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Evidence for an Issue 32 pieces of evidence for this issue.

automation behavior may be unexpected and unexplained (Issue #108) - Automation may perform in ways that are unintended, unexpected, and perhaps unexplainable by pilots, possibly creating confusion, increasing pilot workload to compensate, and sometimes leading to unsafe conditions.

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  2. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the questionnaire data: (#26) "Sometimes what the automatics do or don't do takes me by surprise." 26% of the pilots strongly or slightly agreed, 62% of the pilots strongly or slightly disagreed with the statement, and 13% neither agreed nor disagreed. (page 44-45)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. NASA Technical Memorandum 86659, 1-68. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  4. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Nearly 20% of the pilots reported that at one time or another, the autopilot either turned the wrong way (usually on LOC intercept or when passing over a waypoint), or did not capture the desired route or course." (page 24)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. NASA Technical Memorandum 86659, 1-68. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  6. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Some pilots, in their response to the question 'Have you ever been surprised by the automatics' answered in the affirmative" (page 24)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. NASA Technical Memorandum 86659, 1-68. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  8. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: During the cockpit observation: "On at least four of the segments we experienced the early-capture-at-low-altitude phenomenon reported by the pilots. In every case, both pilots were surprised by the sudden reduction in thrust as the aircraft leveled off, even though they had selected a higher altitude by that time." (page 19-20)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: autoflight
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. NASA Technical Memorandum 86659, 1-68. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  9.  
  10. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the questionnaire data: (#26) "Sometimes what the automatics do or don't do takes me by surprise." 26% of the pilots strongly or slightly agreed, 62% of the pilots strongly or slightly disagreed with the statement, and 13% neither agreed nor disagreed. (page 44-45)
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Curry, R.E. (1985). The Introduction of New Cockpit Technology: A Human Factors Study. NASA Technical Memorandum 86659, 1-68. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  12. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: The autopilot behavior is perplexing; it responds differently to the same pilot action. Setting the altitude to a value behind the current aircraft altitude results in two different responses: In the first case the aircraft will continue at the current climb-rate and "kill the capture". In the second case the aircraft will capture the newly set altitude. So how can the pilot anticipate what the aircraft will do in each case? It turns out that there is a hidden condition here, that revolves around the altitude at which the aircraft transitions to the "Capture" mode (7,000 feet in our example): If the newly set altitude is below (e.g., 6,000 feet) the "start capture altitude", then the aircraft will kill the capture. But if the newly set altitude is above (e.g., 8,000 feet) the "start capture altitude", the aircraft will capture the specified altitude. Do pilots know about this behavior and the condition? No. It’s not in the manual nor is it mentioned in ground school or Initial Operating Experience (IOE) -- it is practically unknown! Now we are not talking about some minor deficiency, but a critical maneuver that sometimes takes place very close to the ground. The pilots’ user-model is inadequate for the task of capturing an altitude after resetting the altitude to a value behind the aircraft. If we go back to our earlier discussion, we have a condition in which the user-model is inadequate for the task. This deficiency corresponds to region 3 in Figure 1. (page 6/7)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot
    Source: Degani, A., & Heymann, M. (2000). Pilot-Autopilot interaction: A formal perspective. Eighth International Conference on Human-Computer Interaction in Aeronautics, Toulouse, France. See Resource details

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  14. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: "The data presented in Table 4-1 suggest the same underlying problem: The crew fails to operate the FMS properly and, at the same time, fails to catch the error before an incident occurs." Table 4-1 shows the breakdown of the number of citations for various Flight Crew FMS Actions/Errors: Keyboard Errors - 15 citations (15%), Logic Errors - 3 citations (3%), Errors of Expectation/Interpretation (ATC related) - 12 citations (12%), Errors of Expectation/Interpretation (FMS logic related) - 27 citations (27%), and Mode control panel (MCP)/automation control selection errors - 18 citations (18%). [Total citations = 99, several categories are not listed in Table 4-1] (page 4.1)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Eldredge, D., Mangold, S., & Dodd, R.S. (1992). A Review and Discussion of Flight Management System Incidents Reported to the Aviation Safety Reporting System. Final Report DOT/FAA/RD-92/2. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration. See Resource details

