FDAI logo   ::  Site Map  ::   
Home  |  About This Website  |  Contact Us
Home » ... » Evidence for an Issue

Evidence for an Issue 48 pieces of evidence for this issue.

training may be inadequate (Issue #133) - Training philosophy, objectives, methods, materials, or equipment may be inadequate to properly train pilots for safe and effective automated aircraft operation.

  1.  
  2. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "2. ANALYSIS ... 2.5 Automation ... Aeronautica Civil believes that the circumstances of this accident demonstrate the need for airlines to revise the procedures used to operate FMS-equipped aircraft, and the training they provide to pilots in the application of those procedures. Giving pilots information on the FMS sufficient to pass a flight test, and relying on sustained use of the equipment thereafter to gain fluency in its use is counter to safe operating practices. Therefore, Aeronautica Civil urges the FAA to evaluate the curricula and flight check requirements used to train and certificate pilots to operate FMS-equipped aircraft, and revise the curricula and flight check requirements to assure that pilots are fully knowledgeable in the logic underlying the FMS or similar aircraft computer system before being granted airman certification to operate the aircraft." (page 46)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: B757-223
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Aeronautica Civil of the Republic of Colombia (1996). Controlled Flight Into Terrain, American Airlines Flight 965, Boeing 757-223, N651AA, Near Cali, Colombia, December 20, 1995. Santafe de Bogota, DC, Colombia: Aeronautica Civil of the Republic of Colombia. See Resource details

  3.  
  4. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "A last factor which may have influenced this crew's behavior, given the stressful nature of the events, is the flight simulator training which they would have experienced. In the simulator virtually all engine problems result in an engine shutdown. Since this crew would have been under both practical and psychological pressure to come up with a programme of action, it cannot be regarded as surprising that the actions they embarked upon were those they had practised in the flight simulator. 2.1.4 Flight crew training The performance of flight crews in emergency situations may be regarded as a product of their natural ability and their training. It is possible to identify three aspects of the circumstances of this accident where a different pattern of training could have favourably influenced to outcome. The ability of the pilots to extract information from the EIS must be questioned, and so must the apparent lack of coordination between the flight deck and the cabin crew. The most important issue, however, concerns the preparation of pilots generally to cope with unforeseen situations which are not covered in their emergency checklists. ... No EIS equipped flight simulator was available at that stage and so the first few flights of pilots who were new to the EIS system were supervised under normal line checking procedures. The result of this pattern of training was that the first time that a pilot was likely to see abnormal indications on the EIS was in-flight in an aircraft with a failing engine." (page 108)
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: B737-400
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Air Accident Investigation Branch, Department of Transport - England (1990). Report on the accident to Boeing 737-400 G-OBME near Kegworth, Leicestershire on 8 January 1989; British Midlands Ltd; AAIB Report 4/90. AAIB Report 4/90. London: Department of Transport. See Resource details

  5.  
  6. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Several of the pilots would have liked more training with the AFDS and Mode Control Panel." (page 17)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: autoflight
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. NASA Technical Memorandum 86659, 1-68. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  7.  
  8. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "When asked on the questionnaire what material they wanted more or less of in training, the strongest responses were requests for: more FMS and CDU training (in general); more 'hands on' experience and training with the FMS/CDU; more line-oriented CDU experiences; and less nonoperational CDU material." (page 26)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: FMS CDU
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. NASA Technical Memorandum 86659, 1-68. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  9.  
  10. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "... questionnaire respondents asked for some instruction on computer concepts." one respondent stated " 'Ground school should not teach just function of the CDU/computers, but a philosophy of computer applications and programming as applicable to our aircraft.' " (page 29)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: FMS CDU
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. NASA Technical Memorandum 86659, 1-68. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  11.  
  12. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "... questionnaire respondents asked for some instruction on computer concepts." one respondent stated " 'From what I've seen so far, we could use a bit more emphasis on the 'background' of some of the automatics to better able a crew to understand what's happening or not happening when things don't go as programmed...' " (page 29)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. NASA Technical Memorandum 86659, 1-68. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  13.  
  14. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "The tendency for some pilots to program a recovery, and not 'turn it off',' was also confirmed by interviews and discussions with line training pilots and check airmen. It does not appear to be a fascination with the new equipment. Instead, it appears to be a habit learned during simulator training and most line training, where the instructor's job is to ensure that the student learns the operation of the automatic equipment. It seems to be taken for granted that the student knows there is an airplane behind the panel, and the student knows when to turn it all off." (page 30)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. NASA Technical Memorandum 86659, 1-68. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  15.  
  16. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Four of the pilots [4%] felt their training was adequate and did not require any changes." (page 16)
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. NASA Technical Memorandum 86659, 1-68. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  17.  
  18. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "It was apparent from the performances of many of the pilots and from the posttest interviews that the GA pilot population would benefit greatly from training, particularly if it contained both procedures for responding to identifiable malfunctions and a thorough explanation of the workings of the AP system and its interaction with and use of the elevator trim (conceptual model development). Such an effort should lead to a reduction in the frequency of misdiagnoses. Training could also help pilots differentiate between malfunctions that may be safe to fly through (i.e., failure of AP to hold heading) and those that should receive an immediate disconnect." (page 172)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot
    Source: Damos, D.L., John, R.S., & Lyall, E.A. (1999). Changes in pilot activities with increasing automation. In R.S. Jensen, B. Cox, J.D. Callister, & R. Lavis (Eds.), Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 810-815. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

