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Evidence for an Issue 38 pieces of evidence for this issue.

pilots may lack confidence in automation (Issue #46) - Pilots may lack confidence in automation due to their experience (or lack thereof) with it. This may result in a failure to use automation when it should be used.

  1.  
  2. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Collaboration requires the maintenance of (mutual) awareness (e.g. what others are doing, intending, have done, found out). Whilst the above-mentioned implications of role switches between pilot and automation (e.g. ironies of automation, automation surprises) may sometimes be unavoidable, their effects may be mitigated by enabling better awareness of computer collaborator’s activities. Human collaborators would consider mode reversions very bad practice without announcing them clearly, ensuring that they have been noticed, and coordinating their effects in relation to collaborators’ activities and plans. Likewise, the supervisory role of pilots needs to be supported by providing suitable indications of automation progress, status, and predictions [13]. Pilots need to constantly double-check what the automation is doing since responsibility remains with them: P1: “you tend to double-check, although the longer you are on the airplane, the more confident you become. I certainly do that with the descent and the approach, double-check using my little method, a lot of guys I guess do the same sort of thing.” P2: “Generally no matter what system you are using you have to monitor it all the time ... you know in three minutes you are going to be here and the plane is going to turn right. (page 4)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (2004). Should Computers Function as Collaborators?. In Proceedings of HCI-Aero 2004 held in Toulouse, France September 29, 2004 to 1 October 2004. See Resource details

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  4. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Collaboration requires the maintenance of (mutual) awareness (e.g. what others are doing, intending, have done, found out). Whilst the above-mentioned implications of role switches between pilot and automation (e.g. ironies of automation, automation surprises) may sometimes be unavoidable, their effects may be mitigated by enabling better awareness of computer collaborator’s activities. Human collaborators would consider mode reversions very bad practice without announcing them clearly, ensuring that they have been noticed, and coordinating their effects in relation to collaborators’ activities and plans. Likewise, the supervisory role of pilots needs to be supported by providing suitable indications of automation progress, status, and predictions [13]. Pilots need to constantly double-check what the automation is doing since responsibility remains with them: P1: “you tend to double-check, although the longer you are on the airplane, the more confident you become. I certainly do that with the descent and the approach, double-check using my little method, a lot of guys I guess do the same sort of thing.” P2: “Generally no matter what system you are using you have to monitor it all the time ... you know in three minutes you are going to be here and the plane is going to turn right.” (page 4)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (2004). Should Computers Function as Collaborators?. In Proceedings of HCI-Aero 2004 held in Toulouse, France September 29, 2004 to 1 October 2004. See Resource details

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  6. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the questionnaire data: "27% agreed that they were 'worried about sudden failures of the new devices like the FMS computer and the CRT displays' (#9), although the majority, 64%, disagreed with the statement" while 10% neither agreed nor disagreed. (page 21)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. NASA Technical Memorandum 86659, 1-68. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  8. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the questionnaire data: "26% agreed that they 'have serious concerns about the reliability of this new equipment,' and ... the majority disagreed (62%)." (#25) while 13% neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement. (page 22)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. NASA Technical Memorandum 86659, 1-68. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  10. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the questionnaire data: "Twenty percent of the pilots disagree with the statement 'The new equipment is more reliable than the old' (#29) (45% agreed with the statement, and 35% neither agreed nor disagreed)." (page 21)
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. NASA Technical Memorandum 86659, 1-68. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  12. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "27% agreed that they were 'worried about sudden failures of the new devices like the FMS computer and the CRT displays' (#9), although the majority, 64%, disagreed with the statement" while 10% neither agreed nor disagreed. (page 21)
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. NASA Technical Memorandum 86659, 1-68. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  13.  
  14. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the questionnaire data: "26% agreed that they 'have serious concerns about the reliability of this new equipment,' and ... the majority disagreed (62%)." (#25) while 13% neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement. (page 22)
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. NASA Technical Memorandum 86659, 1-68. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  16. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: In ASRS incident report #123705 "'... My point is that I have almost 3,000 hours in the airplane and I am very knowledgeable in its operation, but pilots cannot rely on the computers to fly the aircraft.' The reported lack of trust in the FMS that arose from this incident was mirrored in many of the other reports reviewed for this study. Although not cited specifically, it was clear that many of the pilots submitting these reports were, and still are, receptive to the additional sophistication and efficiency represented by the FMS, but have quickly become mistrustful when they experienced errors, irrespective of the cause." (page 4.5)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Eldredge, D., Mangold, S., & Dodd, R.S. (1992). A Review and Discussion of Flight Management System Incidents Reported to the Aviation Safety Reporting System. Final Report DOT/FAA/RD-92/2. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration. See Resource details

