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Evidence for an Issue 9 pieces of evidence for this issue.

operational knowledge may be lacking in design process (Issue #121) - Automation design may not take into consideration the operational knowledge of pilots. This may lead to designs that are counter-intuitive to pilots, possibly increasing pilot workload and the opportunity for error.

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  2. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Q.62. Do you think that airline pilots and designers dialogue sufficiently with each other?" 6.6% of the respondents answered either 'yes, they definately dialogue with each other' or 'yes, with some reservations', 84.4% answered 'No, not at all' or 'No, not sufficiently', and 9.0% answered 'Neither yes nor no' or gave no response. (page 38)
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Gras, A., Moricot, C., et. al. (1994). Faced with automation. Publications de la Sorbonne. See Resource details

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  4. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Q.62. Do you think that airline pilots and designers dialogue sufficiently with each other?" 6.6% of the respondents answered either 'yes, they definately dialogue with each other' or 'yes, with some reservations', 84.4% answered 'No, not at all' or 'No, not sufficiently', and 9.0% answered 'Neither yes nor no' or gave no response. (page 38)
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Gras, A., Moricot, C., et. al. (1994). Faced with automation. Publications de la Sorbonne. See Resource details

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  6. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 19 of the 30 (63%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc121 operational knowledge may be lacking in design process
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  8. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 4 of the 30 (13%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc121 operational knowledge may be lacking in design process
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  10. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 3: "Pilots should have more input into the basic design of flight-decks." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 25=Disagree, 50=Neither agree nor disagree, 75=Agree, and 100=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 78 and the standard deviation was 21. The minimum response was 25 and the maximum was 100. (page 45, 54)
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Morters, K. (1988). B767 Flightdeck Automation Research. Research Paper 32:420, 1-141. See Resource details

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  12. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 3: "Pilots should have more input into the basic design of flight-decks." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 25=Disagree, 50=Neither agree nor disagree, 75=Agree, and 100=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 78 and the standard deviation was 21. The minimum response was 25 and the maximum was 100. (page 45, 54)
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Morters, K. (1988). B767 Flightdeck Automation Research. Research Paper 32:420, 1-141. See Resource details

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  14. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: In our review of 282 automation-related ASRS incident reports, we found 2 reports (1%) supporting issue121 (operational knowledge may be lacking in design process).
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Owen, G. & Funk, K. (1997). Flight Deck Automation Issues: Incident Report Analysis. http://www.flightdeckautomation.com/incidentstudy/incident-analysis.aspx. Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University, Department of Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering. See Resource details

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  16. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "With regard to the automation philosophy, there was a general feeling that the aircraft had been designed by engineers and flight test staff, that operational and practical experience of line operations was not incorporated into the design, that the pilot was being 'automated out' of the flight deck, and that the pilots' role had been forgotten." (page 207)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Rudisill, M. (1994). Flight Crew Experience with Automation Technologies on Commercial Transport Flight Decks. In M. Mouloua & R. Parasuraman (Eds.), Human Performance in Automated Systems: Current Research and Trends. Proceedings of the 1st Automation Technology and Human Performance Conference, held in Washington, DC April 7-9, 1994, 203-211. Hillsdale, NJ:Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  18. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "Loss of constraints after entering change: 20 cases. Pilots experienced with glass cockpit aircraft try to spread their workload by preprogramming the automation for highly dynamic phases of flight. For example, they tend to enter all necessary information concerning an anticipated or assigned approach into the multifunction control and display unit (MCDU) as early as possible. This includes the expected runway, standard arrival procedure, assigned altitudes, speed restrictions, and the minimum descent altitude. Most of the 2 0 surprises reported in this category involved a situation in which the pilot receives an amended clearance from air traffic control (ATC) assigning a new runway after the data for the originally assigned approach and runway have already been entered by the crew. Once the pilot changes the runway in the MCDU, the automation deletes all speed and altitude restrictions that were previously entered, even though they may still apply." (page 560)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: A-320
    Equipment: automation and FMS
    Source: Sherry, L. & Polson, P.G. (1999). Shared models of flight management system vertical guidance. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 9(2), 139-153. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details
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