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  16. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: "Several of the reports appear to indicate that the FMS can be programmed correctly, provide feedback to indicate this, yet still not perform as intended." (page 4.26)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Eldredge, D., Mangold, S., & Dodd, R.S. (1992). A Review and Discussion of Flight Management System Incidents Reported to the Aviation Safety Reporting System. Final Report DOT/FAA/RD-92/2. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration. See Resource details

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  18. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Q.53. Have you ever experienced situations in which automated equipment acted against your intentions?" 66.9% of the respondents answered 'Yes', 31.5% answered 'No' and 1.6% gave no response. (page 36)
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Gras, A., Moricot, C., et. al. (1994). Faced with automation. Publications de la Sorbonne. See Resource details

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  20. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Q.53. Have you ever experienced situations in which automated equipment acted against your intentions?" 66.9% of the respondents answered 'Yes', 31.5% answered 'No', and 1.6% gave no response. (page 36)
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Gras, A., Moricot, C., et. al. (1994). Faced with automation. Publications de la Sorbonne. See Resource details

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  22. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Review Study
    Evidence: If we combine this understanding of the FCU with the events of flight F-GGED, we can identify two pivotal human 'failures' in the causal chain leading to the accident. Firstly, the pilot entered a seemingly correct parameter value on the correct entry dial, whilst the panel was in an unappreciated mode. Subsequently, both the pilot and co-pilot failed to notice the (unintended) rapid descent of the aircraft until shortly before impact. In other words, they were surprised by the performance of the system (plane) – an example of the phenomenon described in section 1. These errors are summarised in the schematic outline of events in Figure 2. (page 4)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: A320
    Equipment:
    Source: Hourizi, R. & Johnson, P. (2001). Beyond Mode Error: Supporting Strategic Knowledge Structures to Enhance Cockpit Safety.. In A. Blandford, J. Vanderdonkt & P. Gray (Eds.): People and Computers XV - Interaction without frontiers. Joint Proceedings of HCI2001 and ICM2001, Lille, 10-14th Sept. 2001, Springer Verlag, 229-246. See Resource details

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  24. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: From the survey data: "In the automation of my current aircraft, there are still things that happen that surprise me." On the scale in which 1= Strongly Disagree, 3=Neutral, 5=Strongly Agree, the mean pilot response was 3.37 and the standard deviation was 1.04. (page 20)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: B757 & B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Hutchins, E., Holder, B., & Hayward, M. (1999). Pilot Attitudes Toward Automation. Web published at http://hci.ucsd.edu/hutchins/attitudes/index.html. See Resource details

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  26. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 20 of the 30 (67%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc108 automation behavior may be unexpected and unexplained
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

