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Evidence for an Issue 10 pieces of evidence for this issue.

workarounds may be necessary (Issue #107) - Pilots may use automation in a manner not intended by designers to get desired results or to avoid undesirable consequences, possibly increasing pilot workload and opportunity for error. This may have unanticipated and undesirable side effects.

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  2. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Whilst the pilots we have talked to did not report mode reversions, they reported many situations in which to make decisions as to what parts of the automated systems to use when, as a prominent aspect in pilots’ tasks. For example, situational factors often require the use of less sophisticated equipment (e.g. adverse weather conditions, landings, Air Traffic Control (ATC) giving headings), or pilots may need to decide when the automated systems cannot cope: P1: “But invariably on every flight the route is changed to some degree by ATC ... even to a point where you disconnect it from the FMS and fly in another mode.” P2: “On our descent they changed the runway three times ... for some reason we didn’t change the frequencies [the third time]. We came in ... looked from a distance... thought ‘this is wrong’... so we knocked off the autopilot.” P2: “Sometimes you have situations where you know the plane is supposed to turn at 4 miles and if it doesn’t then, because it’s so much easier to use the automated system to fly this departure, you’ll find the pilot will sit there and go like, ‘OK, I’ll give it a little more time’.” P2: “[in bad weather]... what you do is you take off the height control... A lot of up- and downdrafts ... can confuse the sensors... If it bobs up and down, you don’t have the autopilot fighting it. But that’s not a company procedure.” P2: “...due to traffic etc. they can’t descend you ... you now find that the system is telling you ‘top of descent’ but you have to ignore it ...suddenly the controller announces to you that you are cleared to descend... Now ... you have to close the throttles and pull out the spoilers, the speed breaks, which gives you the right maximum rate of descent, and in most of the times the autopilot cannot comprehend what is going on ... you have to knock off the descent mode and descent it yourself at the very high rates, and when you’re closer to your level you put it back on ... for the 727 you definitely have to remove the descent mode, in the Learjet you go to speed. (page 3)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (2004). Should Computers Function as Collaborators?. In Proceedings of HCI-Aero 2004 held in Toulouse, France September 29, 2004 to 1 October 2004. See Resource details

  3.  
  4. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Whilst the pilots we have talked to did not report mode reversions, they reported many situations in which to make decisions as to what parts of the automated systems to use when, as a prominent aspect in pilots’ tasks. For example, situational factors often require the use of less sophisticated equipment (e.g. adverse weather conditions, landings, Air Traffic Control (ATC) giving headings), or pilots may need to decide when the automated systems cannot cope: P1: “But invariably on every flight the route is changed to some degree by ATC ... even to a point where you disconnect it from the FMS and fly in another mode.” P2: “On our descent they changed the runway three times ... for some reason we didn’t change the frequencies [the third time]. We came in ... looked from a distance... thought ‘this is wrong’... so we knocked off the autopilot.” P2: “Sometimes you have situations where you know the plane is supposed to turn at 4 miles and if it doesn’t then, because it’s so much easier to use the automated system to fly this departure, you’ll find the pilot will sit there and go like, ‘OK, I’ll give it a little more time’.” P2: “[in bad weather]... what you do is you take off the height control... A lot of up- and downdrafts ... can confuse the sensors... If it bobs up and down, you don’t have the autopilot fighting it. But that’s not a company procedure.” P2: “...due to traffic etc. they can’t descend you ... you now find that the system is telling you ‘top of descent’ but you have to ignore it ...suddenly the controller announces to you that you are cleared to descend... Now ... you have to close the throttles and pull out the spoilers, the speed breaks, which gives you the right maximum rate of descent, and in most of the times the autopilot cannot comprehend what is going on ... you have to knock off the descent mode and descent it yourself at the very high rates, and when you’re closer to your level you put it back on ... for the 727 you definitely have to remove the descent mode, in the Learjet you go to speed. ” (page 3)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (2004). Should Computers Function as Collaborators?. In Proceedings of HCI-Aero 2004 held in Toulouse, France September 29, 2004 to 1 October 2004. See Resource details

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  6. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: The following comment was made in response to the questionnaire statement, "Describe a problem you know of or a concern you have about flightdeck automation.": "As identified in recent research, unanticipated mode changes are a concern, particularly when transitioning from climbing/descending to level flight. Complicating this picture is that - in the ... fleet - we have 3 different glass cockpits (757, 737-300, A320) each with a particular philosophy and design . There are vexing differences even between the 757and 737, both Boeings." (B757 Captain) In response the questionnaire statement, "To your knowledge, has this ever contributed to an accident or incident? Describe.", this B757 captain stated: "The situation described above for the 757 results in missed crossing restrictions on virtually every descent ! Error can range from 50 to 200 feet and 10 to 30 knots. Many pilots compensate by building a 2 or more mile "pad" into the LNAV course, i.e. creating a waypoint ahead of the crossing restriction to reach the altitude early."
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, B., Wilson, J., & Funk, K. (1997). Flightdeck automation issues: Phase 1 survey analysis. Available: http://www.flightdeckautomation.com/ExpertSurvey/e_report.aspx. See Resource details

