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Evidence for an Issue 25 pieces of evidence for this issue.

interface may be poorly designed (Issue #39) - The pilot-automation interface may be poorly designed with respect to human factors considerations, possibly resulting in poor pilot performance or pilot dissatisfaction.

  1.  
  2. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Almost 10% of the pilots reported some discomfort with the speed synchronization at the time the Flight Level Change (FLCH) mode is engaged. FLCH is designed to climb at the existing IAS and climb thrust. The reason for the confusion seems to be that the SPD window shows a value at the same time FLCH is engaged, but this value has no bearing on FLCH operation since the displayed speed automatically changes to the existing speed when FLCH is engaged. These pilots felt that FLCH should hold the speed displayed in the window, instead of the existing speed." (page 24)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: autoflight
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. NASA Technical Memorandum 86659, 1-68. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  3.  
  4. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Q.44. When interfacing have you ever felt or experienced difficulty in dialoguing with systems or in following automation logic?" 77.9% of the respondents answered 'Yes', 19.9% answered 'No' and 2.1% gave no response. (page 34)
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation: interface
    Source: Gras, A., Moricot, C., et. al. (1994). Faced with automation. Publications de la Sorbonne. See Resource details

  5.  
  6. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Q.44. When interfacing have you ever felt or experienced difficulty in dialoguing with systems or in following automation logic?" 77.9% of the respondents answered 'Yes' , 19.9% answered 'No', and 2.1% gave no response. (page 34)
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation: interface
    Source: Gras, A., Moricot, C., et. al. (1994). Faced with automation. Publications de la Sorbonne. See Resource details

  7.  
  8. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "CHAPTER 2.2 - ANALYSIS OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING DIRECTLY TO THE ACCIDENT [ p. 217] ... 22.336 - Conclusion In conclusion, the design of the rotary selector switch and the window displaying the vertical flight path control parameters means that the coherence between the selection of vertical mode and the selected value is critical. Also, the probability of confusion in this area seems to be considerable, particularly for a crew new to the aircraft. The spatial distribution between the mode selector switch and the value selector switch tends to accentuate the natural weakness in the human operator's cognitive process. " (page 230)
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: A320-100
    Equipment: autoflight
    Source: Investigation Commission of Ministry of Transport - France (1993). Rapport de la Commission d'Enquete sur l'Accident survenu le 20 Janvier 1992 pres du Mont Saite Odile (Bas Rhin) a l/Airbus A.320 Immatricule F-GGED Exploite par lay Compagnie Air Inter. Official English translation from the Ministere de l'Equipement, des Transports et du Tourisme, France. Ministere de l'Equipement, des Transports et du Tourisme. See Resource details

