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Evidence for an Issue 54 pieces of evidence for this issue.

displays (visual and aural) may be poorly designed (Issue #92) - Displays (including aural warnings and other auditory displays), display formats, and display elements may not be designed for detectability, discriminability, and interpretability. This may cause important information to be missed or misinterpreted.

  1.  
  2. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "3. Conclusions (a) Findings ... 15. The change from hybrid electro-mechanical instruments to LED displays for engine indications has reduced conspicuity, particularly in respect of the engine vibration indicators. No additional vibration alerting system was fitted that could have highlighted to the pilots which of the two engines was vibrating excessively." (page 143)
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: B737-400
    Equipment: displays
    Source: Air Accident Investigation Branch, Department of Transport - England (1990). Report on the accident to Boeing 737-400 G-OBME near Kegworth, Leicestershire on 8 January 1989; British Midlands Ltd; AAIB Report 4/90. AAIB Report 4/90. London: Department of Transport. See Resource details

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  4. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "Ultimately, the most interesting questions about these data are how many pilots successfully recovered from the runaway pitch trim down malfunction and whether the auditory warning materially contributed to safe recoveries. ... Although the small sample size precludes statistical analysis, it appears that neither mode of flight nor presence of an auditory alarm materially affected the distribution [of potential unintentional ground contacts and overspeeds]. ... Although the auditory trim malfunction warning provided an immediate cue, no detectable difference was present in performance between the two alerting groups [aural alert present for one group of pilots and not present for the other]. The fact that some pilots reported a failure to hear the [aural] warning suggests that a re-evaluation of criteria for general aviation cockpit auditory warnings may be warranted, with specific attention to noise-exposed and aging populations." (page 4-6)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Beringer, D.B. (1997). Automation Effects in General Aviation: Pilot Responses to Autopilot Failures and Alarms. In R.S. Jensen & L. Rakovan (Eds.), Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

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  6. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Review Study
    Evidence: Although the information as to what was happening was available from the displays, neither pilot noticed the significant turn, given that they were pre-occupied with other tasks and assumed the instruction to the system had the intended effect. Whilst there is no guarantee that the pilots would have looked at the displays available, the indication of bank on the primary flight display, and the map display (electronic horizontal situation indicator: EHSI) would have been the main source of indication to detect the erroneous course change. It is not known which type of EHSI was selected – however, it would have required some attention to see the gradual progress of the heading change, by memorising and comparing different snapshots. In arc mode, the target bearing may not have been visible since pointing behind the aircraft. (page 4)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757-223
    Equipment: automation: displays
    Source: Bruseberg, A. (not dated). Designing for new types of interaction. Department of Computer Science, University of Bath. Available at http://www.cs.bath.ac.uk/~anneb/L11Bruseberg.pdf. See Resource details

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  8. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Review Study
    Evidence: 4.3.6 The FMS displays a route discontinuity warning and insufficient fuel warning. The pilot ignores the warnings, does not identify the error, and executes the change. Design analysis: The system was given a support function by providing an assessment of the new waypoint as to whether or not it connects to the previously chosen route, and an assessment of fuel capacity. Problem analysis: The route discontinuity warning to indicate that the new waypoint interrupts the pre-programmed route was not effective. The warnings may have been on a different screen. The system is instructed to fly to an undesired waypoint. Collaboration analysis: 1. The system recognises the instruction as part of a plan that connects several waypoints up to the landing point. However, assessments and warnings by the FMS were not sufficiently meaningful: the route discontinuity warning would have been expected for Rozo too, since the route was being changed in any case. Thus, the FMS only provides a partial plan assessment by noticing that the new route does not connect to the old one. However, the system may have been able to provide more useful assessments based on the information it had access to. Thus, the design insufficiently anticipated what information would be useful to the pilot here. (page 6)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757-223
    Equipment: automation & FMS
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (not dated). Collaboration in the Flightdeck: Opportunities for Interaction Design. Department of Computer Science, University of Bath. Available at http://www.cs.bath.ac.uk/~anneb/collwn.pdf. See Resource details

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  10. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Review Study
    Evidence: 4.3.4 The FMS map display shows the intended new route as a white dashed line, which points off the screen. Design analysis: The system is given a support function by providing feedback of the implications for the selected instruction. It graphically shows the new route in relation to the old one. Moreover, the navigational display helps perception by showing route and route plan in different colours. Problem analysis: The significant course diversion (angle and distance of Romeo) was probably only partially visible since Romeo was off the screen. Collaboration analysis: As a mechanism to ensure a match of understanding, and to provide a prediction of the effects of the instruction, the FMS repeats back the instruction in a different data format (graphically). The feedback also shows context and implications. However, not all information available was communicated. Important aspects were not visible due to the map scale and orientation. (page 5)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757-223
    Equipment: automation: displays
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (not dated). Collaboration in the Flightdeck: Opportunities for Interaction Design. Department of Computer Science, University of Bath. Available at http://www.cs.bath.ac.uk/~anneb/collwn.pdf. See Resource details