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  18. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: One of the first officers that the author rode jumpseat with "was bothered by the feature involved in programming the computer to cross a fix at a certain speed and altitude. The problem is the computer will achieve the required parameters before the fix. 'You are really never sure if it (the computer) is going to make it or not. And if it is going to mess up, it's too late to do anything,' the pilot said." (page 55)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Hughes, D. (March 23, 1992). Automated Cockpits: Keeping Pilots in the Loop - Pilots support 767 automated cockpit, but cite mismatch with ATC system. Aviation Week & Space Technology, 52-55. See Resource details

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  20. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 9 of the 30 (30%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc46 pilots may lack confidence in automation
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  21.  
  22. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 12 of the 30 (40%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc46 pilots may lack confidence in automation
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  24. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: In response to the following statement: "43. The new equipment is more reliable than the old." 70% of the pilots either strongly agreed or agreed while 9% of the pilots either strongly disagreed or disagreed. 21% of the pilots were neutral. (page 17)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E.A. (1990). The effects of mixed-fleet flying of the Boeing 737-200 and -300. America West Airlines Technical Report AWA01-90-01. Phoenix, AZ: America West Airlines. See Resource details

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  26. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: In response to the following statement: "25. I am concerned about the reliability of some of the modern equipment." 24% of the pilots either strongly agreed or agreed while 57% of the pilots either strongly disagreed or disagreed. 19% of the pilots were neutral. (page 16)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E.A. (1990). The effects of mixed-fleet flying of the Boeing 737-200 and -300. America West Airlines Technical Report AWA01-90-01. Phoenix, AZ: America West Airlines. See Resource details

  27.  
  28. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: In response to the following statement: "43. The new equipment is more reliable than the old." 70% of the pilots either strongly agreed or agreed while 9% of the pilots either strongly disagreed or disagreed. 21% of the pilots were neutral. (page 17)
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: B737
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E.A. (1990). The effects of mixed-fleet flying of the Boeing 737-200 and -300. America West Airlines Technical Report AWA01-90-01. Phoenix, AZ: America West Airlines. See Resource details

  29.  
  30. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: In response to the following statement: "25. I am concerned about the reliability of some of the modern equipment." 24% of the pilots either strongly agreed or agreed while 57% of the pilots either strongly disagreed or disagreed. 19% of the pilots were neutral. (page 16)
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: B737
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E.A. (1990). The effects of mixed-fleet flying of the Boeing 737-200 and -300. America West Airlines Technical Report AWA01-90-01. Phoenix, AZ: America West Airlines. See Resource details

  31.  
  32. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Pilots of advanced technology aircraft (A320 and 737-400) indicated that they had reduced trust in the aircraft" (page 185)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: A320, B737-400
    Equipment: automation
    Source: McClumpha, A.J. & James, M.R. (1994). Understanding automated aircraft. In M. Mouloua & R. Parasuraman (Eds.), Human Performance in Automated Systems: Current Research and Trends. Proceedings of the 1st Automation Technology and Human Performance Conference, held in Washington, DC April 7-9, 1994. Hillsdale, NJ:Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  34. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 23: "I have total confidence in automation." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 25=Disagree, 50=Neither agree nor disagree, 75=Agree, and 100=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 46 and the standard deviation was 24. The minimum response was 1 and the maximum was 100. (page 46, 50)
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Morters, K. (1988). B767 Flightdeck Automation Research. Research Paper 32:420, 1-141. See Resource details

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  36. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 4: "The automated equipment is more reliable than non-automated equipment." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 25=Disagree, 50=Neither agree nor disagree, 75=Agree, and 100=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 51 and the standard deviation was 21. The minimum response was 1 and the maximum was 93. (page 45, 50)
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Morters, K. (1988). B767 Flightdeck Automation Research. Research Paper 32:420, 1-141. See Resource details

