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Evidence for an Issue 13 pieces of evidence for this issue.

flightdeck automation may be incompatible with ATC system (Issue #82) - There may be incompatibilities between advanced automation aircraft and the existing ATC system, possibly increasing pilot workload, causing inconsistent information to be presented, or reducing the pilot's ability to use automation for the best results.

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  2. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Whilst the pilots we have talked to did not report mode reversions, they reported many situations in which to make decisions as to what parts of the automated systems to use when, as a prominent aspect in pilots’ tasks. For example, situational factors often require the use of less sophisticated equipment (e.g. adverse weather conditions, landings, Air Traffic Control (ATC) giving headings), or pilots may need to decide when the automated systems cannot cope: P1: “But invariably on every flight the route is changed to some degree by ATC ... even to a point where you disconnect it from the FMS and fly in another mode.” P2: “On our descent they changed the runway three times ... for some reason we didn’t change the frequencies [the third time]. We came in ... looked from a distance... thought ‘this is wrong’... so we knocked off the autopilot.” P2: “Sometimes you have situations where you know the plane is supposed to turn at 4 miles and if it doesn’t then, because it’s so much easier to use the automated system to fly this departure, you’ll find the pilot will sit there and go like, ‘OK, I’ll give it a little more time’.” P2: “[in bad weather]... what you do is you take off the height control... A lot of up- and downdrafts ... can confuse the sensors... If it bobs up and down, you don’t have the autopilot fighting it. But that’s not a company procedure.” P2: “...due to traffic etc. they can’t descend you ... you now find that the system is telling you ‘top of descent’ but you have to ignore it ...suddenly the controller announces to you that you are cleared to descend... Now ... you have to close the throttles and pull out the spoilers, the speed breaks, which gives you the right maximum rate of descent, and in most of the times the autopilot cannot comprehend what is going on ... you have to knock off the descent mode and descent it yourself at the very high rates, and when you’re closer to your level you put it back on ... for the 727 you definitely have to remove the descent mode, in the Learjet you go to speed. ” (page 3)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: FMS & ATC
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (2004). Should Computers Function as Collaborators?. In Proceedings of HCI-Aero 2004 held in Toulouse, France September 29, 2004 to 1 October 2004. See Resource details

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  4. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "A large number of pilots felt that the response time for the Flight Management Computer was excessive. When a specific instance was mentioned, it usually involved complying with ATC requests while maneuvering in the terminal area." (page 22)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. NASA Technical Memorandum 86659, 1-68. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  6. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: "Under ideal conditions, the flight plan programmed into the FMC during preflight will be the flight plan that is actually flown. If this were always the case, virtually all of the errors that occur through FMS use would disappear. One reason as to why flight plans have to be changed, in the air, is Air Traffic Control and today's complex airspace. In areas of high traffic density, ATC clearances issued to a particular flight can be numerous, and in some cases contradictory, making effective use of the FMS difficult due to re-programming requirements, and/or the time needed for the FMS to respond to the new commands. It is also likely that ATC's understanding of the capabilities and limitations of FMS-equipped airplanes may not be what pilots anticipate. High traffic levels with correspondingly high ATC workloads and complex airspace result in very dynamic situations which often require timely and flexible response from the flight crew. ... Advanced cockpit airplanes, however, often engender workload difficulties that are unique as portrayed in the following report. [ASRS incident report #114409] .. 'During climbout from DFW that controller issued a clearance to turn to a heading of 300 degrees, intercept the DFW 274 degree radial, climb to and maintain 16,000 feet, and maintain 250 knots until advised. As the first officer, and pilot not flying, I proceeded to read back the clearance and program the FMS computer for route, speed and altitude. The Captain selected speed intervention of 250 knots and heading to the assigned intercept heading. He also attempted to couple the vertical navigation of the autopilot but this was not accepted so he used flight level change and speed of 250 knots to climb to the assigned altitude of 16,000 feet at 250 knots ... Unfortunately, the autopilot entered an altitude capture mode approaching 10,000 feet instead of continuing to climb to 16,000, In addition, the auto throttle disregarded the 250 kt restriction and continued to accelerate. The controller called to ask our speed and as I looked up from the FMS, I noticed approximately 330 knots... At the time of the incident, the two of us were given an intercept heading, an altitude change, and a speed restriction. In the process of attempting to accomplish the programming for the FMS, listen for ATC, and watch for traffic, the airspeed capture of the auto throttles was overlooked until the speed approached 330 knots.' In this case, the flight crew was busy dealing with a relatively complex clearance form the ATC which included a speed restriction. ... The use of the FMS in busy airspace in which multiple clearances from ATC are likely, along with multiple aircraft configuration and speed changes, appear to make effective use of the FMS difficult, especially for short-term navigation activities. This difficulty is due to the need for pilots to remain flexible and respond quickly to the needs of ATC. The FMC/CDU, however, apparently is no that east to re-program and is not designed to support short term changes. Although this study did not look at ATC-related problems relative to altitude specifically, many of the ATC-related incidents occurred in the middle altitudes between 10,000 feet and FL240. The complexity of this airspace, and ATC overall, seems to be involving larger portions of a given flight's overall trip. Clearly, the role of ATC should be a major consideration in how the next generation automated systems are designed and operated. (page 4.14-4.16)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Eldredge, D., Mangold, S., & Dodd, R.S. (1992). A Review and Discussion of Flight Management System Incidents Reported to the Aviation Safety Reporting System. Final Report DOT/FAA/RD-92/2. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration. See Resource details