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  12. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the questionnaire data: (#19) "The ADI and EHSI displays are always legible and easy to read." 79% of the pilots strongly or slightly agreed, 16% of the pilots strongly or slightly disagreed with the statement, and 5% neither agreed nor disagreed. (page 44-45)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation displays
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. NASA Technical Memorandum 86659, 1-68. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  14. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Incident Reports Two incident reports were examined for the relevant human factors and automation elements. ... [One of the incident reports involved] an inflight spool-down of engines, resulting in temporary loss of the CRT displays. When the CRT displays were present, the EICAS was filled with messages, and he had difficulty assimilating the information except for the only red message (a cabin altitude warning). He could not discriminate between the second-level caution messages (yellow, starting in the left margin) and the advisory messages (yellow, indented one space margin). Furthermore, he had many questions: 'I turned on the APU, is it coming up to speed or not? Are the engines really running or are they windmilling?' He felt another crew member might have been useful, not as much for executing procedures as for helping diagnose the problem." (page 20)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. NASA Technical Memorandum 86659, 1-68. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  16. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Regardless of the value displayed in the speed-select window at the time FLCH is engaged, this displayed value is changed to the existing speed and the pitch autopilot holds the existing IAS. The autohrottles advance to maximum allowable thrust (if climbing) or reduced thrust (if descending). Most pilots who reported this confusion felt the target speed should have been that which was displayed in the window at the time of engagement." (page 15)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: autoflight: MCP
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. NASA Technical Memorandum 86659, 1-68. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  17.  
  18. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Eleven pilots [out of 104 pilots, 11%] reported confusion between the heading orientation and the track up nature of the map display; as they describe it, this almost always occurs during vectoring in the terminal area when they are controlling aircraft heading, not track." (page 16)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation displays
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. NASA Technical Memorandum 86659, 1-68. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  20. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "One check airman suggested that an incorrect setting of the FRONT CRS knob on the Instrument Landing System (ILS) receiver would cause the aircraft to turn the wrong way on LOC intercept; the aircraft will start turning to the incorrect course, but the ILS signals will eventually cause the aircraft to track the localizer correctly. (One respondent mentioned he felt the ILS receiver was too far from the normal scan pattern, and so an incorrect setting might be missed.) There is also the possibility, mentioned by another check airman, that the appearance of the trend vector and the wind correction both contribute to a perception that the aircraft is turning away from the localizer when it is not." (page 24)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. NASA Technical Memorandum 86659, 1-68. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  21.  
  22. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "The Electronic Flight Instrument System (EFIS), or Attitude director Indicator (ADI) and Horizontal situation Indicator (HSI) Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) displays received enthusiastic response. Most of the comments were general in nature, and referred to the information on the displays and the clarity of the displays." (page 10)
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: EFIS
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. NASA Technical Memorandum 86659, 1-68. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  24. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "The Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System ... received many favorable, if general, comments about the quality and quantity of information on the display. ... specifically mentioned by several pilots were the explicit display of engine limits as well as the ability to monitor a large number of variables." (page 12)
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: EICAS
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. NASA Technical Memorandum 86659, 1-68. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  25.  
  26. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the questionnaire data: (#19) "The ADI and EHSI displays are always legible and easy to read." 79% of the pilots strongly or slightly agreed, 16% of the pilots strongly or slightly disagreed with the statement, and 5% neither agreed nor disagreed. (page 44-45)
    Strength: -4
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation displays
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. NASA Technical Memorandum 86659, 1-68. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  28. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: Actually, not. The display is also inadequate for the task – and here is why: To resolve what the aircraft will do we need to know the altitude at which the autopilot transitions to capture (e.g., 7,000 feet). But in practice, it is almost impossible to obtain this value with the current display. First, the pilot has no preview of this value and the interface does not display it. Secondly, the transition to the "Capture" mode happens automatically. In order to obtain the altitude at which the autopilot transitions to "Capture", the pilot must "hunt" for the automatic transition, and at that very moment look down to the altitude tape on the interface and catch the aircraft altitude as it rolls by. Thirdly, this altitude value is not retained by the display; once the transition takes place, the value is gone and there is no way to retrieve it. For all practical purpose, it is impossible to reliably obtain this value. The current display is indeed inadequate for the task. (page 7)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation: displays
    Source: Degani, A., & Heymann, M. (2000). Pilot-Autopilot interaction: A formal perspective. Eighth International Conference on Human-Computer Interaction in Aeronautics, Toulouse, France. See Resource details