  9.  
  10. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "An ANOVA shows a two-way interaction between Phase and Type of human interface affecting the proportion of NoGo decisions (F(1,22) = 42.878, p < .000001). If an engine failure occurs in Phase 2, a NoGo decision must be made. If an engine fails in Phase 3, a Go decision is appropriate, because it is not possible to initiate an RTO before V1 is achieved. Among cases with an engine failure in Phase 2, a NoGo decision was made in about 83 % of cases under the G/A type interface, while about 58 % under Type C interface. For cases with an engine failure in Phase 3, a Go decision was made in about 94 % under the G/A type interface, while only about 67 % under Type C interface (Figure 2). Sheffe tests found significant differences between every pair of means shown in Figure 2. The result implies that the G/A type interface supported well the human to make an appropriate decision."
    Strength: +5
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lintern, G., Waite, T., & Talleur, D.A. (1999). Functional interface design for the modern aircraft cockpit. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 9(3), 225-240. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  11.  
  12. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "An ANOVA shows a two-way interaction between Phase and Type of human interface affecting the proportion of NoGo decisions (F(1,22) = 42.878, p < .000001). If an engine failure occurs in Phase 2, a NoGo decision must be made. If an engine fails in Phase 3, a Go decision is appropriate, because it is not possible to initiate an RTO before V1 is achieved. Among cases with an engine failure in Phase 2, a NoGo decision was made in about 83 % of cases under the G/A type interface, while about 58 % under Type C interface. For cases with an engine failure in Phase 3, a Go decision was made in about 94 % under the G/A type interface, while only about 67 % under Type C interface (Figure 2). Sheffe tests found significant differences between every pair of means shown in Figure 2. The result implies that the G/A type interface supported well the human to make an appropriate decision."
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lintern, G., Waite, T., & Talleur, D.A. (1999). Functional interface design for the modern aircraft cockpit. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 9(3), 225-240. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  13.  
  14. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "An ANOVA shows a significant main effect of the Type of interface affecting the proportion of successful RTOs upon engine failure in Phase 2 (F(1,22)= 9.7997, p < .00487). Among cases with an engine failure in Phase 2, about 73 % ended with successful RTOs under the G/A type interface, while 44 % under Type C interface, which shows efficacy of an Abort message for successful RTOs."
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lintern, G., Waite, T., & Talleur, D.A. (1999). Functional interface design for the modern aircraft cockpit. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 9(3), 225-240. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  15.  
  16. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "An ANOVA also shows a two-way interaction between Phase and Type of interface affecting the proportion of marginal takeoffs (F(1,22) = 12.693, p < .00174) (Figure 3). Among cases with an engine failure in Phase 2, about 47 % of them ended with marginal takeoffs under Type C interface, while about 22 % under the G/A type interface. Scheffe test showed a significant difference between these interface types for Phase 2. The result suggests that an Abort message is useful to lessen marginal takeoffs caused by inappropriate Go-mindedness."
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lintern, G., Waite, T., & Talleur, D.A. (1999). Functional interface design for the modern aircraft cockpit. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 9(3), 225-240. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  17.  
  18. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "An ANOVA shows two-way interaction between Phase and Type of interface affecting the proportion of overrun accidents, where the analysis was performed on data collected under M-mode (F(1,22) = 5.565, p < .0276) (Figure 4). Recall, under SAA-mode, that the computer makes always a Go decision upon an engine failure in Phase 3, and thus no overrun accident occurs. About 23% of cases with an engine failure in Phase 3 ended with overrun accidents under Type C interface, while less than 3 % under the G/A type interface in M-mode. Scheffe test found a significant difference between the interface types for Phase 3, which implies efficacy of an Go message for avoiding overrun accidents when an engine fails in Phase 3."
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lintern, G., Waite, T., & Talleur, D.A. (1999). Functional interface design for the modern aircraft cockpit. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 9(3), 225-240. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  19.  
  20. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "An ANOVA shows two-way interaction between Phase and Type of interface affecting the proportion of overrun accidents, where the analysis was performed on data collected under M-mode (F(1,22) = 5.565, p < .0276) (Figure 4). Recall, under SAA-mode, that the computer makes always a Go decision upon an engine failure in Phase 3, and thus no overrun accident occurs. About 23% of cases with an engine failure in Phase 3 ended with overrun accidents under Type C interface, while less than 3 % under the G/A type interface in M-mode. Scheffe test found a significant difference between the interface types for Phase 3, which implies efficacy of an Go message for avoiding overrun accidents when an engine fails in Phase 3."
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lintern, G., Waite, T., & Talleur, D.A. (1999). Functional interface design for the modern aircraft cockpit. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 9(3), 225-240. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  21.  
  22. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "An ANOVA also shows a two-way interaction between Phase and Type of interface affecting the proportion of marginal takeoffs (F(1,22) = 12.693, p < .00174) (Figure 3). Among cases with an engine failure in Phase 2, about 47 % of them ended with marginal takeoffs under Type C interface, while about 22 % under the G/A type interface. Scheffe test showed a significant difference between these interface types for Phase 2. The result suggests that an Abort message is useful to lessen marginal takeoffs caused by inappropriate Go-mindedness."
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lintern, G., Waite, T., & Talleur, D.A. (1999). Functional interface design for the modern aircraft cockpit. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 9(3), 225-240. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  23.  
  24. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "An ANOVA shows two-way interaction between Phase and Type of interface affecting the proportion of overrun accidents, where the analysis was performed on data collected under M-mode (F(1,22) = 5.565, p < .0276) (Figure 4). Recall, under SAA-mode, that the computer makes always a Go decision upon an engine failure in Phase 3, and thus no overrun accident occurs. About 23% of cases with an engine failure in Phase 3 ended with overrun accidents under Type C interface, while less than 3 % under the G/A type interface in M-mode. Scheffe test found a significant difference between the interface types for Phase 3, which implies efficacy of an Go message for avoiding overrun accidents when an engine fails in Phase 3."
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lintern, G., Waite, T., & Talleur, D.A. (1999). Functional interface design for the modern aircraft cockpit. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 9(3), 225-240. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  25.  
  26. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "An ANOVA shows a significant main effect of the Type of interface affecting the proportion of successful RTOs upon engine failure in Phase 2 (F(1,22)= 9.7997, p < .00487). Among cases with an engine failure in Phase 2, about 73 % ended with successful RTOs under the G/A type interface, while 44 % under Type C interface, which shows efficacy of an Abort message for successful RTOs."
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lintern, G., Waite, T., & Talleur, D.A. (1999). Functional interface design for the modern aircraft cockpit. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 9(3), 225-240. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  27.  
  28. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "An ANOVA shows a two-way interaction between Phase and Type of human interface affecting the proportion of NoGo decisions (F(1,22) = 42.878, p < .000001). If an engine failure occurs in Phase 2, a NoGo decision must be made. If an engine fails in Phase 3, a Go decision is appropriate, because it is not possible to initiate an RTO before V1 is achieved. Among cases with an engine failure in Phase 2, a NoGo decision was made in about 83 % of cases under the G/A type interface, while about 58 % under Type C interface.For cases with an engine failure in Phase 3, a Go decision was made in about 94 % under the G/A type interface, while only about 67 % under Type C interface (Figure 2). Sheffe tests found significant differences between every pair of means shown in Figure 2. The result implies that the G/A type interface supported well the human to make an appropriate decision."
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lintern, G., Waite, T., & Talleur, D.A. (1999). Functional interface design for the modern aircraft cockpit. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 9(3), 225-240. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  29.  
  30. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "An ANOVA shows a two-way interaction between Phase and Type of human interface affecting the proportion of NoGo decisions (F(1,22) = 42.878, p < .000001). If an engine failure occurs in Phase 2, a NoGo decision must be made. If an engine fails in Phase 3, a Go decision is appropriate, because it is not possible to initiate an RTO before V1 is achieved. Among cases with an engine failure in Phase 2, a NoGo decision was made in about 83 % of cases under the G/A type interface, while about 58 % under Type C interface. For cases with an engine failure in Phase 3, a Go decision was made in about 94 % under the G/A type interface, while only about 67 % under Type C interface (Figure 2). Sheffe tests found significant differences between every pair of means shown in Figure 2. The result implies that the G/A type interface supported well the human to make an appropriate decision."
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lintern, G., Waite, T., & Talleur, D.A. (1999). Functional interface design for the modern aircraft cockpit. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 9(3), 225-240. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  31.  
  32. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 16 of the 30 (53%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc039 interface may be poorly designed
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  33.  
  34. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 5 of the 30 (17%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc039 interface may be poorly designed
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  35.  
  36. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: In our review of 282 automation-related ASRS incident reports, we found 1 reports (<1%) supporting issue039 (interface may be poorly designed).
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Owen, G. & Funk, K. (1997). Flight Deck Automation Issues: Incident Report Analysis. http://www.flightdeckautomation.com/incidentstudy/incident-analysis.aspx. Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University, Department of Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering. See Resource details

