTFUL. THE MECH IN NRT RAN A DIAGNOSTIC ON THE AUTOFLT/FMS/GLARESHIELD AND FOUND ONLY A SPURIOUS SPD INPUT TO FMS DSCNT. HE FELT IT HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THIS EVENT. I HAVE HEARD OF ONLY 1 OTHER SUCH TYPE EXCURSION AND HAVE BEEN ON THIS ACFT FOR 6 YRS. I AM UPSET THAT I DO NOT KNOW HOW OR WHY IT OCCURRED OR HOW TO PREVENT IT FROM RECURRING. I WILL VISIT WITH OUR MD11 TYPE MGR NEXT WEEK TO RESEARCH THIS MATTER. I WOULD BE MOST APPRECIATIVE IF YOU HAVE ANY INFO ON WHAT MIGHT HAVE CAUSED THIS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE ACFT BEGAN A SLOW SMOOTH GENTLE CLB FROM FL370 TO FL378 WHEN THE DEV WAS DISCOVERED. THE RPTR SAID AT NO TIME DID THE ALT ALERT SOUND AND THE ALT SELECT STILL READ FL370. THE RPTR STATED THE RPT WAS WRITTEN UP AND TOKYO MAINT DID A COMPREHENSIVE TEST OF THE AUTOFLT, FMS AND GLARESHIELD COMPONENTS AND FOUND NOTHING THAT WOULD CAUSE THE ALTDEV. THE RPTR SAID THE OUTBOUND CAPT WHO HAD EXTENSIVE MD11 EXPERIENCE WAS ADVISED OF THE EVENT AND COMMENTED IT HAD HAPPENED ONCE BEFORE. THE RPTR HAS 6 YRS FLYING THE MD11 WITH NO PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE OF ALTDEV FROM THE FLT CTL COMPUTER. THE RPTR STATED A VISIT WAS MADE TO ACR MD11 FLT MGR TO REQUEST INFO ON PREVIOUS AUTOPLT ALT HOLD RPTS ON THE MD11 BUT NONE WERE IN THE MAINT HISTORY.

  513.  
  514. Accession Number: 413428
    Synopsis: B737 CREW DEVIATES FROM CLRED TRACK IN BOS AIRSPACE.
    Narrative: BOS CLRNC INQUIRED IF WE COULD ACCEPT WYLYY 1 DEP INSTEAD OF LOGAN 2 AS CLRED ON PDC. WE CONSULTED PROC. WE VERIFIED THAT WE WERE 'SLANT F.' DISCUSSED NOTE ABOUT UPDATING NAV SYS TO RWY 27 LATITUDE/LONGITUDE PRIOR TO DEP. THIS ACFT DOES NOT HAVE TKOF SHIFT FEATURE. WE AGREED TO DO A QUICK ALIGNMENT ON RWY AND ACCEPTED DEP. DURING TAXI OUT, FMS CAUSED A RTE DISCONTINUITY FROM THE RWY HDG FIX TO GARVE WAYPOINT. REPAIRED DISCONTINUITY 2 TIMES. TOOK POS ON RWY AND DID A QUICK IRS ALIGNMENT. FLEW DEP IN LNAV. AFTER 1000 FT AGL, ENGAGED AUTOPLT. ACFT IMMEDIATELY STARTED A LARGE R TURN THAT APPEARED EXCESSIVE. DOWNGRADED AUTOPLT TO CTL WHEEL STEERING AND RE-ENGAGED LNAV. COURSE BAR BEGAN TO SWING BACK AND FORTH 180 DEGS EVERY 10 SECONDS. WAYPOINT INDICATOR APPEARED TO BE POINTING TO NEXT FIX, WYLYY, BUT COURSE INFO WAS ERRATIC AND UNUSABLE. REQUESTED VECTORS FROM ATC. ATC QUERIED REASON FOR VECTORS. WE ADVISED THEM OF UNRELIABLE NAV DATA. REST OF DEP UNEVENTFUL.

