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Evidence for an Issue 28 pieces of evidence for this issue.

behavior of automation may not be apparent (Issue #83) - The behavior of automation devices -- what they are doing now and what they will do in the future based upon pilot input or other factors -- may not be apparent to pilots, possibly resulting in reduced pilot awareness of automation behavior and goals.

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  2. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Review Study
    Evidence: A particular problem observed from the Cali Air accident (Accident_Report 1996; Simmon 1998) indicated the need for displaying how much change has happened in a situation where pilots had failed to identify, diagnose, and rectify an erroneous instruction to the Flight Management System. Pilots can instruct the system to an immediate course change by entering a new waypoint using the ‘direct to’ function. After entering and confirming a waypoint code into a keypad, the system then automatically executes the change, having retrieved the corresponding coordinates from a database. The new target heading is calculated by the system. Thus, pilots are not immediately aware of it, unless they check the map display. Moreover, the course change may happen without the pilots being aware of the progress of heading change (i.e. amount of turn). This was a significant contributory factor leading to the Cali air accident, where an erroneous code was entered and lead to a large heading change. The turn remained undetected for a while, and subsequently contributed to a collision with a mountain. (page 4)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757-223
    Equipment: automation: displays
    Source: Bruseberg, A. (not dated). Designing for new types of interaction. Department of Computer Science, University of Bath. Available at http://www.cs.bath.ac.uk/~anneb/L11Bruseberg.pdf. See Resource details

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  4. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Review Study
    Evidence: 4.3.5 The pilot may not have consulted the map display. Problem analysis: To be able to see the system feedback the pilot was required to select a different content for the screen and pay additional attention. The map display was probably never selected or considered. Collaboration analysis: Important feedback information was available but the pilot’s attention was never drawn to it. The system provided no mechanism to ensure that the information available had actually been considered. (page 5)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757-223
    Equipment: automation: displays
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (not dated). Collaboration in the Flightdeck: Opportunities for Interaction Design. Department of Computer Science, University of Bath. Available at http://www.cs.bath.ac.uk/~anneb/collwn.pdf. See Resource details

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  6. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: The autopilot behavior is perplexing; it responds differently to the same pilot action. Setting the altitude to a value behind the current aircraft altitude results in two different responses: In the first case the aircraft will continue at the current climb-rate and "kill the capture". In the second case the aircraft will capture the newly set altitude. So how can the pilot anticipate what the aircraft will do in each case? It turns out that there is a hidden condition here, that revolves around the altitude at which the aircraft transitions to the "Capture" mode (7,000 feet in our example): If the newly set altitude is below (e.g., 6,000 feet) the "start capture altitude", then the aircraft will kill the capture. But if the newly set altitude is above (e.g., 8,000 feet) the "start capture altitude", the aircraft will capture the specified altitude. Do pilots know about this behavior and the condition? No. It’s not in the manual nor is it mentioned in ground school or Initial Operating Experience (IOE) -- it is practically unknown! Now we are not talking about some minor deficiency, but a critical maneuver that sometimes takes place very close to the ground. The pilots’ user-model is inadequate for the task of capturing an altitude after resetting the altitude to a value behind the aircraft. If we go back to our earlier discussion, we have a condition in which the user-model is inadequate for the task. This deficiency corresponds to region 3 in Figure 1. (page 6/7)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot
    Source: Degani, A., & Heymann, M. (2000). Pilot-Autopilot interaction: A formal perspective. Eighth International Conference on Human-Computer Interaction in Aeronautics, Toulouse, France. See Resource details

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  8. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: "Another issue cited in some of the reports was the difficulty that the flight crew had in recognizing programming errors once the data were entered into the FMC/CDU. These pilots maintained that the FMC should be more capable in reviewing and alerting the pilots to entries that appear to be in error or do not logically fit with the rest of the data entered." (page 4.12)
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: FMS CDU
    Source: Eldredge, D., Mangold, S., & Dodd, R.S. (1992). A Review and Discussion of Flight Management System Incidents Reported to the Aviation Safety Reporting System. Final Report DOT/FAA/RD-92/2. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration. See Resource details

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  10. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: "A common observation by the majority of the pilots submitting these reports was the belief that they did not have enough information about what the FMS was doing to be able to effectively monitor the system." (page 4.5)
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Eldredge, D., Mangold, S., & Dodd, R.S. (1992). A Review and Discussion of Flight Management System Incidents Reported to the Aviation Safety Reporting System. Final Report DOT/FAA/RD-92/2. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration. See Resource details

