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Evidence for an Issue 6 pieces of evidence for this issue.

monitoring requirements may be excessive (Issue #5) - Pilots are required to monitor automation for long periods of time, a task for which they are perceptually and cognitively ill-suited, and monitoring errors may be likely.

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  2. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Pilots feel that flying with partial automation is different [than manual flying], and requires more monitoring." (page 35)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. NASA Technical Memorandum 86659, 1-68. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  4. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the survey data: "Automation does not reduce total workload, because there is more to monitor now." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 3=Neutral, 5=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 2.69 and the standard deviation was 1.11. (page 21)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757 & B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Hutchins, E., Holder, B., & Hayward, M. (1999). Pilot Attitudes Toward Automation. Web published at http://hci.ucsd.edu/hutchins/attitudes/index.html. See Resource details

  5.  
  6. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 26 of the 30 (87%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc5 monitoring requirements may be excessive
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  8. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: In our review of 282 automation-related ASRS incident reports, we found 5 reports (2%) supporting issue005 (monitoring requirements may be excessive).
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Owen, G. & Funk, K. (1997). Flight Deck Automation Issues: Incident Report Analysis. http://www.flightdeckautomation.com/incidentstudy/incident-analysis.aspx. Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University, Department of Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering. See Resource details

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  10. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "That the design of flight controls on the A-320 creates an increased monitoring load was pointed out by 77 pilots in this study and also by participants in the Last and Alder (1991) survey. To compensate for the lack of throttle movement, they now pay more attention to the N1 indications on the centralized aircraft monitoring system (44 pilots), to engine noise (12 pilots), and to the airspeed indications on the PFD (2 pilots). These pilots would prefer that the throttles move because monitoring the engine indications requires focal visual attention, a resource that is already heavily taxed given the displays and interfaces on highly automated aircraft such as the A-320. They think that moving levers would alert them earlier and in a more effortless manner to any undesired changes in power settings. One pilot mentioned that reliance on substitute cues such as engine noise can be problematic because the engines on the Airbus A-320 are very quiet, thus reducing the effectiveness of this potential source of feedback." (page 565)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: A-320
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Sherry, L. & Polson, P.G. (1999). Shared models of flight management system vertical guidance. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 9(2), 139-153. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  12. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "Overall, 85 pilots responded that they did not find it difficult to adapt to nonmoving thrust levers. Two pilots even argued that moving throttles would be distracting to them after having flown and adapted to the Airbus A-320 design." (page 565)
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: A-320
    Equipment: automation: controls
    Source: Sherry, L. & Polson, P.G. (1999). Shared models of flight management system vertical guidance. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 9(2), 139-153. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details
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