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  30. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: "6. RECOMMENDATIONS ... 6.1 Design-Related Recommendations This analysis of the FMS-related reports from the ASRS database has provided a valuable look at the problems crews are having with current FMSs. On the basis of this review, the following recommendations suggest how the Description and Characterization study can be focused to concentrate on those issues that appear to have special importance. ... 6) The number of screens that have to be reviewed in performing some tasks also is an important issue. There is an obvious need to review the overall organization and layout of information across pages, and the means for navigating from one screen to another, in order to determine the contributions of these factors to the complexity of the task." (page 6.1-6.2)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Eldredge, D., Mangold, S., & Dodd, R.S. (1992). A Review and Discussion of Flight Management System Incidents Reported to the Aviation Safety Reporting System. Final Report DOT/FAA/RD-92/2. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration. See Resource details

  31.  
  32. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "4 - RECOMMENDATIONS ... 4.3 - AIRCRAFT ... 4.3.2 - The Commission remarked that the aural announcements made by the radio altimeter and the aural warnings were transmitted only via the cockpit loudspeakers and not via the pilots' headsets. The Commission recommends: - that studies be made to see if it would not be judicious to transmit all warnings and aural announcements via the pilots' headsets." (page 64)
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Investigation Commission of Ministry of Transport - France (1989). Final report concerning the accident which occurred on June 26th 1988 at Mulhouse-Habsheim (68) to the Airbus A 320, registered F-GFKC. Ministry of Planning, Housing, Transport and Maritime Affairs. See Resource details

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  34. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "During the debriefing, all the pilots felt the presentation of Flight Path Angle and Vertical Speed Modes could be improved. In free responses, six pilots stated that the mode annunciations should be made more distinct and identifiable. Three pilots stated the selector for these two modes should be physically separated. One suggestion was to use a different color to highlight the 'non-normal' mode, although no opinion was given about what should be the 'normal' mode." (page 18)
    Strength: +5
    Aircraft: A320
    Equipment: autoflight
    Source: Johnson, E.N. & Pritchett, A.R. (1995). Experimental Study Of Vertical Flight Path Mode Awareness. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics. See Resource details

  35.  
  36. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: A repeated-measures multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted on the detection data with feedback type as the between-subjects factor and two within-subject factors, concurrent task load and simultaneity. A significant effect was seen for feedback type, F(2, 18) = 17.76, p < ,001. Pilots receiving visual-only feedback detected approximately 83% of the unexpected mode transitions that occurred throughout the flight, whereas pilots in the other two conditions (tactile-visual and tactile only) detected close to 100% of all changes in mode status. (page 546)
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation: displays
    Source: Lin, H.X. & Salvendy, G. (2000). Warning effect on human error reduction. International Journal of Cognitive Ergonomics, 4(2), 145-161. See Resource details

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  38. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "A repeated-measures MANOVA on the detection rates for traffic conflicts and engine deviations did not yield a significant main effect for feedback condition. Significant main effects were found. however, for both simultaneity, F( 1, 18) = 5.86, p < .05, and for flight phase, F(3, 54) = 6.36, p < .Ol. Traffic and engine deviations that were presented individually were more likely to be detected than those presented simultaneously with a mode transition (see Figure 5)." (page 548)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation: displays
    Source: Lin, H.X. & Salvendy, G. (2000). Warning effect on human error reduction. International Journal of Cognitive Ergonomics, 4(2), 145-161. See Resource details

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  40. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "The analysis did not yield a main effect for flight phase but did show a significant interaction between feedback condition and phase of flight, F(6, 54) = 2.91, p < .05. As illustrated in Figure 3, both tactile conditions yielded nearperfect detection rates in each phase of flight, whereas performance in the visual-only condition was markedly affected by the concurrent demands in the A/P Dynamic phase. An additional analysis conducted on the two tactile conditions alone confirmed that detection of tactile cues was not affected by concurrent load." (page 547)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation: displays
    Source: Lin, H.X. & Salvendy, G. (2000). Warning effect on human error reduction. International Journal of Cognitive Ergonomics, 4(2), 145-161. See Resource details

  41.  
  42. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: The following comments were made in response to the questionnaire statement, "Describe a problem you know of or a concern you have about flightdeck automation.": "FMAs (Flight Mode Annunciations) are cryptic and not well presented." (B737 Captain) "It takes at least 6 months for a transitioning pilot to get used to where the information regarding flight is displayed." (B747 Captain) "Standard FMC/CDU Display ..." (B737 Captain)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, B., Wilson, J., & Funk, K. (1997). Flightdeck automation issues: Phase 1 survey analysis. Available: http://www.flightdeckautomation.com/ExpertSurvey/e_report.aspx. See Resource details

