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Evidence for an Issue 25 pieces of evidence for this issue.

automation may demand attention (Issue #102) - The attentional demands of pilot-automation interaction may significantly interfere with performance of safety-critical tasks. (e.g., "head-down time", distractions, etc.)

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  2. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "Flight deck workload remained high as the first officer obtained details of the actual weather at East Midlands and attempted without success to programme the flight management system to display the landing pattern at East Midlands. This last activity engaged the first officer's attention for 2 minutes." (page 5)
    Strength: +5
    Aircraft: B737-400
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Air Accident Investigation Branch, Department of Transport - England (1990). Report on the accident to Boeing 737-400 G-OBME near Kegworth, Leicestershire on 8 January 1989; British Midlands Ltd; AAIB Report 4/90. AAIB Report 4/90. London: Department of Transport. See Resource details

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  4. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Review Study
    Evidence: Although the information as to what was happening was available from the displays, neither pilot noticed the significant turn, given that they were pre-occupied with other tasks and assumed the instruction to the system had the intended effect. Whilst there is no guarantee that the pilots would have looked at the displays available, the indication of bank on the primary flight display, and the map display (electronic horizontal situation indicator: EHSI) would have been the main source of indication to detect the erroneous course change. It is not known which type of EHSI was selected – however, it would have required some attention to see the gradual progress of the heading change, by memorising and comparing different snapshots. In arc mode, the target bearing may not have been visible since pointing behind the aircraft. (page 4)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757-223
    Equipment: automation: displays
    Source: Bruseberg, A. (not dated). Designing for new types of interaction. Department of Computer Science, University of Bath. Available at http://www.cs.bath.ac.uk/~anneb/L11Bruseberg.pdf. See Resource details

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  6. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Review Study
    Evidence: 4.1 The Cali accident We have re-examined the Cali air accident [1, 7, 16, 20] in depth, to analyse interaction breakdowns between computer-based agents and users (pilots). This accident is an example of a ‘controlled flight into terrain’ accident, which was attributed to pilots’ actions rather than aircraft malfunction. These lead to a collision of the American Airlines Boeing 757-223 with a mountain, whilst attempting to approach Cali Airport (Colombia) in darkness. The pilots had to deal with a serious flight delay. Air Traffic Control (ATC) asked the pilots to accept a late runway change. The pilots’ acceptance significantly increased their (normally high) workload during this flight phase due to the need to re-program the FMS (Flight Management System). There were a number of miscommunications with ATC, one of which led to the deletion of intermediate navigational waypoints in the FMS, after the pilot inputted ‘direct’ to Cali. Thus, the important navigational aid ‘Tulua’ disappeared from the flight path as well as the map display. Consequently they were not aware that ‘Tulua’ had already been passed and the plane was already much closer to the mountain ridges surrounding the approach path to Cali. A further erroneous input of the waypoint ‘Romeo’ instead of ‘Rozo’, as intended, took the aircraft significantly off course into mountainous terrain. The pilots failed to notice the inappropriate direction for about a minute. They then failed to diagnose the correct position of the plane, whilst continually descending. Although they oriented the aircraft towards Cali through a heading change, they did not realize that there were mountains in the way for this (non­standard) flight path. They were alerted through the alarm of the Ground Proximity Warning System but could not avoid collision. Sadly, of the 163 people on board, only 4 passengers survived. The Cali accident highlights a series of interaction failures with the FMS. We will focus here on only one of them – the erroneous input of the waypoint ‘Romeo’ into the FMS, instead of the intended ‘Rozo’ – a miscommunication of an instruction. This was a critical error during the accident sequence since it led to a major course deviation and the loss of situational awareness. (page 3)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B757-223
    Equipment: FMS & ATC
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (not dated). Collaboration in the Flightdeck: Opportunities for Interaction Design. Department of Computer Science, University of Bath. Available at http://www.cs.bath.ac.uk/~anneb/collwn.pdf. See Resource details

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  8. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "Perhaps the most interesting findings concern the effect of automation on the time spent reading the enroute charts and approach plates. Arguably, the EFIS provides more easily assimilated positional information that should decrease the amount of time needed to study charts and plates. Our data provide limited evidence that EFIS decreased the proportion of time spent reading enroute charts and no evidence that it decreased the amount of time spent studying approach plates."
    Strength: -5
    Aircraft: 737/200, 737/300
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Endsley, M.R. & Strauch, B. (1997). Automation and situation awareness: The accident at Cali, Columbia. In R.S. Jensen & L. Rakovan (Eds.), Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 877-881. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