  27.  
  28. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 3 of the 30 (10%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc108 automation behavior may be unexpected and unexplained
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  30. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "When continual efforts were unsuccessful the crew decided to proceed directly to the final fix on the approach to Cali, a beacon named Rozo that was located just before the runway. However, rather than retrieve Rozo from the FMS data base, one of the pilots mistakenly retrieved a different beacon that was located outside Bogota, named Romeo, and then executed a command to proceed directly to it. Evidence revealed that a crewmember had asked for and retrieved all beacons in the data base coded by the abbreviation “R.” and then commanded the FMS to proceed to Romeo. The airplane turned away from its position north of Cali to Romeo, a turn that would have been clearly evident on the CRT in front of each pilot that displayed the FMS-generated predicted flight path. Of the errors the crew committed in the minutes before the accident this most demonstrates the time pressure they experienced. Little, if any, cognitive effort was needed to notice the turn as presented on the predicted flight path. Moreover, pilots of FMS-equipped aircraft are trained to consistently verify a command to the FMS that causes a course change to assure that it is correct. That they did not may be accounted for by their loss of temporal awareness: they were too busy to take the time needed to even glance at the flight path display." (page 197)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: Boeing 757
    Equipment: automation & FMS
    Source: Noyes, J.M. & Starr, A.F. (2000). Civil aircraft warning systems: Future directions in information management and presentation. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 10(2), 169-188. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  32. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Neither pilot was aware that the captain’s execution of the FMS command to proceed “Direct to” Cali had erased intermediate fixes between their position and Cali, especially that of Tulua, the beacon that served as the initial approach fix, the entry to the approach. During the subsequent attempts to review the new approach and perform the preparations for it they were unable to locate Tulua and then understand the cause of this difficulty. Without locating it, the approach could not be executed as published." "The captain, who was managing the FMS while the first officer was the pilot flying asked, "I don't know, what's this ULQ (three letter code for Tulua)," an indication of the extent of his loss of awareness. The airplane's cockpit voice recorder indicated that from the time they accepted the offer to execute the straight in approach the workload of both pilots was quite high as they attempted to complete the many required activities. As a result, the captain was unable to take the time necessary to determine the cause of his difficulty retrieving and locating Tulua. In fact, the FMS had performed as designed but neither pilot was able to discover the cause of the problem." (page 196)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: Boeing 757
    Equipment: automation & FMS
    Source: Noyes, J.M. & Starr, A.F. (2000). Civil aircraft warning systems: Future directions in information management and presentation. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 10(2), 169-188. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  34. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: In our review of 282 automation-related ASRS incident reports, we found 46 reports (16%) supporting issue108 (automation behavior may be unexpected and unexplained).
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Owen, G. & Funk, K. (1997). Flight Deck Automation Issues: Incident Report Analysis. http://www.flightdeckautomation.com/incidentstudy/incident-analysis.aspx. Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University, Department of Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering. See Resource details

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  36. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "56 pilots provided comments on Automation Surprises. These responses were coded into categories based on the primary thrust of the pilot’s response. Five categories were created with ten of the responses not fitting into one of the five categories. The categories, numbers of responses in each category, and a brief summary of the comments are provided below:...Speed (18) -- The plane slows too early. FMS Speed mode causes surprises. This plane places a priority on airspeed over altitude, which is a problem when you have speed and altitude-constrained waypoints." (page 437)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: MD11
    Equipment: automation & FMS
    Source: Parasuraman, R., Mavor, A., Wickens, C.D., Danaher, J.W., & Aalfs, C. (1998). Managing the future national airspace system: Free flight or ground-based control with increased automation (panel session). In Proceedings of the 42nd Annual Meeting of the Human Factors and Ergonomic Society, 62-66. See Resource details

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  38. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "An “Automation Surprise” occurs when the automation commands a maneuver that the pilot is not expecting. We asked pilots to rate the frequency of the automation surprises that they had seen personally (Table 4). The list of automation surprises used in the questionnaire was compiled by experienced flight instructors and included many automation surprises that have been reported in the aviation literature and specifically on the MD-11. Results showed that surprises were seen, at least on occasion, by pilots." (page 436)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: MD11
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Parasuraman, R., Mavor, A., Wickens, C.D., Danaher, J.W., & Aalfs, C. (1998). Managing the future national airspace system: Free flight or ground-based control with increased automation (panel session). In Proceedings of the 42nd Annual Meeting of the Human Factors and Ergonomic Society, 62-66. See Resource details

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  40. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "Only one pilot in this study handled the go around below 100 feet AGL without any problems. He elected to stay in fully manual control of the aircraft until level-off at the acceleration altitude and then reengaged individual subsystems of the automation one after the other, each time assuring himself first that the automated system responded as expected and desired. All other pilots focused on trying to figure out why the automation did not behave as expected, and they tried to get guidance from the automation as soon as possible. For example, seven pilots 38.9%) first called for the flight directors to be turned on after initiating the go-around. even though the automation was not set up to provide any meaningful guidance Another seven pilots (38.9%) activated autothrust before selecting a target speed, and thus the approach speed became the airspeed target. The fact that most pilots hesitated to take manual control of the aircraft and instead tried to understand what the automation was doing resulted in the following problems. Six of the pilots (33.4%) exceeded 250 knots LAS (indicated air speed) below an altitude of 10,000 feet. Another two pilots (11.1 %) allowed the airspeed to increase until almost reaching the maximum allowable airspeed. Another two pilots (11.1%) oversped their flaps during the go around. Finally, three pilots allowed the airspeed to increase all the way to the maximum operating speed before taking action. During the debriefing all pilots explained that they had not expected the autothrust to disengage when applying full power for the goaround. They emphasized that they were busy watching airspeed trends and altitude instead of looking at the flight mode annunciations to find out about the status and behavior of the automation." (page 398)
    Strength: +5
    Aircraft: A320
    Equipment: automation & FMS
    Source: Sanchez-Ku, M.L., & Arthur, Jr. W. (2000). A dyadic protocol for training complex skills: A replication using female participants. Human Factors, 42(3), 512-520. See Resource details

