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Evidence for an Issue 32 pieces of evidence for this issue.

insufficient information may be displayed (Issue #99) - Important information that could be displayed by automation is not displayed, thereby limiting the ability of pilots to make safe decisions and actions.

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  2. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "The evidence suggests several explanations for this deficiency in the flightcrew's situational awareness: ... - Terrain information was not shown on the electronic horizontal situation indicator (EHSI) or graphically portrayed on the approach chart " (page 35) "3. CONCLUSIONS ... 3.2 Probable Cause Aeronautica Civil determines that the probable causes of this accident were: ... 3. The lack of situational awareness of the flightcrew regarding vertical navigation, proximity to terrain, and the relative location of critical radio aids." (page 57) (page 35, 57)
    Strength: +5
    Aircraft: B757-223
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Aeronautica Civil of the Republic of Colombia (1996). Controlled Flight Into Terrain, American Airlines Flight 965, Boeing 757-223, N651AA, Near Cali, Colombia, December 20, 1995. Santafe de Bogota, DC, Colombia: Aeronautica Civil of the Republic of Colombia. See Resource details

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  4. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "3. CONCLUSIONS ... 3.3 Contributing Factors Contributing to the cause of the accident were: ... 3. FMS logic that dropped all intermediate fixes from the display(s) in the event of execution of a direct routing." (page 57)
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: B757-223
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Aeronautica Civil of the Republic of Colombia (1996). Controlled Flight Into Terrain, American Airlines Flight 965, Boeing 757-223, N651AA, Near Cali, Colombia, December 20, 1995. Santafe de Bogota, DC, Colombia: Aeronautica Civil of the Republic of Colombia. See Resource details

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  6. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Review Study
    Evidence: 4.3.6 The FMS displays a route discontinuity warning and insufficient fuel warning. The pilot ignores the warnings, does not identify the error, and executes the change. Design analysis: The system was given a support function by providing an assessment of the new waypoint as to whether or not it connects to the previously chosen route, and an assessment of fuel capacity. Problem analysis: The route discontinuity warning to indicate that the new waypoint interrupts the pre-programmed route was not effective. The warnings may have been on a different screen. The system is instructed to fly to an undesired waypoint. Collaboration analysis: 1. The system recognises the instruction as part of a plan that connects several waypoints up to the landing point. However, assessments and warnings by the FMS were not sufficiently meaningful: the route discontinuity warning would have been expected for Rozo too, since the route was being changed in any case. Thus, the FMS only provides a partial plan assessment by noticing that the new route does not connect to the old one. However, the system may have been able to provide more useful assessments based on the information it had access to. Thus, the design insufficiently anticipated what information would be useful to the pilot here. (page 6)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757-223
    Equipment: automation & FMS
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (not dated). Collaboration in the Flightdeck: Opportunities for Interaction Design. Department of Computer Science, University of Bath. Available at http://www.cs.bath.ac.uk/~anneb/collwn.pdf. See Resource details

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  8. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Review Study
    Evidence: 4.3.1 The pilot enters 'R' to retrieve a list of waypoints. Design analysis: To communicate the waypoint to the system, the pilot is required by a procedure to type an abbreviation into the FMS, as can be found on the (paper) approach chart, which shows and legislates how to approach an airport. Due to the system logic, only inputs of the exact correct identifier can be recognised. The FMS is given the function of retrieving a list of waypoints from its database that may match the intended waypoint selection. Problem analysis: There was a mismatch between the printed approach charts and the FMS database. Since there were two waypoints with the identifier ‘R’ in same area, pilots needed to type ‘R-O-Z-O’ to get Rozo, not ‘R’ as they expected from experience and approach chart information. Collaboration analysis: The design has not allowed for the possibility that the common reference system may be faulty. Pilots needed to know what the FMS does with the instruction – they needed to understand its restriction of not truly being able to ‘guess’ from first letter, since it can only assign one meaning to one letter in a given area. Hence it could fail to match the abbreviation altogether. (page 5)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757-223
    Equipment: automation & FMS
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (not dated). Collaboration in the Flightdeck: Opportunities for Interaction Design. Department of Computer Science, University of Bath. Available at http://www.cs.bath.ac.uk/~anneb/collwn.pdf. See Resource details

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  10. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Q.48. Do you feel that the machine is holding useful information but fails to provide it when you need it?" 48.7% of the respondents answered either 'yes, often' or 'yes, sometimes', 32.5% answered 'No, hardly ever' or 'No, never', and 18.8% answered 'Neither yes nor no' or gave no response. (page 35)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Gras, A., Moricot, C., et. al. (1994). Faced with automation. Publications de la Sorbonne. See Resource details