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  10. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Accident Report
    Evidence: "The purpose of this study was to determine how increasing levels of cockpit automation affect the amount of the time pilots spend performing various activities. Three activities—looking outside of the cockpit, hand flying, andcommunicating—were of particular interest. Our data (reported in Damos, John, and Lyall, in press) concerning looking outside the cockpit support Wiener’s (1993) concerns; pilots of automated aircraft spend more time heads down than pilots of traditional aircraft during approach (below 10,000 ft). Our data, however, indicate that the increase in heads down time only occurs during approach to landings at airports with high traffic density. Similarly, our results show a decrease in hand flying with increased levels of automation and agree with the survey results of McClumpha et al. (1991). However, our results do not support completely those of Costley et al. (1989) and Veinott and Irwin (1993) about the effects of increasing levels of automation on communication. Our analyses only showed a significant effect of automation on flightrelated communication. Additionally, although our analyses showed a significant effect of automation, the differences between the aircraft are relatively small and may have few operational implications."
    Strength: -5
    Aircraft: 737/200, 737/300
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Endsley, M.R. & Strauch, B. (1997). Automation and situation awareness: The accident at Cali, Columbia. In R.S. Jensen & L. Rakovan (Eds.), Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 877-881. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

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  12. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: The following comments were made in response to the questionnaire statement, "Describe a problem you know of or a concern you have about flightdeck automation.": "At times the electronics take away the ability of the pilot to make corrections of to be flexible in order to accommodate changing situations." (B747 First Officer) "We spend too much time with our heads and eyes in the cockpit. ... The tiller is regulated how fast it turns the nosewheel. I can't turn or straighten immediately if need be. I am not in control of this aircraft." (A320 Captain) "In some situations, the amount of programming and/or button pushing can be a serious distraction in the cockpit. Also voltage surges, humidity, temperature can all cause glitches or anomalies that can't be reproduced or explained in a lab. At times the electronics take away the ability of the pilot to make corrections or to be flexible in order to accommodate changing situations." (B747 First Officer) "Increased heads-down time which causes loss or degradation of situational awareness. ... Many new technical applications become so compelling that the pilots inadvertently focus on the problem which creates an insidious safety concern. This problem is particularly noticeable in terminal areas." (B757/767 Captain)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, B., Wilson, J., & Funk, K. (1997). Flightdeck automation issues: Phase 1 survey analysis. Available: http://www.flightdeckautomation.com/ExpertSurvey/e_report.aspx. See Resource details

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  14. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 26 of the 30 (87%) respondents reported a 4 (= agree) or 5 (= strongly agree) with pc102 automation may demand attention
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  16. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: 1 of the 30 (3%) respondents reported a 1 (=strongly disagree) or a 2 (=disagree) with pc102 automation may demand attention
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Lyall, E., Niemczyk, M. & Lyall, R. (1996). Evidence for flightdeck automation problems: A survey of experts. See Resource details