  43.  
  44. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: The following comments were made in response to the questionnaire statement, "Describe a problem you know of or a concern you have about flightdeck automation.": "A number of audible information inputs we get while operating the A320, while designed with the intent of providing us useful info, have two problems: 1) we cannot 'cancel' the aural input after we are aware of it (much like pushing a master caution lite 'out' after understanding the cause) and 2) the volume level is not adjustable and its too loud. I believe that the whole point of an audio callout is to give me information, but that once I receive this info, I should be able to cancel such input, and I should be able to control/modify/stop the transmission of this info at will." (A320 Captain) "The Altitude Alert Warning horns and [emphasized] the TCAS Warning horns that send the tone through our headsets (as opposed to the overhead speaker) are way too loud. Not only is it painful to the ear, it makes it impossible to hear ATC's directions, etc. this is true for about 70-80% of 737-300[s] using this configuration. Solution: Simply turn down the volume or [emphasized] reroute the tone to the overhead speakers." (B737 Captain) "TCAS aural commands being sounded over headset while ATC could be trying to relay information or trying to communicate with other crew member." (B737 Captain)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: A320
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, B., Wilson, J., & Funk, K. (1997). Flightdeck automation issues: Phase 1 survey analysis. Available: http://www.flightdeckautomation.com/ExpertSurvey/e_report.aspx. See Resource details

  45.  
  46. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 8 of the 30 (27%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc92 displays may be poorly designed
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  47.  
  48. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 5 of the 30 (17%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc162 auditory displays may be poorly designed
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  49.  
  50. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 10 of the 30 (33%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc162 auditory displays may be poorly designed
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  51.  
  52. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 16 of the 30 (53%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc92 displays may be poorly designed
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  54. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Question 9: "In your opinion, what changes (if any) could be made to the B767 flight panel/system presentation?" ... "Twenty eight pilots [out of 65, 43%] either indicated that they would not like to see any changes to flight-deck presentation, or were unable to comment as their experience on the aircraft was limited. Thirty six pilots [55%] suggested some design changes." (page 84, 108)
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Morters, K. (1988). B767 Flightdeck Automation Research. Research Paper 32:420, 1-141. See Resource details

  55.  
  56. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Question 9: "In your opinion, what changes (if any) could be made to the B767 flight panel/system presentation?" ... "Twenty eight pilots [out of 65, 43%] either indicated that they would not like to see any changes to flight-deck presentation, or were unable to comment as their experience on the aircraft was limited. Thirty six pilots [55%] suggested some design changes." (page 84, 108)
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Morters, K. (1988). B767 Flightdeck Automation Research. Research Paper 32:420, 1-141. See Resource details

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  58. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: The data showed that pilots often “failed” to fixate the FMA within the first 10 seconds (during which time a green box appears to highlight it). The percentages of cases in which pilots failed to fixate in that first 10 seconds were as follows: M = 53%, AE = 45%, AU = 62%. In other cases, pilots fixated near the time or near the FMA. However, if we examine (more liberally) failures to fixate any FMAs in the first 20 seconds after the green box appears, the failure rates are still high: M = 32%, AE = 29%, AU = 40%. Thus, for a considerable percent of cases pilots do not verify the FMA change, and further, Unexpected mode changes are verified less frequently than the Manual or Automatic-Expected mode changes. This failure suggests that the attention-attracting properties of the green box that accompanies every mode change may be an insufficient cue (Nikolic, Orr, & Sarter, 2001). (page 5)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: B747-400
    Equipment: automation & FMS
    Source: Mumaw, R.J., Sarter, N.B., & Wickens, C.D. (2001). Analysis of Pilots' Monitoring and Performance on an Automated Flight Deck. In Proceedings of the 11th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University.. See Resource details

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  60. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: The data showed that pilots often “failed” to fixate the FMA within the first 10 seconds (during which time a green box appears to highlight it). The percentages of cases in which pilots failed to fixate in that first 10 seconds were as follows: M = 53%, AE = 45%, AU = 62%. In other cases, pilots fixated near the time or near the FMA. However, if we examine (more liberally) failures to fixate any FMAs in the first 20 seconds after the green box appears, the failure rates are still high: M = 32%, AE = 29%, AU = 40%. Thus, for a considerable percent of cases pilots do not verify the FMA change, and further, Unexpected mode changes are verified less frequently than the Manual or Automatic-Expected mode changes. This failure suggests that the attention-attracting properties of the green box that accompanies every mode change may be an insufficient cue (Nikolic, Orr, & Sarter, 2001). (page 5)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B747-400
    Equipment: automation & FMS
    Source: Mumaw, R.J., Sarter, N.B., & Wickens, C.D. (2001). Analysis of Pilots' Monitoring and Performance on an Automated Flight Deck. In Proceedings of the 11th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University.. See Resource details

