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Evidence for an Issue 82 pieces of evidence for this issue.

automation may adversely affect pilot workload (Issue #79) - Automation may increase overall pilot workload, or increase pilot workload at high workload times and reduce pilot workload at low workload times, possibly resulting in excess workload and/or boredom.

  1.  
  2. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "MANOVA results also showed a significant Control Type× ATC interaction for workload (F [1,11] = 4.73, p < .05). Post hoc tests showed that: 1) without ATC, Control Type had no effect on pilot workload, and 2) with ATC, average pilot workload ratings for using the voice interface were 22% lower (average rating = 46) than those for the manual interface (average rating = 59). The weapon delivery workload results are depicted in Figure 9 (next page)."
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Barbato, G. (1999). Lessons learned: Integrating voice recognition and automation target cueing symbology for fighter attack. In R.S. Jensen, B. Cox, J.D. Callister, & R. Lavis (Eds.), Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 203-207. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

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  4. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "The results verified the hypotheses and showed that the pilots were able to designate targets more quickly using voice control coupled with the ATC than with manual control coupled with the ATC (F [1,11] = 4.79, p < .05). Further, pilots reported a decrease in workload when using the voice versus manual interface in combination with the ATC (F [1,11] = 4.73, p < .05)."
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Barbato, G. (1999). Lessons learned: Integrating voice recognition and automation target cueing symbology for fighter attack. In R.S. Jensen, B. Cox, J.D. Callister, & R. Lavis (Eds.), Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 203-207. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

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  6. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "In regard to workload during rerouting, there was a significant two-way interaction for Control Type× TF Task Load (F [1,11] = 4.84, p < .05). Post-hoc tests showed that: 1) during high TF Task Loading, when the voice interface was used to accomplish mission rerouting, it decreased pilot workload by 31% compared to using the manual interface, and 2) during low TF Task Loading, Control Type had no effect on rerouting. During high TF Task Loading, the pilots’ average SWAT ratings to reroute the mission dropped from a 39 with the manual interface to a 27 with the voice interface, whereas during low TF Task Loading, pilots’ average SWAT ratings remained virtually constant at 34."
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Barbato, G. (1999). Lessons learned: Integrating voice recognition and automation target cueing symbology for fighter attack. In R.S. Jensen, B. Cox, J.D. Callister, & R. Lavis (Eds.), Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 203-207. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

  7.  
  8. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "In regard to workload during rerouting, there was a significant two-way interaction for Control Type× TF Task Load (F [1,11] = 4.84, p < .05). Post-hoc tests showed that: 1) during high TF Task Loading, when the voice interface was used to accomplish mission rerouting, it decreased pilot workload by 31% compared to using the manual interface, and 2) during low TF Task Loading, Control Type had no effect on rerouting. During high TF Task Loading, the pilots’ average SWAT ratings to reroute the mission dropped from a 39 with the manual interface to a 27 with the voice interface, whereas during low TF Task Loading, pilots’ average SWAT ratings remained virtually constant at 34."
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Barbato, G. (1999). Lessons learned: Integrating voice recognition and automation target cueing symbology for fighter attack. In R.S. Jensen, B. Cox, J.D. Callister, & R. Lavis (Eds.), Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 203-207. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

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  10. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: A widely reported problem in modern aircraft is entering instructions through the keypad into the FMS, when under time pressure (e.g. [12]). Pilots have mentioned this issue to us as a particular problem: “...during the high workload phases, operating the FMS, especially the tasks that you don’t do very often, and therefore you might forget to put a slash or a stroke, whatever the format should be that you are typing into the scratchpad, that is very distracting; getting the format correct, especially the format that you don’t often use”. (page 5)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation & FMS
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (2004). Considering temporal aspects for the design of humancomputer collaboration: identifying suitable foci. Department of Computer Science, University of Bath. Available at http://www.cs.bath.ac.uk/~anneb/chi%20time%20ws%202004.pdf. See Resource details

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  12. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Review Study
    Evidence: 4.3.2 The FMS displays a list of possible options, with 'Romeo' at the top. The pilot selects the first option on the list without verifying whether the first listed waypoint is Rozo. Design analysis: The FMS has been given the function to support the pilot in making a selection by displaying the waypoint closest to the current position and route first. The purpose of displaying the list is two-fold in terms of providing support. It aims to stipulate an easy selection, as well as to provide feedback of the systems’ understanding. The information is displayed in the format of coordinates, not waypoint name. Problem analysis: The coordinates are difficult to check for accuracy in the time available since they require comparing with documentation to retrieve the associated name. Complacency and lack of time prevents the pilot from checking the accuracy of the first item on the list through comparing the coordinates. Habit leads to choosing the first displayed waypoint without checking. The fact that Rozo was not in the list at all was not identified. Collaboration analysis: Whilst the system anticipates the pilot’s likely first choice on top of the list, it does not effectively support the pilots’ task in using their active relevant terminology (i.e. the full name of the waypoint). The reliance on the system’s choice encouraged complacency and unjustified trust since experience showed that checking is not necessary. If there is virtually no function in making a choice, then why give the pilot the option to do so? (page 5)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757-223
    Equipment: automation & FMS
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (not dated). Collaboration in the Flightdeck: Opportunities for Interaction Design. Department of Computer Science, University of Bath. Available at http://www.cs.bath.ac.uk/~anneb/collwn.pdf. See Resource details

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  14. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Moreover, the functionality of being able to pre-program the FMS to carry out complex automated tasks requires pilots to convey these plans and instructions to the system. Since more complex instructions can be communicated, the communication becomes more complex, too. Rudisill [10] reports that pilots often express problems with entering instructions through the keypad into the FMS, particularly when under time pressure. Likewise, pilots have mentioned this issue to us as a particular problem: P1: “...during the high workload phases, operating the FMS, especially the tasks that you don’t do very often ... you might forget to put a slash or a stroke, whatever the format should be that you are typing into the scratchpad ... that is very distracting, getting the format correct. (page 4)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: FMS keyboard
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (2004). Should Computers Function as Collaborators?. In Proceedings of HCI-Aero 2004 held in Toulouse, France September 29, 2004 to 1 October 2004. See Resource details

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  16. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Automation was perceived as beneficial by the pilots we spoke to, thus reflecting a widely observed opinion: P2: “The autopilot takes a lot of the workload off the pilot... it also helps you in being more accurate.” (page 2)
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (2004). Should Computers Function as Collaborators?. In Proceedings of HCI-Aero 2004 held in Toulouse, France September 29, 2004 to 1 October 2004. See Resource details

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  18. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the questionnaire data: "47% agree and 36% disagree, that 'Automation reduces overall workload' (#32)" while 17% neither agree nor disagree with the statement. (page 21)
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. NASA Technical Memorandum 86659, 1-68. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  20. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: The PF performed only one housekeeping activity: manipulating the controls of the aircraft systems except for cabin temperature. The PNF performed three activities—manipulating the frequency selectors on the communication radios, manipulating the controls on the communication selector panel, and manipulating the cabin temperature controls—that may be classified as housekeeping activities. Of these four housekeeping activities, only manipulating the cabin temperature controls showed a significant effect of level of cockpit automation (F (3, 188) = 4.02,p< .01). For this activity, only the post hoc comparison of the SP-77 versus the 300e was significant (p <.01). The mean frequencies for each aircraft are given in Table 6. (page 15)
    Strength: +5
    Aircraft: B737
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Damos, D.L., John, R.S., & Lyall, E.A. (2005). Pilot Activities and the Level of Cockpit Automation. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 15(3), 251-268. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. See Resource details

