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Evidence for an Issue 14 pieces of evidence for this issue.

company automation policies and procedures may be inappropriate or inadequate (Issue #166) - Company policies and procedures for the use of automation may be inappropriate or inadequate in some circumstances, possibly compelling pilots to use automation when they prefer not to and/or leading to pilot confusion or frustration.

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  2. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Whilst the pilots we have talked to did not report mode reversions, they reported many situations in which to make decisions as to what parts of the automated systems to use when, as a prominent aspect in pilots’ tasks. For example, situational factors often require the use of less sophisticated equipment (e.g. adverse weather conditions, landings, Air Traffic Control (ATC) giving headings), or pilots may need to decide when the automated systems cannot cope: P1: “But invariably on every flight the route is changed to some degree by ATC ... even to a point where you disconnect it from the FMS and fly in another mode.” P2: “On our descent they changed the runway three times ... for some reason we didn’t change the frequencies [the third time]. We came in ... looked from a distance... thought ‘this is wrong’... so we knocked off the autopilot.” P2: “Sometimes you have situations where you know the plane is supposed to turn at 4 miles and if it doesn’t then, because it’s so much easier to use the automated system to fly this departure, you’ll find the pilot will sit there and go like, ‘OK, I’ll give it a little more time’.” P2: “[in bad weather]... what you do is you take off the height control... A lot of up- and downdrafts ... can confuse the sensors... If it bobs up and down, you don’t have the autopilot fighting it. But that’s not a company procedure.” P2: “...due to traffic etc. they can’t descend you ... you now find that the system is telling you ‘top of descent’ but you have to ignore it ...suddenly the controller announces to you that you are cleared to descend... Now ... you have to close the throttles and pull out the spoilers, the speed breaks, which gives you the right maximum rate of descent, and in most of the times the autopilot cannot comprehend what is going on ... you have to knock off the descent mode and descent it yourself at the very high rates, and when you’re closer to your level you put it back on ... for the 727 you definitely have to remove the descent mode, in the Learjet you go to speed. ” (page 3)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (2004). Should Computers Function as Collaborators?. In Proceedings of HCI-Aero 2004 held in Toulouse, France September 29, 2004 to 1 October 2004. See Resource details

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  4. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the questionnaire data: "31% ... agreed to some degree that they 'use automatic devices mainly because the company wants me to' (#35)" while 43% slightly or strongly disagreed with the statement and 27% neither agreed nor disagreed. (page 21)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. NASA Technical Memorandum 86659, 1-68. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  6. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the questionnaire data: "31% ... agreed to some degree that they 'use automatic devices mainly because the company wants me to' (#35)" while 43% slightly or strongly disagreed with the statement, and 27% neither agreed nor disagreed. (page 21)
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. NASA Technical Memorandum 86659, 1-68. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  8. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: "The question arises as to why crews are reluctant to use automation levels other than the FMC. In at least one case, the reason was obvious. The captain insisted that the first officer use the FMC because the company's policy was always to use it." (page 4.9)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Eldredge, D., Mangold, S., & Dodd, R.S. (1992). A Review and Discussion of Flight Management System Incidents Reported to the Aviation Safety Reporting System. Final Report DOT/FAA/RD-92/2. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration. See Resource details

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  10. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the survey data: "I use the automation mainly because my company wants me to." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 3=Neutral, 5=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 2.38 and the standard deviation was 0.88. (page 20)
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B757 & B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Hutchins, E., Holder, B., & Hayward, M. (1999). Pilot Attitudes Toward Automation. Web published at http://hci.ucsd.edu/hutchins/attitudes/index.html. See Resource details

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  12. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the survey data: "I use automation mainly because it helps me get the job done." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 3=Neutral, 5=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 3.84 and the standard deviation was 0.76. (page 21)
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: B757 & B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Hutchins, E., Holder, B., & Hayward, M. (1999). Pilot Attitudes Toward Automation. Web published at http://hci.ucsd.edu/hutchins/attitudes/index.html. See Resource details

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  14. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 12 of the 30 (40%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc159 use may be required by company
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  16. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 9 of the 30 (30%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc159 use may be required by company
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  18. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 32: "I use automatic devices mainly because the company wants me to." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 25=Disagree, 50=Neither agree nor disagree, 75=Agree, and 100=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 36 and the standard deviation was 23. The minimum response was 1 and the maximum was 100. (page 46, 59)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: atuomation
    Source: Morters, K. (1988). B767 Flightdeck Automation Research. Research Paper 32:420, 1-141. See Resource details

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  20. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 32: "I use automatic devices mainly because the company wants me to." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 25=Disagree, 50=Neither agree nor disagree, 75=Agree, and 100=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 36 and the standard deviation was 23. The minimum response was 1 and the maximum was 100. (page 46, 59)
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Morters, K. (1988). B767 Flightdeck Automation Research. Research Paper 32:420, 1-141. See Resource details

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  22. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "2. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 2.1 Analysis ... Although formal training provided adequate opportunity to become familiar with this new concept of aircraft control [control wheel steering], operational experience was limited by company policy. Company operational procedures did not permit operation of the aircraft in CWS; they required all operations to be conducted in the command modes. This restriction might have compromised the ability of pilots to use and understand the unique CWS features of the new autopilot." (page 14-21)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: L1011
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot
    Source: National Transportation Safety Board (1973). Eastern Airlines, Incorporated, L-1011, N31OEA, Miami, Florida, December 29, 1972. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-73-14. Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board. See Resource details

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  24. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Another issue found was that airlines use different Standard Operating Procedures. Some prescribe the use of automatic systems whereas other leave it to the discretion of the crew. The overall trend is to use the automatic systems. This strategy is fuelled by the fact that automatic systems allow more economic flight handling. The reliability and performance of these systems is also an important consideration. An example is the increase of the prescriptive nature of auto pilot usage in non-normal and/or emergency conditions. However, 34% of the pilots also reported that the use of some autopilot modes were prohibited by their airline, again indicating that airlines use the aircraft differently than initially designed for and make a selective use of the original design capabilities."
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot
    Source: Sherman, P.J., Helmreich, R.L., & Merritt, A. (1997). National culture and flight deck automation: Results of a multination survey. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 7(4), 311-329. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  26. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 8: "I use the automation mainly because my company wants me to." From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, only 9% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, only 11% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statemen while 66% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and 68% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 25% in Phase 1 and 21% in Phase 2. (page 162)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  28. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "P8 ['I use the automation mainly because my company wants me to.' From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, only 9% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, only 11% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement while 66% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and 68% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 25% in Phase 1 and 21% in Phase 2.] and P29 ['I use automation mainly because it helps me get the job done.' From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, 62% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, 70% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement while only 15% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and only 14% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 23% in Phase 1 and 16% in Phase 2.] were designed to look into the motivation to use automation, and should be examined jointly. Clearly these probes indicate that the crews turn to automation not because it is expected of them, but because they view it as positively as a means of getting their job done." (page 165)
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details
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