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  62. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: On one half of trials, attention guidance automation was provided to aid the participants in selecting a flight path by highlighting the hazards that presented the most risk to the flight plans. Following the plan selection stage, pilots were asked to monitor the airspace for changes to hazards that could be either highlighted or non-highlighted as a function of their degrees of relevance for the prior choice. The present study sought to assess change detection performance as a function of automation by conducting pairwise t-tests for both accuracy and response time. This analysis included change detection performance for only the automated condition, and did not examine performance in the baseline condition, because in the baseline condition all hazards appeared at the same luminance level. Results revealed that pilots were significantly more accurate in detecting changes to elements that were highlighted (M = 45.1%) than non-highlighted (M = 14.8%), t(15) = 4.78, p < 0.001. No significant difference was found for response time, t(12) = 0.58, p > 0.10. (page 35)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation: displays
    Source: Muthard, E.K. & Wickens, C.D. (August 2002). Factors That Mediate Flight Plan Monitoring and Errors in Plan Revision: An Examination of Planning Under Automated Conditions. Nasa Technical Report AFHD-02-11/NASA-02-8. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  63.  
  64. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: In the plan monitoring phase, we wished to first examine the effect of highlighting on change detection and did so by comparing performance in detecting changes to hazards that were highlighted to those that were not highlighted as a function of workload. The analyses revealed that changes to highlighted hazards were detected more accurately (F(1, 26) = 27.72, p < .001) and more quickly (F(1, 22) = 4.47, p = .05) than changes to nonhighlighted elements. Additionally, a speed accuracy tradeoff was found for workload, such that changes in the low workload condition were detected 36.0% more accurately (F(1, 26) = 7.68, p = .01), but 6.7 s more slowly (F(1, 22) = 8.88, p = .007) than those in the high workload condition. The automation and workload interaction was not significant for accuracy (F(1, 26) = 1.75, p > .10) or response time (F(1, 22) = .27, p > .10). (page 4/5)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Muthard, E.K. & Wickens, C.D. (2003). Factors That Mediate Flight Plan Monitoring and Errors in Plan Revision: An Examination of Planning Under Automated Conditions. In Proceedings of the 12th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 857-62. See Resource details

  65.  
  66. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "3.0 CONCLUSIONS 3.1 Findings ... 47. The EFIS and RMI compass displays do not contain the letters 'N', 'S', 'E' or 'W' to show cardinal headings, which might have provided directional cues to prompt the crew." (page 124)
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: A310
    Equipment: EFIS
    Source: Nepal Aircraft Accident Investigation Committee (1992). Report on the Accident of Thai Airways International A310 Flight TG 311 (HS-TID) on 31 July 1992. His Majesty's Government of Nepal. See Resource details

  67.  
  68. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "When continual efforts were unsuccessful the crew decided to proceed directly to the final fix on the approach to Cali, a beacon named Rozo that was located just before the runway. However, rather than retrieve Rozo from the FMS data base, one of the pilots mistakenly retrieved a different beacon that was located outside Bogota, named Romeo, and then executed a command to proceed directly to it. Evidence revealed that a crewmember had asked for and retrieved all beacons in the data base coded by the abbreviation “R.” and then commanded the FMS to proceed to Romeo. The airplane turned away from its position north of Cali to Romeo, a turn that would have been clearly evident on the CRT in front of each pilot that displayed the FMS-generated predicted flight path. Of the errors the crew committed in the minutes before the accident this most demonstrates the time pressure they experienced. Little, if any, cognitive effort was needed to notice the turn as presented on the predicted flight path. Moreover, pilots of FMS-equipped aircraft are trained to consistently verify a command to the FMS that causes a course change to assure that it is correct. That they did not may be accounted for by their loss of temporal awareness: they were too busy to take the time needed to even glance at the flight path display." (page 197)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: Boeing 757
    Equipment: automation & FMS
    Source: Noyes, J.M. & Starr, A.F. (2000). Civil aircraft warning systems: Future directions in information management and presentation. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 10(2), 169-188. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  69.  
  70. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: In our review of 282 automation-related ASRS incident reports, we found 9 reports (3%) supporting issue092 (displays (visual and aural) may be poorly designed).
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Owen, G. & Funk, K. (1997). Flight Deck Automation Issues: Incident Report Analysis. http://www.flightdeckautomation.com/incidentstudy/incident-analysis.aspx. Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University, Department of Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering. See Resource details