  515.  
  516. Accession Number: 414116
    Synopsis: AN ACR MLG ON APCH TO ORD RWY 14R EXPERIENCES AN ALT EXCURSION PRIOR TO REACHING THE NDB. THE CREW HAD 'BUILT' AN NDB APCH INTO THEIR FMC, BUT THE FIX WAS DEPICTED IN THE WRONG AREA. CREW STARTED DSCNT WITH A PREMATURE NEEDLE SWING. CFIT.
    Narrative: AS THE FO AND PF, I BRIEFED THE NDB RWY 14R APCH AT ORD. BECAUSE AN NDB IS A RARE OCCURRENCE IN OUR OP, WE DECIDED TO 'BUILD' AN NDB APCH WITH THE FMC. DOING THIS WOULD GIVE US A BACKUP ON OUR POS AND A WAY TO ANTICIPATE THE XING OF THE FAF. THE ONLY PROB IS THAT THE CONSTRUCTED APCH DEPICTED 'OR' BEACON 5.2 MI N OF ITS ACTUAL POS. ORD APCH CTL WAS VERY BUSY AND AFTER SEVERAL RADAR VECTORS, LEFT US ON A 140 DEG HDG BUT DID NOT CLR US FOR THE APCH. WITH A STRONG W WIND WE WERE DRIFTING E OF FINAL. AFTER RECEIVING APCH CLRNC, IT WAS A SCRAMBLE TO REINTERCEPT AND GET THE ACFT IN THE LNDG CONFIGN PRIOR TO THE FAF. RAW DATA WAS BEING DISPLAYED ON BOTH THE RDMI AND THE NAV DISPLAY. I THOUGHT WE WERE VERY CLOSE TO THE BEACON AND WHEN I SAW A 10 DEG SWING ON THE ADF NEEDLE, I ASSUMED WE WERE AT 'OR.' WE DSNDED ABOUT 500 FT WHEN APCH CTL SAID THEY HAD A LOW ALT ALERT ON US. WE CLBED BACK TO 2400 FT AND THEN REALIZED WHAT HAD HAPPENED. FACTORS WERE: INFO OVERLOAD, INACCURATE INFO (FMC FIX), HIGH WORKLOAD PORTION OF FLT, NONROUTINE OP, FIRST CREW PAIRING (2ND LEG). SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 414118: IT WAS A HURRIED TURN BACK TO INTERCEPT THE COURSE, BECAUSE THE FMC SHOWED US ALMOST AT THE NDB. WE BOTH SAW THE NEEDLE START TO SWING AND THE FO CALLED FOR THE NEXT ALT. I SELECTED THE NEXT ALT, STARTED THE TIME, AND GOT READY TO CALL THE TWR. TWR FREQ WAS BUSY SO I DIDN'T GET A CALL IN RIGHT AWAY. AFTER DSNDING ABOUT 500 FT, THE TWR GAVE US AN ALT ALERT. WE HAD BEEN DSNDING IN VFR CONDITIONS AND HAD GND CONTACT FROM ABOUT 7000 FT. WE COULD SEE THAT THERE WERE NO OBSTACLES IN OUR VICINITY AND WE WERE STILL ABOUT 1200 FT ABOVE THE GND. THEN WE BOTH LOOKED AT THE ADF NEEDLE AND SAW THAT IT WAS STILL POINTING UP. THE FMC SHOWED THE NDB FURTHER OUT ON THE APCH THAN IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN. A DOUBLECHK MIGHT HAVE CAUGHT THE ERROR. POOR RADAR VECTORS. IT CAUSED US TO BE IN A SLIGHT RUSH TO COMPLETE ALL RECEIVED CONFIGNS AND CHKLISTS. THE NDB'S AND OTHER NON PRECISION APCHS WE FLY AT RECURRENT TRAINING REQUIRE A DSCNT STARTED ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AT STATION PASSAGE. OTHERWISE, THE ACFT WON'T BE AT MDA IN TIME FOR A NORMAL APCH TO THE RWY.

