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Evidence for an Issue 9 pieces of evidence for this issue.

new tasks and errors may exist (Issue #89) - Automation may change and/or add pilot tasks, possibly making new (often more serious) errors possible.

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  2. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "With respect to the source and mechanism or cue for error detection, no significant differenes were found between conventional and glass-cockpit aircraft." (page 198)
    Strength: -5
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Hettinger, L.J. & Haas, M.W. (2000). Current research in advanced cockpit display concepts. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 10(3), 227-229. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  4. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "No significant difference was found between the frequencies for the different error categories and performance levels for conventional versus glass-cockpit aircraft." (page 196)
    Strength: -5
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Hettinger, L.J. & Haas, M.W. (2000). Current research in advanced cockpit display concepts. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 10(3), 227-229. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  6. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the survey data: "I make fewer errors in the automated airplanes than I did in the older models." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 3=Neutral, 5=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 3.02 and the standard deviation was 0.97. (page 20)
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B757 & B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Hutchins, E., Holder, B., & Hayward, M. (1999). Pilot Attitudes Toward Automation. Web published at http://hci.ucsd.edu/hutchins/attitudes/index.html. See Resource details

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  8. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 26 of the 30 (87%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc89 new tasks and errors may exist
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  9.  
  10. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 2 of the 30 (7%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc89 new tasks and errors may exist
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  12. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "On average, participants made 3.25 commission errors out of a possible 6 (SD = 1.88), and almost 80% made 2 or more commission errors. An examination of the number of commission errors as a function of crew size, prompts to verify, training, and trial order indicated that only training affected the number of commission errors participants made, f(2,84) = 3.64,P < .05,02 = 08. In other words, 8% of the variance in commission errors could be accounted for by the training manipulation (an effect size that Cohen, 1977, would categorize as above a medium effect size). Tukey tests indicated that the group that was explicitly trained about automation bias and resultant omission and commission errors made fewer commission errors (M= 2.59, SD = 1.72) than either the could-verify training group (M= 3.84, SD = 1.6 1) or the must-verify group (M = 3.3 1, SD = 2.12). (page 93)
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: A-320
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Sarter, N.B. (2000). The need for multisensory interfaces in support of highly effective attention allocation in highly dynamic event-driven domains: The case of cockpit automation. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 10(3), 231-245. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  14. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "Five pilots were concerned with the cumbersome design of the disconnect procedure for the autothrust system, again echoing concerns raised by some pilots in the Last and Alder (1991) survey. To avoid a power surge, pilots are instructed first to move the thrust levers out of the detent (which does not yet disconnect the system) and then, to move the levers until the actual and commanded thrust indications on the upper engine display match. Once this is achieved, the system can be disconnected by pushing the disconnect buttons on the thrust levers. Pilots point out that this procedure may take too long and might potentially compete with other visual demands if an immediate disconnect becomes necessary for safety reasons. Finally, one pilot mentioned that nonmoving thrust levers discourage pilots from resting their hands on the throttles during final approach-a habit and requirement on most other aircraft, which seems desirable in the interest of achieving the fastest possible response to a problem." (page 566)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: A-320
    Equipment: autoflight: autothrust
    Source: Sherry, L. & Polson, P.G. (1999). Shared models of flight management system vertical guidance. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 9(2), 139-153. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  16. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "Failure to activate the approach: 21 cases. Automated cockpit systems cannot determine on their own when a pilot is ready to begin the approach phase of flight. Pilots must explicitly inform the automation about this transition by “activating the approach.” By taking this step (which involves a single button push), the pilot arms the system for slowing the aircraft to the maneuvering speeds for successive pilot-selected approach configurations (i.e., slats/flaps settings) once speed control is handed over to the automation (i.e., once the “managed speed” mode is activated). If the pilot forgets to activate the approach before engaging managed speed, the automation will not slow the airplane; instead, it will increase thrust in order to return to the last active target speed, which will in most cases be too high for the approach phase of flight." (page 560)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: A-320
    Equipment: automation and FMS
    Source: Sherry, L. & Polson, P.G. (1999). Shared models of flight management system vertical guidance. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 9(2), 139-153. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  18. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "When pilots were asked about their experiences with and attitude toward the uncoupled sidesticks on the Airbus A-320, 94 responded that they did not find it difficult to adapt to controlling the aircraft by means of a sidestick instead of a yoke." (page 566)
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: A-320
    Equipment: automation: controls
    Source: Sherry, L. & Polson, P.G. (1999). Shared models of flight management system vertical guidance. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 9(2), 139-153. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details
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