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  12. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: 6. RECOMMENDATIONS ... 6.1 Design-Related Recommendations This analysis of the FMS-related reports from the ASRS database has provided a valuable look at the problems crews are having with current FMSs. On the basis of this review, the following recommendations suggest how the Description and Characterization study can be focused to concentrate on those issues that appear to have special importance. ... 3) Feedback sources for each automation level, and for each task, need to be specified. A major concern for many flight crews is the inability to effectively predict and understand what the FMS is doing. Issues of adequate and meaning feedback need to be addressed." (page 6.1)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Eldredge, D., Mangold, S., & Dodd, R.S. (1992). A Review and Discussion of Flight Management System Incidents Reported to the Aviation Safety Reporting System. Final Report DOT/FAA/RD-92/2. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration. See Resource details

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  14. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the survey data: "It is easier to bust an altitude in an automated airplane than in other planes." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 3=Neutral, 5=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 2.27 and the standard deviation was 2.67. (page 21)
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B757 & B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Hutchins, E., Holder, B., & Hayward, M. (1999). Pilot Attitudes Toward Automation. Web published at http://hci.ucsd.edu/hutchins/attitudes/index.html. See Resource details

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  16. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "The lack of movement on the A320 does seem to reduce pilots' awareness of thrust demanded." As shown by the pilots' responses to the statement: 'A320 System: Lack of movement reduces awareness of thrust demanded', approximately 55% responded either 'almost always', 'often', or 'sometimes', and approximately 45% responded "almost never". (page 6)
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: A320
    Equipment: autoflight: autothrust
    Source: Last, S. & Alder, M. (1991). British Airways Airbus A320 Pilots' Autothrust Survey. IFALPA Reference ADO/12/3/4, SRS/SJS. IFALPA. See Resource details

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  18. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "The lack of movement on the A320 does seem to reduce pilots' awareness of thrust demanded." As shown by the pilots' responses to the statement: "A320 System: Lack of movement reduces awareness of thrust demanded", approximately 55% responded either "almost always", "often", or "sometimes", and approximately 45% responded "almost never". (page 6)
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: A320
    Equipment: autoflight: autothrust
    Source: Last, S. & Alder, M. (1991). British Airways Airbus A320 Pilots' Autothrust Survey. IFALPA Reference ADO/12/3/4, SRS/SJS. IFALPA. See Resource details

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  20. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 27 of the 30 (90%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc083 behavior of automation may not be apparent
    Strength: +5
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  22. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 20 of the 30 (67%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc051 feedback may be poor
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  24. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 20 of the 30 (67%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc147 pilots may misunderstand automation intent
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  26. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 19 of the 30 (63%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc30 side-sticks may not be coupled
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  28. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 5 of the 30 (17%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc051 feedback may be poor
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  30. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 3 of the 30 (10%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc083 behavior of automation may not be apparent
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  32. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 2 of the 30 (7%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc147 pilots may misunderstand automation intent
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  34. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "4. CAUSES ... The AAIC determined that the following factors, as a chain or a combination thereof, caused the accident: ... 5. There was no warning and recognition function to alert the crew directly and actively to the onset of the abnormal out-of-trim condition." (page 4.1)
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: A300B4-622R
    Equipment: autoflight
    Source: Ministry of Transport Japan, Aircraft Accident Investigation Commission (1996). China Airlines Airbus Industrie A300B4-622R, B1816, Nagoya Airport, April 26, 1994. Report 96-5. Ministry of Transport. See Resource details

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  36. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: We collected detailed performance data on automation use during the scenario and found several areas in which pilots were not proficient. One notable finding is that there was considerable confusion about the altitude intervention button (which provides very poor feedback). No pilot used this button correctly in all cases. (page 5)
    Strength: +5
    Aircraft: B747-400
    Equipment: automation: controls
    Source: Mumaw, R.J., Sarter, N.B., & Wickens, C.D. (2001). Analysis of Pilots' Monitoring and Performance on an Automated Flight Deck. In Proceedings of the 11th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University.. See Resource details

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  38. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "... the flight instruments remain the primary tools at high altitudes for maintaining level, stabilized flight in large airplanes. The captain's statement corroborated the fact that he was relying on these instruments for that purpose. Under these conditions, therefore, the primary instrument for attitude control was the attitude director indicator, which may not have concerned the captain initially since it depicted either a wings-level attitude or a very slight left-wing-down bank. With regard to heading, over the period between 1011:09 to about 1014:00, the heading increased about 4 degrees, a change so slight as to be almost imperceptible. Thus, except for airspeed, which concerned the captain greatly, the only thing in the cockpit that would have depicted the worsening control situation was the control wheel's increasing left-wing-down deflection. However, this was an area which was not included in the captain's regular instrument scan pattern, and since he was not `hands on', he was not aware of the deflection." (page 30)
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: B747-SP-09
    Equipment: autoflight
    Source: National Transportation Safety Board (1986). China Airlines B-747-SP, 300 NM Northwest of San Francisco, February 19, 1985. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-86-03. Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board. See Resource details

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  40. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: In our review of 282 automation-related ASRS incident reports, we found 1 reports (<1%) supporting issue083 (behavior of automation may not be apparent).
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Owen, G. & Funk, K. (1997). Flight Deck Automation Issues: Incident Report Analysis. http://www.flightdeckautomation.com/incidentstudy/incident-analysis.aspx. Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University, Department of Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering. See Resource details

