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Evidence for an Issue 16 pieces of evidence for this issue.

situation awareness may be reduced (Issue #114) - Reliance on automation may reduce pilots' awareness of the present and projected state of the aircraft and its environment, possibly resulting in incorrect decisions and actions.

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  2. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "The evidence suggests several explanations for this deficiency in the flightcrew's situational awareness: ... - Terrain information was not shown on the electronic horizontal situation indicator (EHSI) or graphically portrayed on the approach chart " (page 35) "3.0 Conclusions ... 3.2 Probable Cause Aeronautica Civil determines that the probable causes of this accident were: ... 3. The lack of situational awareness of the flightcrew regarding vertical navigation, proximity to terrain, and the relative location of critical radio aids." (page 57) (page 35,57)
    Strength: +5
    Aircraft: B757-223
    Equipment: displays
    Source: Aeronautica Civil of the Republic of Colombia (1996). Controlled Flight Into Terrain, American Airlines Flight 965, Boeing 757-223, N651AA, Near Cali, Colombia, December 20, 1995. Santafe de Bogota, DC, Colombia: Aeronautica Civil of the Republic of Colombia. See Resource details

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  4. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the survey data: "It is easier to bust an altitude in an automated airplane than in other planes." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 3=Neutral, 5=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 2.27 and the standard deviation was 2.67. (page 21)
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B757 & B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Hutchins, E., Holder, B., & Hayward, M. (1999). Pilot Attitudes Toward Automation. Web published at http://hci.ucsd.edu/hutchins/attitudes/index.html. See Resource details

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  6. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "In the Cali accident, the pilots faced the challenge of working with the FMS display which, by design, portrayed information about the location of navigational fixes but not environmental features such as terrain. The pilots entered “Direct CLO” (Direct to the Cali VOR) in response to a miscommunication with air traffic control (ATC) which led them to believe they had a clearance to proceed direct to Cali as opposed to following the usual waypoints on designated airways. Requesting and receiving a direct clearance is not uncommon in radar controlled airspace, which, based on their extensive background flying in the U.S., this aircrew was accustomed to. The action of making a direct entry into the FMS had an unfortunate side effect, however. It caused a new flight path to be presented between the aircraft’s current position and the Cali VOR (labeled CLO) and all intervening waypoints along the original path to disappear. Thus, when the aircrew received a later clearance from ATC to “report Tulua”, they could not find this waypoint (labeled ULQ) on their display or in an FMS-control device. They devoted considerable efforts in a time pressured situation in trying to find ULQ or other points on their display that corresponded to those on the new approach to runway 19. The selected display did not support the global SA needed to detect their location relevant to pertinent landmarks, nor the global SA needed to rapidly change goals (programming in a new flight path)." (page 879)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation and FMS
    Source: Inagaki, T., Takae, Y., & Moray, N. (1999). Automation and human interface for takeoff safety. In R.S. Jensen, B. Cox, J.D. Callister, & R. Lavis (Eds.), Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 402-407. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

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  8. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 19 of the 30 (63%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc114 situation awareness may be reduced
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  10. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 7 of the 30 (23%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc114 situation awareness may be reduced
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  12. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: Had the pilots been flying the airplane manually (without the autopilot engaged) they likely would have noted the increased right-wing-down control wheel force needed to maintain the desired left bank, become aware of the airplane’s altered performance characteristics, and increased their airspeed or otherwise altered their flight situation to avoid the loss of control. Disengagement of the autopilot during all operations in icing conditions is necessary to enable pilots to sense the aerodynamic effects of icing and enhance their ability to retain control of the airplane. (page 178)
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: Embraer EMB-120RT
    Equipment:
    Source: National Transportation Safety Board (1998). In-Flight Icing Encounter and Uncontrolled Collision with Terrain, COMAIR Flight 3272, Embraer EMB-120RT, N265CA, Monroe, Michigan, January 9, 1997. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-98/04. Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board. See Resource details

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  14. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "The Safety Board concludes that one of the causal factors of the accident was the captain's reliance on the autopilot while the airplane was decelerating. During this 3 minute 40 second period, the captain allowed himself to remain removed from the `control loop' by leaving the autopilot engaged. As a result, he was not aware of the increasing control inputs required to maintain level flight." (page 30)
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: B747-SP-09
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot
    Source: National Transportation Safety Board (1986). China Airlines B-747-SP, 300 NM Northwest of San Francisco, February 19, 1985. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-86-03. Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board. See Resource details

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  16. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: Because the pilots of Comair flight 3272 were operating the airplane with the autopilot engaged during a series of descents, right and left turns, power adjustments, and airspeed reductions, they might not have perceived the airplane’s gradually deteriorating performance. (page 145)
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: Embraer EMB-120RT
    Equipment:
    Source: National Transportation Safety Board (1998). In-Flight Icing Encounter and Uncontrolled Collision with Terrain, COMAIR Flight 3272, Embraer EMB-120RT, N265CA, Monroe, Michigan, January 9, 1997. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-98/04. Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board. See Resource details

