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Evidence for an Issue 16 pieces of evidence for this issue.

pilots may over-rely on automation (Issue #106) - Pilots may use automation in situations where it should not be used.

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  2. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "3. CONCLUSIONS ... 3.2 Probable Cause ... Aeronautica Civil determines that the probable causes of this accident were: ... 4. Failure of the flightcrew to revert to basic radio navigation at the time when the FMS-assisted navigation became confusing and demanded an excessive workload in a critical phase of the flight." (page 57)
    Strength: +5
    Aircraft: B757-223
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Aeronautica Civil of the Republic of Colombia (1996). Controlled Flight Into Terrain, American Airlines Flight 965, Boeing 757-223, N651AA, Near Cali, Colombia, December 20, 1995. Santafe de Bogota, DC, Colombia: Aeronautica Civil of the Republic of Colombia. See Resource details

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  4. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Whilst the pilots we have talked to did not report mode reversions, they reported many situations in which to make decisions as to what parts of the automated systems to use when, as a prominent aspect in pilots’ tasks. For example, situational factors often require the use of less sophisticated equipment (e.g. adverse weather conditions, landings, Air Traffic Control (ATC) giving headings), or pilots may need to decide when the automated systems cannot cope: P1: “But invariably on every flight the route is changed to some degree by ATC ... even to a point where you disconnect it from the FMS and fly in another mode.” P2: “On our descent they changed the runway three times ... for some reason we didn’t change the frequencies [the third time]. We came in ... looked from a distance... thought ‘this is wrong’... so we knocked off the autopilot.” P2: “Sometimes you have situations where you know the plane is supposed to turn at 4 miles and if it doesn’t then, because it’s so much easier to use the automated system to fly this departure, you’ll find the pilot will sit there and go like, ‘OK, I’ll give it a little more time’.” P2: “[in bad weather]... what you do is you take off the height control... A lot of up- and downdrafts ... can confuse the sensors... If it bobs up and down, you don’t have the autopilot fighting it. But that’s not a company procedure.” P2: “...due to traffic etc. they can’t descend you ... you now find that the system is telling you ‘top of descent’ but you have to ignore it ...suddenly the controller announces to you that you are cleared to descend... Now ... you have to close the throttles and pull out the spoilers, the speed breaks, which gives you the right maximum rate of descent, and in most of the times the autopilot cannot comprehend what is going on ... you have to knock off the descent mode and descent it yourself at the very high rates, and when you’re closer to your level you put it back on ... for the 727 you definitely have to remove the descent mode, in the Learjet you go to speed. ” (page 3)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (2004). Should Computers Function as Collaborators?. In Proceedings of HCI-Aero 2004 held in Toulouse, France September 29, 2004 to 1 October 2004. See Resource details

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  6. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "... item five [Item five is a 5 point bi-polar statement: 1="Pilots of automated aircraft rely too heavily on the automatics", 3 = neutral, and 5="Pilots of automated aircraft don't rely enough on the automatics", average response = 2.34, rating=percentage of respondents : 1=16%, 2=44%, 3=31%, 4=8%, 5=1%] indicates the opinion that these pilots also rely too heavily on the automatics." (page 194-196)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: James, M., McClumpha, A., Green, R., Wilson, P., & Belyavin, A. (1991). Pilot attitudes to cockpit automation. In R.S. Jensen (Ed.), Proceedings of the 6th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Columbus, Ohio, April 1991, 192-198. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

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  8. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 18 of the 30 (60%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc106 pilots may over-rely on automation
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  10. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 4 of the 30 (13%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc106 pilots may over-rely on automation
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  12. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "RESULTS ... Commission Errors All of the pilots (N = 21) who experienced the false engine fire message did ultimately shut down the engine. This was contrary to responses on the debriefing questionnaire indicating that an EICAS message without other cues would not be sufficient to diagnose 'definitely a fire,' and that it would be safer, in the presence of only an EICAS message, to retard the throttle of the indicated engine and complete the go-around procedure with the engine running rather than to shut down the suspect engine." (page 58)
    Strength: +5
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment:
    Source: Mosier, K.L., Skitka, L.J., Heers, S., & Burdick, M. (1997). Automation bias: Decision making and performance in high-tech cockpits. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 8(1), 47-63. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  14. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "RESULTS Omission Error Events ... Descriptive analyses revealed overall omission rates for flight-related events of approximately 55% ... The altitude load failure and the heading capture failure, the two events arguably most critical to aircraft operation safety, remained undetected by 44% and 48% of the participants respectively. The frequency misload was undetected by 71% of pilot participants. Only three pilots detected all three flight-related events; five pilots failed to detect any of the three flight-related events." (page 57-58)
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment:
    Source: Mosier, K.L., Skitka, L.J., Heers, S., & Burdick, M. (1997). Automation bias: Decision making and performance in high-tech cockpits. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 8(1), 47-63. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  16. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "The Safety Board also concludes that the captain over-relied on the autopilot and that this was also causal to the accident since the autopilot effectively masked the approaching onset of the loss of control of the airplane." (page 32)
    Strength: +5
    Aircraft: B747-SP-09
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot
    Source: National Transportation Safety Board (1986). China Airlines B-747-SP, 300 NM Northwest of San Francisco, February 19, 1985. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-86-03. Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board. See Resource details