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  22. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: "5. CONCLUSIONS ... The major issues associated with the FMS-related incidents, addressed in this analysis include: - Raw Data and FMS/Aircraft Status Verification - FMS Algorithmic 'Behavior' - Improper Use of the FMC Automation Level - FMC Programming Demands - Multiple FMC Page Monitoring Requirements - Complex ATC Clearances - Complex FMC/CDU Tasks - Lack of Adequate Pilot Training - FMC/MCP Interaction Errors - Inaccurate Pre-Stored Databases All of these factors, singly or together, can combine to increase the pilots' workload to the point that they lose their situational awareness and 'get behind the airplane.' In this situation, the pilot who continues to focus on trying to understand what the FMC/CDU is doing is no longer truly involved in flying the airplane, but trying to troubleshoot a computer that happens to be installed in an airplane. The pilots that did best with FMS-related problems, in high workload situations, were those that elected to reduce the level of automation (by turning OFF the selected function) and appeared to recognize that they needed to become actively involved in flying the airplane. From these reports, it is clear that the current FMSs have not been designed for optimal use under all circumstances, by the flight crew, in the environment where ATC is heavily burdened and expects pilots to remain flexible and responsive to their changing needs of moving traffic. Based on this analysis, it would appear that pilots should not try to use the full features of the FMS under all conditions. Many of the pilots submitting these reports learned that fact, but only after they experienced the incident that initiated the ASRS report. This lends credence to those pilots who argued that the training they received was not adequate to prepare them for using these systems operationally." (page 5.1)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Eldredge, D., Mangold, S., & Dodd, R.S. (1992). A Review and Discussion of Flight Management System Incidents Reported to the Aviation Safety Reporting System. Final Report DOT/FAA/RD-92/2. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration. See Resource details

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  24. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the survey data: "Automation helps me stay ‘ahead of the airplane’." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 3=Neutral, 5=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 3.51 and the standard deviation was 0.96. (page 21)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Hutchins, E., Holder, B., & Hayward, M. (1999). Pilot Attitudes Toward Automation. Web published at http://hci.ucsd.edu/hutchins/attitudes/index.html. See Resource details

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  26. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the survey data: "I spend more time setting up and managing the automation (CDU, FMS) than I would hand-flying or using a plain autopilot." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 3=Neutral, 5=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 3.17 and the standard deviation was 1.13. (page 21)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: B757 & B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Hutchins, E., Holder, B., & Hayward, M. (1999). Pilot Attitudes Toward Automation. Web published at http://hci.ucsd.edu/hutchins/attitudes/index.html. See Resource details

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  28. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the survey data: "Automation does not reduce total workload, because there is more to monitor now." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 3=Neutral, 5=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 2.69 and the standard deviation was 1.11. (page 21)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757 & B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Hutchins, E., Holder, B., & Hayward, M. (1999). Pilot Attitudes Toward Automation. Web published at http://hci.ucsd.edu/hutchins/attitudes/index.html. See Resource details

  29.  
  30. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the survey data: "Automation frees me of much of the routine, mechanical parts of flying so I can concentrate on 'managing' the flight." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 3=Neutral, 5=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 3.79 and the standard deviation was 0.91. (page 20)
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: B757 & B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Hutchins, E., Holder, B., & Hayward, M. (1999). Pilot Attitudes Toward Automation. Web published at http://hci.ucsd.edu/hutchins/attitudes/index.html. See Resource details

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  32. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "In the Cali accident, the pilots faced the challenge of working with the FMS display which, by design, portrayed information about the location of navigational fixes but not environmental features such as terrain. The pilots entered “Direct CLO” (Direct to the Cali VOR) in response to a miscommunication with air traffic control (ATC) which led them to believe they had a clearance to proceed direct to Cali as opposed to following the usual waypoints on designated airways. Requesting and receiving a direct clearance is not uncommon in radar controlled airspace, which, based on their extensive background flying in the U.S., this aircrew was accustomed to. The action of making a direct entry into the FMS had an unfortunate side effect, however. It caused a new flight path to be presented between the aircraft’s current position and the Cali VOR (labeled CLO) and all intervening waypoints along the original path to disappear. Thus, when the aircrew received a later clearance from ATC to “report Tulua”, they could not find this waypoint (labeled ULQ) on their display or in an FMS-control device. They devoted considerable efforts in a time pressured situation in trying to find ULQ or other points on their display that corresponded to those on the new approach to runway 19. The selected display did not support the global SA needed to detect their location relevant to pertinent landmarks, nor the global SA needed to rapidly change goals (programming in a new flight path)." (page 878)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation and FMS
    Source: Inagaki, T., Takae, Y., & Moray, N. (1999). Automation and human interface for takeoff safety. In R.S. Jensen, B. Cox, J.D. Callister, & R. Lavis (Eds.), Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 402-407. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

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  34. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "In this case, the pilots entered “R” to direct the aircraft to fly to a fix on the approach named Rozo. While “R” was the designation for Rozo indicated on the approach chart it was not the designation used for that point in the FMS database. The "R" they actually selected was assigned to another point in Columbia named Romeo. This was a central error in this accident that sent the aircraft into a 180 degree bank to the left towards Romeo. It was a simple error for the pilots to make, likely induced by the fact that “R” was the expected designation for Rozo and was presented on the charts as such. A poorly understood FMS naming convention led to the designation of R for Romeo and not Rozo in the FMS database. (Romeo was nearer to the larger airport in Columbia, Bogota, and therefore received the designator R. Thus Rozo was assigned its full name in the database.)" (page 880)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation and FMS
    Source: Inagaki, T., Takae, Y., & Moray, N. (1999). Automation and human interface for takeoff safety. In R.S. Jensen, B. Cox, J.D. Callister, & R. Lavis (Eds.), Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 402-407. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

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  36. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "Last minute runway assignments can create a significant problem for pilots when they necessitate reprogramming the FMS to execute and/or display the new approach... The requirement to reprogram the FMS and cross check the entries at the last minute certainly played a role in this accident." (page 880)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation and FMS
    Source: Inagaki, T., Takae, Y., & Moray, N. (1999). Automation and human interface for takeoff safety. In R.S. Jensen, B. Cox, J.D. Callister, & R. Lavis (Eds.), Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 402-407. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

  37.  
  38. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: The following comment was made in response to the questionnaire statement, "Describe a problem you know of or a concern you have about flightdeck automation.": "Instead of changing one or two radio receivers only [emphasized] and making a slight turn, now one must change radio frequency on one receiver, re-program the FMC for the new runway, cycle both flight director switches (preferable simultaneously), then fly aircraft or program autopilot to new course." (aviation safety analyst, retired pilot) "Crew coordination on flight decks which are automated is a problem because one pilot must fly while the other programs the automated systems. Often, in busy periods, there is insufficient time to check programming for accuracy. This is true of aircraft control and navigation." (B747 Captain)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, B., Wilson, J., & Funk, K. (1997). Flightdeck automation issues: Phase 1 survey analysis. Available: http://www.flightdeckautomation.com/ExpertSurvey/e_report.aspx. See Resource details