  19.  
  20. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: "Although none of the reports dealt with training directly, many cited training as a factor in the incident's occurence (see Table 4-2). Many of these pilots reported that they did not have a good understanding the of [in sic] underlying logic and limitations of the FMS, and seemed to become easily confused and overloaded in high workload situations, when they continued to try and program the FMS. From the perspective offered by these reports, it appears that current pilot training does not accurately reflect real world needs in using the FMS relative to ATC requirements and the resulting high workload." Table 4-2 lists three Associated Incident Events and Precursors, one of which being "Training/flight crew proficiency related errors/performance problems". Out of the total of 99 citations, 12 (12%) of them were Training/flight crew proficiency related errors/performance problems. (page 4.23)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Eldredge, D., Mangold, S., & Dodd, R.S. (1992). A Review and Discussion of Flight Management System Incidents Reported to the Aviation Safety Reporting System. Final Report DOT/FAA/RD-92/2. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration. See Resource details

  21.  
  22. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the survey data: "Training for my current aircraft was as adequate as any training I have had." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 3=Neutral, 5=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 3.46 and the standard deviation was 1.13. (page 21)
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: B757 & B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Hutchins, E., Holder, B., & Hayward, M. (1999). Pilot Attitudes Toward Automation. Web published at http://hci.ucsd.edu/hutchins/attitudes/index.html. See Resource details

  23.  
  24. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "Conclusions ... Improvements in training and procedures were also suggested by some of the pilots. For example, pilots frequently called out altitudes, DME distances and vertical speeds, but did not have a standard protocol for cross-checking these values with those selected on the Mode Control Panel." (page 21)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: A320
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Johnson, E.N. & Pritchett, A.R. (1995). Experimental Study Of Vertical Flight Path Mode Awareness. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics. See Resource details

  25.  
  26. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 15 of the 30 (50%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc133 training may be inadequate
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  27.  
  28. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 17 of the 30 (57%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc113 training requirements may neglect automation
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  29.  
  30. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 15 of the 30 (50%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc118 automation management training may be lacking
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  31.  
  32. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 14 of the 30 (47%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc67 training philosophy may be lacking
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  33.  
  34. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 2 of the 30 (7%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc118 automation management training may be lacking
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  35.  
  36. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 4 of the 30 (13%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc113 training requirements may neglect automation
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  37.  
  38. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 5 of the 30 (17%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc133 training may be inadequate
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  39.  
  40. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 9 of the 30 (30%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc67 training philosophy may be lacking
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  41.  
  42. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "It is recognized that the CAP and the F/O completed classroom, simulator and flight training based on the training syllabus prepared by China Airlines in accordance with Taiwanese civil aviation laws. However, it is recognized that this training was not necessarily sufficient to understand the sophisticated and complicated AFS system." (page 3.44)
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: A300B4-622R
    Equipment: autoflight
    Source: Ministry of Transport Japan, Aircraft Accident Investigation Commission (1996). China Airlines Airbus Industrie A300B4-622R, B1816, Nagoya Airport, April 26, 1994. Report 96-5. Ministry of Transport. See Resource details

