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Evidence for an Issue 8 pieces of evidence for this issue.

both pilots' attention simultaneously diverted by programming (Issue #75) - Both pilots may become involved in programming duties simultaneously, possibly diverting the attention of both pilots from safety-critical tasks.

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  2. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: "4.1.2.4 FMC Programming Demands Many of the ASRS reports included the complaint that the FMC/CDU is difficult and time consuming to program. This complaint is magnified in the case where, for whatever reason, the FMC rejects the programmer's (pilot not flying) initial attempt. Under these conditions, it is not uncommon for the pilot flying to then get involved as well, at which point no one is flying the airplane. The frequency of these of these comments gives rise to the impression that the design of the current FMC/CDU does not appear to be optimal for the pilot's needs in the operational environment. [ASRS Report #107738] ... In summary, we missed our crossing restriction due to pilot flying doing pilot not flying duties, that is, extensive CDU reprogramming and not monitoring the flight path. I also didn't monitor the flight path close enough while involved in other duties. We received the clearance from MSP center, but failed to comply. Only one person should be doing heads down FMS work while the other monitors flight path. Very busy time in two person cockpit requires extreme discipline. [ASRS Report #87750] ... In training they emphasized that one pilot should fly and the other should program the FMC. I understood and believe that, however, most of the experienced pilots I have been flying with since training seemed to do most of their own FMC Management while flying, especially if I was otherwise occupied on the other radio. Following that example, which may work for an experienced large transport pilot but certainly not for one at my level, I fell into the trap they had warned me about! I pushed buttons, but I did not check the response to the input before going on to something else. No one was flying the aircraft. In the future I will initiate all altitude changes on the MCP (wing flight level change) when the other pilot is unable to enter data in the FMC, and will check the basic aircraft instruments for a response to the inputs I make to the complex, multifaceted auto Flight Control system." (page 4.10-4.12)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Eldredge, D., Mangold, S., & Dodd, R.S. (1992). A Review and Discussion of Flight Management System Incidents Reported to the Aviation Safety Reporting System. Final Report DOT/FAA/RD-92/2. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration. See Resource details

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  4. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 20 of the 30 (67%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc75 PF may help PNF program automation
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  6. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 2 of the 30 (7%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc75 PF may help PNF program automation
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  8. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: In our review of 282 automation-related ASRS incident reports, we found 5 reports (2%) supporting issue075 (both pilots' attention simultaneously diverted by programming).
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Owen, G. & Funk, K. (1997). Flight Deck Automation Issues: Incident Report Analysis. http://www.flightdeckautomation.com/incidentstudy/incident-analysis.aspx. Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University, Department of Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering. See Resource details