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  18. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the flightcrew's (a) disregard for prescribed procedures for monitoring and controlling of airspeed during the final stages of the approach, (b)decision to continue the landing rather than to execute a missed approach, and (c) overreliance on autothrottle speed control system which had a history of recent malfunctions." (page 47)
    Strength: +5
    Aircraft: DC-10-30
    Equipment: autoflight: autothrust (ATSC)
    Source: National Transportation Safety Board (1984). Scandinavian Airlines DC-10-30, J.F.K Airport, New York, February 2, 1984. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-84-15. Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board. See Resource details

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  20. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "The pilot's decision to retain autothrottle speed control throughout the flare and the consequent extended touchdown point on the runway contributed to the severity of the accident." (page 6)
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: DC-10-30CF
    Equipment: autoflight: autothrust
    Source: National Transportation Safety Board (1982). World Airways, Inc. Flight 30H McDonnell Douglas DC-10-3-CF, N113WA, Boston-Logan International Airport, Boston, Massachusetts, January 23, 1982. Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board. See Resource details

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  22. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "2. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 2.1 Analysis ... Pilots' testimony indicated that dependence on the reliability and capability of the autopilot is actually greater than anticipated in its early design and certification. This is particularly true in the cruise phase of flight. However, in this phase of flight, the autopilpot is not designed to remain correctly and safely operational without performance degradation, after a significant failure occurs. ... the following took place in this accident: ... 2. The aircraft was flown to a safe altitude, and the autopilot was engaged to reduce workload, but positive delegation of aircraft control was not accomplished." (page 21)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: L1011
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot
    Source: National Transportation Safety Board (1973). Eastern Airlines, Incorporated, L-1011, N31OEA, Miami, Florida, December 29, 1972. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-73-14. Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board. See Resource details

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  24. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "Yet, despite the difficulty he encountered, the captain persisted in using the FMS to locate Tulua, rather than selecting an alternative navigation method." (page 197)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: Boeing 757
    Equipment: automation & FMS
    Source: Noyes, J.M. & Starr, A.F. (2000). Civil aircraft warning systems: Future directions in information management and presentation. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 10(2), 169-188. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  26. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "When continual efforts were unsuccessful the crew decided to proceed directly to the final fix on the approach to Cali, a beacon named Rozo that was located just before the runway. However, rather than retrieve Rozo from the FMS data base, one of the pilots mistakenly retrieved a different beacon that was located outside Bogota, named Romeo, and then executed a command to proceed directly to it. Evidence revealed that a crewmember had asked for and retrieved all beacons in the data base coded by the abbreviation “R.” and then commanded the FMS to proceed to Romeo. The airplane turned away from its position north of Cali to Romeo, a turn that would have been clearly evident on the CRT in front of each pilot that displayed the FMS-generated predicted flight path. Of the errors the crew committed in the minutes before the accident this most demonstrates the time pressure they experienced. Little, if any, cognitive effort was needed to notice the turn as presented on the predicted flight path. Moreover, pilots of FMS-equipped aircraft are trained to consistently verify a command to the FMS that causes a course change to assure that it is correct. That they did not may be accounted for by their loss of temporal awareness: they were too busy to take the time needed to even glance at the flight path display." (page 197)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: Boeing 757
    Equipment: automation & FMS
    Source: Noyes, J.M. & Starr, A.F. (2000). Civil aircraft warning systems: Future directions in information management and presentation. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 10(2), 169-188. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  28. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: In our review of 282 automation-related ASRS incident reports, we found 7 reports (2%) supporting issue106 (pilots may over-rely on automation).
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Owen, G. & Funk, K. (1997). Flight Deck Automation Issues: Incident Report Analysis. http://www.flightdeckautomation.com/incidentstudy/incident-analysis.aspx. Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University, Department of Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering. See Resource details

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  30. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "The pilots in Experiment Three ended up using the automation an average of 34% more that the students over the entire timeline, and roughly a third of the pilots did not turn the automation off during the failure periods. The dynamic characteristics of the pilots' automation use profile were very similar to those of the students' profile, showing no effect from workload but significant effects from uncertainty and automation reliability. Pilot automation strategies showed somewhat less of a clear pattern based on stated influences than the students' did. Again, no significant correlation was found between manual performance and manual gambles, and there were no significant differences between the two groups in Complacency-Potential Scale scores or measures of risk taking. These conclusions suggest that pilot experience with automation biases them in favor of automatic control, in contrast with the students who showed a bias in favor of manual control." (page 115)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Riley, V.A. (1994). Human use of automation. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Minnesota Department of Psychology. See Resource details

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  32. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "With regard to trust in automation ... [pilots'] primary concern is that many pilots report observing colleagues who become complacent and rely too much on the automation." (page 7)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Rudisill, M. (1995). Line Pilots' Attitudes About and Experience With Flight Deck Automation: Results of an International Survey and Proposed Guidelines. In R.S. Jensen, & L.A. Rakovan (Eds.), Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Columbus, Ohio, April 24-27, 1995, 288-293. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details
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