  71.  
  72. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: The AH-64D pilots also commented on the need for an improvement to the FLIR system and that the ORT should be removed and replaced with another MFD. Representative comments from the AH-64D pilots are: … Need a third MPD in front seat of AH-64D. The ORT currently in use is too small of a screen to be easily viewed when on a mission. Also, ORT handles are entirely too "busy." Some of the function buttons should be moved to the third screen bezel. (page 7)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: AH-64D
    Equipment: automation: displays
    Source: Rash, C.E., Adam, G.E., LeDuc, P.A., & Francis, G. (May 6-8, 2003). Pilot Attitudes on Glass and Traditional Cockpits in the U.S. Army's AH-64 Apache Helicopter. Presented at the American Helicopter Society 59th Annual Forum, Phoenix, AZ. American Helicopter Society International, Inc. See Resource details

  73.  
  74. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Question 12 asked pilots to indicate whether they agreed that the design of the visual displays/instructions was frustrating…Among the AH-64D pilots, 58% chose responses from the disagree side of the scale… (page 6/7)
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: AH-64D
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Rash, C.E., Adam, G.E., LeDuc, P.A., & Francis, G. (May 6-8, 2003). Pilot Attitudes on Glass and Traditional Cockpits in the U.S. Army's AH-64 Apache Helicopter. Presented at the American Helicopter Society 59th Annual Forum, Phoenix, AZ. American Helicopter Society International, Inc. See Resource details

  75.  
  76. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Several specific problems were noted with regard to displays and crew interaction with automated systems; for example: map shift; difficulty with airspeed and altitude tapes; information clutter; presentation of engine secondary data; indecipherability of messages (e.g., due to poor wording and poor use of abbreviations); incorrect feedback (e.g., fuel predictions); improper signaling (e.g., of V2 climb-out speed); overall lack of feedback from systems; irrelevance of some displayed data; slow system activation and response time; extreme complexity with failures; and variable reliability and false/spurious warnings or automated systems." (page 5)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Rudisill, M. (1995). Line Pilots' Attitudes About and Experience With Flight Deck Automation: Results of an International Survey and Proposed Guidelines. In R.S. Jensen, & L.A. Rakovan (Eds.), Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Columbus, Ohio, April 24-27, 1995, 288-293. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

  77.  
  78. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "Pilots also reported that in order to assess the ‘status and behavior of the automation, they often look at indications on the flight control unit (FCU)-which show commanded automation targets and modes instead of monitoring the flight mode annunciations on the PFD-which provide information on the actual automation configuration. They do so despite the fact that it is strongly emphasized in training that FCU indications represent “rumors” (i.e., pilot commands) whereas flight mode annunciations on the PFD are “facts” (i.e., they indicate the actual active modes and target settings)." (page 362)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: A-320
    Equipment: automation: displays
    Source: Sherry, L. & Polson, P.G. (1999). Shared models of flight management system vertical guidance. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 9(2), 139-153. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  79.  
  80. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "More than 75% of all questions received very high marks in the appreciation scale-range of 4 or ... 5, pilots refraining from making extreme position judgments. Where some improvement was desirable for the future they felt free to rate in this direction. Examples in this area concern seating, software, procedures, use of space on the overhead panel, FPV-information, attention-getting capability of some alarms on the PFD and on the ECAM, interpretation of error messages on the FMS, homogeneity of abnormal/emergency checklist with ECAM WD." (page 397-398)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Speyer, J.J. (1990). Towards Design Induced Error Tolerance. ICAO Human Factors Digest #4: Circular 229-AN/137. Leningrad: International Civil Aviation Organization. See Resource details

  81.  
  82. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "The ECAM's operating and display rules did not create any difficulties. Aural warnings were however considered as too loud attention catchers." (page 11.11)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: A310
    Equipment: EICAS (ECAM)
    Source: Speyer, J.J., Monteil, C., Blomberg, R.D., & Fouillot, J.P. (1990). Impact of New Technology on Operational Interface: From Design Aims to Flight Evaluation and Measurement. Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development No. 301, Vol. 1. See Resource details

  83.  
  84. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "THE MAIN A320 MODIFICATIONS DESIRED BY PILOTS ... 3) Improved display of autopilot flight data. ... 7) A new display [layout] on flight control screens. ... 13) Larger and more readable standby instruments." "THE MAIN A320 MODIFICATIONS DESIRED BY PILOTS ... 3) Improved display of autopilot flight data. ... 7) A new display [layout] on flight control screens. ... 13) Larger and more readable standby instruments." (page 15-16)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: A320
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Stefanovich, Y. & Thouanel, B. (1993). Inquiry into a crash. (Translated from VSD), 1-20. See Resource details