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  10. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: "SAMPLE NARRATIVES FROM ASRS REPORTS The following ... ASRS narratives were chosen to illustrate the range of problems identified in the initial survey. ... 1. Crew Distracted by Programming the Flight Management System The following report from the first officer of a glass cockpit airliner describes an altitude deviation that occurred during the descent phase of flight as both pilots attempted to program a holding pattern into the flight-management system (FMS). ... [ASRS incident report # 144196] ... Descending from higher flight levels to 15,000 ft. on Center clearance had anticipated and received clearance to hold at BUCKS due to anticipated weather delay. Captain flying on autopilot using LNAV [lateral navigation] on company stored route everything routine. Captain is a check airman on this aircraft. I am 5-year airline pilot, but only 3 months experience on [glass] equipment. Captain pulled up 'hold' page on FMC [flight-management computer] and began to enter data. We were currently descending on rate of descent command to 15,000 ft. altitude as assigned. I'm reading holding data to captain as he's entering data via keypad. Both eyes off of primary flight instruments but in altitude capture mode (VNAV) [vertical navigation] and LNAV so both pilots are anticipating automatic level off at 15,000 ft. altitude. Captain apparently entered hold at PPOS [present position] instead of at BUCKS in error, and aircraft begins left turn unexpectedly. I, in confusion, not knowing he entered PPOS by mistake, stated, 'This isn't right,' and saw captain disengage autopilot to stop turn while he goes back to FMC page to find out where we should be, got to VOR/ILS [very high-frequency omnidirectional radio range/instrument landing system] mode and picked up en route chart to tune in present position. Aircraft descended below 15,000 ft.. Horn went off at approximately 14,600 ft. Captain called out 'Out of 16 for 15.' I said no (looking up) and said we were at 14,500 ft., only cleared to 15,000 ft., that was a low altitude alert not '1,000 ft. to go' horn. Immediately pulled back up. No ATC [air traffic control] communication took place by either ATC or us about event. Within 30 seconds, ATC gave us new frequency and cleared us to 13,000 ft. No conflict or discussion or awareness of event was stated by ATC. Below 15,000 ft. for about 20 seconds. Cause is obvious - both pilots' attention diverted from aircraft flight path. I suggest hold-page (not used often) be made more user friendly. Have captain tell first officer to watch flight progress while he is correcting other problems. I personally feel that although the FMS is a great tool, but shouldn't be used all the time, especially below FL180. It takes too much pilot attention, especially when newly assigned to the aircraft. Just because the technology exists doesn't mean it should be used. Better pilot training on FMC/pilot problem areas like this should be provided. Also, loss of a flight engineer's eyes is not in the interest of aviation safety. ... This incident report illustrates several problems that can occur in the altitude-change task. The crew apparently correctly received the clearance, set the altitude alert, and set up the autopilot to descend and capture the cleared altitude of 15,000 ft. If the crew had done nothing more, the aircraft was set up to level off automatically at the new altitude. Both pilots were distracted from their routine task of monitoring the altitude change by the nonroutine task of programming the flight management computer (FMC) for the upcoming holding pattern." (page 8-9)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Palmer, E.A., Hutchins, E.L., Ritter, R.D., & VanCleemput, I. (1993). Altitude Deviations: Breakdown of an Error-Tolerant System. NASA Technical Memorandum 108788. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  12. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: "SAMPLE NARRATIVES FROM ASRS REPORTS The following ... ASRS narratives were chosen to illustrate the range of problems identified in the initial survey. ... [ASRS incident report # 148853] ... On an en-route descent into Dayton our clearance was direct RID VOR, direct DAYTON with a descent to 11,000 ft. The controller gave us a new clearance to cross 10 miles west of RID at 10,000 ft. The captain, being less experienced in using the flight management computer than I, wanted me to show him how to program the descent for the new restrictions. We put the restrictions in the magic box, and for some reason, almost certainly something we did improperly, the machine wanted to make the restriction 10 miles east of RID. By the time we caught the error in the midst of doing checklists and the usual cockpit duties we were too late to make the restriction. Nothing was said and there was no conflict. ... This narrative [ASRS incident report #148853] also illustrates another factor that was observed in several reports: in-flight training, in which one pilot attempts to instruct the other pilot on the use of automatic equipment, can distract both pilots from the primary task of maintaining altitude awareness." (page 11)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Palmer, E.A., Hutchins, E.L., Ritter, R.D., & VanCleemput, I. (1993). Altitude Deviations: Breakdown of an Error-Tolerant System. NASA Technical Memorandum 108788. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  14. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Like the AH-64A pilots, many AH-64D pilots requested a moving map. Other comments also noted that the MFDs tend to make the pilot focus inside the aircraft and that the paging system often required too many button pushes. Representative comments of the AH-64D pilots were: … Seems both crewmembers can get sucked into the MPDs and nobody looking outside. "SA" training can counter this. (page 13)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: AH-64D
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Rash, C.E., Adam, G.E., LeDuc, P.A., & Francis, G. (May 6-8, 2003). Pilot Attitudes on Glass and Traditional Cockpits in the U.S. Army's AH-64 Apache Helicopter. Presented at the American Helicopter Society 59th Annual Forum, Phoenix, AZ. American Helicopter Society International, Inc. See Resource details

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  16. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Based on the information in this study, we can summarize the areas of concern in cockpit resource management of high technology aircraft: ... 5. There is a tendency of the crew to 'help' each other with programming duties when workload increases." (page 178)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details
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