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  42. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "The majority of responding A-320 pilots (80%) has been surprised by the automation at least once during line operations." (page 20)
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: A320
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Sarter, N.B. & Woods, D.D. (1995). Strong, Silent, and Out-of-the-loop: Properties of Advanced (Cockpit) Automation and Their Impact on Human-Automation Interaction. CSEL Report 95-TR-01. See Resource details

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  44. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "The pilots' rating of the two statements on cockpit automation basically replicate Wiener's (1989) results." The following are the "percentages of pilots' responses to the first statement 'In the B-737-300 automation, there are still things that happen that surprise me.' " Out of 135 pilots, 18% "strongly agreed", 49% "agreed", 7% were "neutral", 22% "disagreed", and 4% "strongly disagreed" with the statement. That is, 67% agreed or strongly agreed and 26% disagreed or strongly disagreed. (page 307-309)
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: B-737-300
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Sarter, N.B. & Woods, D.D. (1992). Pilot interaction with cockpit automation: Operational experiences with the Flight Management System. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 2(4), 303-321. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  45.  
  46. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Pilots were asked to describe instances where FMS behavior surprised them and to indicate modes/features of FMS operation that they did not understand. There were no sharp boundaries between the incidents elicited by the two questions. Pilot reports are categorized according to their underlying theme." ... There were 38 reports [38 / 135 = 28.1%] in the category: "VNAV logic and calculations ... Pilots indicate that the algorithms underlying the calculation of a VNAV path are not transparent to them. They cannot visualize the intended path, and therefore they are sometimes unable to anticipate or understand VNAV activities initiated to maintain target parameters (25 reports [19%]). VNAV control actions are often described as being surprisingly abrupt (4 reports [3%]). Several pilots report that they have been surprised by VNAV when it failed to start the descent upon reaching the top-of-descent point (TOD) (9 reports [7%])." That is, at least 38 reports (28%) indicated misunderstanding or surprise. (page 307, 310)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Sarter, N.B. & Woods, D.D. (1992). Pilot interaction with cockpit automation: Operational experiences with the Flight Management System. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 2(4), 303-321. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  47.  
  48. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Pilots were asked to describe instances where FMS behavior surprised them and to indicate modes/features of FMS operation that they did not understand. There were no sharp boundaries between the incidents elicited by the two questions. Pilot reports are categorized according to their underlying theme." ... There were 9 reports [9 / 135 = 6.7%] in the category: "Lack of data propagation ... Pilots report that they are sometimes surprised by the effects of interactions between target values entered on different but interrelated CDU pages. They suggest that certain data should propagate automatically to functionally interrelated CDU pages." (page 307, 312)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Sarter, N.B. & Woods, D.D. (1992). Pilot interaction with cockpit automation: Operational experiences with the Flight Management System. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 2(4), 303-321. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  50. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Pilots were asked to describe instances where FMS behavior surprised them and to indicate modes/features of FMS operation that they did not understand. There were no sharp boundaries between the incidents elicited by the two questions. Pilot reports are categorized according to their underlying theme." ... There were 11 reports [11 / 135 = 8.1%] in the category: "Switching between VNAV and MCP descent modes ... These examples refer to situations where pilots had a descent properly programmed and both VNAV (Vertical Navigation mode) and LNAV (Lateral Navigation mode) engaged when ATC asked then for an unanticipated level-off or change in heading. They report uncertainty as to whether or not the reengagement of VNAV after compliance with the clearance by means of MCP interventions would bring them 'back on track'. They have problems with keeping track of active target values related to different FMS subsystems under such circumstances." (page 307, 310)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS VNAV
    Source: Sarter, N.B. & Woods, D.D. (1992). Pilot interaction with cockpit automation: Operational experiences with the Flight Management System. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 2(4), 303-321. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  52. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "The pilots' rating of the two statements on cockpit automation basically replicate Wiener's (1989) results." The following are the "percentages of pilots' responses to the first statement 'In the B-737-300 automation, there are still things that happen that surprise me.' " Out of 135 pilots, 18% "strongly agreed", 49% "agreed", 7% were "neutral", 22% "disagreed", and 4% "strongly disagreed" with the statement. That is, 67% agreed or strongly agreed and 26% disagreed or strongly disagreed. (page 307-309)
