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Evidence for an Issue 5 pieces of evidence for this issue.

false alarms may be frequent (Issue #70) - Frequent false alarms may cause pilots to mistrust or ignore automation and therefore not use it or respond to it when they should.

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  2. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 15 of the 30 (50%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc70 false alarms may be frequent
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  4. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 9 of the 30 (30%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc70 false alarms may be frequent
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  6. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: In our review of 282 automation-related ASRS incident reports, we found 5 reports (2%) supporting issue070 (false alarms may be frequent).
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Owen, G. & Funk, K. (1997). Flight Deck Automation Issues: Incident Report Analysis. http://www.flightdeckautomation.com/incidentstudy/incident-analysis.aspx. Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University, Department of Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering. See Resource details

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  8. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Several specific problems were noted with regard to displays and crew interaction with automated systems; for example: map shift; difficulty with airspeed and altitude tapes; information clutter; presentation of engine secondary data; indecipherability of messages (e.g., due to poor wording and poor use of abbreviations); incorrect feedback (e.g., fuel predictions); improper signaling (e.g., of V2 climb-out speed); overall lack of feedback from systems; irrelevance of some displayed data; slow system activation and response time; extreme complexity with failures; and variable reliability and false/spurious warnings or automated systems." (page 5)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Rudisill, M. (1995). Line Pilots' Attitudes About and Experience With Flight Deck Automation: Results of an International Survey and Proposed Guidelines. In R.S. Jensen, & L.A. Rakovan (Eds.), Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Columbus, Ohio, April 24-27, 1995, 288-293. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

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  10. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: In response to the open-ended question, "2-2 If you were to leave the 757 for an older model aircraft, what features would you miss the most? What would you be happy to leave behind?": 1 pilot out of a total of 133 responded that a feature that "Would not be missed" is "Erroneous status messages" (page 44-46)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details
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