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Evidence for an Issue 9 pieces of evidence for this issue.

automation may lack reasonable functionality (Issue #109) - Automation design may prevent the device from performing a function that seems reasonable to the pilot, possibly requiring the use of alternative strategies which may increase workload and the opportunity for error.

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  2. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Whilst the pilots we have talked to did not report mode reversions, they reported many situations in which to make decisions as to what parts of the automated systems to use when, as a prominent aspect in pilots’ tasks. For example, situational factors often require the use of less sophisticated equipment (e.g. adverse weather conditions, landings, Air Traffic Control (ATC) giving headings), or pilots may need to decide when the automated systems cannot cope: P1: “But invariably on every flight the route is changed to some degree by ATC ... even to a point where you disconnect it from the FMS and fly in another mode.” P2: “On our descent they changed the runway three times ... for some reason we didn’t change the frequencies [the third time]. We came in ... looked from a distance... thought ‘this is wrong’... so we knocked off the autopilot.” P2: “Sometimes you have situations where you know the plane is supposed to turn at 4 miles and if it doesn’t then, because it’s so much easier to use the automated system to fly this departure, you’ll find the pilot will sit there and go like, ‘OK, I’ll give it a little more time’.” P2: “[in bad weather]... what you do is you take off the height control... A lot of up- and downdrafts ... can confuse the sensors... If it bobs up and down, you don’t have the autopilot fighting it. But that’s not a company procedure.” P2: “...due to traffic etc. they can’t descend you ... you now find that the system is telling you ‘top of descent’ but you have to ignore it ...suddenly the controller announces to you that you are cleared to descend... Now ... you have to close the throttles and pull out the spoilers, the speed breaks, which gives you the right maximum rate of descent, and in most of the times the autopilot cannot comprehend what is going on ... you have to knock off the descent mode and descent it yourself at the very high rates, and when you’re closer to your level you put it back on ... for the 727 you definitely have to remove the descent mode, in the Learjet you go to speed. (page 3)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (2004). Should Computers Function as Collaborators?. In Proceedings of HCI-Aero 2004 held in Toulouse, France September 29, 2004 to 1 October 2004. See Resource details

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  4. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 18 of the 30 (60%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc109 automation may lack reasonable functionality
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  6. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 2 of the 30 (7%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc109 automation may lack reasonable functionality
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  8. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: The stall warning system installed in the accident airplane did not provide an adequate warning to the pilots because ice contamination was present on the airplane’s airfoils, and the system was not designed to account for aerodynamic degradation or adjust its warning to compensate for the reduced stall warning margin caused by the ice. (page 178)
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: Embraer EMB-120RT
    Equipment:
    Source: National Transportation Safety Board (1998). In-Flight Icing Encounter and Uncontrolled Collision with Terrain, COMAIR Flight 3272, Embraer EMB-120RT, N265CA, Monroe, Michigan, January 9, 1997. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-98/04. Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board. See Resource details

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  10. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: Require the manufacturers and operators of all airplanes that are certificated to operate in icing conditions to install stall warning/protection systems that provide a cockpit warning (aural warning and/or stick shaker) before the onset of stall when the airplane is operating in icing conditions. (A-98-96) (page 183)
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: Embraer EMB-120RT
    Equipment:
    Source: National Transportation Safety Board (1998). In-Flight Icing Encounter and Uncontrolled Collision with Terrain, COMAIR Flight 3272, Embraer EMB-120RT, N265CA, Monroe, Michigan, January 9, 1997. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-98/04. Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board. See Resource details

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  12. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: Require all manufacturers of transport-category airplanes to incorporate logic into all new and existing transport-category airplanes that have autopilots installed to provide a cockpit aural warning to alert pilots when the airplane’s bank and/or pitch exceeds the autopilot’s maximum bank and/or pitch command limits. (A-98-98) (page 183)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: Embraer EMB-120RT
    Equipment:
    Source: National Transportation Safety Board (1998). In-Flight Icing Encounter and Uncontrolled Collision with Terrain, COMAIR Flight 3272, Embraer EMB-120RT, N265CA, Monroe, Michigan, January 9, 1997. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-98/04. Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board. See Resource details

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  14. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: If the pilots of Comair flight 3272 had received a ground proximity warning system, autopilot, or other system-generated cockpit warning when the airplane first exceeded the autopilot’s maximum bank command limits with the autopilot activated, they might have been able to avoid the unusual attitude condition that resulted from the autopilot’s sudden disengagement. (page 179)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: Embraer EMB-120RT
    Equipment:
    Source: National Transportation Safety Board (1998). In-Flight Icing Encounter and Uncontrolled Collision with Terrain, COMAIR Flight 3272, Embraer EMB-120RT, N265CA, Monroe, Michigan, January 9, 1997. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-98/04. Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board. See Resource details

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  16. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: In our review of 282 automation-related ASRS incident reports, we found 4 reports (1%) supporting issue109 (automation may lack reasonable functionality).
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Owen, G. & Funk, K. (1997). Flight Deck Automation Issues: Incident Report Analysis. http://www.flightdeckautomation.com/incidentstudy/incident-analysis.aspx. Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University, Department of Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering. See Resource details

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  18. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "Exceeding an airspeed of 250 knots below 10,000 feet: 9 cases. These reports refer to a situation in which, during a descent, the pilot selects an airspeed higher than 250 knots and forgets to change this setting or fails to activate managed speed before descending through an altitude of 10 000 feet mean sea level (MSL).... Some pilots mention that they would expect the automation, which seems highly proficient in other circumstances, to detect the risk of a violation and to "autoslow" the airplane for them." (page 560)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: A-320
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Sherry, L. & Polson, P.G. (1999). Shared models of flight management system vertical guidance. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 9(2), 139-153. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details
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