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Evidence for an Issue 9 pieces of evidence for this issue.

information integration may be required (Issue #9) - Pilots may need to integrate information spread over several parts of the interface, possibly creating additional pilot workload.

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  2. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: Actually, not. The display is also inadequate for the task – and here is why: To resolve what the aircraft will do we need to know the altitude at which the autopilot transitions to capture (e.g., 7,000 feet). But in practice, it is almost impossible to obtain this value with the current display. First, the pilot has no preview of this value and the interface does not display it. Secondly, the transition to the "Capture" mode happens automatically. In order to obtain the altitude at which the autopilot transitions to "Capture", the pilot must "hunt" for the automatic transition, and at that very moment look down to the altitude tape on the interface and catch the aircraft altitude as it rolls by. Thirdly, this altitude value is not retained by the display; once the transition takes place, the value is gone and there is no way to retrieve it. For all practical purpose, it is impossible to reliably obtain this value. The current display is indeed inadequate for the task. (page 7)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation: displays
    Source: Degani, A., & Heymann, M. (2000). Pilot-Autopilot interaction: A formal perspective. Eighth International Conference on Human-Computer Interaction in Aeronautics, Toulouse, France. See Resource details

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  4. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: "The organization of information within the FMC/CDU appears to be an issue for some pilots. Monitoring the overall status and performance of the aircraft includes being aware of fuel status, lateral path, position, vertical path, and so on. To adequately monitor aircraft status by means of the FMC, the crew must review the information that is presented on a number of different pages which are accessed by means of a number of mode and/or line select keys. Extensive monitoring of the FMC/CDU dimishes the crew's ability to monitor the data in the mode control panel at the same time, thus creating the possibility for missing important information about the status of the aircraft." (page 4.12)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: FMS CDU
    Source: Eldredge, D., Mangold, S., & Dodd, R.S. (1992). A Review and Discussion of Flight Management System Incidents Reported to the Aviation Safety Reporting System. Final Report DOT/FAA/RD-92/2. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration. See Resource details

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  6. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "…In a time critical situation, it appears that the flight crew trusted the automation to carry out its task (fly to the designated point “R”), as it had many times before... In the Cali accident, the fact that the pilots had become loaded with very demanding tasks that required the use of separate, non-integrated sources of information may have contributed to their lack of vigilance in monitoring the automation during the turn." (page 881)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation and FMS
    Source: Inagaki, T., Takae, Y., & Moray, N. (1999). Automation and human interface for takeoff safety. In R.S. Jensen, B. Cox, J.D. Callister, & R. Lavis (Eds.), Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 402-407. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

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  8. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "This example is also indicative of an underlying problem with the FMS display. Pilots essentially generate their own selective display of the external world, based on the commands they enter. With FMS equipped aircraft, it is possible to enter any series of waypoints and the aircraft will fly that path, however, except for flying near adverse weather, it can be very difficult to detect if the created path is potentially unsafe or incorrect…Without verifying the accuracy of the flight path by comparison with navigation charts, pilots are not able to detect these errors from simply examining the displays and such programming errors are actually fairly easy to make." (page 879)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation and FMS
    Source: Inagaki, T., Takae, Y., & Moray, N. (1999). Automation and human interface for takeoff safety. In R.S. Jensen, B. Cox, J.D. Callister, & R. Lavis (Eds.), Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 402-407. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

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  10. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "Conclusions ... The display cues cited by the pilots and the instruments in their scan suggest study of some changes in mode presentation and pilot training. To monitor autopilot conformance, pilots must compare between mode annunciations, commanded values selected on the mode control panel, and the aircraft states shown on their Primary Flight Displays and HUD. This requires the pilot to reference several displays and compare between displays in different formats on different screens, sometimes referencing states that are not distinctly quantified (such as Flight Path Angle)." (page 21)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: A320
    Equipment: automation: displays
    Source: Johnson, E.N. & Pritchett, A.R. (1995). Experimental Study Of Vertical Flight Path Mode Awareness. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics. See Resource details

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  12. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 23 of the 30 (77%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc9 information integration may be required
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  14. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 2 of the 30 (7%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc9 information integration may be required
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  16. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: The AH-64D pilots also commented on the need for an improvement to the FLIR system and that the ORT should be removed and replaced with another MFD. In addition, several pilots commented on problems with viewing the MFDs and on a need for more permanent representations of some types of data. Representative comments of the AH-64D pilots were: ... Use analog instruments - a circled compass rose is generally missed. I used to just see 45 and 90 degree tick marks on the HSI [horizontal stabilizer indicator] . Now with only a hdg [heading] tape, I have to do the math in my head for traffic pattern work. (page 9)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: AH-64D
    Equipment: HSI/EHSI
    Source: Rash, C.E., Adam, G.E., LeDuc, P.A., & Francis, G. (May 6-8, 2003). Pilot Attitudes on Glass and Traditional Cockpits in the U.S. Army's AH-64 Apache Helicopter. Presented at the American Helicopter Society 59th Annual Forum, Phoenix, AZ. American Helicopter Society International, Inc. See Resource details

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  18. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "Related problems with verifying the status and behavior of the automation attributable to the framentation of feedback were mentioned by five pilots. Fragmentation of feedback refers to the fact that information on the status and behavior of different system components is presetned in various locations of the flgiht deck rather than displayed in an integrated fashion in one place…" (page 562)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: A-320
    Equipment: automation: displays
    Source: Sherry, L. & Polson, P.G. (1999). Shared models of flight management system vertical guidance. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 9(2), 139-153. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details
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