  43.  
  44. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Question 6: "What is your opinion of the B767 training package?" ... "In general, the responses from the pilots was that the course is good. Thirty four pilots [out of 65, 52%] rated the course from 'okay' to 'excellent', however, 11 of these pilots were critical of some aspect of the course. A further 29 pilots [45%] expressed concern about the course. Generally, they considered the course only covered the 'bare basics' rather than provide an indepth understanding of the systems." That is 11 + 29 = 40 pilots (62%) had some criticism of the training. (page 75, 106-10)
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Morters, K. (1988). B767 Flightdeck Automation Research. Research Paper 32:420, 1-141. See Resource details

  45.  
  46. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Question 2: "Does the B767 course need restructuring, for example, the time spent on certain systems, order of presentation?" ... "While 24 [out of 65, 37%] of the pilots indicated that the course did not need restructuring, 16 [25%] indicated that the first week of course was too 'crammed, pressurized or demanding'. The rest of the group [25 pilots, 38%] indicated they would like to see some changes made to the course." That is, 41 of the 65 pilots (63%) thought the course needed restructuring. (page 64, 104)
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Morters, K. (1988). B767 Flightdeck Automation Research. Research Paper 32:420, 1-141. See Resource details

  47.  
  48. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Question 5: "Would you like to see any changes to the structure of your simulator continuation training details, for example, more/less emphasis on manual control?" ... "Seven [out of 65, 11%] of the pilots were unable to answer this question as that had only recently converted to the B767 and had not yet had a simulator detail. A further 15 [23%] pilots simply wrote 'no' on their questionnaire. The majority of the pilots however, would like some change made to the details." That is, 43 out of 65 pilots (66%) would like to see some change made. (page 72, 105)
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Morters, K. (1988). B767 Flightdeck Automation Research. Research Paper 32:420, 1-141. See Resource details

  49.  
  50. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Question 4: "Do you believe that the amount of training given for those BASIC handling skills of the automatics is adequate during the B767 conversion course? If your answer is no, would you indicate the areas that more training should be made available." ... "While 23 [out of 65, 35%] of the pilots considered that the training in this area was adequate, an equal number disagreed." That is, 23 out of 65 pilots (35%) disagreed that the training is adequate. "A number of the pilot's comments (19)[29%], cited the basic training of the FMS/FMC, AFDS and TMS as being inadequate." (page 69, 105)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Morters, K. (1988). B767 Flightdeck Automation Research. Research Paper 32:420, 1-141. See Resource details

  51.  
  52. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 8: "The current training package directs itself sufficiently to specific system failures that may occur." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 25=Disagree, 50=Neither agree nor disagree, 75=Agree, and 100=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 55 and the standard deviation was 25. The minimum response was 1 and the maximum was 100. (page 45, 47)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Morters, K. (1988). B767 Flightdeck Automation Research. Research Paper 32:420, 1-141. See Resource details

  53.  
  54. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "...they [the pilots] did not believe that the course spent enough time on the 'basic' modes of the flight guidance system (No 13)." ... Statement 13: "The conversion course didn't spend enough time on 'basic modes' of the F.G.S." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 25=Disagree, 50=Neither agree nor disagree, 75=Agree, and 100=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 54 and the standard deviation was 25. The minimum response was 1 and the maximum was 100. (page 45, 48)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: autoflight
    Source: Morters, K. (1988). B767 Flightdeck Automation Research. Research Paper 32:420, 1-141. See Resource details

  55.  
  56. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 16: "After the conversion course, the B767 flight director was still a mystery." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 25=Disagree, 50=Neither agree nor disagree, 75=Agree, and 100=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 30 and the standard deviation was 24. The minimum response was 1 and the maximum was 79. (page 45, 48)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Morters, K. (1988). B767 Flightdeck Automation Research. Research Paper 32:420, 1-141. See Resource details

  57.  
  58. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Question 5: "Would you like to see any changes to the structure of your simulator continuation training details, for example, more/less emphasis on manual control?" ... "Seven [out of 65, 11%] of the pilots were unable to answer this question as that had only recently converted to the B767 and had not yet had a simulator detail. A further 15 [23%] pilots simply wrote 'no' on their questionnaire. The majority of the pilots however, would like some change made to the details." That is, 43 out of 65 pilots (66%) would like to see some change made. (page 72, 105)
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Morters, K. (1988). B767 Flightdeck Automation Research. Research Paper 32:420, 1-141. See Resource details