  517.  
  518. Accession Number: 414120
    Synopsis: AN MD88 FLC DOES NOT START DOWN AFTER RECEIVING THEIR DSCNT CLRNC. THE CREW WAS INTERRUPTED BY THE FLT ATTENDANT AND THE CTR CTLR HAD TO ASK THE CREW ABOUT THEIR ALT.
    Narrative: AT FL310, TOP OF DSCNT, COPLT'S LEG, FLT RDU-CVG CLRED DIRECT DRESR TO CROSS IT AT FL240. I CALLED OUT OF FL310, SAW COPLT SET UP FMS AND AUTOPLT FOR DSCNT. AT SAME TIME, FLT ATTENDANT CALLED TO OFFER BREAKFAST. AS HE BROUGHT FOOD FORWARD, ZID ASKED OUR ALT AND IF WE WOULD MAKE THE RESTR AT DRESR. I LOOKED UP AT THE ALTIMETERS. WE WERE STILL AT FL310. I PUT ACFT INTO RAPID DSCNT (IAS MODE, .80 MACH, IDLE, SPD BRAKES). WHEN WE WERE 2 MI FROM DRESR AT FL260, DSNDING AT OVER 6000 FPM, CTLR GAVE US A 90 DEG TURN TO R. WE TURNED LESS THAN 30 DEGS BEFORE HE CLRED DIRECT TO OUR NEXT NAV POINT. I CHKED TCASII. THERE WAS NOT ANOTHER ACFT FOR 20 MI. I DO NOT BELIEVE THERE WAS A LOSS OF SEPARATION. IF THERE IS A LESSON LEARNED FOR ME, THIS ACFT'S AUTOMATION HAS CERTAIN PITFALLS THAT I MUST BE SPECIALLY AWARE OF. ALSO, WHEN I AM THE PNF, I NEED TO CHK WHAT THE PF IS DOING, RELIGIOUSLY, AND LEARN TO FILTER OUT DISTRS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 414123: BEGAN DSCNT VIA VNAV PATH, CAPT CALLED OUT OF FL310. ACFT INTERCEPTED AND BEGAN DSCNT. AT THIS TIME FLT ATTENDANT KNOCKED ON DOOR TO OFFER BREAKFAST. SHORTLY AFTER THIS, CTR ASKED OUR ALT. WE CHKED AND ACFT WAS BACK AT FL310 IN VNAV LEVEL. THE ACFT HAD DSNDED 300 FT INITIALLY, BUT AT SOME TIME DURING THIS PERIOD MUST HAVE RETURNED TO VNAV LEVEL UNNOTICED BY MYSELF OR THE CAPT. WE LEVELED AT FL240 OVER DRESR AND PROCEEDED WITH CONTINUATION OF ARR/APCH. XING ALT WOULD HAVE BEEN MADE, BUT WE HAD RPTED OUT OF FL310 EARLIER AND WERE STILL LEVEL AND WERE UNSURE AT TIME IF WE WOULD MAKE ALT RESTR.

  519.  
  520. Accession Number: 414286
    Synopsis: FO OF AN MD88 OVERSHOT DSCNT ASSIGNED ALT DURING A STAR ARR DUE TO THE #2 AUTOPLT DID NOT CAPTURE THE ALT. THE CAPT DISENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND RETURNED TO ASSIGNED.
    Narrative: I WAS THE CAPT AND PNF ON SEP/XA/98 MLU-DFW. WE WERE DSNDING INTO DFW ON THE CEDAR CREEK 2 ARR. WE WERE DSNDING TO CROSS TACKE INTXN AT 11000 FT MSL WITH THE #2 AUTOPLT ENGAGED IN IAS MODE. APCHING LEVELOFF ALT, THE FMA PANEL ANNUNCIATED ALT CAPTURE. THE ACFT DID NOT LEVEL OFF AND THE PF IMMEDIATELY SELECTED ALT HOLD. THE ACFT CONTINUED TO DSND, AT WHICH POINT I TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AND MANUALLY FLEW BACK TO 11000 FT. I RE-ENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND SELECTED ALT HOLD. THE ACFT BEGAN TO DSND AGAIN. I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT, SELECTED THE #1 AUTOPLT (#1 DFGC), RE-ENGAGED THE AUTOPLT, SELECTED ALT HOLD AND THE AUTOPLT FUNCTIONED NORMALLY. DURING THE COURSE OF THIS EVENT, OUR MINIMUM ALT WAS 10700 FT MSL. WE RECEIVED A CALL FROM DFW APCH WITH A REMINDER THAT OUR CLRED ALT WAS 11000 FT AND HE REPEATED THE CURRENT ALTIMETER SETTING. AT THE TIME WE RECEIVED THIS CALL, WE WERE CLBING BACK TO 11000 FT. ON ARR AT THE GATE IN DFW, DFW MAINT WAS CALLED VIA RADIO AND INFORMED OF THE AUTOPLT MALFUNCTION. AN ENTRY WAS MADE IN THE ACFT LOGBOOK.