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  38. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 21: "I am concerned about sudden failures of the automated system." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 25=Disagree, 50=Neither agree nor disagree, 75=Agree, and 100=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 33 and the standard deviation was 20. The minimum response was 1 and the maximum was 78. (page 46, 51)
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Morters, K. (1988). B767 Flightdeck Automation Research. Research Paper 32:420, 1-141. See Resource details

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  40. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 33: "I have serious concerns about the reliability of the new automated equipment." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 25=Disagree, 50=Neither agree nor disagree, 75=Agree, and 100=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 27 and the standard deviation was 23. The minimum response was 1 and the maximum was 100. (page 46, 51)
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Morters, K. (1988). B767 Flightdeck Automation Research. Research Paper 32:420, 1-141. See Resource details

  41.  
  42. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: When pilots were presented with an automated aid, both accuracy (t(15) = 1.94, p = .07, marginally significant) and confidence (t(15) = 2.67, p = .02, significant) were higher with automation than without the aid, though these differences were only observed for the high workload condition, as shown in Table 1. (page 4/5)
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Muthard, E.K. & Wickens, C.D. (2003). Factors That Mediate Flight Plan Monitoring and Errors in Plan Revision: An Examination of Planning Under Automated Conditions. In Proceedings of the 12th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 857-62. See Resource details

  43.  
  44. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: Automated aids were implemented on one half of trials to assist with the plan selection process. A marginally significant main effect was found for automation on plan selection accuracy (F(1, 15) = 3.75, p = 0.07), such that accuracy was 19.1% higher in trials with attention guidance automation (M = 78.1%), relative to the baseline condition (M = 65.6%), though automation had no significant effect on response time (F(1, 83) = 1.25, p > 0.10). The presence of automation also significantly increased confidence by 10.2% (M = 5.4, F(1, 15) = 7.16, p = 0.02), relative to the baseline condition (M = 4.9). For the measures of accuracy, response time, and confidence, no significant interaction was found for plan selection difficulty and automation, F(3, 45) = 1.63, p > 0.10; F(3, 83) = 1.09, p > 0.10; and F(3, 45) = 0.55, p > 0. 10, respectively. (page 32)
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Muthard, E.K. & Wickens, C.D. (August 2002). Factors That Mediate Flight Plan Monitoring and Errors in Plan Revision: An Examination of Planning Under Automated Conditions. Nasa Technical Report AFHD-02-11/NASA-02-8. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  46. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: The pairwise t-tests revealed that pilots selected flight plans at the second choice point more quickly (M = 3.16 s, t(4) = 2.19, p = 0.09, marginally significant) as well as somewhat more confidently (M = 6.06) in the automated condition relative to the baseline condition (M = 5.96 s, 5.3 8, t(15) = 2.55, p = 0.02). For the dependent variable of accuracy, however, pilots were less accurate in the automated (M = 43.7%) than in the baseline condition (M = 75.0%), t(15)= 1.78, p = 0.09, marginally significant). Recall that it is at the second choice point in this mediumML→H plan selection condition under the attention guidance automation that a change occurs to a now important and high risk (but non-highlighted) hazard. The lowered accuracy under the automated condition reflects the pilots’ failure to notice the change in the automated condition and therefore their complacency in detecting the consequences of this automation failure. (page 40)
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Muthard, E.K. & Wickens, C.D. (August 2002). Factors That Mediate Flight Plan Monitoring and Errors in Plan Revision: An Examination of Planning Under Automated Conditions. Nasa Technical Report AFHD-02-11/NASA-02-8. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  48. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: To assess the effects of workload and automation on plan selection performance, we examined plan selection accuracy, response time, and choice confidence in three ANOVAs. The main effect of workload was not significant for accuracy (F(1, 27) = 1.21, p > .10), response time (F(1, 26) = 1.41, p > .10), or confidence (F(1, 27) = 1.93, p > .10). The automation main effect was also not significant for accuracy (F(1, 27) = 1.21, p > .10), response time (F(1, 26) = .94, p > .10), but was significant for the confidence dependent variable (F(1, 27) = 8.36, p = .01), suggesting that pilots were more confident in plan selection with the automated aid than without. (page 4/5)
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Muthard, E.K. & Wickens, C.D. (2003). Factors That Mediate Flight Plan Monitoring and Errors in Plan Revision: An Examination of Planning Under Automated Conditions. In Proceedings of the 12th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 857-62. See Resource details