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  18. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: Require all operators of turbopropeller-driven air carrier airplanes to require pilots to disengage the autopilot and fly the airplane manually when they activate the anti-ice systems. (A-98-97) (page 183)
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: Embraer EMB-120RT
    Equipment:
    Source: National Transportation Safety Board (1998). In-Flight Icing Encounter and Uncontrolled Collision with Terrain, COMAIR Flight 3272, Embraer EMB-120RT, N265CA, Monroe, Michigan, January 9, 1997. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-98/04. Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board. See Resource details

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  20. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "The captain’s continued efforts to locate Tulua through the FMS, in addition to being ineffective, also precluded his using the little available time to employ an alternative navigation method and limited his ability to systematically analyze the nature of the difficulty as well. Because he did not understand the difficulty, he was unable to estimate the time and effort needed to rectify it. In fact, his efforts appeared to be not so much problem solving as rote repetition of keyboard interactions. Given the time pressure it would have taken extraordinary effort to carry out real problem solving." (page 197)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: Boeing 757
    Equipment: automation & FMS
    Source: Noyes, J.M. & Starr, A.F. (2000). Civil aircraft warning systems: Future directions in information management and presentation. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 10(2), 169-188. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  22. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "About a minute after the turn began the captain indicated his discovery of the turn to Romeo when he asked “what happened here.” He then directed the first officer to turn to the right and, after a short discussion, they decided to proceed directly to Cali. However, because the airplane had been in a constant descent for some time, it had gone beneath the height of the terrain that was located on either side of the airplane’s flight path. Shortly thereafter, the ground proximity warning system alerted and the airplane struck terrain." (page 197)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: Boeing 757
    Equipment: automation & FMS
    Source: Noyes, J.M. & Starr, A.F. (2000). Civil aircraft warning systems: Future directions in information management and presentation. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 10(2), 169-188. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  24. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "When continual efforts were unsuccessful the crew decided to proceed directly to the final fix on the approach to Cali, a beacon named Rozo that was located just before the runway. However, rather than retrieve Rozo from the FMS data base, one of the pilots mistakenly retrieved a different beacon that was located outside Bogota, named Romeo, and then executed a command to proceed directly to it. Evidence revealed that a crewmember had asked for and retrieved all beacons in the data base coded by the abbreviation “R.” and then commanded the FMS to proceed to Romeo. The airplane turned away from its position north of Cali to Romeo, a turn that would have been clearly evident on the CRT in front of each pilot that displayed the FMS-generated predicted flight path. Of the errors the crew committed in the minutes before the accident this most demonstrates the time pressure they experienced. Little, if any, cognitive effort was needed to notice the turn as presented on the predicted flight path. Moreover, pilots of FMS-equipped aircraft are trained to consistently verify a command to the FMS that causes a course change to assure that it is correct. That they did not may be accounted for by their loss of temporal awareness: they were too busy to take the time needed to even glance at the flight path display." (page 197)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: Boeing 757
    Equipment: automation & FMS
    Source: Noyes, J.M. & Starr, A.F. (2000). Civil aircraft warning systems: Future directions in information management and presentation. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 10(2), 169-188. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  26. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: In our review of 282 automation-related ASRS incident reports, we found 3 reports (1%) supporting issue114 (situation awareness may be reduced).
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Owen, G. & Funk, K. (1997). Flight Deck Automation Issues: Incident Report Analysis. http://www.flightdeckautomation.com/incidentstudy/incident-analysis.aspx. Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University, Department of Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering. See Resource details

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  28. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Question 26 asked pilots if they agreed that the visual displays/instruments helped maintain awareness of the aircraft relative to the flight environment…Among the AH-64D pilots, 73% of the responses were on the agree side of the scale… (page 12)
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: AH-64D
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Rash, C.E., Adam, G.E., LeDuc, P.A., & Francis, G. (May 6-8, 2003). Pilot Attitudes on Glass and Traditional Cockpits in the U.S. Army's AH-64 Apache Helicopter. Presented at the American Helicopter Society 59th Annual Forum, Phoenix, AZ. American Helicopter Society International, Inc. See Resource details

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  30. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "In comparing workload between old and new aircraft types, it is worth noting the substantial anecdotal evidence from first officers reconverting to the 737 after being promoted to the left seat. (One-on-one interviews with 12 pilots provided more detailed evidence.) They report having more difficulty with instrument scan, speed control and situational awareness, and that their overall workload is much greater." (page 3)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Roscoe, A.H. (April, 1992). Workload in the Glass Cockpit. Flight Safety Digest, 1-8. See Resource details

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  32. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "A fairly large number of pilots revealed a lack of system awareness in the context of the following scenario events and probes: a) the NDB faliure, b) the runway change, c) the expedited climb, and d) the go-around situation below 100 ft AGL. Eleven pilots [out of a total of eighteen, 61%] never realized the loss of the NDB signal which normally provides lateral guidance to the automation." (page 60)
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: A320
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Sarter, N.B. & Woods, D.D. (1995). Strong, Silent, and Out-of-the-loop: Properties of Advanced (Cockpit) Automation and Their Impact on Human-Automation Interaction. CSEL Report 95-TR-01. See Resource details
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