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Evidence for an Issue 24 pieces of evidence for this issue.

pilots may be overconfident in automation (Issue #131) - Pilots may become complacent because they are overconfident in and uncritical of automation, and fail to exercise appropriate vigilance, sometimes to the extent of abdicating responsibility to it. This can lead to unsafe conditions.

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  2. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "2. ANALYSIS ... 2.4 Awareness of Terrain ... the history of flight indicates that the AA965 flightcrew did not effectively use all navigation information that was available to them and that they relied almost exclusively on their EHSI for navigation." (page 38)
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: B757-223
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Aeronautica Civil of the Republic of Colombia (1996). Controlled Flight Into Terrain, American Airlines Flight 965, Boeing 757-223, N651AA, Near Cali, Colombia, December 20, 1995. Santafe de Bogota, DC, Colombia: Aeronautica Civil of the Republic of Colombia. See Resource details

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  4. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Review Study
    Evidence: 4.3.2 The FMS displays a list of possible options, with 'Romeo' at the top. The pilot selects the first option on the list without verifying whether the first listed waypoint is Rozo. Design analysis: The FMS has been given the function to support the pilot in making a selection by displaying the waypoint closest to the current position and route first. The purpose of displaying the list is two-fold in terms of providing support. It aims to stipulate an easy selection, as well as to provide feedback of the systems’ understanding. The information is displayed in the format of coordinates, not waypoint name. Problem analysis: The coordinates are difficult to check for accuracy in the time available since they require comparing with documentation to retrieve the associated name. Complacency and lack of time prevents the pilot from checking the accuracy of the first item on the list through comparing the coordinates. Habit leads to choosing the first displayed waypoint without checking. The fact that Rozo was not in the list at all was not identified. Collaboration analysis: Whilst the system anticipates the pilot’s likely first choice on top of the list, it does not effectively support the pilots’ task in using their active relevant terminology (i.e. the full name of the waypoint). The reliance on the system’s choice encouraged complacency and unjustified trust since experience showed that checking is not necessary. If there is virtually no function in making a choice, then why give the pilot the option to do so? (page 5)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757-223
    Equipment: automation & FMS
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (not dated). Collaboration in the Flightdeck: Opportunities for Interaction Design. Department of Computer Science, University of Bath. Available at http://www.cs.bath.ac.uk/~anneb/collwn.pdf. See Resource details

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  6. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "…In a time critical situation, it appears that the flight crew trusted the automation to carry out its task (fly to the designated point “R”), as it had many times before... In the Cali accident, the fact that the pilots had become loaded with very demanding tasks that required the use of separate, non-integrated sources of information may have contributed to their lack of vigilance in monitoring the automation during the turn." (page 881)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation and FMS
    Source: Inagaki, T., Takae, Y., & Moray, N. (1999). Automation and human interface for takeoff safety. In R.S. Jensen, B. Cox, J.D. Callister, & R. Lavis (Eds.), Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 402-407. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

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  8. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "3 - CONCLUSIONS ... 3.2 - PROBABLE CAUSE ... 3.2.2 - Other Factors The Commission also remarked that the following factors contributed towards placing the crew in a situation that they were not able to fully control: ... - The A320 has new features which may have inspired some overconfidence in the mind of the Captain." (page 60)
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: A320
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Investigation Commission of Ministry of Transport - France (1989). Final report concerning the accident which occurred on June 26th 1988 at Mulhouse-Habsheim (68) to the Airbus A 320, registered F-GFKC. Ministry of Planning, Housing, Transport and Maritime Affairs. See Resource details

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  10. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 24 of the 30 (80%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc003 pilots may become complacent
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  12. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 24 of the 30 (80%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc163 pilots may abdicate responsibility to automation
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  14. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 15 of the 30 (50%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc090 pilots may be uncritical of automation actions
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  16. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 22 of the 30 (73%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc131 pilots may be overconfident in automation
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  18. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 4 of the 30 (13%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc3 pilots may become complacent
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  20. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 3 of the 30 (10%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc131 pilots may be overconfident in automation
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  22. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 3 of the 30 (10%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc163 pilots may abdicate responsibility to automation
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  24. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 8 of the 30 (27%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc090 pilots may be uncritical of automation actions
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  26. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "3 FINDINGS ... 19. Basically alpha floor functioning is built as a protection against wind shear, but the pilots seem to be under the impression that the protection from this system will be available to increase power of the engines in any emergency without any time delay and a false sense of faith has been reposed on this system." (page 39)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: A320
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Ministry of Civil Aviation - India (1990). Report on Accident to Indian Airlines Airbus A-320 Aircraft VT-EPN at Bangalore, February 14, 1990. Ministry of Civil Aviation, Government of India. See Resource details

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  28. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "... there is ... mild agreement that automation induces complacency (No 26...)." ... Statement 26: "Automation induces complacency on the part of the flight crew." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 25=Disagree, 50=Neither agree nor disagree, 75=Agree, and 100=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 55 and the standard deviation was 26. The minimum response was 1 and the maximum was 100. (page 46, 59)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Morters, K. (1988). B767 Flightdeck Automation Research. Research Paper 32:420, 1-141. See Resource details