  85.  
  86. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "LIKES AND DISLIKES On the first questionnaire, crews were asked ... List the features or modes of the 757 automation, instrumentation, or avionics that you like or dislike. Explain why if you wish." ... 30 pilots of 166 responded as a 'dislike' : "Displays.. Weather radar -- various complaints: low intensity on HSI map, too much red; underestimates intensity". [30/166 = 18.1% of pilots surveyed] (page 25)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  87.  
  88. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "The ASRS reports below are illustrative of some of the problems of autoflight. ... [ASRS incident report #141226] Narrative: Aircraft was coupled to autopilot and autopilot was armed for the ILS (8L at Atlanta). Aircraft intercepted and captured localizer at approximately 15 nm from airfield, aircraft at 5000'. I identified localizer. As per company procedures captain rotated heading (HDG) select knob to 340 deg for missed approach HDG, but unknown to either of us, the multifunction knob was pushed in far enough to activate 'HDG Hold' I did not notice the flight mode annunciator window change From 'LOC TRK' to 'HDG HLD'. Of course, the ADI (flight director) display remained as before with the pitch bar giving altitude hold at 5000' And the back bar still centered but centered because we were On HDG not localizer. Obviously we gradually started to drift right. The HSI (nav display) was selected on map mode (20 mile scale). On this scale a small deviation off localizer is too small to detect. I monitored the glide slope (raw data display) and saw it descend through the flight director pitch bar. I looked at the flight mode annunciator (FMA) and realized we were no longer armed for the ILS. I immediately announced to the captain and disconnected the autopilot to start descent and selected arc mode on the nav display. I saw we were full scale localizer deflection so I put in about a 15 deg correction to course. At that moment Atlanta Approach called to tell us we were drifting into the parallel ILS course and he told us to maintain 4500' until established. (He also gave us a HDG to correct). I leveled at 4700' and as I did the localizer centered up and the ILS was resumed uneventfully. Having map mode in HSI instead of arc does not make a localizer deviation immediately obvious. Lack of continuous cross-check of FMA by pilots is a factor. Hdg select knob doubles as HDG hold button and an imperceptible extra push in on it activates HDG hold. To correct the problem: fly ILS with arc (or rose) in map to make deviations immediately obvious. Additionally, multifunction knobs should not be accepted on aircraft. It is simply too easy at night when you are tired or distracted to activate the wrong function. (We have 3 multifunction knobs where different functions are activated depending on how far you push the knob. It can be very tricky sometimes)." (page 5-6)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1993). Intervention Strategies for the Management of Human Error. NASA Contractor Report NCA2-441. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  89.  
  90. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "LIKES AND DISLIKES On the first questionnaire, crews were asked ... List the features or modes of the 757 automation, instrumentation, or avionics that you like or dislike. Explain why if you wish." ... 9 pilots of 166 responded as a 'dislike' : "F/D V-bars should be filled in (not outlined) - Airline-2". [9/166 = 5% of pilots surveyed] (page 26)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  91.  
  92. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "LIKES AND DISLIKES On the first questionnaire, crews were asked ... List the features or modes of the 757 automation, instrumentation, or avionics that you like or dislike. Explain why if you wish." ... 8 pilots of 166 responded as a 'dislike' : "Lack of aural tone on altimeter alerter". [8/166 = 5% of pilots surveyed] (page 26)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  93.  
  94. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "INITIAL OPERATING EXPERIENCE (IOE) [On the first questionnaire, crews were asked]... Describe any problems that you had during your IOE (initial operating experience) and early months of flying the 757. Are there still areas you have trouble with, or don't understand?" In response to this question, the following comment was made by one of the pilots: " Yes! What [emphasized] information is available from what [emphasized] page of the CDU and when [emphasized]? Example: VOR/ILS frequencies? Field elevation? 2033" (page 72, 76)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: FMS: CDU
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  95.  
  96. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "VIII. Cockpit Errors And Error Reduction ... B. Reports Of Cockpit Errors [Pilots were asked to respond to the following question:] 3. Describe in detail an error which you made, or observed, in operating the automatic features of the 757 that could have led to an incident or violation. How could it have been avoided? (equipment design? Training? Crew? Coordination?) Please describe specifically what was done." ... One pilot responded, "A mechanic was removing the No. 2 altimeter and I was standing out of the way watching. The F/O reached across the pedestal to assist the mechanic as he was having difficulty installing the altimeter. His arm touched a select button on the climb page, in this case we believe it was the S/E climb speeds etc. After completion of the mechanical work I got into the seat and the F/O said that the route was in and needed to be executed. By this time (I think I was on the RTE page) I executed what I thought was a route activation. I looked at the HSI to verify this, but the route did not activate so I went through the steps again. This time it took. I said, 'That's strange' but forgot about it. Everything was normal until climb power was called for and VNAV was selected. The power went to max cont. and VNAV disengaged. This confused us both. So I told the F/O to see if he could fix the problem and that I would fly the aircraft. We pulled breakers etc. but finally went to the DATA page, then the CLB page and found out we had selected S/E climb performance inadvertently and then executed it. Not sure how to prevent this error. Maybe the EXE light should not light unless the corresponding page is in view. 1006" (page 100, 104)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  97.  
  98. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "VIII. Cockpit Errors And Error Reduction ... B. Reports Of Cockpit Errors [Pilots were asked to respond to the following question:] 3. Describe in detail an error which you made, or observed, in operating the automatic features of the 757 that could have led to an incident or violation. How could it have been avoided? (equipment design? Training? Crew? Coordination?) Please describe specifically what was done." ... One pilot responded, "While flying at 12,000 in the MSP terminal area, using weather radar to vector around thunderstorm cells, which were particularly active, we entered an area of moderate precip, some 15 miles north of MSP. Almost immediately Mode 2A of the ground prox sounded 'Whoop, whoop, pull up, pull up', and the weather radar went to solid red on all range scales. Coincidentally, the ACARS selcal aural sounded (indicating a message was waiting) and a flight attendant signaled from the aft section requesting the MSP arrival time. The cacophony of aural signals caused substantial distraction and confusion, and resulted in difficult communication with MSP APC. Our request for vectors was not heard by APC, and a MSP altitude and heading change was missed by us. After several minutes we were able to sort out the aural warnings and calls, and disable the Mode 2 Warning while re-establishing clear contact with MSP. When we emerged from the precip, the weather radar regained its usefulness and we resumed a more normal terminal arrival, using the radar to vector around cumulus build-ups. It is obvious that a third crew member [emphasized] would have been of substantial assistance here, however, a weather radar which is not useful in precip is useless 25% of the time. 2044" (page 100, 107)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  99.  
  100. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "LIKES AND DISLIKES On the first questionnaire, crews were asked ... List the features or modes of the 757 automation, instrumentation, or avionics that you like or dislike. Explain why if you wish." ... Pilots mentioned items as a 'like' 122 times regarding the HSI in general such as: "HSI map mode", "HSI radar plot with map", "Ability to scale map, "Wind vector", "Map display of airports and navaids, "Green arc", "Ability to see point where will intercept ILS", "Map plan mode", "Track predictor display" . [122/166 = 73.5% of pilots surveyed] (page 22)
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  101.  
  102. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Pilots responded to "Open-Ended Question 7A. List the ways you feel automation has affected cockpit design (e.g., physical layout, information presentation, use of color, size of keypad)." 7 pilots out of a total of 98, 7% responded that they disliked "Display Intensity in Bright Sunlight" (page 202)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wise, J.A., Abbott, D.W., Tilden, D., Dyck, J.L., Guide, P.C., & Ryan, L. (1993). Automation in Corporate Aviation: Human Factors Issues. CAAR-15406-93-1. Daytona Beach, FL: Center for Aviation/Aerospace Research, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. See Resource details

