FDAI logo   ::  Site Map  ::   
Home  |  About This Website  |  Contact Us
Home » ... » Evidence for an Issue

Evidence for an Issue 13 pieces of evidence for this issue.

pilots have responsibility but may lack authority (Issue #12) - Automation design may limit the authority of a pilot to exercise full control over the aircraft to perform a function even though he/she still has responsibility for it.

  1.  
  2. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: The following comments were made in response to the questionnaire statement, "Describe a problem you know of or a concern you have about flightdeck automation.": "At times the electronics take away the ability of the pilot to make corrections of to be flexible in order to accommodate changing situations." (B747 First Officer) "We spend too much time with our heads and eyes in the cockpit. ... The tiller is regulated how fast it turns the nosewheel. I can't turn or straighten immediately if need be. I am not in control of this aircraft." (A320 Captain) "In some situations, the amount of programming and/or button pushing can be a serious distraction in the cockpit. Also voltage surges, humidity, temperature can all cause glitches or anomalies that can't be reproduced or explained in a lab. At times the electronics take away the ability of the pilot to make corrections or to be flexible in order to accommodate changing situations." (B747 First Officer)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, B., Wilson, J., & Funk, K. (1997). Flightdeck automation issues: Phase 1 survey analysis. Available: http://www.flightdeckautomation.com/ExpertSurvey/e_report.aspx. See Resource details

  3.  
  4. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 16 of the 30 (53%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc58 envelope protections may limit pilot authority
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  5.  
  6. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 13 of the 30 (43%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc12 pilots have responsibility but may lack authority
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  7.  
  8. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 9 of the 30 (30%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc043 disengagement may be impossible
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  9.  
  10. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 3 of the 30 (10%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc58 envelope protections may limit pilot authority
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  11.  
  12. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 12 of the 30 (40%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc12 pilots have responsibility but may lack authority
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  13.  
  14. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 18 of the 30 (60%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc043 disengagement may be impossible
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  15.  
  16. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "3. Conclusions ... 3.1 Findings ... B. Aircraft ... 4. In emergency, the crew is unable to override the lock-out and to operate ground spoilers and engine thrust reversers" ... also on page 44: "3.2 Causes of Accident ... Actions of the flight crew were also affected by design features of the aircraft which limited the feasibility of applying available braking systems as well as by insufficient information in the aircraft operations manual (AOM) relating to the increase of the landing distance." (page 40 (44))
    Strength: +5
    Aircraft: A320-211
    Equipment: flight controls: brakes & spoilers
    Source: Main Commission Aircraft Accident Investigation - Poland (1994). Report on the accident to Airbus A320-211 Aircraft in Warsaw on 14 September 1993. See Resource details

  17.  
  18. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "3. Conclusions ... 3.1 Findings ... B. Aircraft ... 4. In emergency, the crew is unable to override the lock-out and to operate ground spoilers and engine thrust reversers" (page 40)
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: A320-211
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Main Commission Aircraft Accident Investigation - Poland (1994). Report on the accident to Airbus A320-211 Aircraft in Warsaw on 14 September 1993. See Resource details

  19.  
  20. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Pilots were asked to describe instances where FMS behavior surprised them and to indicate modes/features of FMS operation that they did not understand. There were no sharp boundaries between the incidents elicited by the two questions. Pilot reports are categorized according to their underlying theme." ... There were 6 reports [6 / 135 = 4%] in the category of "Disengagement of the Approach (APPR) mode ... Some pilots report that they were not able to disengage the APPR mode when required to do so." (page 307-311)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Sarter, N.B. & Woods, D.D. (1992). Pilot interaction with cockpit automation: Operational experiences with the Flight Management System. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 2(4), 303-321. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  21.  
  22. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "The overall result [determined from the pilot questionnaire surveys] was extremely positive and showed no difficulties of adaptation to the side-stick, unanimous approval fo the C* pitch law, unanimous enthusiasm for the flight envelope protection especially at low speeds" (page (4))
    Strength: -5
    Aircraft: A320
    Equipment: flight control
    Source: Speyer, J.J., Blomberg, R.D., & Fouillot, J.P. (1990). Evaluation the Impact of New Technology Cockpits: Onwards from A300FF, A310, A320 to A330, A340. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Human Machine Interaction and Artificial Intelligence in Aeronautics and Space. See Resource details

  23.  
  24. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: One pilot made the following response to the open-ended question, "2-2 If you were to leave the 757 for an older model aircraft, what features would you miss the most? What would you be happy to leave behind?": "...Out of SEA one day I lost the right engine at 140 feet above the field at near max gross weight. I wished I had had the capability of overriding the EEC inorder to obtain more than 'limit EPR' power. 2024" (page 50)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  25.  
  26. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: One pilot made the following response to the open-ended question, "2-2 If you were to leave the 757 for an older model aircraft, what features would you miss the most? What would you be happy to leave behind?": "...But I dislike surrendering most of my experience and judgment to a computer, especially when it's judge, jury, and executioner. 3033" (page 49)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details
Flight Deck Automation Issues Website  
© 1997-2013 Research Integrations, Inc.