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: B-737-300
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Sarter, N.B. & Woods, D.D. (1992). Pilot interaction with cockpit automation: Operational experiences with the Flight Management System. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 2(4), 303-321. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  54. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Fifty eight structured interviews were conducted at a number of European airlines to enable pilots and training instructors to comment on current transition training practices, to give levels of understanding of various automated systems and express their views on automation and related issues… Pilots attitudes towards the automation were generally positive. Surprises caused by the automation tended to occur especially early after training, as did human errors due to negative transfer. In cases where pilots were surprised, they admitted that it did influence their trust in the aircraft. Comments suggested that a higher level of understanding of systems, better problem solving skills and prioritisation rules to avoid excessive head-down time, could mitigate negative effects of difficult situations."
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Sherman, P.J., Helmreich, R.L., & Merritt, A. (1997). National culture and flight deck automation: Results of a multination survey. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 7(4), 311-329. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  56. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "The majority of the responding pilots (80%) reported that they had experienced automation surprises at least once during line operations. This result confirms and even exceeds the finding of a study concerning pilot-automation interaction on the B-757, which showed that 60% of pilots on that glass cockpit aircraft were sometimes surprised by their automated systems (Wiener, 1989). A similar result was also found by Sarter and Woods (1992) in their survey of B-737-3001 400 pilots, in which 67% of the responding pilots indicated that the automation sometimes behaved in unexpected ways." (page 558)
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: A-320
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Sherry, L. & Polson, P.G. (1999). Shared models of flight management system vertical guidance. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 9(2), 139-153. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  58. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "Unexpected airpeeeds during a go-around: 5 cases. These pilots reported that they have been surprised by the behavior of the automation in the case of a go-around below 100 feet above ground level without flight director guidance. This particular situation is the only one in which advancing the thrust levers to the takeoff/go around position does not automatically arm the autothrust system. As a consequence, the autothrust system does not vary thrust to maintain appropriate airspeeds during the go-around. Pilots did not know and failed to notice that the system did not arm, and they were surprised when the airspeed increased to above 250 knots below 10 000 feet (because full thrust was still commanded) or stayed at the approach speed throughout the go-around (as pilots finally engaged the autothrust system but without entering a target airspeed)." (page 561)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: A-320
    Equipment: autoflight: autothrust and autopilot
    Source: Sherry, L. & Polson, P.G. (1999). Shared models of flight management system vertical guidance. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 9(2), 139-153. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  60. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 11: "In the B-757 automation, there are still things that happen that surprise me." From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, 68% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, 56% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement while 18% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and 27% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 14% in Phase 1 and 17% in Phase 2. (page 28)
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  62. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: In response to "Question 2. Since flying the -80, have you seen any confusion or incorrect operation on the part of the other crew members? Please describe." A respondent in Wave Two replied, "Having A/P disengage for no reason causes real confusion, esp. on IFR approaches" (page 29-31)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: DC9-80
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1985). Human Factors of Cockpit Automation: A Field Study of Flight Crew Transition. NASA Contactor Report 177333. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  63.  
  64. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 11: "In the B-757 automation, there are still things that happen that surprise me." From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, 68% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, 56% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement while only 18% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and 27% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 14% in Phase 1 and 17% in Phase 2. (page 28)
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details
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