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  40. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 23 of the 30 (77%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc079 automation may adversely affect pilot workload
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  41.  
  42. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 19 of the 30 (63%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc164 automation may increase workload
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  43.  
  44. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 4 of the 30 (13%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc079 automation may adversely affect pilot workload
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  46. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 5 of the 30 (17%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc164 automation may increase workload
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  48. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: In response to the survey question regarding workload: "3. Rate the difference in the mental [emphasized] workload required by the [B737-] 200 and [B737-] 300?" Out of a total of 201 responses, 115 pilots [57%] responded that the mental workload required is "higher" in the 200, 50 pilots [25%] responded that the mental workload required is "higher" in the 300, and 36 pilots [18%] responded that the amount is the same in the 200 and 300. (This data from an unpublished addendum to the report.) (page (3))
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: B737
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E.A. (1990). The effects of mixed-fleet flying of the Boeing 737-200 and -300. America West Airlines Technical Report AWA01-90-01. Phoenix, AZ: America West Airlines. See Resource details

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  50. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: In response to the following statement: "42. Automation reduces overall workload." 70% of the pilots either strongly agreed or agreed while 15% of the pilots either strongly disagreed or disagreed. 15% of the pilots were neutral. (page (17))
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E.A. (1990). The effects of mixed-fleet flying of the Boeing 737-200 and -300. America West Airlines Technical Report AWA01-90-01. Phoenix, AZ: America West Airlines. See Resource details

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  52. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: In response to the survey question regarding workload: "2. Rate the difference in the physical [emphasized] workload required by the [B737-] 200 and [B737-] 300?" Out of a total of 202 responses, 120 pilots [59%] responded that the physical workload required is "higher" in the 200, 26 pilots [13%] responded that the physical workload required is "higher" in the 300, and 56 pilots [28%] responded that the amount is the same in the 200 and 300. (This data from an unpublished addendum to the report.) (page (3))
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E.A. (1990). The effects of mixed-fleet flying of the Boeing 737-200 and -300. America West Airlines Technical Report AWA01-90-01. Phoenix, AZ: America West Airlines. See Resource details

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  54. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: In response to the survey question regarding workload: "1. Rate the difference in the overall [emphasized] workload required by the [B737-] 200 and [B737-] 300?" Out of a total of 199 responses, 125 pilots [63%] responded that the overall workload required is "higher" in the 200, 40 pilots [20%] responded that the overall workload required is "higher" in the 300, and 34 pilots [17%] responded that the amount is the same in the 200 and 300. (This data from an unpublished addendum to the report.) (page (2))
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E.A. (1990). The effects of mixed-fleet flying of the Boeing 737-200 and -300. America West Airlines Technical Report AWA01-90-01. Phoenix, AZ: America West Airlines. See Resource details

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  56. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: In response to the following statement: "42. Automation reduces overall workload." 70% of the pilots either strongly agreed or agreed while 15% of the pilots either strongly disagreed or disagreed. 15% of the pilots were neutral. (page (17))
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: B737
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E.A. (1990). The effects of mixed-fleet flying of the Boeing 737-200 and -300. America West Airlines Technical Report AWA01-90-01. Phoenix, AZ: America West Airlines. See Resource details

  57.  
  58. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: In response to the survey question regarding workload: "2. Rate the difference in the physical [emphasized] workload required by the [B737-] 200 and [B737-] 300?" Out of a total of 202 responses, 120 pilots [59%] responded that the physical workload required is "higher" in the 200, 26 pilots [13%] responded that the physical workload required is "higher" in the 300, and 56 pilots [28%] responded that the amount is the same in the 200 and 300. (This data from an unpublished addendum to the report.) (page (3))
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E.A. (1990). The effects of mixed-fleet flying of the Boeing 737-200 and -300. America West Airlines Technical Report AWA01-90-01. Phoenix, AZ: America West Airlines. See Resource details

  59.  
  60. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: In response to the survey question regarding workload: "3. Rate the difference in the mental [emphasized] workload required by the [B737-] 200 and [B737-] 300?" Out of a total of 201 responses, 115 pilots [57%] responded that the mental workload required is "higher" in the 200, 50 pilots [25%] responded that the mental workload required is "higher" in the 300, and 36 pilots [18%] responded that the amount is the same in the 200 and 300. (This data from an unpublished addendum to the report.) (page (3))
    Strength: -4
    Aircraft: B737
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E.A. (1990). The effects of mixed-fleet flying of the Boeing 737-200 and -300. America West Airlines Technical Report AWA01-90-01. Phoenix, AZ: America West Airlines. See Resource details

  61.  
  62. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: In response to the survey question regarding workload: "1. Rate the difference in the overall [emphasized] workload required by the [B737-] 200 and [B737-] 300?" Out of a total of 199 responses, 125 pilots [63%] responded that the overall workload required is "higher" in the 200, 40 pilots [20%] responded that the overall workload required is "higher" in the 300, and 34 pilots [17%] responded that the amount is the same in the 200 and 300. (This data from an unpublished addendum to the report.) (page (2))
    Strength: -4
    Aircraft: B737
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E.A. (1990). The effects of mixed-fleet flying of the Boeing 737-200 and -300. America West Airlines Technical Report AWA01-90-01. Phoenix, AZ: America West Airlines. See Resource details

  63.  
  64. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: In the plan monitoring phase, we wished to first examine the effect of highlighting on change detection and did so by comparing performance in detecting changes to hazards that were highlighted to those that were not highlighted as a function of workload. The analyses revealed that changes to highlighted hazards were detected more accurately (F(1, 26) = 27.72, p < .001) and more quickly (F(1, 22) = 4.47, p = .05) than changes to nonhighlighted elements. Additionally, a speed accuracy tradeoff was found for workload, such that changes in the low workload condition were detected 36.0% more accurately (F(1, 26) = 7.68, p = .01), but 6.7 s more slowly (F(1, 22) = 8.88, p = .007) than those in the high workload condition. The automation and workload interaction was not significant for accuracy (F(1, 26) = 1.75, p > .10) or response time (F(1, 22) = .27, p > .10). (page 4/5)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Muthard, E.K. & Wickens, C.D. (2003). Factors That Mediate Flight Plan Monitoring and Errors in Plan Revision: An Examination of Planning Under Automated Conditions. In Proceedings of the 12th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 857-62. See Resource details