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  12. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Q.48. Do you feel that the machine is holding useful information but fails to provide it when you need it?" 48.7% of the respondents answered either 'yes, often' or 'yes, sometimes', 32.5% answered 'No, hardly ever' or 'No, never', and 18.8% answered 'Neither yes nor no' or gave no response. (page 35)
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Gras, A., Moricot, C., et. al. (1994). Faced with automation. Publications de la Sorbonne. See Resource details

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  14. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "In this accident, the pilots received a clearance to Runway 19, a runway they were not expecting, and they chose to accept that clearance (possibly in an effort to land as quickly as possible or possibly due to a confirmation bias as they had previously set-up the FMS for Runway 1 per information from the company dispatcher and in accordance with previous experience into the Cali airport.) At that point they needed to find and review the necessary approach charts and perform a number of steps to program the new approach into the FMS. This process was complicated, however, by the fact that an earlier entry to go direct to the Cali VOR had removed the points from the display that were need for creating the proper path. That is, the Tulua VOR (ULQ) was no longer displayed." (page 880)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation and FMS
    Source: Inagaki, T., Takae, Y., & Moray, N. (1999). Automation and human interface for takeoff safety. In R.S. Jensen, B. Cox, J.D. Callister, & R. Lavis (Eds.), Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 402-407. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

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  16. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "A particular deficiency of the FMS, in terms of its ability to support the SA requirements of the pilot, is its presentation of vertical information. The flight path displayed provides only the programmed lateral path of the aircraft. No direct display of either the vertical path of the aircraft nor its relationship to surrounding terrain is provided...The pilots demonstrated a lack of awareness of the proximity and altitude of surrounding terrain that would have alerted them to the danger of continuing their descent. A direct display of vertical path information and its relation to surrounding terrain is not provided by the displays. This state of affairs allowed the crew to continue their descent without questioning its advisability (at least as far as the cockpit voice recorder reveals). Particularly in light of the fact that the lateral path was so clearly and saliently displayed, the lack of salience of vertical information on the FMS was a significant factor in this accident."
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation and FMS
    Source: Inagaki, T., Takae, Y., & Moray, N. (1999). Automation and human interface for takeoff safety. In R.S. Jensen, B. Cox, J.D. Callister, & R. Lavis (Eds.), Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 402-407. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

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  18. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "In the Cali accident, the pilots faced the challenge of working with the FMS display which, by design, portrayed information about the location of navigational fixes but not environmental features such as terrain. The pilots entered “Direct CLO” (Direct to the Cali VOR) in response to a miscommunication with air traffic control (ATC) which led them to believe they had a clearance to proceed direct to Cali as opposed to following the usual waypoints on designated airways. Requesting and receiving a direct clearance is not uncommon in radar controlled airspace, which, based on their extensive background flying in the U.S., this aircrew was accustomed to. The action of making a direct entry into the FMS had an unfortunate side effect, however. It caused a new flight path to be presented between the aircraft’s current position and the Cali VOR (labeled CLO) and all intervening waypoints along the original path to disappear. Thus, when the aircrew received a later clearance from ATC to “report Tulua”, they could not find this waypoint (labeled ULQ) on their display or in an FMS-control device. They devoted considerable efforts in a time pressured situation in trying to find ULQ or other points on their display that corresponded to those on the new approach to runway 19. The selected display did not support the global SA needed to detect their location relevant to pertinent landmarks, nor the global SA needed to rapidly change goals (programming in a new flight path)." (page 878)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation and FMS
    Source: Inagaki, T., Takae, Y., & Moray, N. (1999). Automation and human interface for takeoff safety. In R.S. Jensen, B. Cox, J.D. Callister, & R. Lavis (Eds.), Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 402-407. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

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  20. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "Six pilots [out of a total of 12, 50%] suggested mode annunciation or graphical cues on the HUD, although three [25%] also expressed concerns about cluttering the HUD and information overload." (page 18)
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: A320
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Johnson, E.N. & Pritchett, A.R. (1995). Experimental Study Of Vertical Flight Path Mode Awareness. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics. See Resource details

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  22. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "Two pilots [out of a total of 12, 17%] suggested aural alerts for 'stupid' mode selections. One pilot suggested changes in the procedures used for selecting modes, such as calling out the mode and commanded state value, with a response from the pilot-not-flying." (page 18)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: A310-304
    Equipment: autoflight
    Source: Johnson, E.N. & Pritchett, A.R. (1995). Experimental Study Of Vertical Flight Path Mode Awareness. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics. See Resource details