  59.  
  60. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 8: "The current training package directs itself sufficiently to specific system failures that may occur." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 25=Disagree, 50=Neither agree nor disagree, 75=Agree, and 100=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 55 and the standard deviation was 25. The minimum response was 1 and the maximum was 100. (page 45, 47)
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Morters, K. (1988). B767 Flightdeck Automation Research. Research Paper 32:420, 1-141. See Resource details

  61.  
  62. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Question 6: "What is your opinion of the B767 training package?" ... "In general, the responses from the pilots was that the course is good. Thirty four pilots [out of 65, 52%] rated the course from 'okay' to 'excellent', however, 11 of these pilots were critical of some aspect of the course. A further 29 pilots [45%] expressed concern about the course. Generally, they considered the course only covered the 'bare basics' rather than provide an indepth understanding of the systems." (page 75, 106-10)
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Morters, K. (1988). B767 Flightdeck Automation Research. Research Paper 32:420, 1-141. See Resource details

  63.  
  64. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Question 4: "Do you believe that the amount of training given for those BASIC handling skills of the automatics is adequate during the B767 conversion course? If your answer is no, would you indicate the areas that more training should be made available." ... "While 23 [out of 65, 35%] of the pilots considered that the training in this area was adequate, an equal number disagreed." That is, 23 out of 65 pilots (35%) disagreed that the training is adequate. "A number of the pilot's comments (19)[29%], cited the basic training of the FMS/FMC, AFDS and TMS as being inadequate." (page 69, 105)
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Morters, K. (1988). B767 Flightdeck Automation Research. Research Paper 32:420, 1-141. See Resource details

  65.  
  66. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Question 2: "Does the B767 course need restructuring, for example, the time spent on certain systems, order of presentation?" ... "While 24 [out of 65, 37%] of the pilots indicated that the course did not need restructuring, 16 [25%] indicated that the first week of course was too 'crammed, pressurized or demanding'. The rest of the group [25 pilots, 38%] indicated they would like to see some changes made to the course." That is, 41 of the 65 pilots (63%) thought the course needed restructuring. (page 64, 104)
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Morters, K. (1988). B767 Flightdeck Automation Research. Research Paper 32:420, 1-141. See Resource details

  67.  
  68. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 16: "After the conversion course, the B767 flight director was still a mystery." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 25=Disagree, 50=Neither agree nor disagree, 75=Agree, and 100=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 30 and the standard deviation was 24. The minimum response was 1 and the maximum was 79. (page 45, 48)
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Morters, K. (1988). B767 Flightdeck Automation Research. Research Paper 32:420, 1-141. See Resource details

  69.  
  70. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: In our review of 282 automation-related ASRS incident reports, we found 7 reports (2%) supporting issue133 (training may be inadequate).
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Owen, G. & Funk, K. (1997). Flight Deck Automation Issues: Incident Report Analysis. http://www.flightdeckautomation.com/incidentstudy/incident-analysis.aspx. Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University, Department of Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering. See Resource details

  71.  
  72. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: Table 2 summarizes the "descriptive factors assigned to altitude-deviation reports" from traditional cockpits and glass cockpits. In the traditional cockpit, 10 out of 50 (20%) reports suggested that training was a factor in the incident and in the glass cockpit, 34 out of 50 (68%) reports suggested that training was a factor in the incident. (page 7)
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Palmer, E.A., Hutchins, E.L., Ritter, R.D., & VanCleemput, I. (1993). Altitude Deviations: Breakdown of an Error-Tolerant System. NASA Technical Memorandum 108788. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  73.  
  74. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "We asked pilots to rate specific training topics dealing with vertical navigation. For each topic, pilots told us if they felt it was thoroughly taught in the existing courses provided by the company. If they indicated that more training was needed, we asked them to tell us if the training should be part of either the initial or recurrent pilot training courses. Responses indicated that pilots had mixed feelings about what needed to be trained above and beyond what was taught in the company programs. Less than one quarter of the pilots felt that the following training topics were adequately covered (Table 5): FMS Speed Logic, understanding PROF (VNAV), interpretation of the Flight Mode Enunciator, and optimal vertical navigation." (page 436)
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: MD11
    Equipment: FMS VNAV
    Source: Parasuraman, R., Mavor, A., Wickens, C.D., Danaher, J.W., & Aalfs, C. (1998). Managing the future national airspace system: Free flight or ground-based control with increased automation (panel session). In Proceedings of the 42nd Annual Meeting of the Human Factors and Ergonomic Society, 62-66. See Resource details