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  18. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: In comparing the prevalence of plan continuation errors under the automated condition relative to baseline condition, an analysis revealed that a greater percentage of the trials in the automated condition were comprised of plan continuation errors (7 of 16 or 43.7%), than in the baseline condition (3 of 16 or 18.7%). A chi-squared test performed on these data revealed a nonsignificant trend, Χ2(1) = 2.3 3, p = 0. 13, showing that plan continuation errors were more likely under the automated condition than the baseline condition. This finding is analogous to that described above in which accuracy at selecting a flight plan at the second choice point was lower, due to the pilot’s inability to detect an automation failure, with automation than without the decision aid. (page 40)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Muthard, E.K. & Wickens, C.D. (August 2002). Factors That Mediate Flight Plan Monitoring and Errors in Plan Revision: An Examination of Planning Under Automated Conditions. Nasa Technical Report AFHD-02-11/NASA-02-8. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  20. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: Automated aids were implemented on one half of trials to assist with the plan selection process. A marginally significant main effect was found for automation on plan selection accuracy (F(1, 15) = 3.75, p = 0.07), such that accuracy was 19.1% higher in trials with attention guidance automation (M = 78.1%), relative to the baseline condition (M = 65.6%), though automation had no significant effect on response time (F(1, 83) = 1.25, p > 0.10). The presence of automation also significantly increased confidence by 10.2% (M = 5.4, F(1, 15) = 7.16, p = 0.02), relative to the baseline condition (M = 4.9). For the measures of accuracy, response time, and confidence, no significant interaction was found for plan selection difficulty and automation, F(3, 45) = 1.63, p > 0.10; F(3, 83) = 1.09, p > 0.10; and F(3, 45) = 0.55, p > 0. 10, respectively. (page 31/32)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Muthard, E.K. & Wickens, C.D. (August 2002). Factors That Mediate Flight Plan Monitoring and Errors in Plan Revision: An Examination of Planning Under Automated Conditions. Nasa Technical Report AFHD-02-11/NASA-02-8. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  22. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: The pairwise t-tests revealed that pilots selected flight plans at the second choice point more quickly (M = 3.16 s, t(4) = 2.19, p = 0.09, marginally significant) as well as somewhat more confidently (M = 6.06) in the automated condition relative to the baseline condition (M = 5.96 s, 5.3 8, t(15) = 2.55, p = 0.02). For the dependent variable of accuracy, however, pilots were less accurate in the automated (M = 43.7%) than in the baseline condition (M = 75.0%), t(15)= 1.78, p = 0.09, marginally significant). Recall that it is at the second choice point in this mediumML→H plan selection condition under the attention guidance automation that a change occurs to a now important and high risk (but non-highlighted) hazard. The lowered accuracy under the automated condition reflects the pilots’ failure to notice the change in the automated condition and therefore their complacency in detecting the consequences of this automation failure. (page 40)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Muthard, E.K. & Wickens, C.D. (August 2002). Factors That Mediate Flight Plan Monitoring and Errors in Plan Revision: An Examination of Planning Under Automated Conditions. Nasa Technical Report AFHD-02-11/NASA-02-8. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  24. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: On one half of trials, attention guidance automation was provided to aid the participants in selecting a flight path by highlighting the hazards that presented the most risk to the flight plans. Following the plan selection stage, pilots were asked to monitor the airspace for changes to hazards that could be either highlighted or non-highlighted as a function of their degrees of relevance for the prior choice. The present study sought to assess change detection performance as a function of automation by conducting pairwise t-tests for both accuracy and response time. This analysis included change detection performance for only the automated condition, and did not examine performance in the baseline condition, because in the baseline condition all hazards appeared at the same luminance level. Results revealed that pilots were significantly more accurate in detecting changes to elements that were highlighted (M = 45.1%) than non-highlighted (M = 14.8%), t(15) = 4.78, p < 0.001. No significant difference was found for response time, t(12) = 0.58, p > 0.10. (page 35)
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation: displays
    Source: Muthard, E.K. & Wickens, C.D. (August 2002). Factors That Mediate Flight Plan Monitoring and Errors in Plan Revision: An Examination of Planning Under Automated Conditions. Nasa Technical Report AFHD-02-11/NASA-02-8. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  26. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: In our review of 282 automation-related ASRS incident reports, we found 29 reports (10%) supporting issue102 (automation may demand attention).
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Owen, G. & Funk, K. (1997). Flight Deck Automation Issues: Incident Report Analysis. http://www.flightdeckautomation.com/incidentstudy/incident-analysis.aspx. Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University, Department of Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering. See Resource details

