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Evidence for an Issue 9 pieces of evidence for this issue.

mode selection may be incorrect (Issue #145) - Pilots may inadvertently select the wrong automation mode or fail to engage the selected mode, possibly causing the automation to behave in ways different than intended or expected.

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  2. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "ANALYSIS ... When the captain took over the controls, he put his right hand on the throttle levers. According to the DFDR the go-around mode was activated at the height of approximately 120 ft which must indicate that the captain or first officer pushed at least one of the two TOGA buttons on the thrust levers. The captain told he had no intention to make a go around. No signs of go-around can be seen in the DFDR elevator control data. According to the investigation commission the TOGA button push must have been unintentional or a so called substitution error ie. [in sic] either pilot has intended to switch off the autothrottle but has selected the TOGA button." (page 38)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: DC-9-83
    Equipment: autoflight: autothrottle
    Source: Council of State appointed investigation commission - Finland (1996). Aircraft accident at Kajaani Airport, Finland, 3. November 1994. DC-9-83 registered as F-GHED operated by Air Liberte Tunisie. Translation of the Finnish original report. Helsinki: Multiprint. See Resource details

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  4. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 20 of the 30 (67%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc145 mode selection may be incorrect
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  6. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 3 of the 30 (10%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc145 mode selection may be incorrect
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  8. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "3 FINDINGS: ... xxix) The aircraft during approach never went to the speed mode which is the proper mode for landing and one of the Flight Directors remained engaged till the time the aircraft crashed. If Capt. Gopujkar [PF] would have also disengaged his Flight Director when Capt. Fernandez [PNF] disengaged his Flight Director 21 seconds prior to the crash, the speed mode would have been activated and engine power would have started building up from that instant to restore the speed and the accident could have possibly been averted." (page 61)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: A320
    Equipment: autoflight
    Source: Ministry of Civil Aviation - India (1990). Report on Accident to Indian Airlines Airbus A-320 Aircraft VT-EPN at Bangalore, February 14, 1990. Ministry of Civil Aviation, Government of India. See Resource details

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  10. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "The Safety Board thus concludes that the crew erred in both their actions and recollections regarding the AP mode selection. It is probable that the flightcrew did begin, or intended to begin, the climb with the ATS N1 mode/AP IAS mode selections. However, when the captain selected 320 kn into the ATS speed window he may have either intentionally or unintentionally pulled the ATS speed selector knob. This action would have changed the ATS selection from the N1 mode to the airspeed mode. This in turn would have caused the AP IAS Hold mode to disengage and revert automatically to the vertical speed mode of operation. In any case, the DFDR indicates that the AP was in the vertical speed mode from about 16,000 ft upward. ... 3. Conclusions ... 3.1 Findings ... 6. The autopilot commanded an increasing angle of attack while attempting to maintain a preselected vertical speed which exceeded the limit thrust performance capability of the aircraft at higher altitudes." (page 21-22)
    Strength: +5
    Aircraft: DC10-30
    Equipment: autoflight
    Source: National Transportation Safety Board (1980). Aeromexico DC-10-30 over Luxembourg, November 11, 1979. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-80-10. Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board. See Resource details

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  12. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: In our review of 282 automation-related ASRS incident reports, we found 1 reports (<1%) supporting issue145 (mode selection may be incorrect).
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Owen, G. & Funk, K. (1997). Flight Deck Automation Issues: Incident Report Analysis. http://www.flightdeckautomation.com/incidentstudy/incident-analysis.aspx. Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University, Department of Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering. See Resource details

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  14. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "Expedite climb. During climb-out. Pilots were cleared to climb and maintain 12,000 feet and to cross the waypoint Ventura at or below 10,000 feet. Upon reaching approximately 4000 feet, they were given the instruction to expedite their climb through 9000 feet for traffic separation. Pilots had several automation options to choose from in order to comply with this clearance. Eleven pilots used the EXPEDITE button on the FCU to engage this mode. Also, 5 pilots selected a lower airspeed on the FCU to make the airplane climb at a higher rate. The remaining 2 pilots used the vertical speed mode and dialed in a higher-than-normal rate of climb on the FCU. In the debriefing, 7 pilots were asked why they did not use the EXPEDITE mode, which was designed for this type of situation. They responded that they did not like the fact that in this mode, the automation would drastically increase the pitch angle and slow the aircraft more than they felt was necessary. In addition, some pilots knew about and disliked the fact that the EXPEDITE mode would not honor any preprogrammed constraints. Only 11 pilots (61%) complied with the altitude constraint at the waypoint Ventura. The other 7 pilots did remember to resume “normal climb” upon reaching 9000 feet, but they selected the “open climb” mode (instead of “managed vertical navigation”), which, similar to the EXPEDITE mode, does not honor constraints programmed into the MCDU." (page 397)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: A320
    Equipment: automation & FMS
    Source: Sanchez-Ku, M.L., & Arthur, Jr. W. (2000). A dyadic protocol for training complex skills: A replication using female participants. Human Factors, 42(3), 512-520. See Resource details

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  16. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "Expedite climb. During climb-out. Pilots were cleared to climb and maintain 12,000 feet and to cross the waypoint Ventura at or below 10,000 feet. Upon reaching approximately 4000 feet, they were given the instruction to expedite their climb through 9000 feet for traffic separation. Pilots had several automation options to choose from in order to comply with this clearance. Eleven pilots used the EXPEDITE button on the FCU to engage this mode. Also, 5 pilots selected a lower airspeed on the FCU to make the airplane climb at a higher rate. The remaining 2 pilots used the vertical speed mode and dialed in a higher-than-normal rate of climb on the FCU. In the debriefing, 7 pilots were asked why they did not use the EXPEDITE mode, which was designed for this type of situation. They responded that they did not like the fact that in this mode, the automation would drastically increase the pitch angle and slow the aircraft more than they felt was necessary. In addition, some pilots knew about and disliked the fact that the EXPEDITE mode would not honor any preprogrammed constraints. Only 11 pilots (61%) complied with the altitude constraint at the waypoint Ventura. The other 7 pilots did remember to resume “normal climb” upon reaching 9000 feet, but they selected the “open climb” mode (instead of “managed vertical navigation”), which, similar to the EXPEDITE mode, does not honor constraints programmed into the MCDU." (page 397)
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: A320
    Equipment: automation & FMS
    Source: Sanchez-Ku, M.L., & Arthur, Jr. W. (2000). A dyadic protocol for training complex skills: A replication using female participants. Human Factors, 42(3), 512-520. See Resource details

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  18. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "Another interesting result refers to failures to engage or re-engage a mode after entering (new) target values into either the MCP or the CDU. This omission occurred at least once during the scenario for 5 of the 6 transitioning pilots (the total number of omissions for this group was 9). Only two of the 14 [14 %] experienced pilots forgot to engage an appropriate mode, and this occurred only once for each of them. The problem occurred four times in regard to the LNAV mode, six times with respect to the VNAV mode and once concerning the LVL CHG mode." [7 of 20 pilots = 35% made an omission] (page 18-20)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS & autoflight
    Source: Sarter, N.B. & Woods, D.D. (1994). Pilot interaction with cockpit automation II: An experimental study of pilot's model and awareness of the Flight Management System. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 4(1), 1-28. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details
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