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Evidence for an Issue 11 pieces of evidence for this issue.

automation may not work well under unusual conditions (Issue #150) - Automation may work well under normal conditions but, due to design limitations, not have the desired behavior under unusual conditions, such as those close to the margins of its operating envelope. This can lead to unsafe conditions.

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  2. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: "From these reports, it is clear that the current FMSs have not been designed for optimal use under all circumstances, by the flight crew, in the environment where ATC is heavily burdened and expects pilots to remain flexible and responsive to their changing needs of moving traffic." (page 5.1)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Eldredge, D., Mangold, S., & Dodd, R.S. (1992). A Review and Discussion of Flight Management System Incidents Reported to the Aviation Safety Reporting System. Final Report DOT/FAA/RD-92/2. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration. See Resource details

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  4. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "2.2.3 Flight preparation by the crew ... The training given to the pilots emphasized all the protections from which the A320 benefits with respect to its lift which could have given them the feeling, which indeed is justified, of increased safety. In particular, the demonstration of the activation of the safety features and protection of this aircraft may lead one to consider flight approaching one of the limitations (especially the one related to angle of attack) as a foreseeable flight condition since lift is guaranteed. ... The choice to inhibit the automatic go-around protection (Alpha Floor) resulted from the need to eliminate this protection if flight at 100 feet or above is planned at an angle of attack higher than the one activating this protection. The inhibition in this case can only be achieved in practice by pressing and holding the two switches placed on the throttles. After 30 seconds, inhibition becomes permanent for the rest of the flight. This decision is compatible with the objectives expressed by the Captain to maintain a height of 100 feet and seems to confirm that the incursion below 100 feet was not considered by him at this stage. In effect, below 100 feet, this protection is not active." (page 50-52)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: A320
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Investigation Commission of Ministry of Transport - France (1989). Final report concerning the accident which occurred on June 26th 1988 at Mulhouse-Habsheim (68) to the Airbus A 320, registered F-GFKC. Ministry of Planning, Housing, Transport and Maritime Affairs. See Resource details

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  6. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 21 of the 30 (70%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc125 design specifications may be inadequate
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  8. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 16 of the 30 (53%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc120 automation operation may be based on few variables
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  10. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 13 of the 30 (43%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc150 automation performance may be reduced at margins of envelope
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  12. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 3 of the 30 (10%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc120 automation operation may be based on few variables
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  14. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 8 of the 30 (27%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc150 automation performance may be reduced at margins of envelope
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  16. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "3. Conclusions ... 3.1 Findings ... B. Aircraft ... 3. The aircraft automatics comprises, for basic landing configuration if the aircraft [sic] ..., the programme which subjects actuation of all braking devices to some specific conditions. Ground spoilers, when selected, will extend provided that either shock absorbers are compressed at both main landing gears ..., or wheel speed [sic] are above 72 kts at both main landing gears. Engine reversers, when selected, will deploy provided that shock absorbers are compressed at both main landing gears. ... D. Crew ... 6. The steering technique applied in the course of aircraft landing in the touchdown phase utilized the lateral bank as a countermeasure to balance lateral wind component. It resulted in touchdown on one main undercarriage leg only and in false impression on the part of the crew that touchdown was efficient. In reality the immediate start of operation of braking devices was not possible." (page 42)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: A320-211
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Main Commission Aircraft Accident Investigation - Poland (1994). Report on the accident to Airbus A320-211 Aircraft in Warsaw on 14 September 1993. See Resource details

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  18. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "3. CONCLUSIONS 3.1 Findings ... 2. Thrust from all three engines was at an autothrottle limiting value for several minutes during which pitch and attitude increased and airspeed decreased. ... 6. The autopilot commanded an increasing angle of attack while attempting to maintain a preselected vertical speed which exceeded the limit thrust performance capability of the aircraft at higher altitudes." (page 22)
    Strength: +5
    Aircraft: DC10
    Equipment: autoflight
    Source: National Transportation Safety Board (1980). Aeromexico DC-10-30 over Luxembourg, November 11, 1979. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-80-10. Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board. See Resource details

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  20. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "3. CONCLUSIONS 3.1 Findings ... 10. The lateral control deflections required to maintain level flight under conditions of thrust asymmetry and decreasing airspeed exceeded the limits of the autopilot's lateral control authority, causing the airplane to roll and yaw to the right. The captain lost control of the airplane when, after disengaging the autopilot, he failed to make the proper flight control corrections to recover the airplane." (page 33-34)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: B747-SP
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot
    Source: National Transportation Safety Board (1986). China Airlines B-747-SP, 300 NM Northwest of San Francisco, February 19, 1985. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-86-03. Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board. See Resource details

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  22. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: In our review of 282 automation-related ASRS incident reports, we found 1 reports (<1%) supporting issue150 (automation may not work well under unusual conditions).
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Owen, G. & Funk, K. (1997). Flight Deck Automation Issues: Incident Report Analysis. http://www.flightdeckautomation.com/incidentstudy/incident-analysis.aspx. Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University, Department of Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering. See Resource details
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