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Evidence for an Issue 10 pieces of evidence for this issue.

database may be erroneous or incomplete (Issue #110) - Automation system databases may be incomplete, contain erroneous data, or be inconsistent with other information used by the pilots, possibly increasing pilot workload and/or creating the opportunity for navigation or other errors.

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  2. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "Aeronautica Civil believes that the discrepancy between the approach chart and FMS presentation of data for the same approach can hinder the ability of pilots to execute an instrument approach, especially since flightcrews are expected to rely on both the FMS-generated display and the approach chart for information regarding the conduct of the approach. When two methods of presenting approach information depict important information differently or one readily show it at all, that information can be counterproductive to flightcrew performance in general, and their ability to prepare for an approach in particular. The lack of coordinated standards for the development and portrayal of aeronautical charts and FMS data bases and displays has led to a situation in which, not only are the charts and displays different in appearance, but the basic data are different. This lack of commonality is confusing, time consuming, and increases pilot workload during a critical phase of flight, the approach phase." (page 43) "3.0 Conclusions 3.1 Findings ... 7. Numerous important differences existed between the display of identical navigation data on approach charts and on FMS-generated displays, despite the fact that the same supplier provided AA with the navigational data. ... 3.3 Contributing Factors Contributing to the cause of the accident were: ... 4. FMS-generated navigational information that used a different naming convention from that published in navigational charts." (pages 55-57) (page 43)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: B757-223
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Aeronautica Civil of the Republic of Colombia (1996). Controlled Flight Into Terrain, American Airlines Flight 965, Boeing 757-223, N651AA, Near Cali, Colombia, December 20, 1995. Santafe de Bogota, DC, Colombia: Aeronautica Civil of the Republic of Colombia. See Resource details

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  4. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Review Study
    Evidence: 4.3.1 The pilot enters 'R' to retrieve a list of waypoints. Design analysis: To communicate the waypoint to the system, the pilot is required by a procedure to type an abbreviation into the FMS, as can be found on the (paper) approach chart, which shows and legislates how to approach an airport. Due to the system logic, only inputs of the exact correct identifier can be recognised. The FMS is given the function of retrieving a list of waypoints from its database that may match the intended waypoint selection. Problem analysis: There was a mismatch between the printed approach charts and the FMS database. Since there were two waypoints with the identifier ‘R’ in same area, pilots needed to type ‘R-O-Z-O’ to get Rozo, not ‘R’ as they expected from experience and approach chart information. Collaboration analysis: The design has not allowed for the possibility that the common reference system may be faulty. Pilots needed to know what the FMS does with the instruction – they needed to understand its restriction of not truly being able to ‘guess’ from first letter, since it can only assign one meaning to one letter in a given area. Hence it could fail to match the abbreviation altogether. (page 5)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757-223
    Equipment: automation & FMS
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (not dated). Collaboration in the Flightdeck: Opportunities for Interaction Design. Department of Computer Science, University of Bath. Available at http://www.cs.bath.ac.uk/~anneb/collwn.pdf. See Resource details

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  6. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: "Of particular interest is the fact that five of the six [83%] holding pattern problems included in Table 4-3 (Phase of Flight) were caused by erroneous information being stored in the database." Table 4-3 Phase of Flight shows that of the 115 citations listed, 6 of them [5%] occurred during the holding pattern phase of flight. (page 4.28)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Eldredge, D., Mangold, S., & Dodd, R.S. (1992). A Review and Discussion of Flight Management System Incidents Reported to the Aviation Safety Reporting System. Final Report DOT/FAA/RD-92/2. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration. See Resource details

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  8. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "In this case, the pilots entered “R” to direct the aircraft to fly to a fix on the approach named Rozo. While “R” was the designation for Rozo indicated on the approach chart it was not the designation used for that point in the FMS database. The "R" they actually selected was assigned to another point in Columbia named Romeo. This was a central error in this accident that sent the aircraft into a 180 degree bank to the left towards Romeo. It was a simple error for the pilots to make, likely induced by the fact that “R” was the expected designation for Rozo and was presented on the charts as such. A poorly understood FMS naming convention led to the designation of R for Romeo and not Rozo in the FMS database. (Romeo was nearer to the larger airport in Columbia, Bogota, and therefore received the designator R. Thus Rozo was assigned its full name in the database.)" (page 880)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation and FMS
    Source: Inagaki, T., Takae, Y., & Moray, N. (1999). Automation and human interface for takeoff safety. In R.S. Jensen, B. Cox, J.D. Callister, & R. Lavis (Eds.), Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 402-407. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

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  10. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "…theCali accident demonstrated that there can be substantial differences in the points and nomenclature used between the two information sources. As a result, determining a correlation between identical points on the two different navigation sources can be both difficult and time consuming. In this accident, the points on the desired flight path were named CF19 and FF19 in the FMSgenerated data, and D21 and D16 on the map. It takes considerable calculation to determine that they actually represent the same points, and these calculations are often time-consuming." (page 879)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation and FMS
    Source: Inagaki, T., Takae, Y., & Moray, N. (1999). Automation and human interface for takeoff safety. In R.S. Jensen, B. Cox, J.D. Callister, & R. Lavis (Eds.), Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 402-407. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

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  12. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 23 of the 30 (77%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc110 database may be erroneous or incomplete
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  14. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 1 of the 30 (3%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc110 database may be erroneous or incomplete
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  16. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Further. the pilots’ expertise with the FMS, gained from having flown the Boeing 757 for several years. May have actually detracted from their ability to effectively use the FMS. The execution of the command to proceed to Romeo was consistent with the selection of the beacon that is identified first on the computer-display unit and is the beacon that the airplane is closest to. If not explicitly taught in training, the pilots would have recognized over repeated use that beacons with a common one letter identifier were presented in descending order of their proximity to the airplane. Pilots who recognized this rule could have assumed, because they were so close to Rozo, that among those beacons identified by the abbreviation "R," Rozo would be presented first. Thus, not only would the command to proceed to Romeo have been executed by a crew that had no time available to refer to a flight path display, but also by a crew that had effectively executed such commands in the past." It can be assumed that the crew’s familiarity with the FMS extended only to a portion of FMS logic, that concerning the order of presentation of the navaids, and not to another, the coding of the navaids themselves." (page 197)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: Boeing 757
    Equipment: automation & FMS
    Source: Noyes, J.M. & Starr, A.F. (2000). Civil aircraft warning systems: Future directions in information management and presentation. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 10(2), 169-188. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  18. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "In addition, the selection of the beacon Romeo and the execution of the command to proceed to that beacon revealed an additional, heretofore unrecognized, deficiency of the FMS. Neither pilot knew the rules governing the coding of data in the FMS-navigation data base and in fact, until this accident, few pilots were aware that the rules used to identify beacons, navaids, and fixes on navigation charts did not consistently match those used on corresponding data stored in FMS-navigation data bases. The abbreviation "R" that was used for Rozo and prominently displayed on the chart of the approach to Cali did not correspond to Rozo in the data base. In the data base "R" indicated Romeo." (page 197)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: Boeing 757
    Equipment: automation & FMS
    Source: Noyes, J.M. & Starr, A.F. (2000). Civil aircraft warning systems: Future directions in information management and presentation. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 10(2), 169-188. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  20. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: In our review of 282 automation-related ASRS incident reports, we found 14 reports (5%) supporting issue110 (database may be erroneous or incomplete).
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Owen, G. & Funk, K. (1997). Flight Deck Automation Issues: Incident Report Analysis. http://www.flightdeckautomation.com/incidentstudy/incident-analysis.aspx. Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University, Department of Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering. See Resource details
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