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  8. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 13 of the 30 (43%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc107 workarounds may be necessary
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  10. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 7 of the 30 (23%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc107 workarounds may be necessary
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  12. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: In our review of 282 automation-related ASRS incident reports, we found 1 reports (<1%) supporting issue107 (workarounds may be necessary).
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Owen, G. & Funk, K. (1997). Flight Deck Automation Issues: Incident Report Analysis. http://www.flightdeckautomation.com/incidentstudy/incident-analysis.aspx. Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University, Department of Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering. See Resource details

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  14. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: In response to question "1-6. Do you like the way the 757 automation interfaces to the ATC environment? Please mention things you have trouble with, and things that work well, in working with ATC." One pilot responded: " 'No! No! No! ATC can't seem to understand that this airplane does not want to come down! They treat us like older A/C with a 3:1 glide <3 miles longitudinally for 1000 feet vertically>, and this thing with its 4:1 [glide] is very difficult to get down without "cheating" all the automation. This just negates the fuel efficiency advantages of the aircraft and its automation. The 757 is also much slower on approach, which causes all kinds of problems with automation.' 2064" (page 154)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  16. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "The ASRS reports below are illustrative of some of the problems of autoflight. Narrative: We were cleared to cross 40 nm west of LINDEN VOR to maintain FL270. The Captain and I began [to] discuss the best methods to program the CDU to allow the performance management system to descend the aircraft. We had a difference of opinion on how to best accomplish this task (since we are trained to use all possible on-board performance systems). We wanted to use the aircraft's capabilities to its fullest. As a result, a late descent was started using conventional autopilot capabilities (vert spd, max indicated Mach/airspeed, and spd brakes). Near the end of descent, the aircraft was descending at 340 KIAS and 6000 FPM rate of descent. The aircraft crossed the fix approximately 250-500 feet high. Unfortunately we made no call to ATC to advise them of the possibility of not meeting the require [in sic] alt/fix. This possible altitude excursion resulted because: 1) The captain. [in sic] and the F/O had differences of opinion on how best to program the descent; A) Both thought their method was the best, the captain's of programming (fooling) the computer to believe anti-ice would be used during descent, which starts the descent earlier. The F/O's of subtracting 5 miles from the nav fix and programming the computer to cross 5 miles prior to LINDEN at FL270. B) A minor personality clash between the captain and the F/O brought about by differences of opinion on general discipline. C) Time wasted by both captain and F/O (especially F/O) in incorrectly programming CDU and FMS for descent, which obviously wasted time at level flight, which should have been used for descent. Observation: as a pilot for a large commercial carrier at its largest base, we seldom fly with the same cockpit crew member. This normally does not create a problem. I do, however, feel that with approximately 6 years, which can cause a bit more difficult transition than, say month to month cockpit crew change on a 727 or pre-EFIS DC-9. I have flown commercially for 10 years, and have flown 2-man crew for 8 of those 10. The toughest transition for me is to determine who shares the PF and PNF duties. This historically (3 years) has been the most difficult when the other crew member has transferred from a 3-man cockpit to a 2-man 'glass cockpit.' This is especially pertinent when the crew member has been on a 3-man crew for a number of years. As F/O, when you are the PNF, you accomplish your normal duties. However, often times when one is the PF, the F/O also has to do the PNF duties because the other crew member has not been used to doing the PNF duties to the extent that is required on 2-man cockpits, whether they be conventional or EFIS. This obviously can lead to a myriad of problems. Add weather or an airport such as Washington National, LaGuardia, or Orange County, and such problems can accelerate with alarming rapidity. (ASRS No. 122778)" (page 5)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1993). Intervention Strategies for the Management of Human Error. NASA Contractor Report NCA2-441. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  18. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Many pilots expressed the desire for additional features, and many had learned ways to 'trick the computer' to obtain desired results when no direct method was available." (page 171)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation & FMS
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  20. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "In this and in other studies we have observed practitioners adapt information technology provided for them to the immediate tasks at hand in a locally pragmatic way, and usually in ways not anticipated by the designers of the information technology." (page 191)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment:
    Source: Woods, D.D. (1993). Price of flexibility in intelligent interfaces. Knowledge-Based Systems, 6(4)., 189-196. See Resource details
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