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  42. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Pilots also reported feeling somewhat isolated or distanced from the physical aircraft. For example, pilots note great difficulty in anticipating aircraft behavior." (page 6)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Rudisill, M. (1995). Line Pilots' Attitudes About and Experience With Flight Deck Automation: Results of an International Survey and Proposed Guidelines. In R.S. Jensen, & L.A. Rakovan (Eds.), Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Columbus, Ohio, April 24-27, 1995, 288-293. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

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  44. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "... there is an overall negative response to the perceived lack of feedback from the fixed autothrust system and auto-trim (e.g., 'the seat of the pants is gone...') and lack of cross-cockpit and autopilot control coupling." (page 5)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: autoflight: autothrust & autopilot
    Source: Rudisill, M. (1995). Line Pilots' Attitudes About and Experience With Flight Deck Automation: Results of an International Survey and Proposed Guidelines. In R.S. Jensen, & L.A. Rakovan (Eds.), Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Columbus, Ohio, April 24-27, 1995, 288-293. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

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  46. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Pilots were asked to describe instances where FMS behavior surprised them and to indicate modes/features of FMS operation that they did not understand. There were no sharp boundaries between the incidents elicited by the two questions. Pilot reports are categorized according to their underlying theme." ... "VNAV logic and calculations (38 Reports) Pilots indicate that the algorithms underlying the calculation of a VNAV path are not transparent to them. They cannot visualize the intended path, and therefore they are sometimes unable to anticipate or understand VNAV activities initiated to maintain target parameters (25 [of 135] reports [19%])". (page 307,310)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Sarter, N.B. & Woods, D.D. (1992). Pilot interaction with cockpit automation: Operational experiences with the Flight Management System. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 2(4), 303-321. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  48. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "Many examples of inadequate feedback occurred in the corpus [which includes both this study and the study referenced by s0069] including difficulties integrating data on FMS status distributed over different cockpit displays or CDU pages, difficulties anticipating uncommanded mode changes, difficulties assessing the implications of changes to the instructions given to the FMS (e.g., enroute changes in cruise speed may interact with pre-programmed values for the descent phase on a different CDU page), difficulties visualizing the descent profile programmed in VNAV." (page 317)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Sarter, N.B. & Woods, D.D. (1992). Pilot interaction with cockpit automation: Operational experiences with the Flight Management System. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 2(4), 303-321. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  50. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "During these first 3 sessions, it was, in some cases, difficult for pilots to keep track of who is in charge and what are the currently active target values ... difficulties in tracking active target values and FMS behavior in some modes can contribute to losing track of 'what the automation is doing'." (page 314-317)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Sarter, N.B. & Woods, D.D. (1992). Pilot interaction with cockpit automation: Operational experiences with the Flight Management System. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 2(4), 303-321. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  52. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Pilots were asked to describe instances where FMS behavior surprised them and to indicate modes/features of FMS operation that they did not understand. There were no sharp boundaries between the incidents elicited by the two questions. Pilot reports are categorized according to their underlying theme." ... There were 10 reports [10 / 135 = 7.4%] in the category: "Active Target Values ... In some situations, it seems to be difficult for pilots to keep track of what are the currently active target values. The pilot reports indicate that one of the major sources of this problem is the interaction between the values selected on the MCP and those selected within the CDU. Pilots also commented that, while the MCP targets can immediately be seen on the MCP, the FMS targets are sometimes 'hidden' in the CDU page architecture." (page 307,312)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Sarter, N.B. & Woods, D.D. (1992). Pilot interaction with cockpit automation: Operational experiences with the Flight Management System. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 2(4), 303-321. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  54. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "During these first 3 sessions, it was, in some cases, difficult for pilots to keep track of who is in charge and what are the currently active target values ... difficulties in tracking active target values and FMS behavior in some modes can contribute to losing track of 'what the automation is doing'." (page 314-317)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Sarter, N.B. & Woods, D.D. (1992). Pilot interaction with cockpit automation: Operational experiences with the Flight Management System. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 2(4), 303-321. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  56. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "To assess whether the dimensions were related, correlations were calculated between every possible pair of dimensions, using the average score across participants for each of the 26 components listed in Table 4 as the data entered into the correlation (n = 26). ...This same cluster of correlated dimensions also related to workload (Dimension F). Parts rated highly distracting (Dimension C) were rated as workload intensive, R = .8933, p < .001, as were parts requiring a high degree of attention to the automation (Dimension A), R = .4034, p < .05. Difficulty in predicting the automation’s behavior (Dimension E) also contributed to high workload, R = .6966, p < .05." (page 116)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Skitka, L.J., Mosier, K.L., Burdick, M., & Rosenblatt, B. (2000). Automation bias and errors: Are crews better than individuals?. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 10(1), 85-97. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details
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