  65.  
  66. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "Workload on the pilot not flying, particularly in a terminal area while the aircraft is being flown manually, can be very high. Britannia Airways Ltd. has used heart rate data to augment subjective pilot ratings of workload. ... Heart rate measurements were taken for crews flying the Boeing 767 and the 737 which have very different levels of automation. Both take-off and landing flight phases, as well as different operating modes, were measured. The difference between the 767 and 737 is illustrated in Figure 9 [which shows a comparision between the heart rate response for the same pilot flying the B737 and the B767] for similar ILS approaches at Luton using the flight director. The heart rate for the 767 approach is about 10 beats/minute lower than for the 737. Figure 10 compares the heart rate responses during standard instrument departures out of Luton. On the 767, the autopilot is engaged at about 500 feet before the aircraft is cleaned up. On the 737, due to noise abatement procedures, the autopilot is engaged after the flaps are retracted and the aircraft is in trim. As a last comparison, Figure 11 shoes the difference in heart rates for different operating modes during a standard instrument departure from Luton in the 767. Compare to hand flying (bottom trace), heart rates are reduced when an autopilot (top trace) is used. Rates are also reduced when a flight director which is driven by the flight management (FMS) is used (middle trace). In summary, for the take-off and approach to landing phase, the Boeing 737 crews had generally higher rates than the 767 crews. However, the rates during the actual flare to touch down flight phase were approximately equal for both aircraft. These heart rates were also higher for actual flight conditions than would be expected in the simulator and this was probably due to an inability to properly simulate the real world, particularly wind conditions." (page 29-31)
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B737 & B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Norman, S.D. & Orlady, H.W. (1988). Flightdeck Automation: Promises and Realities. Final Report of a NASA/FAA Industry Workshop. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  67.  
  68. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Likewise. it can also be assumed that they would have recognized, as demonstrated in the Kansas City accident, that last minute changes in the approach presented some risk as well. In fact, the first officer’s response to the captain’s question about accepting the offer to execute the approach indicated his concern, “Yeah. We’ll have to scramble to get down. We can do it.” In fact, the airplane had been in a descent before he made this comment, and the descent continued to the accident." (page 196)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: Boeing 757
    Equipment: FMS & ATC
    Source: Noyes, J.M. & Starr, A.F. (2000). Civil aircraft warning systems: Future directions in information management and presentation. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 10(2), 169-188. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  69.  
  70. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Neither pilot was aware that the captain’s execution of the FMS command to proceed “Direct to” Cali had erased intermediate fixes between their position and Cali, especially that of Tulua, the beacon that served as the initial approach fix, the entry to the approach. During the subsequent attempts to review the new approach and perform the preparations for it they were unable to locate Tulua and then understand the cause of this difficulty. Without locating it, the approach could not be executed as published." "The captain, who was managing the FMS while the first officer was the pilot flying asked, "I don't know, what's this ULQ (three letter code for Tulua)," an indication of the extent of his loss of awareness. The airplane's cockpit voice recorder indicated that from the time they accepted the offer to execute the straight in approach the workload of both pilots was quite high as they attempted to complete the many required activities. As a result, the captain was unable to take the time necessary to determine the cause of his difficulty retrieving and locating Tulua. In fact, the FMS had performed as designed but neither pilot was able to discover the cause of the problem." (page 196)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: Boeing 757
    Equipment: automation & FMS
    Source: Noyes, J.M. & Starr, A.F. (2000). Civil aircraft warning systems: Future directions in information management and presentation. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 10(2), 169-188. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  71.  
  72. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "When continual efforts were unsuccessful the crew decided to proceed directly to the final fix on the approach to Cali, a beacon named Rozo that was located just before the runway. However, rather than retrieve Rozo from the FMS data base, one of the pilots mistakenly retrieved a different beacon that was located outside Bogota, named Romeo, and then executed a command to proceed directly to it. Evidence revealed that a crewmember had asked for and retrieved all beacons in the data base coded by the abbreviation “R.” and then commanded the FMS to proceed to Romeo. The airplane turned away from its position north of Cali to Romeo, a turn that would have been clearly evident on the CRT in front of each pilot that displayed the FMS-generated predicted flight path. Of the errors the crew committed in the minutes before the accident this most demonstrates the time pressure they experienced. Little, if any, cognitive effort was needed to notice the turn as presented on the predicted flight path. Moreover, pilots of FMS-equipped aircraft are trained to consistently verify a command to the FMS that causes a course change to assure that it is correct. That they did not may be accounted for by their loss of temporal awareness: they were too busy to take the time needed to even glance at the flight path display." (page 197)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: Boeing 757
    Equipment: automation & FMS
    Source: Noyes, J.M. & Starr, A.F. (2000). Civil aircraft warning systems: Future directions in information management and presentation. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 10(2), 169-188. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  73.  
  74. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: In our review of 282 automation-related ASRS incident reports, we found 7 reports (2%) supporting issue079 (automation may adversely affect pilot workload).
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Owen, G. & Funk, K. (1997). Flight Deck Automation Issues: Incident Report Analysis. http://www.flightdeckautomation.com/incidentstudy/incident-analysis.aspx. Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University, Department of Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering. See Resource details

  75.  
  76. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "For all four of the measures [psychophysiological measures], mental workload was higher in the Manual tracking condition than in Automated tracking. This effect was not significant at the .05 level for the IBI measure [F(1,11)=1.08, p=.32], but did attain significance for HRV [F(1,11)=35.93, p=.0001] and .10HZ [F(1,11)=7.34, p=.02], and approached significance for RSA [F(1,11)=4.18, p=.07]." (page 782)
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Palmer, E.A. & Mitchell, C.M. (1997). Models, methods, and metrics: A structured approach for the evaluation and redesign of autoflight system interfaces. In R.S. Jensen & L. Rakovan (Eds.), Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 965-970. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

  77.  
  78. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "That automation of the tracking task reduced RT to instrument deviations (although the effect was only significant for one of the tasks) is not surprising. The present results show that automation-induced improvements in responses to other tasks, due to task offloading, can be demonstrated in a moderate-fidelity simulated environment, just as they can be found in lower-fidelity part-task settings (e.g., Parasuraman et al., 1991)." (page 782)
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Palmer, E.A. & Mitchell, C.M. (1997). Models, methods, and metrics: A structured approach for the evaluation and redesign of autoflight system interfaces. In R.S. Jensen & L. Rakovan (Eds.), Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 965-970. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

  79.  
  80. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "As hypothesized, response times were generally increased by time-on-task and/or by Manual (as compared to Automated) tracking. However, the pattern of statistical significance differed, depending on which instrument was being responded to. RTs to NAV1 deflections grew slower as a function of time on-task, with decrements occurring as early as the second five-minute period of a session. This task was not, however, significantly slowed by the need to manually maintain heading. Resets of the AI failures, though, were unaffected by time-on-task. Instead, this task was impaired by the Manual tracking condition, which saw participants taking on average almost twice as long to respond to this event as they took during Automated tracking." (page 782)
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Palmer, E.A. & Mitchell, C.M. (1997). Models, methods, and metrics: A structured approach for the evaluation and redesign of autoflight system interfaces. In R.S. Jensen & L. Rakovan (Eds.), Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 965-970. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

  81.  
  82. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Question 13 asked pilots to indicate whether they agreed that the design of the visual displays/instruments kept them busier than they needed to be…Among the AH-64D pilots, 45% of the responses were on the disagree side of the scale… (page 7)
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: AH-64D
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Rash, C.E., Adam, G.E., LeDuc, P.A., & Francis, G. (May 6-8, 2003). Pilot Attitudes on Glass and Traditional Cockpits in the U.S. Army's AH-64 Apache Helicopter. Presented at the American Helicopter Society 59th Annual Forum, Phoenix, AZ. American Helicopter Society International, Inc. See Resource details