  75.  
  76. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Even more so than the AH-64A pilots, the AH-64D comments asked for an accurate computer simulator or emulator. Representative comments of the AH-64D pilots were: … Need to have a mock up for blind cockpit procedures. Split LCT (SIM) periods so they are not back-to-back to allow discussion. Increase flight line flights to 2.0 instead of 1.4 to allow more interactions of tasks in the A/C [aircraft]. (page 15)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: AH-64D
    Equipment: Other
    Source: Rash, C.E., Adam, G.E., LeDuc, P.A., & Francis, G. (May 6-8, 2003). Pilot Attitudes on Glass and Traditional Cockpits in the U.S. Army's AH-64 Apache Helicopter. Presented at the American Helicopter Society 59th Annual Forum, Phoenix, AZ. American Helicopter Society International, Inc. See Resource details

  77.  
  78. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Even more so than the AH-64A pilots, the AH-64D comments asked for an accurate computer simulator or emulator. Representative comments of the AH-64D pilots were: … We badly need an updated emulator that will work reliably on newer computers, and much greater access to the LCTs [Longbow crew trainer]. (page 15)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: AH-64D
    Equipment: Other
    Source: Rash, C.E., Adam, G.E., LeDuc, P.A., & Francis, G. (May 6-8, 2003). Pilot Attitudes on Glass and Traditional Cockpits in the U.S. Army's AH-64 Apache Helicopter. Presented at the American Helicopter Society 59th Annual Forum, Phoenix, AZ. American Helicopter Society International, Inc. See Resource details

  79.  
  80. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Even more so than the AH-64A pilots, the AH-64D comments asked for an accurate computer simulator or emulator. Representative comments of the AH-64D pilots were: … Need a TSTT [TAD (target acquisition designation system) selected task trainer] type device to practice all MPD ops, which include grip and ORT buttons/switches. (page 15)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: AH-64D
    Equipment: Other
    Source: Rash, C.E., Adam, G.E., LeDuc, P.A., & Francis, G. (May 6-8, 2003). Pilot Attitudes on Glass and Traditional Cockpits in the U.S. Army's AH-64 Apache Helicopter. Presented at the American Helicopter Society 59th Annual Forum, Phoenix, AZ. American Helicopter Society International, Inc. See Resource details

  81.  
  82. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Even more so than the AH-64A pilots, the AH-64D comments asked for an accurate computer simulator or emulator. Representative comments of the AH-64D pilots were: … Have an MPD computer program in the learning center. Create a Longbow TSTT. Have more LCT time; get rid of supplemental course. (page 15)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: AH-64D
    Equipment: Other
    Source: Rash, C.E., Adam, G.E., LeDuc, P.A., & Francis, G. (May 6-8, 2003). Pilot Attitudes on Glass and Traditional Cockpits in the U.S. Army's AH-64 Apache Helicopter. Presented at the American Helicopter Society 59th Annual Forum, Phoenix, AZ. American Helicopter Society International, Inc. See Resource details

  83.  
  84. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Even more so than the AH-64A pilots, the AH-64D comments asked for an accurate computer simulator or emulator. Representative comments of the AH-64D pilots were: … Better, more accurate home computer emulators, or something in the way of a C- WEPT [Cockpit weapons emergency procedure trainer] type device that students can use without having an IP [instructor pilot] there. (page 15)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: AH-64D
    Equipment: Other
    Source: Rash, C.E., Adam, G.E., LeDuc, P.A., & Francis, G. (May 6-8, 2003). Pilot Attitudes on Glass and Traditional Cockpits in the U.S. Army's AH-64 Apache Helicopter. Presented at the American Helicopter Society 59th Annual Forum, Phoenix, AZ. American Helicopter Society International, Inc. See Resource details