  521.  
  522. Accession Number: 414510
    Synopsis: A SAAB 340 WAS VECTORED TO TURN ON FINAL THAT WAS TOO SHORT FOR ILS RECEIVER TO CAPTURE SIGNAL. CREW WAS NOT GIVEN FREQ CHANGE TO TWR BEFORE PRELNDG COCKPIT DUTIES DISTR THEM FROM REQUESTING LNDG CLRNC.
    Narrative: BEING VECTORED FOR ILS APCH TO PITTSBURGH. FINAL CTLR TURNED US ON TIGHT. AUTOPLT DIDN'T CAPTURE LOC AND WE DIDN'T CAPTURE GS BECAUSE LOC WASN'T CAPTURED. CALLED FOR FLAPS 15 DEGS, AUTOPLT DIDN'T HOLD ALT. DISENGAGED AUTOPLT AND BEGAN HAND FLYING INSIDE FAF. FO HAD LESS THAN 100 HRS IN ACFT. WE WERE VERY BUSY ON SHORT FINAL AND THE FINAL APCH CTLR NEVER HANDED US OVER TO TWR. WE WERE VERY BUSY AND LANDED WITHOUT CONTACTING THE TWR.

  523.  
  524. Accession Number: 414810
    Synopsis: ACR ACFT MISSES XING RESTR IN ZNY AIRSPACE.
    Narrative: ATC XING RESTR OF FL240 AT NEWES INTXN. ACFT PROGRAMMED, CREW DISTR WITH OTHER CONCERN. FMS DID NOT COMPLY. ATC CALLED PRIOR TO REACHING NEWES INTXN. THEN GIVEN 13000 FT XING AT RAALF INTXN, WHICH WAS COMPLIED WITH. ATC APPEARED TO HAVE NO PROB -- NEITHER DID WE. AT ALL TIMES WE WERE COMMUNICATING.

  525.  
  526. Accession Number: 415300
    Synopsis: MD80 CREW HAD AN ALT EXCURSION WHEN THE AUTOPLT MADE AN UNCOMMANDED CLB.
    Narrative: WE HAD A NORMAL CLBOUT AND LEVELOFF AT FL310. AFTER THE CRUISE CHKLIST WAS COMPLETED, I BEGAN MY ENRTE PA. WE HAD BEEN LEVEL FOR ALMOST 10 MINS WHEN THE FO ANNOUNCED FL320 FOR FL330. I ASKED WHEN WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO FL330, AND WE BOTH THOUGHT UH-OH. I WAS ABOUT TO TELL ATC WE WERE RETURNING TO ALT WHEN HE ASKED ABOUT OUR CLB. HE OFFERED US FL350 IF WE WANTED IT, BUT WE HAD ALREADY DISCUSSED WITH THIS CTLR ABOUT THE RIDES AND HAD PREVIOUSLY STATED WE WERE GOING TO STAY AT FL310. I ASKED IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY CONFLICT, AND HE STATED NO PROBS AT ALL. WE THEN DISCUSSED WHAT HAPPENED. NEITHER OF US COULD REMEMBER HAVING BEEN ANYWHERE NEAR THE ALT KNOB. WE HAD BEEN LEVEL FOR NEARLY 10 MINS PRIOR TO THE TRANSGRESSION AND WERE MYSTIFIED AS TO WHY THE AIRPLANE CLBED. HOWEVER, I DO HAVE A WORKING THEORY, ALTHOUGH I CANNOT VERIFY ANY OF THE SCENARIO, AS I DID NOT SEE ANY OF IT. WHILE LEVEL, THE FO WAS NAVING VIA HDG SELECT TO CTY VOR. THE VOR CAP HAD BEEN WANDERING AS IT NORMALLY DOES AND HE WAS MAKING GOOD MANUAL CORRECTIONS. I BELIEVE HE MAY HAVE INADVERTENTLY BUMPED THE ALT KNOB, OR EVEN TURNED IT THINKING IT WAS THE HDG KNOB. A COMMON MISTAKE. HE HAD BEEN IN PERFORMANCE CRUISE. WHEN THE ALT GOT TO FL330 IN THE WINDOW, THE PERFORMANCE WENT TO CLB MODE. WE HAD A BRIEF DISCUSSION AS TO THE DESIRED ENRTE MA