  83.  
  84. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Question 9 asked pilots to characterize the amount of mental activity involved in working with the visual displays/instruments on a scale between "Very little" (coded as 1) and "Very much" (coded as 5). The opinions of pilots in the AH-64A versus the AH-64D aircraft were dissimilar (U=8580.5, p=0.001). As Figure 2 indicates, the difference seems to be that the AH-64D pilots tended to have more responses toward the "Very much" end of the scale and fewer middle responses than the AH-64A pilots. Quantitatively, &hellip, while only 34% of the AH-64A pilots selected those choices. (page 5)
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: AH-64A
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Rash, C.E., Adam, G.E., LeDuc, P.A., & Francis, G. (May 6-8, 2003). Pilot Attitudes on Glass and Traditional Cockpits in the U.S. Army's AH-64 Apache Helicopter. Presented at the American Helicopter Society 59th Annual Forum, Phoenix, AZ. American Helicopter Society International, Inc. See Resource details

  85.  
  86. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Question 11 asked pilots to indicate whether they agreed that the visual displays/instruments minimized the time required to perform tasks... Among the AH-64D pilots, 49% chose responses from the agree side of the scale... (page 5)
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: AH-64D
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Rash, C.E., Adam, G.E., LeDuc, P.A., & Francis, G. (May 6-8, 2003). Pilot Attitudes on Glass and Traditional Cockpits in the U.S. Army's AH-64 Apache Helicopter. Presented at the American Helicopter Society 59th Annual Forum, Phoenix, AZ. American Helicopter Society International, Inc. See Resource details

  87.  
  88. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Question 29 asked pilots if they agreed that the visual displays/instruments allowed them to get the information they needed within an appropriate amount of time…Among the AH-64D pilots, 64% of the responses were on the agree side of the scale… (page 12)
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: AH-64D
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Rash, C.E., Adam, G.E., LeDuc, P.A., & Francis, G. (May 6-8, 2003). Pilot Attitudes on Glass and Traditional Cockpits in the U.S. Army's AH-64 Apache Helicopter. Presented at the American Helicopter Society 59th Annual Forum, Phoenix, AZ. American Helicopter Society International, Inc. See Resource details

  89.  
  90. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: Cockpit Workload Reporters cited cockpit workload on SIDs and STARS as a factor in 44 percent of reports. The most commonly noted workload issues are shown in Table 2. @I “I tried unseuccessfully to enter the restriction in the FMS. After three attempts, the Captain tried unsuccessfully and tried to explain why it wouldn’t take. Meanwhile, no descent was started.. . We are flying an airplane, not a computer. My focus on the FMS got in the way of doing a very simple descent profile. I will be focusing on flying first, programming second. " (# 259889) (page 14)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: FMS & ATC
    Source: Riley, V., Lyall, E., & Wiener, E. (1993). Analytic Methods for Flight-Deck Automation Design and Evaluation, Phase Two Report: Pilot Use of Automation. FAA Contract Number DTFA01-91-C-0039. See Resource details

  91.  
  92. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: The following is part of Table 2 Table 2 - Cockpit Workload Issues FMS Programming (automation issues) Citations 18 Percent 24% (page 14)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation & FMS
    Source: Riley, V., Lyall, E., & Wiener, E. (1993). Analytic Methods for Flight-Deck Automation Design and Evaluation, Phase Two Report: Pilot Use of Automation. FAA Contract Number DTFA01-91-C-0039. See Resource details

  93.  
  94. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "Results from a total of 73 flight sectors strongly supported numerous anecdotal reports from company pilots that levels of workload in the 767 are almost always noticeably lower than in the 737[-200]." (page 2)
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Roscoe, A.H. (April, 1992). Workload in the Glass Cockpit. Flight Safety Digest, 1-8. See Resource details

  95.  
  96. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "In comparing workload between old and new aircraft types, it is worth noting the substantial anecdotal evidence from first officers reconverting to the 737[-200] after being promoted to the left seat. (One-on-one interviews with 12 pilots provided more detailed evidence.) They report having more difficulty with instrument scan, speed control and situational awareness, and that their overall workload is much greater." (page 3)
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Roscoe, A.H. (April, 1992). Workload in the Glass Cockpit. Flight Safety Digest, 1-8. See Resource details

  97.  
  98. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Impact of automation on crew operations: With regard to workload, the typical view reflected in the pilot comments was that, once you become experienced with automation, it significantly lowers workload associated with 'routine' tasks in low workload flight phases under normal circumstances. However, automation increases workload during abnormal situations and during high workload phases of flight (e.g., in terminal areas; when required to follow a non-programmed flight path). A significant number of respondents, however, took issue with the assumption that automation actually lowered workload." (page 207)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Rudisill, M. (1994). Flight Crew Experience with Automation Technologies on Commercial Transport Flight Decks. In M. Mouloua & R. Parasuraman (Eds.), Human Performance in Automated Systems: Current Research and Trends. Proceedings of the 1st Automation Technology and Human Performance Conference, held in Washington, DC April 7-9, 1994, 203-211. Hillsdale, NJ:Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  99.  
  100. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Impact of automation on crew operations: With regard to workload, the typical view reflected in the pilot comments was that, once you become experienced with automation, it significantly lowers workload associated with 'routine' tasks in low workload flight phases under normal circumstances. However, automation increases workload during abnormal situations and during high workload phases of flight (e.g., in terminal areas; when required to follow a non-programmed flight path). A significant number of respondents ... took issue with the assumption that automation actually lowered workload." (page 207)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Rudisill, M. (1994). Flight Crew Experience with Automation Technologies on Commercial Transport Flight Decks. In M. Mouloua & R. Parasuraman (Eds.), Human Performance in Automated Systems: Current Research and Trends. Proceedings of the 1st Automation Technology and Human Performance Conference, held in Washington, DC April 7-9, 1994, 203-211. Hillsdale, NJ:Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  101.  
  102. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Impact of automation on crew operations: With regard to workload, the typical view reflected in the pilot comments was that, once you become experienced with automation, it significantly lowers workload associated with 'routine' tasks in low workload flight phases under normal circumstances. However, automation increases workload during abnormal situations and during high workload phases of flight (e.g., in terminal areas; when required to follow a non-programmed flight path). A significant number of respondents ... took issue with the assumption that automation actually lowered workload." (page 207)
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Rudisill, M. (1994). Flight Crew Experience with Automation Technologies on Commercial Transport Flight Decks. In M. Mouloua & R. Parasuraman (Eds.), Human Performance in Automated Systems: Current Research and Trends. Proceedings of the 1st Automation Technology and Human Performance Conference, held in Washington, DC April 7-9, 1994, 203-211. Hillsdale, NJ:Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  103.  
  104. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "Only one pilot in this study handled the go around below 100 feet AGL without any problems. He elected to stay in fully manual control of the aircraft until level-off at the acceleration altitude and then reengaged individual subsystems of the automation one after the other, each time assuring himself first that the automated system responded as expected and desired. All other pilots focused on trying to figure out why the automation did not behave as expected, and they tried to get guidance from the automation as soon as possible. For example, seven pilots 38.9%) first called for the flight directors to be turned on after initiating the go-around. even though the automation was not set up to provide any meaningful guidance Another seven pilots (38.9%) activated autothrust before selecting a target speed, and thus the approach speed became the airspeed target. The fact that most pilots hesitated to take manual control of the aircraft and instead tried to understand what the automation was doing resulted in the following problems. Six of the pilots (33.4%) exceeded 250 knots LAS (indicated air speed) below an altitude of 10,000 feet. Another two pilots (11.1 %) allowed the airspeed to increase until almost reaching the maximum allowable airspeed. Another two pilots (11.1%) oversped their flaps during the go around. Finally, three pilots allowed the airspeed to increase all the way to the maximum operating speed before taking action. During the debriefing all pilots explained that they had not expected the autothrust to disengage when applying full power for the goaround. They emphasized that they were busy watching airspeed trends and altitude instead of looking at the flight mode annunciations to find out about the status and behavior of the automation." (page 398)
    Strength: +5
    Aircraft: A320
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Sanchez-Ku, M.L., & Arthur, Jr. W. (2000). A dyadic protocol for training complex skills: A replication using female participants. Human Factors, 42(3), 512-520. See Resource details

