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Evidence for an Issue 10 pieces of evidence for this issue.

cross checking may be difficult (Issue #72) - It may be difficult for one pilot to monitor what another is doing with automation, possibly reducing awareness of pilot intentions and cross checking for errors.

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  2. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the questionnaire data: (#27) "It is easier to cross-check the other pilot in the 767 than in our other airplanes." 37% of the pilots strongly or slightly agreed, 34% of the pilots strongly or slightly disagreed with the statement, and 30% neither agreed nor disagreed. (page 44-45)
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. NASA Technical Memorandum 86659, 1-68. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  4. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 21 of the 30 (70%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc072 cross checking may be difficult
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  6. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 4 of the 30 (13%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc072 cross checking may be difficult
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  8. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Question 23 asked pilots if they agreed that the visual displays/instruments promoted cross monitoring of actions and decisions…Among the AH-64D pilots, 63% of the responses were on the agree side of the scale… (page 11)
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: AH-64D
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Rash, C.E., Adam, G.E., LeDuc, P.A., & Francis, G. (May 6-8, 2003). Pilot Attitudes on Glass and Traditional Cockpits in the U.S. Army's AH-64 Apache Helicopter. Presented at the American Helicopter Society 59th Annual Forum, Phoenix, AZ. American Helicopter Society International, Inc. See Resource details

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  10. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "In 35 of the ASRS incidents we studied, the Pilot Not Flying reported that preoccupation with other duties prevented monitoring the other pilot closely enough to catch in time an error being made in flying or taxiing. In 13 of these 35 incidents (and 22 of the total 107 incidents), the Pilot Not Flying was preoccupied with some form of head-down work, most commonly paperwork or programming the FMS." (page 5)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Shelden, S. & Belcher, S. (1999). Cockpit traffic displays of tomorrow. Ergonomics in Design, 7(3), 4-9. See Resource details

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  12. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "However, 10 pilots were concerned about the lack of coupling of the two sidesticks because that particular aspect of the design prevents them from monitoring the performance of the other pilot when he or she is manually flying the airplane. This lack of feedback is particularly worrisome to them in circumstances such as strong crosswind conditions or manually flying close to the ground. A related comment was made by one check airman, who finds if more difficult to assess pilot performance on check rides with this particular design." (page 566)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: A-320
    Equipment: automation: controls
    Source: Sherry, L. & Polson, P.G. (1999). Shared models of flight management system vertical guidance. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 9(2), 139-153. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  14. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "Another potential concern with the lack of coupling of the sidesticks was raised by a pilot who explained that this design has allowed him to assist another pilot three times during a flare without the other pilot’s knowledge.." (page 566)
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: A-320
    Equipment: automation: controls
    Source: Sherry, L. & Polson, P.G. (1999). Shared models of flight management system vertical guidance. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 9(2), 139-153. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  16. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "The majority of pilots in every nation said they knew how to utilize the automation effectively (i.e., can rapidly access the FMC, feel free to select level of automation, understand all the FMC modes and features), and that they knew to include the other pilot in automation decisions and activities (i.e., more cross-checking and acknowledgment of program changes)." (page 323)
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Strauch, B. (1997). Automation and decision making -- lessons from the Cali accident. In Proceedings of the 41st Annual Meeting of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 195-199. See Resource details

  17.  
  18. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "VII. Cockpit Resource Management, Crew Coordination And Communication ... B. Cockpit Resource Management, Supervision, and Coordination ... Numerous captains stated that it is somewhat more difficult to supervise the work of the first officer in the automated cockpit. This may be due to the fact that the CDU gives the first officer more opportunities to make decisions than he had on traditional aircraft." (page 121)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  20. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "VII. Cockpit Resource Management, Crew Coordination And Communication ... B. Cockpit Resource Management, Supervision, and Coordination ... Some [of the pilots interviewed] mentioned that it was difficult for the captain to see what the F/O was doing, and that it took time to digest what had been entered in the CDU, whereas in the DC-9 or 727 one quick scan of the panel revealed what modes had been selected, and hence what one could expect." (page 121)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: FMS: CDU
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details
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