  85.  
  86. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Many pilots noted that the initial training program was very difficult and they felt unprepared for their first unsupervised flight. Insufficient information was provided concerning the actual aircraft and its systems, making it difficult to assess potential problems. They wished for more hands-on practice and more simulator time, to consolidate their knowledge." (page 7)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Rudisill, M. (1995). Line Pilots' Attitudes About and Experience With Flight Deck Automation: Results of an International Survey and Proposed Guidelines. In R.S. Jensen, & L.A. Rakovan (Eds.), Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Columbus, Ohio, April 24-27, 1995, 288-293. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

  87.  
  88. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "On average, participants made 3.25 commission errors out of a possible 6 (SD = 1.88), and almost 80% made 2 or more commission errors. An examination of the number of commission errors as a function of crew size, prompts to verify, training, and trial order indicated that only training affected the number of commission errors participants made, f(2,84) = 3.64,P < .05,02 = 08. In other words, 8% of the variance in commission errors could be accounted for by the training manipulation (an effect size that Cohen, 1977, would categorize as above a medium effect size). Tukey tests indicated that the group that was explicitly trained about automation bias and resultant omission and commission errors made fewer commission errors (M= 2.59, SD = 1.72) than either the could-verify training group (M= 3.84, SD = 1.6 1) or the must-verify group (M = 3.3 1, SD = 2.12). (page 93)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: A-320
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Sarter, N.B. (2000). The need for multisensory interfaces in support of highly effective attention allocation in highly dynamic event-driven domains: The case of cockpit automation. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 10(3), 231-245. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  89.  
  90. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "The FMS training that we observed emphasized a bottom-up approach oriented towards proficiency in specific tasks by providing 'recipes' for system operation. The result that most of the difficulties in the corpus [which includes both this study and the study referenced by s0069] involved non-standard situations and complex interactions of FMS subsystems seems to suggest that a top-down approach would be desirable as an addition or complement. If pilots were provided with an overall mental representation of the functional structure of the FMS, they would be better able to manage and utilize the automated systems in unusual or novel situations. Given that their role has shifted towards the detection of deviations from the expected and towards troubleshooting and managing such situations, this capability seems to be very important for pilots in highly automated aircraft." (page 320)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Sarter, N.B. & Woods, D.D. (1992). Pilot interaction with cockpit automation: Operational experiences with the Flight Management System. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 2(4), 303-321. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  91.  
  92. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Over the full range of skills that were investigated, a substantial percentage of the investigated pilot population expressed a need for extra training…ranking of seven different skill groups with respect to need/priority for extra training 1) knowledge of automation 2) decision making 3) crew resource management 4)manual flying 5)determination of appropriate SOP's 6) standard cockpit handling 7)knowledge of SOP's." Note: this information is depicted in table format in the document.
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Sherman, P.J., Helmreich, R.L., & Merritt, A. (1997). National culture and flight deck automation: Results of a multination survey. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 7(4), 311-329. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  93.  
  94. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Fifty eight structured interviews were conducted at a number of European airlines to enable pilots and training instructors to comment on current transition training practices, to give levels of understanding of various automated systems and express their views on automation and related issues. The results suggested inter alia. that specific pre-course preparation is not common, often pilots finish flying their old aircraft, only days before the course starts, limiting their time for preparation. The interviews also suggested that the courses spent very little time on highlighting the differences and similarities between old and new aircraft. Ensuring that pilots are aware of differences, improves the pilots’ knowledge and understanding both during and after the course and reduces risks for negative transfer of habits or strategies." "Pilots attitudes towards the automation were generally positive. Surprises caused by the automation tended to occur especially early after training, as did human errors due to negative transfer. In cases where pilots were surprised, they admitted that it did influence their trust in the aircraft. Comments suggested that a higher level of understanding of systems, better problem solving skills and prioritisation rules to avoid excessive head-down time, could mitigate negative effects of difficult situations."
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Sherman, P.J., Helmreich, R.L., & Merritt, A. (1997). National culture and flight deck automation: Results of a multination survey. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 7(4), 311-329. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  95.  
  96. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Training for the 757 at both airlines in this study was generally considered to be well planned and well conducted. A large number of pilots reported on their questionnaires that 757 school was the best training program they had ever been through." (page 172)
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details
Flight Deck Automation Issues Website  
© 1997-2013 Research Integrations, Inc.