  105.  
  106. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "Five pilots were concerned with the cumbersome design of the disconnect procedure for the autothrust system, again echoing concerns raised by some pilots in the Last and Alder (1991) survey. To avoid a power surge, pilots are instructed first to move the thrust levers out of the detent (which does not yet disconnect the system) and then, to move the levers until the actual and commanded thrust indications on the upper engine display match. Once this is achieved, the system can be disconnected by pushing the disconnect buttons on the thrust levers. Pilots point out that this procedure may take too long and might potentially compete with other visual demands if an immediate disconnect becomes necessary for safety reasons. Finally, one pilot mentioned that nonmoving thrust levers discourage pilots from resting their hands on the throttles during final approach-a habit and requirement on most other aircraft, which seems desirable in the interest of achieving the fastest possible response to a problem." (page 566)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: A-320
    Equipment: autoflight: autothrust
    Source: Sherry, L. & Polson, P.G. (1999). Shared models of flight management system vertical guidance. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 9(2), 139-153. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  107.  
  108. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "The results supported the conventional wisdom that automation has reduced physical workload more than it has mental workload. Inspection of the portion of the curve that is above 3.0 (“higher than in conventional cockpits”) shows that Physical workload was rated as being higher than in the past for preflight (4.04) and taxi before takeoff (3.14). The biggest reduction in physical demands can be seen in the cruise phase (1.69) presumably reflecting the widespread use of flight control and navigation automation. Mental workload was rated as being higher than in the past for preflight (4.03), taxi before takeoff (3.22), and approach for landing (3.24)." (page 110)
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Skitka, L.J., Mosier, K.L., Burdick, M., & Rosenblatt, B. (2000). Automation bias and errors: Are crews better than individuals?. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 10(1), 85-97. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  109.  
  110. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "The results supported the conventional wisdom that automation has reduced physical workload more than it has mental workload. Inspection of the portion of the curve that is above 3.0 (“higher than in conventional cockpits”) shows that Physical workload was rated as being higher than in the past for preflight (4.04) and taxi before takeoff (3.14). The biggest reduction in physical demands can be seen in the cruise phase (1.69) presumably reflecting the widespread use of flight control and navigation automation. Mental workload was rated as being higher than in the past for preflight (4.03), taxi before takeoff (3.22), and approach for landing (3.24)." (page 110)
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Skitka, L.J., Mosier, K.L., Burdick, M., & Rosenblatt, B. (2000). Automation bias and errors: Are crews better than individuals?. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 10(1), 85-97. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  111.  
  112. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "The results supported the conventional wisdom that automation has reduced physical workload more than it has mental workload. Inspection of the portion of the curve that is above 3.0 (“higher than in conventional cockpits”) shows that Physical workload was rated as being higher than in the past for preflight (4.04) and taxi before takeoff (3.14). The biggest reduction in physical demands can be seen in the cruise phase (1.69) presumably reflecting the widespread use of flight control and navigation automation. Mental workload was rated as being higher than in the past for preflight (4.03), taxi before takeoff (3.22), and approach for landing (3.24)." (page 110)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Skitka, L.J., Mosier, K.L., Burdick, M., & Rosenblatt, B. (2000). Automation bias and errors: Are crews better than individuals?. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 10(1), 85-97. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  113.  
  114. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "The results supported the conventional wisdom that automation has reduced physical workload more than it has mental workload. Inspection of the portion of the curve that is above 3.0 (“higher than in conventional cockpits”) shows that Physical workload was rated as being higher than in the past for preflight (4.04) and taxi before takeoff (3.14). The biggest reduction in physical demands can be seen in the cruise phase (1.69) presumably reflecting the widespread use of flight control and navigation automation. Mental workload was rated as being higher than in the past for preflight (4.03), taxi before takeoff (3.22), and approach for landing (3.24)." (page 110)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Skitka, L.J., Mosier, K.L., Burdick, M., & Rosenblatt, B. (2000). Automation bias and errors: Are crews better than individuals?. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 10(1), 85-97. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  115.  
  116. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "The results supported the conventional wisdom that automation has reduced physical workload more than it has mental workload. Inspection of the portion of the curve that is above 3.0 (“higher than in conventional cockpits”) shows that Physical workload was rated as being higher than in the past for preflight (4.04) and taxi before takeoff (3.14). The biggest reduction in physical demands can be seen in the cruise phase (1.69) presumably reflecting the widespread use of flight control and navigation automation. Mental workload was rated as being higher than in the past for preflight (4.03), taxi before takeoff (3.22), and approach for landing (3.24)." (page 110)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Skitka, L.J., Mosier, K.L., Burdick, M., & Rosenblatt, B. (2000). Automation bias and errors: Are crews better than individuals?. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 10(1), 85-97. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  117.  
  118. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "The results supported the conventional wisdom that automation has reduced physical workload more than it has mental workload. Inspection of the portion of the curve that is above 3.0 (“higher than in conventional cockpits”) shows that Physical workload was rated as being higher than in the past for preflight (4.04) and taxi before takeoff (3.14). The biggest reduction in physical demands can be seen in the cruise phase (1.69) presumably reflecting the widespread use of flight control and navigation automation. Mental workload was rated as being higher than in the past for preflight (4.03), taxi before takeoff (3.22), and approach for landing (3.24)." (page 110)
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Skitka, L.J., Mosier, K.L., Burdick, M., & Rosenblatt, B. (2000). Automation bias and errors: Are crews better than individuals?. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 10(1), 85-97. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  119.  
  120. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "The results of averaging the ratings across participants and components showed that, overall, participants found the automation components to be unobtrusive (4.02), predictable (3.96), extremely helpful for reducing workload (3.81). and they were inclined to use them whenever appropriate (4.39). On the other hand, they were close to the midpoint when it came to the feeling that they were controlling the flight rather than managing the automation (3.28, in which 5 indicates high controlling), and the feeling that they were focusing on the flight rather than on the automation (3.64, in which 5 indicates attention to flight)." (page 115)
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Skitka, L.J., Mosier, K.L., Burdick, M., & Rosenblatt, B. (2000). Automation bias and errors: Are crews better than individuals?. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 10(1), 85-97. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  121.  
  122. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "The results of the examination of workload and automation for the A320 certification data suggested that for the range of automation experienced, an inverse relationship exists. Thus, as automation increases, workload experienced by the crew decreases. Unfortunately, the flying situations could not support firm conclusions with respect to automation." (page (3))
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: A320
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Speyer, J.J. & Blomberg, R.D. (1989). Workload and automation. In Proceedings of the 2nd Conference of Human Error Avoidance Techniques, Herndon, VA, September 18-19, 1989. See Resource details

