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Evidence for an Issue 9 pieces of evidence for this issue.

pilots may be out of the loop (Issue #2) - Pilots may be out of the control loop and peripheral to the actual operation of the aircraft and therefore not prepared to assume control when necessary.

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  2. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "Once the pilots did detect the turn, they spent the next several minutes trying to determine the nature of their navigation difficulty and then correct the problem. This incident is typical of the out-of-the-loop performance problem that has been noted to occur with automated systems. Not only did it take the pilots some time to figure out there was a problem, they also were sufficiently out-of-the-loop such that they had significant difficulty in ascertaining just how they ended up in that position (to understand what the current system state actually was) and trying to figure out how to rectify it. The pilots had significant difficulty in trying to correct the state they found themselves in and their confusion was evident." (page 881)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation and FMS
    Source: Inagaki, T., Takae, Y., & Moray, N. (1999). Automation and human interface for takeoff safety. In R.S. Jensen, B. Cox, J.D. Callister, & R. Lavis (Eds.), Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 402-407. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

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  4. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 19 of the 30 (63%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc2 pilots may be out of the loop
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  6. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 9 of the 30 (30%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc2 pilots may be out of the loop
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  8. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "The Safety Board concludes that one of the causal factors of the accident was the captain's reliance on the autopilot while the airplane was decelerating. During this 3 minute 40 second period, the captain allowed himself to remain removed from the `control loop' by leaving the autopilot engaged. As a result, he was not aware of the increasing control inputs required to maintain level flight." (page 30)
    Strength: +5
    Aircraft: B747-SP-09
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot
    Source: National Transportation Safety Board (1986). China Airlines B-747-SP, 300 NM Northwest of San Francisco, February 19, 1985. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-86-03. Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board. See Resource details

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  10. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: Had the pilots been flying the airplane manually (without the autopilot engaged) they likely would have noted the increased right-wing-down control wheel force needed to maintain the desired left bank, become aware of the airplane’s altered performance characteristics, and increased their airspeed or otherwise altered their flight situation to avoid the loss of control. Disengagement of the autopilot during all operations in icing conditions is necessary to enable pilots to sense the aerodynamic effects of icing and enhance their ability to retain control of the airplane. (page 178)
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: Embraer EMB-120RT
    Equipment:
    Source: National Transportation Safety Board (1998). In-Flight Icing Encounter and Uncontrolled Collision with Terrain, COMAIR Flight 3272, Embraer EMB-120RT, N265CA, Monroe, Michigan, January 9, 1997. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-98/04. Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board. See Resource details

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  12. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: Because the pilots of Comair flight 3272 were operating the airplane with the autopilot engaged during a series of descents, right and left turns, power adjustments, and airspeed reductions, they might not have perceived the airplane’s gradually deteriorating performance. (page 145)
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: Embraer EMB-120RT
    Equipment:
    Source: National Transportation Safety Board (1998). In-Flight Icing Encounter and Uncontrolled Collision with Terrain, COMAIR Flight 3272, Embraer EMB-120RT, N265CA, Monroe, Michigan, January 9, 1997. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-98/04. Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board. See Resource details

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  14. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: Require all operators of turbopropeller-driven air carrier airplanes to require pilots to disengage the autopilot and fly the airplane manually when they activate the anti-ice systems. (A-98-97) (page 183)
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: Embraer EMB-120RT
    Equipment:
    Source: National Transportation Safety Board (1998). In-Flight Icing Encounter and Uncontrolled Collision with Terrain, COMAIR Flight 3272, Embraer EMB-120RT, N265CA, Monroe, Michigan, January 9, 1997. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-98/04. Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board. See Resource details

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  16. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Pilots noted that automation requires more self-discipline -- it 'makes things too easy,' and they may find themselves in 'traps' that lead to accidents and incidents. In glass cockpits, it is easier to be 'drawn in' and lose sight of the aircraft; that is, it is easier to become a 'spectator' and lose awareness of ongoing operations." (page 6)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Rudisill, M. (1995). Line Pilots' Attitudes About and Experience With Flight Deck Automation: Results of an International Survey and Proposed Guidelines. In R.S. Jensen, & L.A. Rakovan (Eds.), Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Columbus, Ohio, April 24-27, 1995, 288-293. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

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  18. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "As for safety, many of the crews [surveyed in this study] expressed the view that automation may have gone too far, that they felt they were often 'out of the loop', probably meaning that they tended to lose situational awareness, and that they feared that automation led to complacency , a term used repeatedly in interviews and questionnaires in this study." (page 170)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details
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