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  8. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the survey data: "The automation in my current aircraft works great in today's ATC environment." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 3=Neutral, 5=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 3.62 and the standard deviation was 0.90. (page 20)
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: B757 & B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Hutchins, E., Holder, B., & Hayward, M. (1999). Pilot Attitudes Toward Automation. Web published at http://hci.ucsd.edu/hutchins/attitudes/index.html. See Resource details

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  10. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 24 of the 30 (80%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc82 flightdeck automation may be incompatible with ATC system
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  12. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 11 of the 30 (37%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc157 automation may conflict with ATC
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  14. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 2 of the 30 (7%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc82 flightdeck automation may be incompatible with ATC system
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  16. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 2 of the 30 (7%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc157 automation may conflict with ATC
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  18. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: In our review of 282 automation-related ASRS incident reports, we found 5 reports (2%) supporting issue082 (flightdeck automation may be incompatible with ATC system).
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Owen, G. & Funk, K. (1997). Flight Deck Automation Issues: Incident Report Analysis. http://www.flightdeckautomation.com/incidentstudy/incident-analysis.aspx. Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University, Department of Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering. See Resource details

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  20. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "[Pilots] report that interactions with the FMS, in particular, are very complex. Pilots find FMS programming to be time-consuming and that the automation cannot deal adequately with ATC changes." (page 6)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Rudisill, M. (1995). Line Pilots' Attitudes About and Experience With Flight Deck Automation: Results of an International Survey and Proposed Guidelines. In R.S. Jensen, & L.A. Rakovan (Eds.), Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Columbus, Ohio, April 24-27, 1995, 288-293. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

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  22. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "It is also important to realize that the performance benefits of the NAV condition were achieved without noticeably altering the 'style' in which the aircraft flew the circuit. The tracks produced by the FMS appeared 'normal', i.e., not unlike the intended track or the tracks produced when the pilots flew in the STANDARD condition. There was no apparent cause for concern that flight tracks flown with the FMS in command would differ materially from those flown by aircraft not equipped with an [in sic] FMS. Hence, it could be concluded that the Airbus A310 and similarly equipped aircraft should blend smoothly and easily into the existing ATC environment regardless of the mode in which they are flown." (page 11.14)
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: A310
    Equipment: FMS & autopilot & ATC
    Source: Speyer, J.J., Monteil, C., Blomberg, R.D., & Fouillot, J.P. (1990). Impact of New Technology on Operational Interface: From Design Aims to Flight Evaluation and Measurement. Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development No. 301, Vol. 1. See Resource details

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  24. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 3: "The B-757 automation works great in today's ATC environment." From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, 51% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, 55% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement while only 28% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and 25% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 21% in Phase 1 and 20% in Phase 2. (page 147)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  26. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 3: "The B-757 automation works great in today's ATC environment." From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, 51% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, 55% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement while only 28% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and 25% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 21% in Phase 1 and 20% in Phase 2. (page 147)
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details
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