  123.  
  124. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "7. COMMUNICATIONS AND NEW TECHNOLOGY ... Primary Flight Display (PFD) The former electromechanical instruments had an inherent lack of flexibility because of the physical necessity to spread information on several instruments of the pilot's panels. The successor to the ADI [Altitude Direction Indicator], the PFD is basically used for short term flight path monitoring and at first glance it shows the aircraft aerodynamic situation i.e. attitude, speed and status of guidance system. Communication to the crew of the main parameters displayed on the same full colour, shadow mask, high resolution EFIS CRT reduces the need to scan a large area of instruments, but without concentrating the information to the 'hypnosis point'. Crew mental workload was shown to be reduced by the new, more direct process of information assimilation" (page 7)
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Speyer, J.J. & Fort, A.P. (1983). Communications: Major Human Factor in Cockpit Design. SAE Technical Paper Series. Long Beach, CA: Society of Automotive Engineers. See Resource details

  125.  
  126. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "... statistical results from this formal test strongly militated for the fly-by-wire/sidestick arrangement planned for the A320: ... - pilot control inputs were reduced by 50% or more (as seen from reversal rates), lowering pilot taskload and hence enabling him to attend other supervisory duties." (page (4))
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: A320
    Equipment: flight control
    Source: Speyer, J.J., Blomberg, R.D., & Fouillot, J.P. (1990). Evaluation the Impact of New Technology Cockpits: Onwards from A300FF, A310, A320 to A330, A340. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Human Machine Interaction and Artificial Intelligence in Aeronautics and Space. See Resource details

  127.  
  128. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "It appears from ... [the] graphic plots that the results of each aircraft under certification were generally indicating decreased taskload burden for each crewmember when compared to their referenced aircraft. Burden figures for CM2 are always much higher than for CM1 as the former s carrying out the bulk of the system management work. With regard to the weighted average taskload the individual crewmember figures for the aircraft under certification were generally equivalent to their reference aircraft. More important, however, was the fact that they stay well inside the satisfactory range of the static taskload scale. It is concluded that there are less tasks on the new aircraft and that they are easy to execute. Several other ways exist to graphically represent the results of the Static Taskload Analysis one of which being Normalized Principal Components Analysis of the taskload matrices. ... The objective of normalized principal components analysis is to provide a synthetic representation of the information contained in a matrix of p continuous variables and n observations. ... In this particular way of representation we used procedure matrices whose observation points corresponded with the burden data for normal, abnormal and emergency procedures of both aircraft to be compared. The variable corresponded with the 6 elementary activities in a task. Differentiation of the two aircraft to be compared (the DC-9 and the A300 FF) was done by attributing different codes to the projected observation points. ... One can get an idea of the homogeneity of procedures or of the homogeneity of action burden data associated with the procedures whether the subclouds are clustered or dispersed. In essence this method indicated that as a whole the elementary activities normal procedures and 10 abnormal/emergency procedures. ... Task analyses of system management activities were performed for each crew member of each aircraft with a task breakdown into basic actions (look, observe, monitor, reach, operate and monitor) on the A300 FF are more homogenously grouped and centered and therefore less demanding that on the DC-9." (page 475, 478)
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: A300FF
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Speyer, J.J., Fort, A., Fouillot, J.P., & Blomberg, R.D. (1987). Assessing pilot workload for minimum crew certification. The Practical Assessment of Pilot Workload, 90-115. AGARDograph No. 282. London: North Atlantic Treaty Organization Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development. See Resource details

  129.  
  130. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "... the performance gains observed for both the EFIS and FMS were not associated with any increase in the workload perceived by the pilots in the experiments. In fact, they rated (on a 10-point numeric interruption scale) flying with the EFIS as a lower workload situation than flying with conventional instruments. Likewise, use of the FMS was associated with lower rated workload than trials flown without it. Although neither of these latter differences was statistically significant, the results provided the clear implication that pilot workload would be positively influenced by the introduction of these new, electronic flight instruments." (page 11.15)
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: A310
    Equipment: EFIS & FMS
    Source: Speyer, J.J., Monteil, C., Blomberg, R.D., & Fouillot, J.P. (1990). Impact of New Technology on Operational Interface: From Design Aims to Flight Evaluation and Measurement. Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development No. 301, Vol. 1. See Resource details

  131.  
  132. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "The performance benefits of the NAV condition were clearly documented in this study. The FMC appears capable of commanding the AP to navigate the aircraft in the horizontal plane with great precision and repeatability. This frees the pilots to attend to other tasks or simply reduces their workload and makes them more available to respond to unexpected occurrences." (page 11.14)
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: A310
    Equipment: FMS & autoflight: autopilot
    Source: Speyer, J.J., Monteil, C., Blomberg, R.D., & Fouillot, J.P. (1990). Impact of New Technology on Operational Interface: From Design Aims to Flight Evaluation and Measurement. Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development No. 301, Vol. 1. See Resource details

