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Evidence for an Issue 7 pieces of evidence for this issue.

pilots may be reluctant to assume control (Issue #26) - Pilots may be reluctant to assume control from automation. Even when automation malfunctions or behaves contrary to their expectations they may persist in using it, possibly with time-consuming programming changes.This may lead to unsafe conditions.

  2. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Whilst the pilots we have talked to did not report mode reversions, they reported many situations in which to make decisions as to what parts of the automated systems to use when, as a prominent aspect in pilots’ tasks. For example, situational factors often require the use of less sophisticated equipment (e.g. adverse weather conditions, landings, Air Traffic Control (ATC) giving headings), or pilots may need to decide when the automated systems cannot cope: P1: “But invariably on every flight the route is changed to some degree by ATC ... even to a point where you disconnect it from the FMS and fly in another mode.” P2: “On our descent they changed the runway three times ... for some reason we didn’t change the frequencies [the third time]. We came in ... looked from a distance... thought ‘this is wrong’... so we knocked off the autopilot.” P2: “Sometimes you have situations where you know the plane is supposed to turn at 4 miles and if it doesn’t then, because it’s so much easier to use the automated system to fly this departure, you’ll find the pilot will sit there and go like, ‘OK, I’ll give it a little more time’.” P2: “[in bad weather]... what you do is you take off the height control... A lot of up- and downdrafts ... can confuse the sensors... If it bobs up and down, you don’t have the autopilot fighting it. But that’s not a company procedure.” P2: “...due to traffic etc. they can’t descend you ... you now find that the system is telling you ‘top of descent’ but you have to ignore it ...suddenly the controller announces to you that you are cleared to descend... Now ... you have to close the throttles and pull out the spoilers, the speed breaks, which gives you the right maximum rate of descent, and in most of the times the autopilot cannot comprehend what is going on ... you have to knock off the descent mode and descent it yourself at the very high rates, and when you’re closer to your level you put it back on ... for the 727 you definitely have to remove the descent mode, in the Learjet you go to speed. ” (page 3)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (2004). Should Computers Function as Collaborators?. In Proceedings of HCI-Aero 2004 held in Toulouse, France September 29, 2004 to 1 October 2004. See Resource details

  4. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "On several of the line observation trips, the NASA observer noticed the following. When things did not go as planned, or when the pilot was 'surprised' by the automatics (e.g., the early altitude capture with high rate of climb), the pilot would try to 'program' his way out of the anomalous condition. The situation would sometimes get worse and more confusing, not better." (page 30)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. NASA Technical Memorandum 86659, 1-68. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  6. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "the captain appeared engaged in a state we will call automation fixation. People have grown accustomed to technology working in only fixed ways and they may routinely have to try several tactics to get it to do what they want it to do. Therefore they may engage in a persistence behavior (continuing to repeatedly try different things) which is frequently eventually successful. Engaging in this type of automation fixation may have very negative consequences, however, if the circumstances are such that a wiser course of action would be to give up and do the task in another way (e.g. fly the aircraft manually). Even after all of the problems encountered by this crew, the captain remained intent on trying to program the FMS to fly the approach path." (page 881)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation and FMS
    Source: Inagaki, T., Takae, Y., & Moray, N. (1999). Automation and human interface for takeoff safety. In R.S. Jensen, B. Cox, J.D. Callister, & R. Lavis (Eds.), Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 402-407. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

  8. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 17 of the 30 (57%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc026 pilots may be reluctant to assume control
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  10. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 5 of the 30 (17%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc026 pilots may be reluctant to assume control
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  12. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: In our review of 282 automation-related ASRS incident reports, we found 1 reports (<1%) supporting issue026 (pilots may be reluctant to assume control).
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Owen, G. & Funk, K. (1997). Flight Deck Automation Issues: Incident Report Analysis. http://www.flightdeckautomation.com/incidentstudy/incident-analysis.aspx. Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University, Department of Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering. See Resource details

  14. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "Only one pilot in this study handled the go around below 100 feet AGL without any problems. He elected to stay in fully manual control of the aircraft until level-off at the acceleration altitude and then reengaged individual subsystems of the automation one after the other, each time assuring himself first that the automated system responded as expected and desired. All other pilots focused on trying to figure out why the automation did not behave as expected, and they tried to get guidance from the automation as soon as possible. For example, seven pilots 38.9%) first called for the flight directors to be turned on after initiating the go-around. even though the automation was not set up to provide any meaningful guidance Another seven pilots (38.9%) activated autothrust before selecting a target speed, and thus the approach speed became the airspeed target. The fact that most pilots hesitated to take manual control of the aircraft and instead tried to understand what the automation was doing resulted in the following problems. Six of the pilots (33.4%) exceeded 250 knots LAS (indicated air speed) below an altitude of 10,000 feet. Another two pilots (11.1 %) allowed the airspeed to increase until almost reaching the maximum allowable airspeed. Another two pilots (11.1%) oversped their flaps during the go around. Finally, three pilots allowed the airspeed to increase all the way to the maximum operating speed before taking action. During the debriefing all pilots explained that they had not expected the autothrust to disengage when applying full power for the goaround. They emphasized that they were busy watching airspeed trends and altitude instead of looking at the flight mode annunciations to find out about the status and behavior of the automation." (page 398)
    Strength: +5
    Aircraft: A320
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Sanchez-Ku, M.L., & Arthur, Jr. W. (2000). A dyadic protocol for training complex skills: A replication using female participants. Human Factors, 42(3), 512-520. See Resource details
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