  49.  
  50. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "3.0 CONCLUSIONS 3.1 Findings ... 40. The Captain assessed the GPWS warning as false." (page 121, 124)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: A310
    Equipment: GPWS
    Source: Nepal Aircraft Accident Investigation Committee (1992). Report on the Accident of Thai Airways International A310 Flight TG 311 (HS-TID) on 31 July 1992. His Majesty's Government of Nepal. See Resource details

  51.  
  52. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: In our review of 282 automation-related ASRS incident reports, we found 5 reports (2%) supporting issue046 (pilots may lack confidence in automatio).
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Owen, G. & Funk, K. (1997). Flight Deck Automation Issues: Incident Report Analysis. http://www.flightdeckautomation.com/incidentstudy/incident-analysis.aspx. Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University, Department of Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering. See Resource details

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  54. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "56 pilots provided comments on Automation Surprises. These responses were coded into categories based on the primary thrust of the pilot’s response. Five categories were created with ten of the responses not fitting into one of the five categories. The categories, numbers of responses in each category, and a brief summary of the comments are provided below:...Trust (2) - Not confident that it will make altitude restrictions. I never trust the automation completely." (page 437)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: MD11
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Parasuraman, R., Mavor, A., Wickens, C.D., Danaher, J.W., & Aalfs, C. (1998). Managing the future national airspace system: Free flight or ground-based control with increased automation (panel session). In Proceedings of the 42nd Annual Meeting of the Human Factors and Ergonomic Society, 62-66. See Resource details

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  56. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Question 31 asked pilots to report how much confidence they placed in the accuracy of the information shown in the visual displays/instruments…Among the AH­64D pilots, 82% of the responses were on the agree side of the scale… (page 12)
    Strength: -4
    Aircraft: AH-64D
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Rash, C.E., Adam, G.E., LeDuc, P.A., & Francis, G. (May 6-8, 2003). Pilot Attitudes on Glass and Traditional Cockpits in the U.S. Army's AH-64 Apache Helicopter. Presented at the American Helicopter Society 59th Annual Forum, Phoenix, AZ. American Helicopter Society International, Inc. See Resource details

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  58. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "With regard to trust in automation, pilots have some reservations. They report good, but variable, reliability, i.e., some automated systems are reliable; others are not." (page 7)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Rudisill, M. (1995). Line Pilots' Attitudes About and Experience With Flight Deck Automation: Results of an International Survey and Proposed Guidelines. In R.S. Jensen, & L.A. Rakovan (Eds.), Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Columbus, Ohio, April 24-27, 1995, 288-293. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

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  60. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Pilots were asked to describe instances where FMS behavior surprised them and to indicate modes/features of FMS operation that they did not understand. There were no sharp boundaries between the incidents elicited by the two questions. Pilot reports are categorized according to their underlying theme." ... There were 11 reports [11 / 135 = 8.1%] in the category: "Flight Director (FD) Bars ... Pilots describe cases where the FD bars commanded pitch attitudes which seemed to be inadequate or unnecessarily abrupt. Some pilots report that, as a result, they loose [in sic] confidence in the FD bars." (page 307,311)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS FD Bars
    Source: Sarter, N.B. & Woods, D.D. (1992). Pilot interaction with cockpit automation: Operational experiences with the Flight Management System. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 2(4), 303-321. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  62. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "Close examination of this profile reveals some interesting behaviors. A generally rising trend of automation use over time suggests that learning or fatigue may be contributing to automation use decisions. Further analysis confirms this; subjects who cited fatigue as a reason for using the automation tended to use it more later than other subjects (the midpoint of their automation use was relatively later but their overall levels of automation use were relatively lower than other subjects, suggesting that subjects who cited fatigue tended to perform the task manually for much of the experiment, then turn the automation on late). In addition, subjects turned the automation off quickly when it failed but showed no greater reluctance to use it after it had recovered than before it had failed. This finding was confirmed in a later experiment using response times as the dependent measure (Riley, 1994)." (page 12)
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Shelden, S. & Belcher, S. (1999). Cockpit traffic displays of tomorrow. Ergonomics in Design, 7(3), 4-9. See Resource details