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  28. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: "SAMPLE NARRATIVES FROM ASRS REPORTS The following ... ASRS narratives were chosen to illustrate the range of problems identified in the initial survey. ... [ASRS incident report # 134179] ... 'Taking off from ORD in a [large transport] with a light load and maximum takeoff power (engine anti-ice on). The first officer, just out of training, was flying the leg while I handled communications. Each of us had only done one previous leg in a [large transport]. (I have several hundred hours in [wide body transport].) The combination of cold weather, maximum power, and a nearly empty aircraft caused the airspeed to increase extremely rapidly after liftoff. The first officer was reluctant to raise the nose to the extreme angle required to maintain 250 (in this case, probably better than 25 [degrees]). When I saw the airspeed zipping through 270, I warned him to slow down and he disconnected the autothrottles, manually retarding power and raising the nose just as the flight director went to altitude capture (between 3,500 and 4,000 ft.). Attempting to level at 5,000 ft. , we overshot by 200-300 ft. (still fast), when we were cleared to 14,000 ft. (I don't really know whether we actually broke 5,300 ft. Before being cleared up.) I punched flight-level change, but the autothrottles refused to engage initially. In the confusion over exactly what was wrong, we both were slow to respond to several heading changes, which understandable annoyed the controller. Nothing really serious here, except the same old story. Both of us were engrossed in trying to figure out why this computerized marvel was doing what it was, rather than turning everything off and manually flying (which we finally did) until we could sort things out. This is a common tendency in this type of cockpit, but our familiarity with the super high performance of the LGT [large transport] was a contributing factor. It really is a handful to takeoff and level at a low altitude and seems to require an almost immediate power reduction to maintain a reasonable nose attitude at low weights.' ... In addition the problems caused by the crew's lack of familiarity with high performance of their twin-engine aircraft., [in sic] this incident illustrated two other problems. First, like the crew attempting to set of the hold at waypoint BUCKS 9incident [in sic] No. 1 [ASRS incident report #144196]), this crew mentions being distracted by attempting to determine why the autoflight system was not performing as they expected. Second, as reported in prior examples, this crew appears to have difficulty translating the departure clearance from ATC language to the language of the autoflight and FMS." (page 14-15)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: LRG
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Palmer, E.A., Hutchins, E.L., Ritter, R.D., & VanCleemput, I. (1993). Altitude Deviations: Breakdown of an Error-Tolerant System. NASA Technical Memorandum 108788. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  30. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Incident Study
    Evidence: "SAMPLE NARRATIVES FROM ASRS REPORTS The following ... ASRS narratives were chosen to illustrate the range of problems identified in the initial survey. ... [ASRS incident report # 148853] ... On an en-route descent into Dayton our clearance was direct RID VOR, direct DAYTON with a descent to 11,000 ft. The controller gave us a new clearance to cross 10 miles west of RID at 10,000 ft. The captain, being less experienced in using the flight management computer than I, wanted me to show him how to program the descent for the new restrictions. We put the restrictions in the magic box, and for some reason, almost certainly something we did improperly, the machine wanted to make the restriction 10 miles east of RID. By the time we caught the error in the midst of doing checklists and the usual cockpit duties we were too late to make the restriction. Nothing was said and there was no conflict. ... In flight training on the operation of complex systems such as the autoflight and FMSs is going to happen, but it should be done during the low-workload cruise phase of flight. Unfortunately, as the report of this incident points out, the clearances that require complex reprogramming usually occur during the already busy climb and descent phases of flight." (page 11)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Palmer, E.A., Hutchins, E.L., Ritter, R.D., & VanCleemput, I. (1993). Altitude Deviations: Breakdown of an Error-Tolerant System. NASA Technical Memorandum 108788. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  32. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Question 13 asked pilots to indicate whether they agreed that the design of the visual displaysinstruments kept them busier than they needed to be. The opinions of pilots in the AH-64A versus the AH-64D aircraft were dissimilar (U=8991.5, p=0.006). As Figure 2 indicates, the difference seems to be that the AH-64A pilots had most responses in the middle of the scale with a fairly symmetric pattern for the extremes, while the AH-64D pilots had responses skewed to the “Strongly disagree” side of the scale. Among the AH-64D pilots, 45% of the responses were on the disagree side of the scale, while only 29% of the AH-64A pilot chose such responses. (page 7)
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: AH-64D
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Rash, C.E., Adam, G.E., LeDuc, P.A., & Francis, G. (May 6-8, 2003). Pilot Attitudes on Glass and Traditional Cockpits in the U.S. Army's AH-64 Apache Helicopter. Presented at the American Helicopter Society 59th Annual Forum, Phoenix, AZ. American Helicopter Society International, Inc. See Resource details