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  30. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: "The most interesting aspects of the data have to do with the 'cause' of the anomaly ... Crews also cited complacency or lack of vigilance as a factor in 77% of the reports." (page 194)
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Mosier, K.L., Skitka, L.J., & Korte, K.J. (1994). Cognitive and Social Psychological Issues in Flight Crew/Automation Interaction. In Proceedings of the 1st Automation Technology and Human Performance Conference, held in Washington, DC, April 7-9, 1994, 191-197. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers. See Resource details

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  32. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "2. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS ... 2.1 Analysis ... Pilots' testimony indicated that dependence on the reliability and capability of the autopilot is actually greater than anticipated in its early design and certification. This is particularly true in the cruise phase of flight. However, in this phase of flight, the autopilpot is not designed to remain correctly and safely operational without performance degradation, after a significant failure occurs. ... the following took place in this accident: ... 2. The aircraft was flown to a safe altitude, and the autopilot was engaged to reduce workload, but positive delegation of aircraft control was not accomplished." (page 21)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: L1011
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot
    Source: National Transportation Safety Board (1973). Eastern Airlines, Incorporated, L-1011, N31OEA, Miami, Florida, December 29, 1972. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-73-14. Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board. See Resource details

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  34. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "Consequently, the Safety Board can only conclude that the crew's attention must have been diverted from the control of the airplane and from instrument scan soon after engaging the autopilot. Believing that the autopilot was effectively maintaining a satisfactory climb attitude and speed, they probably were surprised at the control column vibration or the onset of stall buffet or a combination of both and consequently misinterpreted these cues as an engine problem." (page 21)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: DC-10-30
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot
    Source: National Transportation Safety Board (1980). Aeromexico DC-10-30 over Luxembourg, November 11, 1979. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-80-10. Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board. See Resource details

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  36. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: In our review of 282 automation-related ASRS incident reports, we found 52 reports (16%) supporting issue131 (pilots may be overconfident in automation).
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Owen, G. & Funk, K. (1997). Flight Deck Automation Issues: Incident Report Analysis. http://www.flightdeckautomation.com/incidentstudy/incident-analysis.aspx. Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University, Department of Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering. See Resource details

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  38. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: Table 2 summarizes the "descriptive factors assigned to altitude-deviation reports" from traditional cockpits and glass cockpits. In the traditional cockpit, 16 out of 50 (32%) reports suggested that complacency was a factor in the incident and in the glass cockpit, 24 out of 50 (48%) reports suggested that complacency was a factor in the incident. (page 7)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Palmer, E.A., Hutchins, E.L., Ritter, R.D., & VanCleemput, I. (1993). Altitude Deviations: Breakdown of an Error-Tolerant System. NASA Technical Memorandum 108788. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  40. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "With regard to trust in automation ... [pilots'] primary concern is that many pilots report observing colleagues who become complacent and rely too much on the automation." (page 7)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Rudisill, M. (1995). Line Pilots' Attitudes About and Experience With Flight Deck Automation: Results of an International Survey and Proposed Guidelines. In R.S. Jensen, & L.A. Rakovan (Eds.), Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Columbus, Ohio, April 24-27, 1995, 288-293. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

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  42. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "... there were specific concerns with automation. Automation may lead to a false sense of security, particularly with inexperienced pilots. ... Pilots believe there is a general temptation to ignore raw information and 'follow the green/magenta line'." (page 5)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Rudisill, M. (1995). Line Pilots' Attitudes About and Experience With Flight Deck Automation: Results of an International Survey and Proposed Guidelines. In R.S. Jensen, & L.A. Rakovan (Eds.), Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Columbus, Ohio, April 24-27, 1995, 288-293. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

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  44. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "In order to identify what kinds of problems occur in automated aircraft, a review of accident and incident reports from a number of European and US sources was completed. Reports were selected on the basis of keyword searches for terms relating to human factors, training and automation, and were then classified using a taxonomy developed in ECOTTRIS to identify various operational, behavioural, design contributory and general automation factors. "Analysis of frequency of factors and linkages between factors was carried out and yielded the following results: deficiency in CRM was a contributory factor in incidents and accidents (identified in 39% of all reports) and this could be linked with incorrect settings, monitoring and vigilance, inadequate knowledge of aircraft systems, experience and flight handling. Furthermore, complacency was found in 13% of reports and improper use of systems occurred in 15% of reports. In this part of the study, mode awareness was identified as a factor in only 6% of reports."
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Sherman, P.J., Helmreich, R.L., & Merritt, A. (1997). National culture and flight deck automation: Results of a multination survey. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 7(4), 311-329. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  46. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: Concern ratings showed a clear differentiation of levels (see Table 3). Overall concern grew from 2.35 to 3.29 as automation increased, which was a significant difference, F(2, 220) = 96.001, p < .OOOl . A Tukey test showed that each of the levels differed significantly from the others. These results were highly stable, with concern increasing regularly across levels for a majority of items (see superscripted items in Table 3). Major concerns at the fully automated level were increased head-downtime (4.05) complacency (3.95), and degradation of pilot skills (3.90). (page 111)
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Skitka, L.J., Mosier, K.L., Burdick, M., & Rosenblatt, B. (2000). Automation bias and errors: Are crews better than individuals?. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 10(1), 85-97. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  48. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "As for safety, many of the crews [surveyed in this study] expressed the view that automation may have gone too far, that they felt they were often 'out of the loop', probably meaning that they tended to lose situational awareness, and that they feared that automation led to complacency, a term used repeatedly in interviews and questionnaires in this study." (page 170)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details
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