  103.  
  104. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: In response to "Open-Ended Question 1. Briefly describe an operational problem - that you personally know of - involving the automated features of your aircraft that could have a negative safety consequence. How could the error have been avoided?" 1 pilot responded: "Altitude select being inadvertently deselected by moving the autopilot pitch trim knob after altitude select has 'captured'. No aural warning and limited visual warning on EFIS occurs." (page 163, 166)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wise, J.A., Abbott, D.W., Tilden, D., Dyck, J.L., Guide, P.C., & Ryan, L. (1993). Automation in Corporate Aviation: Human Factors Issues. CAAR-15406-93-1. Daytona Beach, FL: Center for Aviation/Aerospace Research, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. See Resource details

  105.  
  106. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: In response to "Open-Ended Question 5C. Describe any problems that you had in an automated aircraft during: (a) your initial [emphasized] operating experience, and (b) your subsequent [emphasized] operating experience." 1 pilot responded: "Trying to get the proper information when you want and trying to [get] this information quickly. With EFIS etc. you get a lot of information. Had problem with digital airspeed and no needle. Its hard to pick up trend even though there is a trend rate. Round dials are easier than vertical dials." (page 189-190)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wise, J.A., Abbott, D.W., Tilden, D., Dyck, J.L., Guide, P.C., & Ryan, L. (1993). Automation in Corporate Aviation: Human Factors Issues. CAAR-15406-93-1. Daytona Beach, FL: Center for Aviation/Aerospace Research, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. See Resource details

  107.  
  108. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Pilots responded to "Open-Ended Question 3. What operational features should be added to improve safety and/or reduce workload?" 20 pilots out of a total of 291, 7% responded either "Standardarize EFIS Displays" or "Minimize Display Clutter" (page 170)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wise, J.A., Abbott, D.W., Tilden, D., Dyck, J.L., Guide, P.C., & Ryan, L. (1993). Automation in Corporate Aviation: Human Factors Issues. CAAR-15406-93-1. Daytona Beach, FL: Center for Aviation/Aerospace Research, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. See Resource details
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