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  64. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Fifty eight structured interviews were conducted at a number of European airlines to enable pilots and training instructors to comment on current transition training practices, to give levels of understanding of various automated systems and express their views on automation and related issues… Pilots attitudes towards the automation were generally positive. Surprises caused by the automation tended to occur especially early after training, as did human errors due to negative transfer. In cases where pilots were surprised, they admitted that it did influence their trust in the aircraft. Comments suggested that a higher level of understanding of systems, better problem solving skills and prioritisation rules to avoid excessive head-down time, could mitigate negative effects of difficult situations."
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Sherman, P.J., Helmreich, R.L., & Merritt, A. (1997). National culture and flight deck automation: Results of a multination survey. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 7(4), 311-329. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  66. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 25: "I am concerned about the reliability of some of the modern equipment." From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, only 33% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, only 28% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement while 56% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and 56% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 11% in Phase 1 and 16% in Phase 2. (page 42)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  68. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "INITIAL OPERATING EXPERIENCE (IOE) [On the first questionnaire, crews were asked]... Describe any problems that you had during your IOE (initial operating experience) and early months of flying the 757. Are there still areas you have trouble with, or don't understand?" In response to this question, the following comment was made by one of the pilots: " I had a tough time believing that the automation was going to do what I had programmed it to do (e.g. capturing altitudes, proceeding direct to fixes, etc.). I found myself turning off the A/P, placing the aircraft where I wanted it, and turning the A/P back on. 2022" (page 72, 76)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  69.  
  70. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 25: "I am concerned about the reliability of some of the modern equipment." From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, 33% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, 28% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement while 56% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and 56% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 11% in Phase 1 and 16% in Phase 2. (page 42)
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  71.  
  72. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Pilots responded to "Question 31. The trustworthiness of the automated systems in my aircraft is:" Ratings ranged from Completely Untrustworthy (= 1) to Perfect (= 7). "The mean rating for this opinion was 5.3 (s = 1.1) indicating a high level of trustworthiness." 7 % of the pilots rated the statement as either a 1 or 2 while 81% of the pilots rated the statement as either a 6 or 7. The remaining pilots rated the statement as a 3, 4, or 5. (page 128)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wise, J.A., Abbott, D.W., Tilden, D., Dyck, J.L., Guide, P.C., & Ryan, L. (1993). Automation in Corporate Aviation: Human Factors Issues. CAAR-15406-93-1. Daytona Beach, FL: Center for Aviation/Aerospace Research, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. See Resource details

  73.  
  74. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Pilots responded to "Open-Ended Question 6A. Please describe your current feelings about flying highly automated aircraft." "...pilots (n=25 [out of a total of 117, 21%]) stated that these new systems are great, however, they also expressed some degree of caution, suggesting that they are not completely confident in the systems capabilities or reliability." (page 192)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wise, J.A., Abbott, D.W., Tilden, D., Dyck, J.L., Guide, P.C., & Ryan, L. (1993). Automation in Corporate Aviation: Human Factors Issues. CAAR-15406-93-1. Daytona Beach, FL: Center for Aviation/Aerospace Research, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. See Resource details

  75.  
  76. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Pilots responded to "Question 31. The trustworthiness of the automated systems in my aircraft is:" Ratings ranged from Completely Untrustworthy (= 1) to Perfect (= 7). "The mean rating for this opinion was 5.3 (s = 1.1) indicating a high level of trustworthiness." 7 % of the pilots rated the statement as either a 1 or 2 while 81% of the pilots rated the statement as either a 6 or 7. The remaining pilots rated the statement as a 3, 4, or 5. (page 128)
    Strength: -4
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wise, J.A., Abbott, D.W., Tilden, D., Dyck, J.L., Guide, P.C., & Ryan, L. (1993). Automation in Corporate Aviation: Human Factors Issues. CAAR-15406-93-1. Daytona Beach, FL: Center for Aviation/Aerospace Research, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. See Resource details
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