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Evidence for an Issue 9 pieces of evidence for this issue.

controls of automation may be poorly designed (Issue #37) - Automation controls may be designed so they are difficult to access and activate quickly and accurately, or easy to activate inadvertently.

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  2. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the questionnaire data: (#16) "I can find the exact location of important controls and switches without any hesitation." 58% of the pilots strongly or slightly agreed, 33% of the pilots strongly or slightly disagreed with the statement, and 10% neither agreed nor disagreed. (page 44-45)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation controls
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. NASA Technical Memorandum 86659, 1-68. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  4. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the questionnaire data: (#16) "I can find the exact location of important controls and switches without any hesitation." 58% of the pilots strongly or slightly agreed, 33% of the pilots strongly or slightly disagreed with the statement, and 10% neither agreed nor disagreed. (page 44-45)
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation controls
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. NASA Technical Memorandum 86659, 1-68. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  6. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 9 of the 30 (30%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc037 controls of automation may be poorly designed
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  8. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 14 of the 30 (47%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc037 controls of automation may be poorly designed
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  10. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "... the Court itself has drawn attention to the most probable cause for the engagement of idle/open descent mode was that instead of selecting a vertical speed of 700 feet per minute at the relevant time i.e. about 35 seconds before the first impact, the pilot CM.2 had inadvertently selected an altitude of 700 feet. The vertical speed and altitude selection knobs of the Flight Control Unit (FCU) are close to each other, and instead of operating the vertical speed knob, the pilot CM. 2 had inadvertently operated the altitude selection knob. The altitude of 700 feet that got selected in this manner was lower than the aircraft altitude at that time and therefore the aircraft had gone into open/idle descent mode. That this is the most probable cause for engagement of idle/open descent mode is recognised by the Court in para 14 at page 310 of the report where it has discussed this matter, and in recommendation N0. 29 where the Court has specifically suggested a design change with respect to the two knobs." (page iv)
    Strength: +5
    Aircraft: A320
    Equipment: autoflight FCU
    Source: Ministry of Civil Aviation - India (1990). Report on Accident to Indian Airlines Airbus A-320 Aircraft VT-EPN at Bangalore, February 14, 1990. Ministry of Civil Aviation, Government of India. See Resource details

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  12. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "4. CAUSES ... The AAIC determined that the following factors, as a chain or a combination thereof, caused the accident: 1. The F/O inadvertantly triggered the Go [in sic] lever It is considered that the design of the GO lever contributed to it: normal operation of the thrust lever allows the possibility of an inadvertent triggering of the GO lever." (page 4.1)
    Strength: +5
    Aircraft: A300B4-622R
    Equipment: autoflight
    Source: Ministry of Transport Japan, Aircraft Accident Investigation Commission (1996). China Airlines Airbus Industrie A300B4-622R, B1816, Nagoya Airport, April 26, 1994. Report 96-5. Ministry of Transport. See Resource details

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  14. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: In our review of 282 automation-related ASRS incident reports, we found 11 reports (4%) supporting issue037 (controls of automation may be poorly designed).
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Owen, G. & Funk, K. (1997). Flight Deck Automation Issues: Incident Report Analysis. http://www.flightdeckautomation.com/incidentstudy/incident-analysis.aspx. Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University, Department of Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering. See Resource details

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  16. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: The AH-64D pilots also commented on the need for an improvement to the FLIR system and that the ORT should be removed and replaced with another MFD. Representative comments from the AH-64D pilots are: … Need a third MPD in front seat of AH-64D. The ORT currently in use is too small of a screen to be easily viewed when on a mission. Also, ORT handles are entirely too "busy." Some of the function buttons should be moved to the third screen bezel. (page 7)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: AH-64D
    Equipment: Other
    Source: Rash, C.E., Adam, G.E., LeDuc, P.A., & Francis, G. (May 6-8, 2003). Pilot Attitudes on Glass and Traditional Cockpits in the U.S. Army's AH-64 Apache Helicopter. Presented at the American Helicopter Society 59th Annual Forum, Phoenix, AZ. American Helicopter Society International, Inc. See Resource details

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  18. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "Another factor to be considered is the rapid expansion of automation in the cockpit. Many in the aviation industry have assumed that automation would remove human error, replacing the fallible human with unerring devices. The research of Wiener and Curry, including field studies with airlines bringing highly automated aircraft on line, suggests that this may be overly optimistic, and that possibly increases the severity of its consequences (Curry, 1985; Wiener, 1885a, 1985c, 19988a; 1989a,b; Wiener and Curry, 1980). The same appears to be true in the other industries mentioned. In brief, computer-controlled flight may invite large blunders while eliminating the small errors seen in manual systems. The ASRS reports below are illustrative of some of the problems of autoflight. ... [ASRS incident report #141226] Narrative: Aircraft was coupled to autopilot and autopilot was armed for the ILS (8L at Atlanta). Aircraft intercepted and captured localizer at approximately 15 nm from airfield, aircraft at 5000'. I identified localizer. As per company procedures captain rotated heading (HDG) select knob to 340 deg for missed approach HDG, but unknown to either of us, the multifunction knob was pushed in far enough to activate "HDG Hold" I did not notice the flight mode annunciator window change From "LOC TRK" to "HDG HLD". Of course, the ADI (flight director) display remained as before with the pitch bar giving altitude hold at 5000' And the back bar still centered but centered because we were On HDG not localizer. Obviously we gradually started to drift right. The HSI (nav display) was selected on map mode (20 mile scale). On this scale a small deviation off localizer is too small to detect. I monitored the glide slope (raw data display) and saw it descend through the flight director pitch bar. I looked at the flight mode annunciator (FMA) and realized we were no longer armed for the ILS. I immediately announced to the captain and disconnected the autopilot to start descent and selected arc mode on the nav display. I saw we were full scale localizer deflection so I put in about a 15 deg correction to course. At that moment Atlanta Approach called to tell us we were drifting into the parallel ILS course and he told us to maintain 4500' until established. (He also gave us a HDG to correct). I leveled at 4700' and as I did the localizer centered up and the ILS was resumed uneventfully. Having map mode in HSI instead of arc does not make a localizer deviation immediately obvious. Lack of continuous cross-check of FMA by pilots is a factor. Hdg select knob doubles as HDG hold button and an imperceptible extra push in on it activates HDG hold. To correct the problem: fly ILS with arc (or rose) in map to make deviations immediately obvious. Additionally, multifunction knobs should not be accepted on aircraft. It is simply too easy at night when you are tired or distracted to activate the wrong function. (We have 3 multifunction knobs where different functions are activated depending on how far you push the knob. It can be very tricky sometimes)." (page 4-6)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1993). Intervention Strategies for the Management of Human Error. NASA Contractor Report NCA2-441. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details
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