  133.  
  134. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 18: "Automation does not reduce total workload, since there is more to monitor now." From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, 49% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, 53% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement while 42% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and 41% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 9% in Phase 1 and 6% in Phase 2. (page 132) "With respect to workload there was strong disagreement, but at least half of the respondents reported concern that automation actually increase workload, that workload was increased during phases of flight already characterized by high workload, and decreased during periods of low workload." (page 170) (page 132, 170)
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  135.  
  136. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "With respect to workload, there was strong disagreement, but at least half of the respondents reported concern that automation actually increased workload, that workload was increased during phases of the flight already characterized by high workload, and decreased during periods of low workload." (page 170)
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  137.  
  138. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: In response to the open-ended question, "2-2 If you were to leave the 757 for an older model aircraft, what features would you miss the most? What would you be happy to leave behind?": 8 pilots out of a total of 133 [6%] responded that "Features that Would not be missed" were "Excessive workload in terminal areas" or "High workload during malfunctions, short legs, or entry in complex TCAs" (page 44-46)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  139.  
  140. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "Workload management, or lack of it, is illustrated by the following ASRS report. [ASRS incident report #167993] Narrative: passing ARNES on CIVET 2 profile descent, we both (2 man crew) thought we were cleared after passing FUELR for the 25L ILS approach with a sidestep to runway 24R. Approach later asked if we had the airport and we reported we did and we both thought we were cleared for a visual to runway 24R. We switched the ILS to 24R and turned in that direction. Alt was 4000' and descending, the Approach told us to turn 20 deg left and that we had traffic to our right. He apparently was turning into runway 24R. Approach said our original clearance was for runway 25R, not for runway 25R. Apparently we misheard the clearance. Contributing factors: tuning in a runway and being forced to changed to another runway while trying to make altitude restrictions etc. Also flying an automated, glass cockpit aircraft in this environment pushes workload to the limit, when having to change runways on final, forcing you to reprogram the computer, re-tune the nav radios and change VHF freq and change charts. It becomes very easy to misunderstand clearances. Also no one had time to look for other traffic." (page 13-14)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1993). Intervention Strategies for the Management of Human Error. NASA Contractor Report NCA2-441. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  141.  
  142. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: In response to the open-ended question, "2-4 What can you say about overall workload of the 757 compared to the other aircraft you have flown? Include mental workload, monitoring etc. What about outside scan?": 21 pilots out of a total of 133 [16%] responded that there was either "More" or " Much more workload" in the 757, 17 pilots out of a total of 133 [13%] responded that there was "Same or more", "About the same", or "Same or less" workload in the 757, and 32 pilots out of a total of 133 [24%] responded that there was either "Less" or " Much less" workload in the 757. (page 138)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  143.  
  144. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: In response to the open-ended question, "2-4 What can you say about overall workload of the 757 compared to the other aircraft you have flown? Include mental workload, monitoring etc. What about outside scan?": 21 pilots out of a total of 133 [16%] responded that there was either "More" or " Much more workload" in the 757, 17 pilots out of a total of 133 [13%] responded that there was "Same or more", "About the same", or "Same or less" workload in the 757, and 32 pilots out of a total of 133 [24%] responded that there was either "Less" or " Much less" workload in the 757. (page 138)
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  145.  
  146. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "With respect to workload, there was strong disagreement, but at least half of the respondents reported concern that automation actually increased workload, that workload was increased during phases of the flight already characterized by high workload, and decreased during periods of low workload." (page 170)
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  147.  
  148. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "On the subject of workload reduction, there were mixed reviews ... The attitude questions dealing with the workload show an overall positive view, but in interviews the crews expressed the opinion that the workload reduction overall was slight, especially when 'mental' ('cognitive') workload was taken into account, as well as the increased demand for monitoring. ... There was considerable recognition of the fact that although workload may not have been reduced much overall, it was redistributed in a manner that allowed certain operations to be performed at non-critical times (at the gate, for example) rather than during times such as second segment climb. ..." (page 93-94)
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: DC9-80
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1985). Human Factors of Cockpit Automation: A Field Study of Flight Crew Transition. NASA Contactor Report 177333. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  149.  
  150. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "With respect to workload, there was strong disagreement, but at least half of the respondents reported concern that automation actually increased workload, that workload was increased during phases of the flight already characterized by high workload, and decreased during periods of low workload." (page 170)
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  151.  
  152. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 18: "Automation does not reduce total workload, since there is more to monitor now." From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, 49% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, 53% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement while 42% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and 41% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 9% in Phase 1 and 6% in Phase 2. (page 132)
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  153.  
  154. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Results ... The total composite score, a global measure of workload described in the previous section, the contrast between the two aircraft was significant at the 0.051 level (F(1,20) = 4.30). ... The results for the captains were non-significant, however for the first officers the difference between the mean composite workload ratings for the two aircraft were statistically significant, indicating that the MD-88 first officer attributed a higher workload to their cockpit duties than those assigned to the DC-9s. ... The mean workload score for MD-88 F/Os was 30.50, for DC-9 F/Os was 26.67." (page 36)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: MD88 & DC9
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. Chidester, T.R., Kanki, B.G., Palmer, E.A., Curry, R.E., & Gregorich, S.E. (1991). The Impact of Cockpit Automation on Crew Coordination and Communication: I. Overview, LOFT Evaluations, Error Severity, and questionnaire data. NASA Contractor Report 177587. See Resource details

  155.  
  156. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Each of the six individual items that made up the composite score of the self-assessment form was also subjected to ANOVAs of the same design (type-by-seat). Of the six, two resulted in significant results in the contrast of the aircraft type: Physical Demand (Item No. 3) and Frustration Level (Item No. 7). In both cases, the means were higher for MD-88 crews than for DC-9 crews, meaning that MD-88 pilots perceived their jobs as being more physically demanding, and more frustrating. ... for the first officers, Physical Demand was viewed as significantly higher for MD-88 crews compared to DC-9 crews, but for captains there was no significant difference. The Frustration Level rating were significantly higher for both crew members in the MD-88 compared to the DC-9" (page 37)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: MD88 & DC9
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. Chidester, T.R., Kanki, B.G., Palmer, E.A., Curry, R.E., & Gregorich, S.E. (1991). The Impact of Cockpit Automation on Crew Coordination and Communication: I. Overview, LOFT Evaluations, Error Severity, and questionnaire data. NASA Contractor Report 177587. See Resource details

  157.  
  158. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 14: "Automation does not reduce total workload." From the histograph of the responses, 21 of the 31 [68%] MD-88 pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, 10 [32%] disagreed or strongly disagreed, and none of the MD-88 gave a neutral response. These results can be compared to the responses of the DC-9 pilots. 32 of the 42 [77%] DC-9 pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, 6 [14%] disagreed or strongly disagreed, and 4 [9%] gave a neutral response. Combining these two groups reveals that 53 of the 73 [73%] pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, 16 [22%] disagreed or strongly disagreed, and 4 [5%] gave a neutral response. (page 61)
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: MD88 & DC9
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. Chidester, T.R., Kanki, B.G., Palmer, E.A., Curry, R.E., & Gregorich, S.E. (1991). The Impact of Cockpit Automation on Crew Coordination and Communication: I. Overview, LOFT Evaluations, Error Severity, and questionnaire data. NASA Contractor Report 177587. See Resource details

  159.  
  160. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Pilots responded to "Open-Ended Question 4B. What effect has automation had on your workload? Where has it increased workload? Where has it decreased workload?" A total of 129 pilots responded to this question. There were 110 responses categorized as "Increased Workload Responses" which the analysts categorized as follows: "Preflight Planning" = 56 responses, "ATC Changes" = 19 responses, "Descent/Approach" = 15 responses, "Initial Learning" = 7 responses, "Terminal Area" = 7 responses, and "Takeoff/Departure" = 6 responses. (page 175)
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wise, J.A., Abbott, D.W., Tilden, D., Dyck, J.L., Guide, P.C., & Ryan, L. (1993). Automation in Corporate Aviation: Human Factors Issues. CAAR-15406-93-1. Daytona Beach, FL: Center for Aviation/Aerospace Research, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. See Resource details

  161.  
  162. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Pilots responded to "Open-Ended Question 6A. Please describe your current feelings about flying highly automated aircraft." 13 pilots out of a total of 117, 11% responded that it "Decreases Workload" (page 192)
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wise, J.A., Abbott, D.W., Tilden, D., Dyck, J.L., Guide, P.C., & Ryan, L. (1993). Automation in Corporate Aviation: Human Factors Issues. CAAR-15406-93-1. Daytona Beach, FL: Center for Aviation/Aerospace Research, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. See Resource details

  163.  
  164. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Pilots responded to "Open-Ended Question 4B. What effect has automation had on your workload? Where has it increased workload? Where has it decreased workload?" A total of 129 pilots responded to this question. There were 126 responses categorized as "Decreased Workload Responses" which the analysts categorized as follows: "Enroute" = 39 responses, "General Decrease" = 31 responses, "Once Experienced with Systems" = 13 responses, "Automatic Computations" = 13 responses, "Preflight & Programming" = 10 responses, "Descent/Approach" = 8 responses, "Takeoff/Departure" = 8 responses, and "SIDs/STARs/Flight Plans Easily Accessed" = 8 responses. (page 175)
    Strength: -5
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wise, J.A., Abbott, D.W., Tilden, D., Dyck, J.L., Guide, P.C., & Ryan, L. (1993). Automation in Corporate Aviation: Human Factors Issues. CAAR-15406-93-1. Daytona Beach, FL: Center for Aviation/Aerospace Research, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. See Resource details
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