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  24. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "There tends to be a lack of information concerning the consequences of crew actions in current checklists, and when provided, the information is often at the end of an action list. This lack of information has a number of implications because the interdependence of aircraft systems means that following one course of action can prevent another set of actions being implemented later, or that one set of actions will require other actions indirectly related to a problem to be completed….Hence, it was decided to ask that two statements be considered: 1. Flight deck displays provide adequate information about secondary consequences of malfunctions (e.g., inoperative systems, restrictions on operational procedures, etc.).Flight deck crews participating in the research felt that current warning systems and associated information (e.g., flying and technical manuals, the QRHs, etc.) did not provide’sufficient detail about the consequences of actions undertaken (A4 = 4.92, SD = 1.75). (page 178)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation: displays
    Source: Johnston, A.N., Rushby, N., & Maclean, I. (2000). An assistant for crew performance assessment. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 10(1), 99-108. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  26. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "There is a need, therefore, to ensure that warning messages relayed to the crew are optimal in terms of leading crew to the primary cause. Accordingly, the following two statements needed to be adressed: 1. All warnings appropriate to the situation are given.... Responses were generally favorable (M = 2.94, SD = 1.53 for the first statement;…" (page 177)
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation: displays
    Source: Johnston, A.N., Rushby, N., & Maclean, I. (2000). An assistant for crew performance assessment. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 10(1), 99-108. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  28. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "Research has indicated that pilots have a strong preference for predictive information (Trujillo, 1998, 1999). Hence, the following two statements were devised: 1. Warnings that are given are effective in directing me to appropriate procedures for dealing with the problem. An excess of 80% of crew agreed that the “warnings that are given are effective in directing" them toward appropriate actions." (page 182)
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation: displays
    Source: Johnston, A.N., Rushby, N., & Maclean, I. (2000). An assistant for crew performance assessment. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 10(1), 99-108. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  30. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: The following comment was made in response to the questionnaire statement, "Describe a problem you know of or a concern you have about flightdeck automation.": "Not enough information is presented to the crew for them to make timely, informed decisions or corrective actions." (B737 Captain)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, B., Wilson, J., & Funk, K. (1997). Flightdeck automation issues: Phase 1 survey analysis. Available: http://www.flightdeckautomation.com/ExpertSurvey/e_report.aspx. See Resource details

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  32. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 8 of the 30 (27%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc99 insufficient information may be displayed
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  34. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 6 of the 30 (20%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc28 maintenance information may be inaccessible
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  36. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 7 of the 30 (23%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc28 maintenance information may be inaccessible
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  38. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 15 of the 30 (50%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc99 insufficient information may be displayed
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  40. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: "This study investigated human error reduction effect of a special type of warning - a warning that does not instruct participants how to do a task and does not involve catastrophic consequences if ignored. Cautions should be exercised in interpreting the results of this study. A practical implication of this study is that warning instructions that do not include knowledge of how to perform the task have only limited effect in human error reduction they may only reduce human errors for HKC [high knowledge content] participants in performing high inference tasks. Whenever possible, do include knowledge of how to perform a task into warnings. Theoretically, this study supports Lehto’s (1991) and Lehto and Salvendy’s (1995) theoretical analysis of when and why warnings can help reduce human error and that is when warnings can help participants transit from skill- or rule-based performance level to knowledge-based level." (page 155)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation: displays
    Source: McElhatton, J., Buchanan, P., & Drew, C. (1998). Crossing restriction altitude deviations on SIDs and STARs. ASRS Directline, 10, 10-15. See Resource details

  41.  
  42. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: The GPWS unit installed in the airplane was a Mark I system, which only provided a generic "pull up" warning and did not provide a specific message about the reason for the alert. A Mark II system would have provided the warning "too low flaps." The Safety Board considers it unlikely that the captain’s decision to land would have been affected even if he had received the more specific warning, as he was already aware that the flaps were not extended. However, the captain’s statement that he interpreted the alerts as a high sink rate warning, and not as a configuration warning, illustrates the potential for misinterpretation of the less specific warning messages provided by the Mark I GPWS. (page 48)
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: Douglas DC-9
    Equipment:
    Source: National Transportation Safety Board (1997). Wheels-Up Landing, Continental Airlines Flight 1943, Douglas DC-9 N10556, Houston, Texas, February 19, 1996. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-97/01. Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board. See Resource details

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  44. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: In our review of 282 automation-related ASRS incident reports, we found 1 reports (<1%) supporting issue099 (insufficient information may be displayed).
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Owen, G. & Funk, K. (1997). Flight Deck Automation Issues: Incident Report Analysis. http://www.flightdeckautomation.com/incidentstudy/incident-analysis.aspx. Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University, Department of Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering. See Resource details

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  46. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: The AH-64D pilots also commented on the need for an improvement to the FLIR system and that the ORT should be removed and replaced with another MFD. Representative comments from the AH-64D pilots are: … With only two displays, I tend to feel restricted as to what information is immediately available while in flight, as compared to what is available. (page 7)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: AH-64A
    Equipment: automation: displays
    Source: Rash, C.E., Adam, G.E., LeDuc, P.A., & Francis, G. (May 6-8, 2003). Pilot Attitudes on Glass and Traditional Cockpits in the U.S. Army's AH-64 Apache Helicopter. Presented at the American Helicopter Society 59th Annual Forum, Phoenix, AZ. American Helicopter Society International, Inc. See Resource details