  37.  
  38. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: "We will see in other incidents that there is often a mismatch between the pilots' intentions and the interface that is provided for communicating those intentions to the autopilot and flight management system." (page 10)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Palmer, E.A., Hutchins, E.L., Ritter, R.D., & VanCleemput, I. (1993). Altitude Deviations: Breakdown of an Error-Tolerant System. NASA Technical Memorandum 108788. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  39.  
  40. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Like the AH-64A pilots, many AH-64D pilots requested a moving map. Other comments also noted that the MFDs tend to make the pilot focus inside the aircraft and that the paging system often required too many button pushes. Representative comments of the AH-64D pilots were: … Too many menus/screen. Actions that used to take only the push of a button now take longer since we are forced to navigate through multiple "pages." (page 13)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: AH-64D
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Rash, C.E., Adam, G.E., LeDuc, P.A., & Francis, G. (May 6-8, 2003). Pilot Attitudes on Glass and Traditional Cockpits in the U.S. Army's AH-64 Apache Helicopter. Presented at the American Helicopter Society 59th Annual Forum, Phoenix, AZ. American Helicopter Society International, Inc. See Resource details

  41.  
  42. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Several specific problems were noted with regard to displays and crew interaction with automated systems; for example: map shift; difficulty with airspeed and altitude tapes; information clutter; presentation of engine secondary data; indecipherability of messages (e.g., due to poor wording and poor use of abbreviations); incorrect feedback (e.g., fuel predictions); improper signaling (e.g., of V2 climb-out speed); overall lack of feedback from systems; irrelevance of some displayed data; slow system activation and response time; extreme complexity with failures; and variable reliability and false/spurious warnings or automated systems." (page 5)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Rudisill, M. (1995). Line Pilots' Attitudes About and Experience With Flight Deck Automation: Results of an International Survey and Proposed Guidelines. In R.S. Jensen, & L.A. Rakovan (Eds.), Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Columbus, Ohio, April 24-27, 1995, 288-293. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

  43.  
  44. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Insertion of navaids not in the database and of waypoints by means of the scratchpad was found to be an area for improvement." (page 11.11)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: A320, B737-400
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Speyer, J.J., Monteil, C., Blomberg, R.D., & Fouillot, J.P. (1990). Impact of New Technology on Operational Interface: From Design Aims to Flight Evaluation and Measurement. Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development No. 301, Vol. 1. See Resource details

  45.  
  46. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "The location of the navigation display is found suboptimal since it is partially hidden behind the control column. Knowledge and practice with the display's symbology was found to be best acqired during simulator and line training." (page 11.11)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: A310
    Equipment: automation: displays
    Source: Speyer, J.J., Monteil, C., Blomberg, R.D., & Fouillot, J.P. (1990). Impact of New Technology on Operational Interface: From Design Aims to Flight Evaluation and Measurement. Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development No. 301, Vol. 1. See Resource details

  47.  
  48. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "In spite of the conclusions regarding the problems of the difficult interface, the crews reported satisfaction with the general layout of the cockpit, and few problems in the area of traditional human factors." (page 171)
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  49.  
  50. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: In response to "Open-Ended Question 1. Briefly describe an operational problem - that you personally know of - involving the automated features of your aircraft that could have a negative safety consequence. How could the error have been avoided?" 22 out of 339 [22/339 = 6%] responses were in the category of Design/Interface. (page 163)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wise, J.A., Abbott, D.W., Tilden, D., Dyck, J.L., Guide, P.C., & Ryan, L. (1993). Automation in Corporate Aviation: Human Factors Issues. CAAR-15406-93-1. Daytona Beach, FL: Center for Aviation/Aerospace Research, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. See Resource details
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