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  34. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "There were a number of concerns with use of the FMS. The primary concern was too much head-down time with one pilot being forced out-of-the-loop because of preoccupation with FMS or for reprogramming (e.g., for rerouting), especially in busy terminal area or during a system malfunction." (page 207)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Rudisill, M. (1994). Flight Crew Experience with Automation Technologies on Commercial Transport Flight Decks. In M. Mouloua & R. Parasuraman (Eds.), Human Performance in Automated Systems: Current Research and Trends. Proceedings of the 1st Automation Technology and Human Performance Conference, held in Washington, DC April 7-9, 1994, 203-211. Hillsdale, NJ:Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  36. Evidence Type: Excerpt from resource
    Evidence: "In 35 of the ASRS incidents we studied, the Pilot Not Flying reported that preoccupation with other duties prevented monitoring the other pilot closely enough to catch in time an error being made in flying or taxiing. In 13 of these 35 incidents (and 22 of the total 107 incidents), the Pilot Not Flying was preoccupied with some form of head-down work, most commonly paperwork or programming the FMS." (page 5)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Shelden, S. & Belcher, S. (1999). Cockpit traffic displays of tomorrow. Ergonomics in Design, 7(3), 4-9. See Resource details

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  38. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "Concern ratings showed a clear differentiation of levels (see Table 3). Overall concern grew from 2.35 to 3.29 as automation increased, which was a significant difference, F(2, 220) = 96.001, p < .OOOl . A Tukey test showed that each of the levels differed significantly from the others. These results were highly stable, with concern increasing regularly across levels for a majority of items (see superscripted items in Table 3). Major concerns at the fully automated level were increased head-downtime (4.05) complacency (3.95), and degradation of pilot skills (3.90)." (page 111)
    Strength: +4
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Skitka, L.J., Mosier, K.L., Burdick, M., & Rosenblatt, B. (2000). Automation bias and errors: Are crews better than individuals?. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 10(1), 85-97. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  40. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "To assess whether the dimensions were related, correlations were calculated between every possible pair of dimensions, using the average score across participants for each of the 26 components listed in Table 4 as the data entered into the correlation (n = 26). ...This same cluster of correlated dimensions also related to workload (Dimension F). Parts rated highly distracting (Dimension C) were rated as workload intensive, R = .8933, p < .001, as were parts requiring a high degree of attention to the automation (Dimension A), R = .4034, p < .05. Difficulty in predicting the automation’s behavior (Dimension E) also contributed to high workload, R = .6966, p < .05." (page 116)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Skitka, L.J., Mosier, K.L., Burdick, M., & Rosenblatt, B. (2000). Automation bias and errors: Are crews better than individuals?. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 10(1), 85-97. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  42. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Experiment
    Evidence: "The one remaining significant correlation concerned understanding of the big picture (Dimension B). In this case, components that contributed to a deeper understanding of the situation (Dimension B) also were rated as demanding attention to the automation (Dimension A), R = -.3955, p < .05." (page 116)
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: various
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Skitka, L.J., Mosier, K.L., Burdick, M., & Rosenblatt, B. (2000). Automation bias and errors: Are crews better than individuals?. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 10(1), 85-97. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

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  44. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 35: "In the B-757 there is too much programming going on below 10,000 feet and in the terminal areas." From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, 54% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, 50% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement while 30% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and 33% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 16% in Phase 1 and 17% in Phase 2. (page 43)
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  46. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "VIII. Workload ... The most frequent comments in both the questionnaires and the interviews dealt with the demand for programming the CDU, especially in the terminal areas, and the effect on 'heads up' time." ... Statement 28: "We have more time to look out for other aircraft in the terminal areas in the B-757 than other aircraft I've flown." From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, only 21% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, only 30% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement while 58% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and 48% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 21% in Phase 1 and 22% in Phase 2. (page 134)
    Strength: +2
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  48. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: Statement 35: "In the B-757 there is too much programming going on below 10,000 feet and in the terminal areas." From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, 54% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, 50% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement while only 30% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and 33% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 16% in Phase 1 and 17% in Phase 2. (page 43)
    Strength: -2
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

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  50. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Survey
    Evidence: "VIII. Workload ... The most frequent comments in both the questionnaires and the interviews dealt with the demand for programming the CDU, especially in the terminal areas, and the effect on 'heads up' time." ... Statement 28: "We have more time to look out for other aircraft in the terminal areas in the B-757 than other aircraft I've flown." From the histograph of the responses in Phase 1 of the study, only 21% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and in Phase 2 of the study, only 30% of the pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement while 58% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 1, and 48% disagreed or strongly disagreed in Phase 2. The neutral responses were 21% in Phase 1 and 22% in Phase 2. (page 131-134)
    Strength: -3
    Aircraft: B757
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details
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