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  48. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: The AH-64D pilots also commented on the need for an improvement to the FLIR system and that the ORT should be removed and replaced with another MFD. In addition, several pilots commented on problems with viewing the MFDs and on a need for more permanent representations of some types of data. Representative comments of the AH-64D pilots were: ... Use analog instruments - a circled compass rose is generally missed. I used to just see 45 and 90 degree tick marks on the HSI [horizontal stabilizer indicator] . Now with only a hdg [heading] tape, I have to do the math in my head for traffic pattern work. (page 9)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: AH-64D
    Equipment: HSI/EHSI
    Source: Rash, C.E., Adam, G.E., LeDuc, P.A., & Francis, G. (May 6-8, 2003). Pilot Attitudes on Glass and Traditional Cockpits in the U.S. Army's AH-64 Apache Helicopter. Presented at the American Helicopter Society 59th Annual Forum, Phoenix, AZ. American Helicopter Society International, Inc. See Resource details

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  50. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Question 28 asked pilots if they agreed that the visual displays/instruments allowed access to all the information that was needed…Among the AH-64D pilots, 81% of the responses were on the agree side of the scale… (page 12)
    Strength: -4
    Aircraft: AH-64D
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Rash, C.E., Adam, G.E., LeDuc, P.A., & Francis, G. (May 6-8, 2003). Pilot Attitudes on Glass and Traditional Cockpits in the U.S. Army's AH-64 Apache Helicopter. Presented at the American Helicopter Society 59th Annual Forum, Phoenix, AZ. American Helicopter Society International, Inc. See Resource details

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  52. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "LIKES AND DISLIKES On the first questionnaire, crews were asked ... List the features or modes of the 757 automation, instrumentation, or avionics that you like or dislike. Explain why if you wish." ... 11 pilots of 166 responded as a 'dislike' : "Non-availability of FMC maintenance pages in flight". [11/166 = 6.6% of pilots surveyed] (page 25)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  54. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "PROGRAMMING DUTIES ... The Phase-2 questionnaire contained [the following] open-ended question about programming the FMC ... What changes in the method of programming of the CDU or additional features, pages, prompts, etc. would you like to see? Do you feel that the programming tasks could or should be simplified? In what way?" In response to this question, 3 pilots of 133 mentioned "Maintenance information should be available to crew". [3/133=2.3% of the pilots] (page 34)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  55.  
  56. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "PROGRAMMING DUTIES ... The Phase-2 questionnaire contained [the following] open-ended question about programming the FMC ... What changes in the method of programming of the CDU or additional features, pages, prompts, etc. would you like to see? Do you feel that the programming tasks could or should be simplified? In what way?" In response to this question, 3 pilots of 133 mentioned "FMC should calculate and display V-speeds". [3/133=2.3% of the pilots] (page 34)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  58. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "PROGRAMMING DUTIES ... The Phase-2 questionnaire contained [the following] open-ended question about programming the FMC ... What changes in the method of programming of the CDU or additional features, pages, prompts, etc. would you like to see? Do you feel that the programming tasks could or should be simplified? In what way?" In response to this question, 2 pilots of 133 mentioned "Latitude and longitude should be displayed on map display". [2/133=1.5% of the pilots] (page 34)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  60. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "The following comment was written on the Wave Two questionnaire forms, in response to "Question 5. If you could make any changes in the cockpit layout, equipment or modes of the -80, what would you like to change?" ... Add a minimum fuel warning [1/20 pilots = 5%]" (page 38-40)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: DC9-80
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1985). Human Factors of Cockpit Automation: A Field Study of Flight Crew Transition. NASA Contactor Report 177333. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  62. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "PROGRAMMING DUTIES ... The Phase-2 questionnaire contained [the following] open-ended question about programming the FMC ... What changes in the method of programming of the CDU or additional features, pages, prompts, etc. would you like to see? Do you feel that the programming tasks could or should be simplified? In what way?" In response to this question, 3 pilots of 133 mentioned "FMC computer should display approach speeds". [3/133=2.3% of the pilots] (page 34)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  64. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Pilots responded to "Open-Ended Question 3. What operational features should be added to improve safety and/or reduce workload?" 8 pilots out of a total of 291, 3% responded either "Keep Past Waypoints Alive" or "Terrain/Obstacle Information Displayed". (page 170)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wise, J.A., Abbott, D.W., Tilden, D., Dyck, J.L., Guide, P.C., & Ryan, L. (1993). Automation in Corporate Aviation: Human Factors Issues. CAAR-15406-93-1. Daytona Beach, FL: Center for Aviation/Aerospace Research, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. See Resource details
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